CardanoLeo

Feedback on the "Governance Incentives Framework 2026" Proposal

Thank you to the proposal team for introducing the Governance Incentives Framework 2026. I fully agree that the increasing concentration of voting power is an important governance topic that warrants thoughtful attention. However, after carefully reviewing the proposal details and the publicly available completion reports of the team's past projects, I remain hesitant to support this treasury withdrawal of ₳4,207,967 at this stage.

Public Completion Records and Verifiable Limitations of Past Projects

To ground this discussion in objective reference points, I reviewed the public pages and completion reports for the team's relevant completed Catalyst projects:

1. Smart Pack: parcels damage verification system on Cardano

• Project ID: 1100259｜Catalyst Project Page
• Project Managers: Eric den Boer & Sebastian Pereira
• Timeline: 04/24/2024 – 02/15/2025
• Status: Marked as Complete; fully funded.
• Key Completion Details: Deliverables included freight calculation sheets, an AI photo database, ChatGPT damage evaluation demo videos, backend screenshots, test transaction hashes, UI mockups, workflow recordings, LiDAR tests, early app store links, and web demos.
• Reported Limitations: The “Next Steps” section explicitly notes: “We are in contact with a few agricultural producers in the US... These discussions are in a very early phase, so for now we do not have concrete plans to deploy this solution in a more realistic environment.” The team also thoughtfully pointed out: “Cardano is not very friendly to mobile devices... very slow... In a mass commercial production environment, this will be a severe problem.”

1. Littlefish - Coordinating Action

• Closeout Video: Watch on YouTube
• Status: Marked as Complete.
• Verifiable Limitations: The closeout video has recorded approximately 87 views. The disclosed community size at the time was on the order of around 100 members, and subsequent public sources do not indicate significant transition into a widely adopted coordination platform.

1. Cardano Smart (AI Documentation & Developer Assistant)

• Milestone Page: Catalyst Milestones
• Verifiable Limitations: Although successfully closed out with open-source deliverables, publicly visible GitHub activity remains quiet, with limited records of ongoing user traction or broad integration into mainstream developer workflows.

These projects were all officially marked as completed within the Catalyst system, demonstrating that milestone deliverables were fully satisfied. However, information in the public completion reports suggests that evidence of subsequent real-world adoption and sustained long-term usage remains relatively modest. This leads me to remain prudent regarding whether allocating over 4.2 million ADA toward another extensive research and framework initiative will seamlessly translate into real-world governance adoption and long-term, measurable value.

Perspective on Problem Diagnosis

The proposal highlights that “one Constitutional Committee consortium retired due to lack of compensation” and that “there is no systematic, data-driven approach to determine how to incentivize governance participants.”

I fully acknowledge that appropriate incentives play a crucial role in sustaining active participation. However, I am not entirely convinced that this necessitates an immediate “investment of ₳4.2M into a comprehensive research framework.” A more direct and pragmatic approach might involve substantive refinements to the Constitution or Guardrails, or the rollout of clear, actionable incentive mechanisms.

Preferred Direction for Governance Incentives

I strongly favor establishing an incentive mechanism for DReps, but I gently advocate that incentives should ideally stem from sustainable non-Treasury models. For instance, delegators could consider allocating a small, fixed, or dynamic percentage of their own staking rewards to compensate their chosen DReps.

This operates similarly to a "delegation service fee": delegators receiving rewards from the ecosystem reasonably support the operational costs of their elected representatives. Linking rewards to engagement, dialogue quality, and voting participation creates a healthy feedback loop—allowing dedicated DReps to receive fair compensation while allowing natural delegation choices to optimize resource allocation. This approach minimizes reliance on the Treasury while fostering an active and accountable governance culture.

Conclusion

Given the finite nature of Treasury resources, the modest long-term adoption observed in past similar projects, and the ability of existing tools to cover foundational needs, I believe allocating ₳4.2 million ADA to this research framework may not represent the highest priority at this time.

I look forward to seeing concrete proposals that directly address structural challenges (such as voting power concentration and silent non-voting dynamics) through sustainable incentive models that do not depend primarily on treasury funding.

Based on publicly verifiable records and the available information, I am unable to support this proposal at present. However, if the project team can provide additional context regarding the ongoing adoption of previous initiatives, or demonstrate why alternative lower-cost pathways are insufficient, I would be very open to re-evaluating my perspective.

I support the proposal Withdraw 120,000,000 ADA for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME.

In evaluating this proposal, the phased funding release mechanism was the key factor that ultimately influenced my decision to vote Yes.

Approximately 75% of the funds remain locked behind the Phase 3 release gate in Month 4 and can only be released after review and approval by the Operating Group. For a treasury proposal of this scale, I believe this structure is particularly important: rather than releasing the funds all at once, it ties subsequent funding to actual execution progress while preserving an opportunity for the community to reassess the initiative at key milestones.

At the same time, I believe Cardano now needs to progressively turn the technical foundation it has built over the years into real users, liquidity, and on-chain activity.

We have come a long way in building infrastructure, but if the application layer continues to lack sufficient depth and activity, it will be difficult for those technical achievements to translate into lasting ecosystem value. For that reason, I am willing to support this initiative, which focuses on protocol readiness, incentives, and market expansion, as a market-driven experiment worth pursuing and evaluating.

That said, voting Yes does not mean assuming in advance that the initiative will succeed.

Going forward, I will continue to pay close attention to the quality of execution, whether the liquidity brought in proves sustainable, and whether the Operating Group genuinely fulfills its role as an independent layer of oversight.

Overall, I am voting Yes.

I support giving Cardano the opportunity to move more actively toward adoption and market growth, while retaining meaningful milestone-based review and oversight mechanisms.

Ultimately, whether this funding creates real value will have to be demonstrated by the results that follow.

I support the proposal **Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ADA and increase Plutus Memory Limits (Part 2) **.
In this vote, I believe the two adjustments need to be considered separately.
First, the 25% increase in Plutus memory limits has already been validated on the testnet. It directly eases the execution-space constraints currently faced by DApp developers, carries relatively manageable risk, and aligns with Cardano’s ongoing effort to strengthen on-chain application capacity. I regard this as a reasonable and necessary technical improvement.
Regarding the reduction of minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA, my view is more measured.
I do not consider lowering the fixed-cost floor to be an ideal long-term solution in itself. However, under the present conditions of declining block rewards and increasing operational pressure on smaller stake pools, this is a staged adjustment that has become difficult to avoid.
If no change is made now, the marginalisation of smaller pools is likely only to accelerate. Therefore, until more complete structural solutions—such as a proportional minPoolMargin—are in place, I am willing to support this reduction as a means of giving smaller pools some breathing room in the near term.
At the same time, I wish to keep one important observation:
75 ADA addresses the immediate pressure; it does not resolve the underlying economics of running a stake pool.
Over the longer term, what continues to concern me most is whether fee revenue can grow, whether the reward structure can improve, and whether Cardano’s overall economic model can move toward a healthier and more sustainable path.
For these reasons, I am casting a Yes vote.
I support the necessary near-term relief, while remaining mindful of the longer-term issues that still need to be addressed.

I support the** Update Constitutional Committee 2026 **proposal.

For me, the most important consideration in this vote is respect for a governance process that has already been completed. The 2026 Constitutional Committee election has concluded, the results have been independently audited, and DReps have selected the four candidates through the established voting process.
Since the process has been duly completed, I prefer to see the election outcome formally recorded on-chain, and to allow the Constitutional Committee to maintain the continuity of its operations.
Looking at the backgrounds of the four candidates, I believe each brings a distinct form of value.
Philip DiSarro (Phil_uplc) has long been involved in Cardano smart contract security, formal verification, and developer tooling, and also carries practical experience in both the ecosystem and governance. Regarding certain controversies that remain under discussion in the community, I will continue to pay attention. At the same time, I do not wish to dismiss years of technical contribution and existing governance experience solely on the basis of information that has not yet been fully clarified.
Marek Mahut has a substantial track record in Cardano infrastructure, the open-source community, and the SPO ecosystem. His work on Blockfrost, together with his earlier involvement in community and open-source efforts, gives me a relatively high degree of confidence in his technical and ecosystem contributions.
Cardano Curia represents a different model of governance experience. Participating as a consortium, consistently publishing rationales for its votes, and placing emphasis on evidence and constitutional grounding is an approach that I believe deserves continued observation and recognition.
As for Leandros BSP, the publicly verifiable technical and governance record is currently more limited, consisting mainly of Catalyst proposals and community participation. For this reason, I look forward to seeing the concrete contributions he will make once he takes up the role on the Constitutional Committee.
I recognise that stepping forward to participate in Cardano governance already carries considerable responsibility, and that this itself warrants a basic level of respect.
For these reasons, I am casting a Yes vote.
I am supporting the completed election process and the continuity of the Constitutional Committee’s work, while remaining open to forming further judgements based on actual performance going forward.

I support naming the Protocol Version 12 hard fork “von Bergen” without hesitation.
The fact that Cardano chooses to honour long-standing community contributors in this way is one of the ecosystem’s quiet strengths, and something we should continue to uphold. Fabian von Bergen (Zyroxa) was part of the community from the ITN days. He contributed with quiet diligence, humility, and consistency. Thoughtful yet clear in his views, he never softened his words for convenience and never stepped back from difficult conversations, always meeting the community as his genuine self.
These are exactly the qualities a healthy and lasting ecosystem needs. Naming the hard fork after him is more than a personal tribute. It ensures that future participants reading the ledger and the history of Cardano will know that someone of real substance once stood among us.
May the name “von Bergen” remain a lasting reminder that this community remembers those who truly contributed.