Kevin_ALBERT

I vote YES on "MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Plutarch and Ply" because Cardano needs well-maintained tools for people building smart contracts. Plutarch and Ply are not user-facing apps, but if tools like these fall behind, builders can face broken code, extra migration work, or higher costs when Cardano changes. I also want Cardano to keep supporting several serious smart-contract toolchains, including Aiken, so developers have strong options instead of a single path. My support is not a blank cheque: future requests should explain usage, deliverables, costs, and the 15-team versus 26-team adoption claim more clearly.

I vote YES on "Withdraw 3,810,423 ada for Mithril Protocol" because Mithril is core Cardano infrastructure: it helps nodes, wallets, light clients, bridges, and monitoring tools verify Cardano state faster and with less reliance on centralized APIs or full-chain synchronization. This is a high-priority public-good spend, not a speculative subsidy, and the Intersect treasury-contract process gives better fund control than a simple upfront transfer. My concern is that even core infrastructure must meet a higher standard under tight NCL pressure: future funding should show clearer FTE/rate breakdowns, milestone acceptance criteria, usage metrics, wallet/node integration evidence, and a sustainable maintenance path. I support this withdrawal to protect important infrastructure continuity, but I expect sharper reporting and cost transparency before similar future requests.

I vote YES on "Blockfrost's transformation to not-for-profit" because Blockfrost is critical Cardano infrastructure and transferring its code, trademarks, domains and related assets to a community-governed nonprofit is a valid public-good use of Treasury funds. My support is not an endorsement of the excessive FTE costs: the team should manage the ₳9.83M as the full ADA budget for 18 months, not as USD-protected payroll. Teams funded in ADA should share Cardano's currency risk and upside, so I would reject a later top-up caused by ADA/USD moves or poor reserve management. This YES gives neither Blockfrost nor competing API providers an entitlement to similar grants; future requests must prove exceptional public value, transparent costs, provider diversity and no recurring Treasury dependence. I expect enforceable asset transfer, independent milestone verification, public budget and usage reporting, conflict-aware governance and unused funds returned to the Treasury.

I vote YES on "Intersect: Governance coordination and technical stewardship for the Cardano ecosystem" because these functions are core infrastructure for Cardano: release coordination, incident response, security coordination, and stewardship of key repositories cannot simply be left unmanaged. The request is large and I remain concerned about Intersect becoming too dependent on treasury funding or combining administration with vendor roles. However, the proposal includes milestone-based disbursement, external assurance, oversight, and on-chain treasury tooling, and the technical continuity value outweighs the risk at this stage. Future Intersect funding should be more modular, better itemized, and supported by clear public reporting and value-for-money evidence.

I vote YES on this treasury withdrawal because the Technical Steering Committee funds important technical governance capacity for Cardano, including parameter review, CIP stewardship, hard-fork coordination, and independent technical input for DReps. I see this as useful public-good infrastructure that can help governance make safer and better-informed technical decisions. At the same time, my support is not a blank cheque for Intersect's broader budget or structure, especially because this proposal depends on the larger IntersectMBO budget being approved. I expect transparent reporting, clear deliverables, conflict-of-interest disclosure, and a strong commitment that the TSC remains an advisory technical support function rather than a central authority over governance decisions.

I vote NO on this version of Hardware Wallet Maintenance 2026. I agree that hardware-wallet support is important security infrastructure for Cardano users, but I do not think this proposal sufficiently justifies another recurring treasury payment to support work that should become sustainable across hardware-wallet vendors, integrators, and the commercial ecosystem that benefits from it. I am especially concerned by the Cardano Foundation’s points about unclear cost justification, prior delivery delays or incomplete milestones, and the need to explain whether this is routine maintenance or a larger rewrite. Public funding should not become a default operating subsidy for a for-profit maintenance relationship without stronger transparency, milestones, delivery evidence, and vendor responsibility. I would reconsider a revised proposal with clearer costs, accountability, and a credible path toward sustainability.

I vote YES on this proposal because Dolos is useful open-source Cardano data infrastructure that helps builders access chain data without always needing heavier full-node setups or relying only on hosted APIs. The request is relatively small compared with the current 350M ADA Net Change Limit, and it funds bounded maintenance rather than a speculative new product. I also see TxPipe as a trusted ecosystem contributor, and maintaining developer infrastructure fits well with Cardano’s long-term needs. My support is not unconditional: future funding should show clearer usage metrics, concrete adoption, and measurable impact so the treasury can keep prioritizing the most valuable public-good infrastructure.

I vote ABSTAIN on this proposal because I support the goal of bringing real-world payment use cases and reusable payment infrastructure to Cardano, but I am not fully convinced by the funding structure as presented. The strongest part of the proposal is its claim that the work will deliver open-source on-chain settlement, wallet/API infrastructure, account abstraction, and reusable components for other builders, not just a private card product. My concern is that a commercial payments provider may still capture most of the upside unless the public-good scope, non-exclusive reuse, Cardano-specific adoption metrics, maintenance obligations, and any return to the ecosystem are made very concrete and enforceable. I do not want to reject the direction, because payments and real-world utility matter for Cardano adoption. At the same time, I cannot vote YES without stronger assurance that this is truly shared Cardano infrastructure rather than treasury-funded commercial expansion.

I respect Strike Finance as one of the more visible DeFi protocols in the Cardano ecosystem. My NO vote is not a vote against Strike, perpetuals, or Cardano DeFi.

However, I do not believe the Cardano treasury should act as a liquidity provider for one specific protocol. This proposal would sell treasury ADA into a dollar-denominated stablecoin position and deploy it into a single application, creating asset-allocation risk, opportunity-cost risk, protocol risk, smart-contract risk, stablecoin risk, and precedent risk.

Without a broader treasury management framework, neutral access criteria, formal risk limits, and stronger independently verified safeguards, this is not an appropriate use of public treasury funds.

For that reason, I vote NO.

I vote YES to reimburse the 100,000 ADA deposit lost in this early governance action case, because this appears to be a narrow restitution issue caused by an implementation or tooling failure rather than ordinary proposal risk. I am less convinced by the additional 3,000 ADA for missed staking rewards, since normal governance action deposits do not receive interest and this should not become a precedent for open-ended opportunity-cost claims. However, given the small size of the extra amount and the importance of correcting a clear early-governance edge case, I support resolving this case now. Future reimbursement requests should require clear recipient verification and stronger guardrails.

I vote ABSTAIN on Reforming Treasury Governance because I agree that Cardano needs better treasury coordination, clearer budget categories, and more expert input to help DReps evaluate complex proposals. However, I am not ready to endorse this specific direction as presented, because a strategic entity and expert commission must be very carefully designed so they support decentralized liquid governance rather than centralize decision-making. I am willing to accept some governance friction if that helps preserve openness, direct accountability, and the ability for independent proposals and DReps to challenge the process. Future treasury reform should keep expert review advisory, transparent, conflict-aware, and ultimately accountable to DReps and the wider community.

I vote NO on this proposal to raise the Net Change Limit for epochs 613–713 to 500M ADA. I recognize that builder funding matters and that a lower ADA price can make the existing limit feel tight, but a spending cap should only be raised when it remains sustainable relative to treasury inflows and when a clear, evidence-based bottleneck has been shown. The current 350M ADA limit is already a large guardrail, and raising it mid-period because capacity is becoming constrained weakens the purpose of having a limit at all. Liquid democracy should help Cardano make disciplined long-term choices, not react emotionally to short-term funding pressure. I prefer to preserve the existing NCL, prioritize the highest-impact proposals within it, and reconsider any increase only with stronger data and a modest sustainability buffer.

I vote YES on IO: Hydra because Hydra is critical Cardano scaling infrastructure with real production use and a clear path to improving finality, fees, throughput, and developer adoption. I recognize concerns around the size of the ask and the need for better budget transparency from major ecosystem vendors, but in this case I give the proposal the benefit of the doubt because Hydra is one of the few Layer 2 systems already supporting live Cardano workloads. The milestone-gated funding, independent assurance, and Intersect administration make the treasury risk more acceptable. I expect public reporting on benchmarks, active integrations, reliability, usage, and the long-term maintenance path so future support can be judged on evidence, not trust alone.

I vote YES on reducing committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 because Cardano governance should not be able to freeze just because one Constitutional Committee seat becomes temporarily vacant. The Constitutional Committee is the group that checks whether certain governance actions follow the Constitution; this change does not reduce its intended size or remove its role, it only creates a safety buffer so governance can keep working while vacancies are filled. I recognize the downside: if the committee were allowed to operate with only five members for too long, each member would have more blocking power and oversight would become narrower. For that reason, I support this as an operational minimum, not as the new normal: Cardano should still aim to keep seven active, qualified members and improve replacement, transparency, and succession processes.

I vote NO on the Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day 2026 Cardano Title Sponsorship proposal. I recognize Rare Network’s track record and I see real value in Dev Gov Day as a governance and developer coordination event, but I cannot approve this package under current treasury and NCL pressure. The proposal is too broad and too expensive for what is mainly an incremental title sponsorship and visibility layer around an event that will happen regardless of treasury funding. I would be open to a leaner, more focused proposal for Dev Gov Day with clearer outcome metrics, transparent reporting, and no future-year deposit. My NO is therefore not a rejection of Rare Evo’s value, but a call for a more disciplined funding structure.

I vote NO on the 5am.earth Trust Layer proposal, while remaining strongly supportive of the direction. This is the kind of real-world adoption Cardano should pursue: identity, traceability, agricultural data, and auditability anchored on-chain rather than another narrow liquidity subsidy. However, the current request is too ambitious and too risky in its present form, especially with a 10M ADA ask, a large 5M ADA first tranche, very aggressive 18-month scaling targets, and no strong direct return or repayment mechanism for the Treasury. I would be open to supporting a revised version with a smaller initial tranche, clearer milestone gates, stronger evidence of demand, and tighter safeguards around public funds. My NO is therefore not a rejection of the project’s mission, but a request for a more disciplined v2.

I vote YES on Cardano Critical Integrations V2 because I consider these integrations part of the real infrastructure Cardano needs to stay useful for users, builders, exchanges, and institutions. The proposal is expensive and the budget transparency is not ideal, but I think stopping maintenance on live integrations like USDCx, LayerZero, Pyth, Dune, and Fireblocks would waste the earlier V1 investment and weaken Cardano’s ecosystem position. I expect the proposers to keep the reporting and accountability strong, especially because this looks like a recurring treasury obligation rather than a one-off purchase.

I vote NO on the revised Eternl proposal as well. The new version still asks the treasury to underwrite a closed-source, private wallet's operating costs, and the lower ADA/USD conversion makes the ask even larger in ADA terms for the same roughly $420,000 yearly run-rate. I appreciate the attempt to clarify audits and oversight, but that does not solve the core issue: this is still an operational subsidy without hard on-chain milestones or an enforceable repayment mechanism. Eternl is useful infrastructure, but I would rather see a smaller maintenance-only scope, stronger controls, or proof that the Pro model can stand on its own before asking the treasury for this much again.

I vote NO on this version of the Eternl treasury withdrawal. I respect Eternl and use it myself, but this first version has effectively been superseded by a revised v2 after constitutional and audit-clarity concerns were raised. I also remain uncomfortable using public treasury funds for a closed-source, private wallet's operating costs without milestone-based disbursement or an enforceable repayment mechanism. The proposed Pro-plan and treasury repayment model are positive signals, but they are still business-risk commitments rather than hard public-good guarantees. I prefer to evaluate the corrected v2 separately rather than support this older version.

I vote NO on the TOKEN2049 Singapore 2026 Title sponsorship top-up. I support Cardano being present at TOKEN2049, and that is why I support the baseline Platinum proposal, but this extra top-up mainly adds a prestige layer on top of an already meaningful presence. A larger booth, title branding, lanyards, and extra visibility may have some value, but I do not think the marginal benefit is strong enough to justify another 1.77M ADA under current Net Change Limit pressure. The treasury should fund practical ecosystem needs and broadly shared public goods before premium marketing upgrades. If the Cardano Foundation or other major ecosystem entities consider the Title upgrade strategically important, I would prefer them to fund or co-fund that extra layer themselves.

I vote YES on the TOKEN2049 Singapore 2026 Baseline Platinum sponsorship because Cardano should be visibly present where the major crypto, Web3, institutional, exchange, infrastructure, and investor conversations are happening. TOKEN2049 Singapore is one of the largest industry gatherings, and not being there would send the wrong signal at a time when Cardano needs stronger external visibility, partnerships, and adoption channels. I support this baseline proposal because it gives Cardano builders a practical presence through booth space, a dedicated stage, tickets, lead generation, and post-event reporting, while avoiding an automatic commitment to the more expensive Title upgrade. I remain mindful of the Net Change Limit and treasury discipline, so this support depends on efficient execution, transparent reporting, and measurable follow-up after the event. In this case, the strategic need to show up in front of the right companies and decision-makers outweighs the cost concerns.

I vote YES on the Revised Cardano Summit 2026 Singapore proposal because I believe Cardano needs credible visibility, ecosystem coordination, and real-world adoption opportunities alongside its technical development. The revised proposal is materially better than the earlier bundled version, with a lower ask, a clearer scope, and separate consideration of the TOKEN2049 sponsorships. I remain mindful of the Net Change Limit and the need for treasury discipline, so my support should not be read as a blank check for future event funding. In this case, the timing, Singapore location, builder and institutional focus, and improved accountability make the proposal worth supporting. I expect transparent post-event reporting and a continued move toward more sustainable funding for future Summits.

I vote YES because Cardano Upgrades targets concrete adoption and usability barriers at the protocol level. Allowing users to pay transaction fees in any currency or asset they already hold could make onboarding much smoother by removing the need to first acquire ADA, while CIP-159 can improve micro-fees, wallet economics, and Layer 2 reserve patterns. I also see value in exploring a multi-asset Treasury for better long-term treasury resilience, although asset selection and governance around that must be handled carefully. The proposal is expensive, and I would have preferred more granular budget detail, but these are one-time infrastructure upgrades rather than ongoing operational subsidies. My YES comes with the expectation that Babel Fees moves beyond a closed single-provider MVP toward a permissionless multi-provider model, and that IO/Intersect report clearly per workstream.

I vote YES because improving Cardano's developer experience is important for both technical progress and ecosystem growth. Developer activity is also part of Cardano's broader market signal: it matters to builders, users, and investors whether the ecosystem looks easy and attractive to build on. This proposal targets real friction points such as project setup, reusable contract libraries, developer documentation, onboarding, and bounty-funded tooling improvements, and the ask is relatively modest compared with the rest of the IO slate. I do note that the proposal can be confusing because it describes a six-month execution program while targeting improvement over a twelve-month horizon, and I cannot fully assess overlap with the other IO proposals until they are reviewed. My YES therefore comes with an expectation of clear public reporting on delivered tools, developer adoption metrics, overlap with other funded work, and maintenance ownership after the initial program.

I vote NO on this proposal because, while Cardano does need stronger application-layer growth and better founder support, this asks the treasury to commit 50M ADA in the first tranche—about $15M at the proposal’s assumed $0.30/ADA price—into an external venture structure that could later scale to $75M from the treasury and up to 175M ADA** across three tranches. The proposal says the majority of this first tranche would go to direct investments in Cardano-native or Cardano-integrated startups ($10.75M), with additional spending on growth capital ($1.9M), startup acceleration and talent ($1M), management fees ($1M), and **audit/legal/compliance (~$0.3M), and I am not comfortable using treasury funds this way. I understand the strategic upside of trying to grow TVL, usage, and developer activity, but the proposal still relies too heavily on off-chain execution, broad discretion, and trust in an external manager without sufficiently clear KPIs, tranche milestones, downside protection, or proof that this model is better than more Cardano-native alternatives. The stated return ambitions of roughly 3x gross multiple and 25%+ IRR are meaningful, but for an ask of this size they remain too aspirational and not well enough supported to justify approval. If Cardano wants to fund builder growth more aggressively, I would prefer a smaller, more transparent, and more tightly scoped approach with stronger community oversight and clearer measurable outcomes.

I vote YES on approving the Cardano Foundation as the new managing entity of Project Catalyst because keeping Funds 10–14 operational and giving CF a chance to prove responsible stewardship is preferable to avoidable disruption. IOG’s cooperation in this handover makes the transition more credible, and I still value Catalyst as a funding path for smaller builders even if the model may eventually need deeper reform or be replaced by better alternatives. At the same time, I remain cautious because CF already holds significant financial power, operates under a Swiss structure with limited community influence, and has a history that raises legitimate accountability concerns. This YES is therefore not a blank cheque: if CF later asks for more funding or manages Catalyst poorly, DReps should be ready to withdraw support and force a different path.

I vote NO on this proposal because, although a production-grade Go node could improve resilience and add long-term value, I do not think this is the right funding priority now. Cardano is already committing substantial resources to infrastructure, and I currently prefer stronger focus on application growth, user adoption, TVL, transaction activity, and healthier ecosystem funding balance. My concern is therefore mainly about timing and treasury sequencing, not about dismissing the technical ambition or Blink Labs’ work altogether. I would be more open to this type of investment later, once broader budget priorities are clearer and the case for expanding beyond the current node roadmap is more compelling.

I vote NO on this treasury withdrawal. The choice here is whether to fund legal and operational setup now for a broader DeFi-liquidity program, or to keep treasury spending focused on priorities I see as more clearly shared public goods. I acknowledge a real improvement in this version: the proposal is more structured, with clearer audit, contract controls, and refund paths. The downside I cannot ignore is that approving this step still advances a treasury direction I do not support in principle.

I vote YES on this Info Action because it provides a clear and structured framework for how Cardano budget proposals are collected, reviewed, prioritized, and monitored before treasury withdrawals are executed. I support this direction because stronger coordination and process discipline are currently more valuable than fragmented budgeting approaches. The framework improves comparability between proposals through explicit data requirements, KPI alignment, work-package budgeting, and defined review stages. It does not itself authorize direct treasury spending, but it creates a predictable governance pipeline that can reduce ambiguity and improve execution quality. In this phase of ecosystem growth, I consider this level of structured coordination through Intersect a pragmatic and beneficial choice.

I vote YES on this treasury withdrawal because the proposal addresses a core infrastructure need: stronger node diversity and resilience for Cardano, with a defined 2026 scope. My decision is based on governance discipline as much as technical value, so funding must remain tied to milestone-based payouts, objective acceptance criteria, and transparent public reporting of delivery and spending. The requested amount is significant, which makes strict accountability essential throughout execution. If these safeguards are not upheld, future support should be reconsidered.

I vote YES on the 300M ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 613–713 because Cardano needs a constitutional NCL in place for this window after the prior 350M proposal for the same epoch range failed CC constitutionality approval (2/3 required, i.e., 5/7). On-chain parameters currently show rho=0.003 and tau=0.20, with reserves around 6.57B ADA and the treasury around 1.63B ADA, meaning the treasury’s reserve-driven inflow is roughly ~3.94M ADA per epoch while the fee component is comparatively small (~13k ADA/epoch at recent levels). Over a 101-epoch window, that implies a rough reserve-driven treasury inflow on the order of 344M ADA, and I prefer 300M as a more prudent ceiling that helps keep the treasury stable as reserves decline over time. An NCL is a cap, not a mandate to spend, and I want withdrawals to remain broadly aligned with sustainable inflows rather than drawing down principal in a weak market. This balance preserves long-term resilience while still leaving meaningful room to invest in high-impact work when it’s justified.

I vote NO on “Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1” because I voted NO on the underlying stablecoin/liquidity budget direction and I remain consistent with that position. While I value audits, reporting, and contract-based controls, this withdrawal mainly builds the legal and operational machinery to enable a much larger treasury deployment that I do not support. The Cardano treasury should prioritize core infrastructure and broadly shared public goods, not subsidizing stablecoin-liquidity strategies that increase centralization and regulatory exposure. Technical safeguards reduce implementation risk but do not resolve the mandate and precedent risk of using public funds for this purpose. For these reasons, I vote NO and encourage a smaller, fully on-chain, utility first pilot if the community wants to test this approach.

I'm voting YES on naming the upcoming Protocol Version 11 hard fork the "van Rossem Hard Fork" to honor Max van Rossem and his meaningful contributions to Cardano's governance work, including the Constitution. This is an InfoAction (a signalling vote, with no protocol or economic change), so the practical risk is minimal. I had the privilege of meeting Max at an early Constitution meetup and remember him as sharp and deeply committed to the project.

We don’t want to spend money just because we can,
but we also don’t want to miss opportunities because we’re not allowed to.

I'm voting YES, lets reduce propagation delays, use more plutus v2, I normally don't like to increase block size, but if slot duration is not increased too much we stay within safety limits. let's change and monitor.

This proposal requests 1.5M ADA to upgrade DeltaDeFi, a Hydra-based platform for fast off-chain trades.

Pros: open-source GitHub tools (Apache license) reusable for DeFi (trading without banks), ties to 2030 goals with KPIs like $10M TVL (locked money) and 1,000 traders, built on 650K ADA from Project Catalyst, and quarterly reports for accountability.

Cons: seeks more funds without proving users or liquidity, no clear plan for attracting traders beyond "build it and they come," which failed most Cardano DEXs except Minswap per adastat.net. The 20% budget (300K ADA) for custom metrics tracking is wasteful given Cardano's Dune partnership for cheap TVL/volume data. Without a loan or profit share like SNEK (required repayment per intersectmbo.org), it feels like funding private business over ecosystem infrastructure.

This framework is designed to inform me voting, not enforce it.
I acknowledge that it provides a shared direction to channel collective effort.
By adopting this vision, the community gains the strategic discipline to focus resources and accelerate coherent, long-term growth and treasury resource allocations.
I is clearly stated what the vision is and the KPI's and that this framework is adaptable.

The Cardano Constitution sets a minimum of seven members for the Constitutional Committee, but no maximum, so adding Christina after her close tie with Curia in the snap election fits the rules and boosts resilience—if someone quits, the committee stays above seven and avoids delays in approving actions. Christina adds enthusiasm and fresh ideas, helping users and developers on Cardano, and this follows the permissionless system where anyone can propose changes for more freedom and decentralization. On the downside, with eight members (an even number), decisions need 67% approval, meaning at least six yes votes out of eight; a 4-4 split or close votes could block actions more often, leading to slower governance, and while there's no pay for members now, a bigger group might cost the treasury more later if compensation starts, making it less efficient. Still, I vote yes because the gains in stability and inclusion outweigh the risks.

I vote YES on the Cardano Critical Integrations Budget because it teams up Cardano's main founders — Input Output Global, Cardano Foundation, and EMURGO — to add needed tools like stablecoins, bridges to other chains, oracles for real-world data and real-world assets projects. Funds go out only after milestones, with audits and reports for transparency, and leftovers return to the treasury in 24 months.
Downsides: partner names stay secret for deals, cutting early community checks and risking trust if things fail or lean too central, like fiat stablecoins that go against Satoshi's idea of avoiding controlled money and inflation. It hands more cash to big groups like the Foundation, who already hold plenty from early days, instead of using that or funding independent projects that proved themselves, which might slow real decentralization by depending on central players. No full cost details upfront could lead to waste.

I vote YES on the "2025 Net Change Limit Extension" because it keeps Cardano's treasury operations running smoothly without raising the 350M ADA spending cap. It avoids a governance freeze after Epoch 604, allowing key proposals like the 70M ADA Cardano Critical Integrations Budget (for upgrades in scalability and security) to execute on time, benefiting users who rely on these features. Other DReps highlight this continuity as a main reason for yes, and the official explanation at https://github.com/Tingvard-cc/public-records/tree/main/ncl-clarity confirms it adds no new spending but extends the term to Epoch 612 to sidestep constitutional issues.

I vote NO on the governance action for .ada and .cardano gTLDs. I prioritize proposals that solve real problems for Cardano’s users and developers, like Python’s practical tools drove its growth. This is an expensive branding effort with no clear use case, such as wallet or DApp integration, to boost users or developers. The costs, potentially $2 million per year, are high for unproven impact. Although the Cardano Foundation (CF) uses its own funds, these were once community assets, and their occasionally obstructive stance conflicts with Cardano’s decentralized, community-driven vision. Transparency is promised but doesn’t deliver tangible benefits. Pros: A gTLD could increase Cardano’s visibility and potentially spark Web3 innovation, like .xyz or .crypto. Cons: Without a concrete application, this is a symbolic investment with little measurable impact. The CF’s control over domain sales could centralize power, letting them profit or favor certain projects without strong community oversight, undermining decentralization. I only support projects with proven, community-driven value.

I’ve reviewed the changes from Cardano Constitution v2.0 to v2.3, as detailed in the IPFS link (https://cardano.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafybeihjegoita5u67sr6q2cplb33zglytwdo7355u6f2wn4wayhq6uy4e). I’m voting YES because it simplifies governance, speeds up funding for developers and users, and aligns with Cardano’s decentralized vision, building on my support for v2.0. It clarifies terms like “Ada Holders,” defines “Net Change Limit” (the cap on treasury spending), and ensures proposals can’t be changed after submission (ARTICLE II, Section 6), boosting trust. Combining the Budget Info step into a single withdrawal action with a checklist makes funding faster, and requiring audits for all withdrawals ensures community safety, a key priority for me.

However, there are risks. The removal of the requirement to name recipients of treasury withdrawals (ARTICLE II, Section 7) could obscure who gets funds, reducing transparency and risking misuse, as noted in other DReps’ concerns about accountability. Not mandating funds for audits in withdrawal proposals might lead to weaker oversight, as audits could be underfunded, potentially allowing sloppy spending. Dropping the Constitutional Committee’s code of conduct mandate (ARTICLE VII, Section 6) means the CC, which approves governance actions, isn’t required to follow clear ethical rules. This could lead to inconsistent decisions, eroding community trust, as some DReps argue it makes the Constitution feel less authoritative. The new “Stake Pool Operator” definition as “the entity controlling cold keys” (ARTICLE II, Section 5) might confuse voting rights in multi-party pool setups, where the keyholder isn’t the main operator, potentially disrupting fair governance.

I am voting YES on the Cardano 2030 Vision & Strategy because I believe our ecosystem needs a guiding framework now, even if it is imperfect. The document provides ambition, direction, and a shared “North Star,” which is better than moving forward with no vision at all. At the same time, I recognize the validity of many concerns: the lack of explicit mapping between vision and strategy, the vagueness around key technologies like Leios or Hydra, the absence of privacy and governance details, and the risks of aspirational KPIs without clear execution plans.

My support is therefore conditional in spirit: I see this as a provisional strategy that must be improved. Going forward, I expect stronger commitments to disruptive citizen-empowering projects, better documentation and education, transparent funding oversight, concrete adoption of ADA as currency, and measurable delivery in regions like Africa. I also believe governance and treasury KPIs should be added to ensure accountability.

I’m voting NO. Regional adoption and marketing programs are better piloted via Project Catalyst and local co-funding, not the main Treasury. The plan concentrates spend on soft outputs (events, promotion, meetups) with weak guarantees they convert into durable, on-chain usage. It also introduces an external administrator layer and prioritizes one geography with funds that should build global, reusable public goods (dev tooling, infra, wallets, standards).

I’m voting NO. Even as a loan, using 5M ADA of public funds to list and market a single meme token isn’t a treasury mandate or a public good. It sets a precedent that the treasury bankrolls project-specific CEX fees and market-making while the actual activity happens off-chain and doesn’t require Cardano.
I respect SNEK’s hustle and culture—memes are fun, treasuries are serious. If this makes sense, fund it via private capital, sponsors, or Project Catalyst where marketing-style proposals belong. A 2.44% APR near staking yield doesn’t compensate the risk of default, enforcement, and reputational downside if a meme cycle turns.
I prefer treasury spending on foundations that benefit everyone (dev tooling, infra, UX, compliance frameworks, BOS/L2s, core upgrades), not promoting a single ticker. Enjoy the memes on the timeline; I won’t underwrite them with public ADA.

Rationale for Voting No on Treasury Stablecoin Liquidity Fund
Cardano treasury funds should be used for development, infrastructure, and public goods, not for converting ADA into fiat-backed stablecoins.
I prefer peer-to-peer trade in ADA itself, this directs value away into USD-based assets alone.
If the community wants experiments with stablecoin liquidity, they should be proposed through Catalyst or voluntary initiatives, not with 50 million ADA from the treasury.
Cardano represents more than money alone: RWA, NFTs, smart and financial contracts, BOS integration, and scaling are all stronger reasons for treasury investment.

v2.0 is mostly a clean-up plus one meaningful process change. It fixes typos, tightens language, clarifies terms, and removes old, unused parts—so the Constitution is easier to read and use. The full text is here:
https://cardano.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafybeiezgj4gu6fyxfpnu7h7cgrhfyyvbn4ve72ytpxrv7cmatbok32e4m

What actually changes (with simple examples)

Treasury withdrawals get simpler. Before, you had to post a separate “Budget Information” action before asking for funds. Now you can file one Withdrawal action, as long as you include a clear disclosure checklist (what you’re doing, how long it takes, who receives funds, costs, prior treasury withdrawals in the past 24 months, refund conditions, etc.).
Example: A team asking for 200k ADA doesn’t need an extra budget post; they include those details inside the Withdrawal itself.

Small asks face less red tape. For under ~1M ADA across two years, some heavier requirements (like audits) are relaxed. Big asks still have stronger controls.
Example: A 300k ADA tooling grant won’t need the same audit burden as a multi-million ADA program, but large programs still must meet stricter rules.

Old/outdated parts are removed, definitions made clearer. v2.0 trims unused sections (like old DRep/SPO “codes of conduct”) and cleans up defined terms so people use the same words the same way.
Example: Definitions in the appendices are tightened and aligned with the updated treasury-withdrawal flow, so readers aren’t bouncing between mismatched sections.

Why I’m voting YES
This makes funding faster and clearer for builders while keeping guardrails (disclosure checklist, limits on how much can leave the Treasury). It reduces bureaucracy without removing accountability. Nothing is perfect on the first try, but this is a solid step forward we can iterate on—fix what’s rough in a quick v2.1 if needed, rather than blocking useful improvements today.

Concerns to be aware of (raised by other DReps)
Some DReps asked for the bigger policy change (removing the Budget Info step) to be voted on separately from all the small edits. Others worry a few rules are hard to enforce in practice (e.g., public disclosure of overlapping roles or compensation when identities can be anonymous), nit-picked inconsistent capitalization (like “Ada Holders”), and questioned the “immutable URL” requirement because a content hash already proves the document didn’t change. I hear these points, and I’m open to a short community “temperature check” to capture feedback for a tidy v2.1 pass.

Bottom line
I’m voting YES because v2.0 cleans up the Constitution and streamlines how we fund work—helping real builders move faster—while we continue polishing details together.

I’m voting NO. SNEK has real momentum and has already paid for big listings itself, but using 5M ADA from the Cardano Treasury to list and market one token isn’t a public-good expense. It sets a precedent for project-specific listing fees, shifts focus off on-chain growth (CEX trading doesn’t require the Cardano network), and diverts funds from things that help everyone—developer tools, ADA/stablecoin liquidity, compliance frameworks any token can reuse, UX, and core upgrades. We’ll get better long-term onboarding from ecosystem work like BOS, Midnight, and later Leios—tech alone isn’t enough, but public money should build foundations, not promote a single ticker. For marketing-style asks, Project Catalyst is the better venue where the whole community (not just DReps) reviews and votes.

Side note for newcomers: if you enjoy the culture, check out Snek and its playful cousin Snok, plus NikePig—they’re part of Cardano’s meme “family” and fun to follow.
(snek.com) (snok.lol) (nikepig.com)

I’m voting NO. SNEK has real momentum and has already paid for big listings itself, but using 5M ADA from the Cardano Treasury to list and market one token isn’t a public-good expense. It sets a precedent for project-specific listing fees, shifts focus off on-chain growth (CEX trading doesn’t require the Cardano network), and diverts funds from things that help everyone—developer tools, ADA/stablecoin liquidity, compliance frameworks any token can reuse, UX, and core upgrades. We’ll get better long-term onboarding from ecosystem work like BOS, Midnight, and later Leios—tech alone isn’t enough, but public money should build foundations, not promote a single ticker. For marketing-style asks, Project Catalyst is the better venue where the whole community (not just DReps) reviews and votes.

Side note for newcomers: if you enjoy the culture, check out Snek and its playful cousin Snok, plus NikePig—they’re part of Cardano’s meme “family” and fun to follow.
(snek.com) (snok.lol) (nikepig.com)

I am voting YES because this action simply enacts the results of the May–July 2025 community election and replaces the temporary (interim) Constitutional Committee (CC) with the newly elected CC before the interim term expires; this ensures governance keeps working without a gap for proposals that require CC approval. A YES means the new, community-elected CC takes over with staggered one-year and two-year terms, giving a soft handover that blends fresh members with experienced community councils; I also appreciate that the Cardano Foundation is stepping aside here to strengthen decentralization. Some have noted that only DReps voted in the election, but Cardano’s model is delegated democracy: any ADA holder can become a DRep and vote directly, or delegate their voting power to a DRep and change that delegation at any time. If we vote NO, the interim CC will time out and Cardano could face a governance pause—technical operations continue, but actions needing CC sign-off cannot be approved until a new committee is installed later. For those who want to learn more or take part next time, the official election portal used by DReps is: elections.constitution.gov.tools (with voting run via Ekklesia).

I am voting YES because this single, on-chain budget translates the broad DRep mandate expressed in Ekklesia—more than 70 % of active stake—into an executable plan that remains beneath the 300 M ADA Net Change Limit I already endorsed. By grouping the thirty-nine proposals that cleared the 50 % support threshold and explicitly asked Intersect to act as administrator, we avoid a patchwork of separate withdrawals, reduce deposits that smaller teams cannot afford, and give the community one clear point of oversight. Each project will still face its own due-diligence, milestone, and smart-contract escrow before funds leave the treasury, so low-quality work can be halted without jeopardising the rest. Approving the budget now keeps treasury outflows roughly in line with expected inflows, prevents decision-making gridlock, and lets builders focus on delivering the 2025 roadmap while DReps retain the right to scrutinise every withdrawal. For these reasons, and to maintain momentum under the constitutional process we helped create, I support the Intersect aggregate budget.

I am voting NO because this request duplicates projects that are already scheduled to receive funding in the main 2025 Intersect budget, yet appoints Intersect as fund administrator without explicit consent from every team and without a shared framework for milestones, reporting, or claw-backs; approving it now would create overlapping custody arrangements, invite double payments, and add unnecessary complexity to a governance process that is already spread across GovTool, Ekklesia, and on-chain actions. I will support these same initiatives once they are presented through a single, coherent budget or as individual InfoActions with clear terms, but until then the prudent choice is to preserve treasury clarity and vote NO.

I support this NCL because 300M ADA matches the treasury’s expected inflow for the same 73-epoch window (Epoch 563 – 635), keeping withdrawals in line with deposits. It gives teams approved for 2025 a clear budget runway into early 2026 while staying below the 350 M cap I previously endorsed, preserving reserves for future cycles. A simple, inflation-neutral ceiling maintains fiscal discipline yet leaves room for essential infrastructure and governance work—exactly the balance our earlier votes aimed to achieve.

I'm voting NO because the plan asks the treasury to sink 50 million ADA into fiat-backed stablecoins without even specifying which ones.
Today Cardano's native stablecoin market is tiny—about $23 million total and almost all USD-pegged tokens.
Backing only dollar coins would tether our ecosystem to U.S. monetary policy and concentrate regulatory risk,
while monthly conversions of ADA to fiat could still pressure the price.
The scheme returns just 15 % of the yield to the treasury and puts principal at the mercy of smart-contract exploits or a stablecoin de-peg.
A small, fully on-chain pilot—say 5-10 million ADA,
multi-currency, milestone-gated, with instant claw-backs—could test the "sovereign-wealth" idea safely.
Until such a scoped proposal appears, the prudent move is to preserve treasury funds and let open-market demand grow stablecoin liquidity organically.

I'm voting YES because a second, Rust-based block-producing node adds vital resilience and removes the single-implementation risk currently hanging over Cardano. The maintainer committee—Blink Labs, dcSpark, Sundae Labs, TxPipe, Cardano Foundation, and Pi Lanningham—has a proven record of shipping high-quality infrastructure, so I trust their ability to deliver. The ₳1.5 M ask is bounded to six months, guarded by a smart-contract escrow and quarterly public reports; if milestones slip, unused funds flow back to the treasury. Rust's efficiency and built-in observability will lower hardware costs for small SPOs and give us better telemetry, while encouraging fresh contributors from the wider Rust ecosystem. Finally, backing PRAGMA alongside Intersect strengthens collaboration rather than rivalry—diverse teams, shared vision, stronger network. Let's fund this pilot, measure its progress, and reassess future budgets based on results.

I vote YES on the 200M ADA Net Change Limit for 2025. This cap, well below the annual inflow of approximately 315M ADA, protects the treasury’s reserves of 1.71B ADA, aligning with my support for the 300M/250M NCL. Although the 200M ADA does not meet all budget proposals, it forces prioritization of high-impact projects, consistent with my vote for 350M to promote disciplined growth. The lower limit reduces selling pressure on ADA, addresses Stake Pool Operators’ concerns after their rejection of the 350M NCL, and supports price stability. By voting YES, I break the deadlock following the split over the 350M NCL, enabling treasury withdrawals before the May 30, 2025, deadline.

I agree to set the Net Change Limit (NCL) to 350 million ADA for 2025.
Enabling treasury withdrawals to fund Cardano’s ecosystem growth without risking depletion.

I'm voting YES on setting the Net Change Limit to 300M ADA for 2025 and 250M ADA for 2026. Below, I'll briefly explain my reasoning in a way that's easy to understand, balanced, and respectful to everyone involved.

Why YES?

Responsible Spending: Approving a clear spending limit ensures we only use funds that come into the treasury, avoiding the risk of rapidly draining resources we've carefully built up over time. It's similar to spending only what you earn, which helps keep finances healthy for the long term.

Financial Stability: This approach keeps our reserves intact, ensuring that we always have resources available to support important and worthwhile projects in the future. It’s like maintaining savings for unexpected or valuable opportunities rather than spending it all at once.

Clear Boundaries: Setting explicit limits provides clarity for everyone involved. It makes future budget decisions easier, clearer, and more transparent.

Possible Concerns & Counterpoints

Centralization Concerns: Some are concerned that Intersect or any specific organization might gain too much control over how funds are distributed. This is a fair concern—central control can create inefficiencies or lead to decisions that don't align with the broader community's interests. I acknowledge this worry and share the view that future allocations must remain transparent, decentralized, and closely monitored.

Fear of Bureaucracy: There's also a concern about overly complex procedures that might slow down decision-making or reduce transparency. It's important that future processes remain simple, clear, and easy to follow for everyone involved.

Balanced Perspective

This YES vote doesn't mean automatic trust in any organization; rather, it's a practical first step toward responsible financial management. It sets a sensible boundary for spending, ensuring funds are used thoughtfully and sustainably. Future proposals on specific budget items must still undergo careful review, transparent discussion, and broad community agreement.

To those voting NO or having doubts: your concerns about centralization, transparency, or spending oversight are valid and important. My YES vote aligns closely with these principles, aiming to protect our treasury and ensure financial responsibility for the benefit of the entire Cardano community.

I am voting YES on the 2025 Vision & Roadmap for Cardano because it outlines a well-structured and ambitious plan to enhance scalability, decentralization, and usability. The roadmap presents a strong commitment to technical excellence, including advancements such as Leios for improved transaction throughput, Hydra and Midgard for L2 scaling, and innovations in programmable assets.

These developments will strengthen Cardano’s position as a leading blockchain ecosystem by fostering developer engagement, increasing interoperability, and driving real-world adoption. The work done by the community, developers, and governance members is commendable, and I fully support these improvements to ensure a sustainable and decentralized future for Cardano.