Lucas.Macchiavelli

The proposal addresses a legitimate and strategically important infrastructure challenge for Cardano’s future scalability. As throughput increases under Leios, the cost and operational burden of full-chain indexing could become a major centralization pressure for data providers and developers. Project Cayley presents a credible approach to reducing those barriers through decentralized slice indexing, while also improving ecosystem resilience and affordability.

Blockfrost has become critical public infrastructure within the Cardano ecosystem, providing free access relied upon by a large portion of developers and applications. Supporting continuity during the transition toward more decentralized indexing infrastructure is a reasonable treasury use case, particularly where service disruption could negatively impact ecosystem growth and developer experience.

The proposal also includes milestone-based delivery, third-party oversight, security audits, and refund conditions for undistributed funds, providing a reasonable governance and accountability framework for treasury expenditure.

I am voting YES on this proposal because long-term maintenance is foundational to Cardano’s stability, security, and operational resilience. The proposal covers critical ongoing responsibilities — including node maintenance, QA, monitoring, release management, security coordination, infrastructure operations, and documentation — that are necessary to sustain a production-grade blockchain ecosystem.

For these reasons, I believe this proposal represents necessary operational investment in Cardano’s core infrastructure and ecosystem continuity.

I voted YES because I believe Leios is one of the most strategically important upgrades currently proposed for Cardano. If Cardano is serious about supporting meaningful long-term adoption, DeFi growth, and global-scale transaction demand, then improving throughput and settlement capacity at the consensus layer is essential.

What I appreciate most about this proposal is that it focuses on strengthening the core protocol itself while preserving Cardano’s decentralization and security assumptions rather than pursuing shortcuts. The proposal is technically ambitious, but it is also grounded in years of research, formal methods, testnet work, and incremental engineering progress already underway.

I also appreciate that the proposal clearly identifies risks, dependencies, and operational constraints rather than overselling certainty. While the treasury ask is substantial, I believe core protocol scalability is one of the few areas where large investments are fully justified because the benefits compound across the entire ecosystem.

In my view, Leios is foundational infrastructure for Cardano’s future competitiveness and long-term sustainability.

Vote Rationale — No

I want to start by saying that I genuinely like the direction of this proposal and, in particular, the idea of treasury return mechanisms tied to EBITDA. I believe this is exactly the kind of thinking Cardano governance should encourage going forward. Treasury-funded initiatives should increasingly explore ways to create sustainable return flows back into the ecosystem rather than relying exclusively on one-way funding. On that principle, I strongly agree with the team.

That said, I ultimately voted NO for structural and execution-related reasons.

First, I believe the proposal tries to do too many things at once. The infrastructure layer, lending system, yield/RWA components, and commercial business model all carry different levels of risk, maturity, and public value. In my view, these should have been separated into smaller and more focused proposals so the community could evaluate each component independently.

Second, I do not believe the POGUN team did enough outreach and ecosystem engagement relative to the scale of the ask, especially when compared to other teams inside the IO budget proposal that made extensive efforts to engage stakeholders, host discussions, gather feedback, and build broader ecosystem alignment ahead of voting. For a proposal requesting significant treasury funding, I expected much stronger efforts around community visibility, public discussions, feedback collection, and broader relationship-building across the ecosystem before moving to a vote. Building confidence and alignment is just as important as building the technology itself.

Importantly, this NO vote is not a rejection of the vision itself. I actually believe this idea could become a major win for Cardano if executed correctly. The proposal contains several innovative concepts, and I appreciate the willingness to experiment with treasury-aligned economic models.

I would absolutely be willing to revisit and reconsider a future version, particularly one that is more modular, more community-aligned, and more narrowly scoped in its initial phase.

Vote Rationale — No

I agree with the broader premise that Cardano needs scalable infrastructure and that L2 development is strategically important. However, after reviewing the proposal, I am not sufficiently convinced by the maturity and readiness of the Midgard component to support treasury funding at this stage.

My concerns are not about the ambition of the vision, but about the gap between the claims being made and the level of demonstrated validation currently available. The proposal presents Midgard as a key piece of Cardano’s scaling future, yet several critical aspects are still either unresolved, lightly specified, or acknowledged as major risks within the proposal itself.

I also believe the proposal relies heavily on projected future adoption and ecosystem benefits rather than demonstrated demand or proven production traction today. For a treasury request of this scale, I would expect clearer evidence that the architecture, operational model, and ecosystem fit have already passed a stronger level of validation.

This should not be interpreted as opposition to L2 experimentation or to the teams involved. I appreciate the technical effort and believe continued research in this direction is valuable. However, I do not currently have enough confidence in the Midgard workstream specifically to justify supporting the proposal in its present form.

I support this proposal because it delivers meaningful infrastructure improvements that strengthen Cardano’s long-term usability, scalability, and economic flexibility. CIP-159 enables lower-cost wallet and DeFi interactions, Babel Fees significantly improves onboarding by removing the requirement to hold ADA for transaction fees, and the Multi-Asset Treasury initiative advances more sustainable treasury management options.

The proposal is strategically aligned with Cardano’s 2030 goals around adoption, ecosystem resilience, and treasury sustainability. While there are implementation dependencies and technical risks, the workstreams address real limitations in the current ecosystem and provide foundational capabilities that can unlock broader growth across wallets, DeFi, L2s, and cross-chain participation.

For these reasons, I am voting YES.

I support this proposal because improving Cardano’s developer experience is a high-leverage investment that directly strengthens ecosystem adoption, utility, and long-term competitiveness. The proposal identifies well-known pain points such as fragmented tooling, weak onboarding, poor documentation, and lack of coordination, and presents a pragmatic, ecosystem-oriented plan to address them through shared infrastructure, canonical tooling, developer onboarding, and reusable contract libraries.

The initiative is also outcome-oriented, with measurable targets tied to developer growth, onboarding efficiency, and ecosystem expansion. I particularly support the focus on reducing time-to-MVP, improving onboarding for both Web2 and EVM developers, and consolidating existing community efforts instead of duplicating them.

While the treasury ask is substantial, the proposal includes milestone-based oversight, third-party assurance, and transparent delivery mechanisms. Given the strategic importance of attracting and retaining builders, I believe this is a reasonable and timely investment in Cardano’s long-term growth.

As a note, having met Robertino personally, I can vouch for his commitment, professionalism, and genuine passion for Cardano and its long-term success.

Vote: YES — Harmonic Laboratories (HLabs) Proposal

This proposal is a strong infrastructure investment that advances decentralization, developer accessibility, and ecosystem resilience through Gerolamo (light node), Pebble (smart contract language), and ongoing TypeScript tooling maintenance.

It aligns well with Cardano 2030 priorities. Gerolamo supports client diversity and reduces reliance on centralized infrastructure, while Pebble lowers the barrier for mainstream developers. Continued tooling maintenance ensures stability across hard forks and avoids fragmentation risks.

The value proposition is clear: enabling trust-minimized dApps and wallets, expanding the developer funnel, and maintaining critical ecosystem dependencies. The budget is substantial but justified, with transparent FTE-based costing and a reasonable contingency.

Governance safeguards are robust, including milestone-based escrow, independent oversight, and treasury protections, significantly reducing execution risk.

There are execution and adoption risks, particularly around scope and Pebble uptake, but these are acknowledged and mitigated through milestones and measurable targets.

Overall, this is a credible, well-structured proposal addressing key ecosystem bottlenecks.

Final Position: YES

I support this proposal and vote YES.

This proposal funds a credible, already-progressing effort to deliver a second production-ready Cardano node implementation in Go, with clear benefits to network resilience, developer accessibility, and protocol robustness.

Rationale:

Client diversity is critical infrastructure: Cardano currently relies on a single block-producing node implementation. Dingo meaningfully advances multi-client resilience, reducing systemic risk.
Strong execution track record: Blink Labs demonstrates sustained delivery (1,000+ PRs, full Plutus conformance, working protocol components), indicating high likelihood of completion.
Clear and bounded scope: The roadmap—from Praos completion through Dijkstra and Leios integration to audit and mainnet readiness—is well-structured and technically coherent.
Governance-aligned fund management: The use of audited escrow contracts, milestone-based releases, and an independent oversight board provides strong accountability.
Conclusion:

This is a high-impact infrastructure investment with strong transparency, credible delivery capacity, and clear alignment with Cardano’s long-term decentralization and scalability goals.

I support this first-stage increase to maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] (14M → 16.5M) and maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] (62M → 72M).

This is a disciplined, guardrail-compliant adjustment that reduces developer friction while preserving network safety. The increases sit exactly at the per-epoch limits allowed under MTEU-M-04 and MBEU-M-03, reflecting incremental rather than aggressive tuning. The change has been benchmarked, ratified through the appropriate committees, deployed on testnets, and satisfies the procedural requirements for critical parameter updates.

This is measured parameter stewardship: evidence-based, staged, and ecosystem-aligned.

I will vote YES.

I support the proposal from Intersect’s Hard Fork Working Group to name Protocol Version 11 the “van Rossem Hard Fork” in memory of Max van Rossem.

Cardano has an established tradition of naming hard forks after significant historical figures and, more recently, respected community members who have made lasting contributions to the ecosystem. This includes upgrades such as Vasil hard fork, Valentine hard fork, Chang hard fork, and Plomin hard fork. Naming Protocol Version 11 after Max continues that precedent in a coherent and principled way.

Max’s contributions to Cardano governance were substantive. He played a meaningful role in shaping the Constitution, contributed to governance discussions and optimizations, and was integral to the election of the first fully elected Constitutional Committee. As a delegate at the Constitutional Convention in Buenos Aires. He also served as a DRep within the Dutch DRep Collective and worked to ensure his local community was actively represented in governance processes. Beyond governance, his founding of AdaMoments reflected a creative commitment to using Cardano as durable public infrastructure.

For these reasons, I will vote YES.

Rationale for Voting YES
I am voting YES on the Cardano Constitution v2.3 because it represents a clear step forward in the legitimacy, clarity, and enforceability of Cardano’s governance foundation.

This version reflects important lessons from earlier iterations (v2.0) by streamlining the document to focus on what is constitutionally essential and enforceable. It eliminates ambiguity, reduces procedural complexity, and better aligns the Constitution with the principles of a decentralized, scalable governance system.

Equally important, this update demonstrates responsiveness to community input. The high participation in the previous constitutional vote, and the incorporation of feedback into this version, reinforce that the process is evolving in the right direction: one that balances broad community engagement with governance realism.

Ultimately, I support this proposal because it strengthens Cardano’s ability to govern itself credibly and sustainably—both in principle and in practice.

My DRep ID: drep1y2jd3c4hg...2e9zm6

I am voting YES to adopt version 2 of the Cardano Constitution. While the changes are primarily stylistic and clarifying, not substantive, they improve the document’s readability, enforceability, and operational guidance—especially in the expanded Guardrails and the new Supporting Guidance appendices.

The core governance framework remains unchanged: the tenets, roles of DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee, budget oversight, and amendment thresholds are all preserved.

The document now offers clearer language around protocol parameters, treasury withdrawals, and hard fork criteria, improving transparency and technical safeguards without altering the Constitution's intent.

That said, I would like to see a more formalized, community-led process for future constitutional updates, including wider consultation, draft review periods, and clear change tracking. In this case, however, the scope of the revision was limited, and the substance remains faithful to version 1. For these reasons, I support this update and vote YES.

DREP ID: drep1y2jd3c4hg...2e9zm6

VOTE 0024

DRep voting Update:

NO Vote Rationale – Haus Tokenized Real Estate (₳3,000,000 Treasury Withdrawal)

This is a tough decision, as the proposal targets a promising real-world asset tokenization use case that aligns well with Cardano’s long-term vision. However, at this stage, I believe the requested funding level is premature.

With a significantly lower budget, I would be more open to supporting it as an experimental pilot. Additional independently verifiable details about the team would also improve confidence. I encourage the proposers to refine their approach and consider reapplying in a future round or through Project Catalyst, where a phased entry could better validate their model. The concept has potential, and I hope to see it develop further.

DREP ID: drep1y2jd3c4hg...2e9zm6

VOTE0023

DREP VOTING UPDATE:

Proposal: Cardano Product Committee: Community-driven 2030 Cardano Vision and 2026 roadmap insights collection via workshops and structured product research

Cardano cannot thrive without a clear, shared vision and roadmap—without it, the ecosystem risks fragmentation, misaligned priorities, and missed opportunities.

This proposal funds the first large-scale, community-led effort to define that vision, backed by structured research and broad stakeholder engagement.
It creates the strategic foundation needed for Cardano to compete globally, guide development priorities, and coordinate ecosystem growth.

Supporting this ensures that critical direction-setting is not left to chance, but driven by data and a unified plan for success.

I trust the committee will lead us in the right direction

DRep ID: drep1y2jd3c4hg...2e9zm6

VOTE 0022

Vote Rationale – YES

This proposal merits support in light of both its strategic objective and the proven track record of its driving force, Dave. Dave has been a consistent and visible contributor to the Cardano ecosystem for years, often working far beyond any direct funding to ensure that projects, entrepreneurs, and advocates have opportunities to showcase their work to global audiences.

His efforts demonstrate commitment, capability, and a deep understanding of how to position Cardano in competitive spaces.

While the requested ₳889,500 is significant, the potential marketing leverage across multiple regions and audiences, combined with Dave’s long history of successful delivery for the Cardano community, makes this an investment in both ecosystem growth and a trusted operator who has repeatedly demonstrated value.

Conclusion: Yes – This is an opportunity to amplify a proven contributor’s impact, extend Cardano’s reach into critical industry events, and provide tangible support to ecosystem projects in a structured, accountable manner.

VOTE0021

Rationale for Voting Yes – VOTE0020

I initially leaned toward voting No on this proposal, based on concerns regarding the scale of funding requested and the absence of prior validation within the Cardano ecosystem. However, after further consideration, I believe a Yes vote is warranted in light of the strategic importance of strengthening Project Catalyst.

Context Shift: Prioritizing Catalyst’s Resilience

With millions of ADA entering Catalyst through treasury allocations, ensuring the robustness and adaptability of its funding mechanisms is essential. While the Extended Quadratic Funding (EQF) model is untested in our ecosystem, it represents a timely opportunity to expand Catalyst’s toolkit and address long-standing challenges in voter participation and funding distribution.

Balancing Caution with Strategic Opportunity

My initial preference was for a smaller-scale pilot, possibly within Catalyst itself, before committing to a direct treasury withdrawal of this size. However, I now view this proposal as a strategic investment in governance infrastructure. The credibility of the proposing team and the clarity of their execution plan reduce operational risk, and the potential insights gained could significantly inform future funding models.

Conclusion

While caution remains appropriate, the need to evolve Catalyst in step with growing treasury inflows makes this proposal both relevant and timely. Supporting this initiative reflects a commitment to proactive governance and innovation in how Cardano funds its future.

Vote NO – Proposal contains an input error and should be resubmitted correctly.

VOTE0019

While I am supportive in principle of securing top-tier exchange listings for Cardano Native Tokens (CNTs) and improving ecosystem liquidity, I do not believe that this specific proposal demonstrates a proportional return on the significant amount of ADA being requested.

The projected outcomes — potentially only one to three listings, dependent on exchange fee negotiations — are limited in scope compared to the ₳3.12M requested. Without clear criteria for token selection, measurable adoption targets, or a robust framework for assessing long-term market impact, it is difficult to ensure this expenditure will yield sustained benefits for the Cardano ecosystem.

I would prefer to see a smaller-scale, pilot initiative brought forward first. Such a proposal could focus on one or two listings with comprehensive reporting on cost, liquidity impact, trading volume changes, and ecosystem adoption metrics. This would allow the community to evaluate the true effectiveness of funded listings and market making before committing larger treasury amounts.

For these reasons, while I support the underlying objective, I cannot support this request in its current form.

VOTE0018

I support this treasury withdrawal as it addresses a critical gap in Cardano’s post-MVG evolution — the lack of a transparent, repeatable, and data-driven framework for assessing governance performance. By producing a State of Governance report, defining KPIs, and translating findings into CPS/CIP drafts, this initiative can equip the community with a stronger foundation for evidence-based decision-making and long-term governance refinement.

While the development of such a framework earlier in the governance rollout could have provided even greater foresight, I view this proposal as a timely and valuable step. It builds on the substantial work and dedication already invested by the team and broader ecosystem, and positions us to continually strengthen Cardano’s governance model going forward.

VOTE0017

Vote: YES

Rationale:
Funding NFTCDN for 18 months will remove major cost (~$100k) and time (9+ months) barriers for projects needing native asset delivery, saving an estimated $5.5M and 39,000 dev hours across the ecosystem. This directly supports Cardano’s 2025 goals for developer experience and adoption, accelerates launches, and improves end-user performance through shared, enterprise-grade infrastructure.

While centralization and sustainability risks exist, they are mitigated by SLAs, third-party oversight, and the limited funding term. The ROI and adoption potential justify support.

VOTE0016

I’m voting YES on this treasury withdrawal to fund Intersect with ₳15.75M for the 2025–2026 delivery period. Intersect continues to serve a critical function in Cardano’s governance infrastructure—maintaining the core Haskell codebases, coordinating network upgrades like Chang and Plomin, and supporting over 30 working groups and 8 elected committees. This action is well-scoped, time-bound, and aligned with the constitutional intent to support a plural, decentralized governance system.

Cardano needs Intersect to continue pushing forward with coordination, tooling, and committee support to ensure that on-chain decision-making is not only functional, but effective.

VOTE0015

I vote YES on this Info Action because GovTool is essential infrastructure for Cardano’s decentralized governance. It enables ADA holders to participate in governance actions—registering, delegating, proposing, and voting

Maintaining and improving GovTool is critical for inclusive, accessible, and decentralized governance. Supporting this proposal means investing in the foundation that makes Cardano governance work—for everyone.

YES Vote Rationale

I support the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget Info Action proposing an aggregate allocation of 275,269,340 ada administered by Intersect over 73 epochs. While the process was not without its imperfections, I believe it represents a good-faith effort toward participatory budgeting under constrained conditions. We should acknowledge these limitations while also recognizing the importance of continuity and collective progress.

This proposal is constitutionally compliant and aligns with the current Net Change Limit (NCL), fulfilling both the procedural and fiduciary standards expected of on-chain governance.

The 39 included proposals each surpassed the >50% support threshold and requested Intersect as their Administrator, adding further coherence and administrative accountability to the aggregate action. Although voting yes on this proposal, I'm looking forward to revisiting the 39 proposals as an extra layer in the treasury withdrawal actions following this one.

The budget supports mission-critical areas across the ecosystem necessary to sustain Cardano’s roadmap, governance evolution, and broader ecosystem momentum. I also hope Intersect, as the Administrator, will implement appropriate safeguards to manage potential selling pressure from large Treasury disbursements, maintaining stability and confidence in the ecosystem.

VOTE0013

DRep Voting Rationale — Vote: No

This proposal reflects a strong commitment to expanding access to treasury funds for community builders, a goal that is central to Cardano’s decentralized future. It respects constitutional safeguards by applying the 2.69B ADA participation threshold and excludes founding entity proposals.

However, I am voting No based on a key governance concern: the risk of duplication with the Intersect budget. Given that Intersect has been closely involved in assembling their own budget proposal which is currently live up for voting on chain and close to being ratified. My concern with approving this proposal is getting a proposal funded twice. Of course, for that to happen it would need a withdrawal action too.

Additional Perspective on Treasury Withdrawal Structure

• As a DRep, I also wish to express my broader view on the upcoming Treasury Withdrawals structure:

• I am strongly in favor of greater granularity in funding decisions to allow more nuanced and accountable governance.

• Although I value pragmatism in governance operations, I am most comfortable with Option D (five brackets from Ekklesia), which strikes a strong balance between decentralization and operational feasibility for Intersect. It might be argued that this discredits Intersect's budget process, but I prefer to be on the safe side and get additional results, especially this being Cardano's 1st budget.

• I would also be willing to review 39 individual proposals (Option E) if necessary, despite the heavier governance load, because it offers the maximum clarity. Option C (two support brackets split across 2025 and 2026) is acceptable to me too. Sticking to D, though.

VOTE0012

I will vote YES to establish a Net Change Limit (NCL) of 300 million ADA covering epochs 563 to 635.

Rationale
Prior Voting Behavior
I have consistently supported a disciplined yet pragmatic approach to Treasury management.

I previously voted NO on a 200M ADA NCL (too restrictive) and YES on a 350M ADA NCL (more aligned with strategic flexibility).

In the Intersect budget temperature check, I backed around 345M ADA worth of proposals — higher than my ideal comfort level, but in recognition of the critical need to fund governance and ecosystem infrastructure.

The Intersect proposal has since been refined to 275M ADA. It is still a significant amount of ADA, but I agree with the areas covered in the budget for critical infrastructure and growth. Therefore, I am now more comfortable with reducing the NCL from 350M ADA to 300M ADA. 300 MM ADa leaves an extra 25M ADA for other proposals, such as the Amaru Node proposal, which I have voted YES on.

Approving a 300M ADA NCL balances fiscal prudence with strategic investment. I feel comfortable with 300M ADA as a middle ground — it is high enough to fund critical initiatives, but low enough to prevent excessive overspending. A 300M ADA NCL aligns with projected Treasury inflows. It sends a signal of responsibility and ambition: that we are serious about scaling Cardano while also committed to preserving Treasury sustainability.

Although it is not guaranteed, I am writing this rationale assuming the Intersect info action will be approved, based on the results observed so far.

I fully acknowledge we are authorizing the withdrawal of a significant amount of ADA. Treasury stewardship must remain paramount. However, platforms operating within exponential technology ecosystems like Cardano cannot afford underinvestment at a critical growth phase.

The risks of underfunding key infrastructure and governance maturation far outweigh the carefully managed risks of targeted investment. This is the time to establish a robust foundation — and it requires deliberate, well-scoped financial commitments.

VOTE0011

I am voting NO on this proposal.

While I am fundamentally supportive of the objective — increasing DeFi liquidity on Cardano — there are procedural and substantive concerns that warrant a negative vote.

First, there is a clear and definitive violation of Article III, Section 5 of the Cardano Constitution. The on-chain hash does not match the off-chain governance content. Procedural compliance is critical for maintaining the legitimacy and enforceability of governance outcomes. Allowing proposals that fail such basic checks would weaken trust in the system we are collectively building. Some might argue, that this is the CCs Job, but I won't vote yes for what I believe is unconstitutional to begin with.

Beyond the procedural issues, although I support the concept of using treasury funds to catalyze DeFi liquidity, I believe the scale of the request — 50 million ADA — is too large for an initial deployment. A pilot-sized deployment would provide a valuable proof-of-concept. I understand going too low might not make any impact at all, so I hope there are some reductions to be made and for the project to validate its concept.

I appreciate the design of the proposal’s governance structure. Creating a dedicated committee to manage funds is a positive step toward more specialized and efficient decision-making. I think this is the way to go in my personal opinion. The idea aligns with a concept of a “DAO of DAOs” — potentially enabling individuals to directly propose initiatives within specific governance domains. This is a governance evolution Cardano needs to foster for greater agility and effectiveness.

It appears likely that the proposers will resubmit after correcting the formatting and hash issues. I encourage this and would welcome a revised proposal that maintains the strong core ideas while addressing procedural compliance and adjusting the initial scope to a more conservative pilot phase.

VOTE0010

I am voting YES on the proposal Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025.

This proposal directly advances Cardano’s strategic objectives of enhancing decentralization, improving security, and ensuring the long-term sustainability of the network. By supporting the development of Amaru as an independent, interoperable node implementation, it addresses the systemic risk of relying on a single codebase and strengthens the network’s resilience, fully aligned with the constitutional principles of decentralization and robustness.

The initiative is led by a consortium of reputable ecosystem actors — Blink Labs, Cardano Foundation, dcSpark, Sundae Labs, and TxPipe — operating under PRAGMA’s not-for-profit governance structure. The maintainer committee is composed of recognized domain experts, each assigned clear scopes of responsibility. This structure ensures a high degree of technical competence and operational accountability, critical for a project of this complexity.

Moreover, the broader impact of this initiative is significant. Increasing node diversity, improving observability with industry standards, and fostering a more inclusive development environment are critical to enhancing the operational robustness and decentralization of the Cardano ecosystem.

For these reasons, I support this proposal and cast my vote in favor.

VOTE0009

Vote: NO

Proposal: # 2025 Cardano NCL

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Rationale for Opposition

This proposal’s cautious 200M ADA ceiling, while fiscally conservative, risks underfunding a foundational year in Cardano’s constitutional and governance evolution. 2025 is not a maintenance year—it is a strategic inflection point. Underspending could lead to half-measures across core infrastructure, developer tooling, and ecosystem growth.

I tend to view Cardano as a startup still searching for product-market fit—not just as a blockchain, but as a governance-layered ecosystem. I don’t believe we, as an industry, have reached that fit yet. In this early phase, investment in talent, experimentation, and feedback loops is critical. We do not yet know the full cost of sustainable, decentralized governance. Arbitrarily capping expenditure without operational precedent is not prudent—it’s blindfolded restraint.

Starting with a low ceiling risks disrupting development continuity and creating political friction over reallocations and perceived scarcity. In conclusion, this is not the year to constrain the ecosystem’s ability to act. It is the year to learn what it takes to responsibly fund and operate an open protocol. A vote against this proposal is not a call for reckless spending, but a recognition that 200M ADA is too low to support the needs of a maturing, self-governing ecosystem in its most formative year ever. Based on community sentiment I’ve observed, expectations for a reasonable 2025 NCL orbit between 200M and 350M ADA. I prefer to position us safely in the middle of that range, rather than risk underspending at the floor.

As a DRep, I also believe Treasury constraints should be informed by real experience and evolving risk management mechanisms—not early-stage caution that may inadvertently stall progress. I hope to see more maturity and responsiveness in the 2026 budget cycle as our governance capabilities evolve.

VOTE0008

Voting Rationale – 2025 Net Change Limit (NCL)

I'm voting YES on this governance action — not because it's perfect, but because having a 350M ₳ budget is better than having no budget at all for the months ahead. We can't afford a governance deadlock. The ecosystem needs continuity, especially as we step into a new era of on-chain decision-making. 350M ₳ its still a huge number, I would be more comfortable with spending 250M ₳ in 2025.

That said, here's some nuance:

This should have been a percentage, not a fixed yearly number. A percentage of treasury inflows keeps us flexible and aligned with network growth. Hard limits age quickly and tie our hands — not great for dynamic environments like blockchain governance.

I already voted NO on the 2025 + 2026 NCL combo proposal. Why? Because locking ourselves into 2026 without deeper analysis or flexibility is not a sustainable strategy for a new governance system. Each year should be modeled and discussed based on fresh data and needs — not bundled and rushed.

While I’m voting YES on the 350M ₳ NCL for 2025, I plan to be disciplined in budget reviews. That means I’ll most likely supporting withdrawals up to 300M ₳ as a counterbalance, pushing for fiscal responsibility and impact-driven funding. Budgets tend to expand to its upper limit, that's why I'm doing this counterbalance. Although most likely a symbolic one.

So yes — this vote is strategic, not enthusiastic. It's about keeping Cardano moving while holding the line on value, accountability, and progress.

VOTE0007

Rationale for Voting NO on Governance Action:

Set 2025 Net Change Limit of 300M ADA, 2026 Net Change Limit of 250M ADA

While I appreciate the urgency and effort behind this proposal to define a Net Change Limit (NCL) for the upcoming years, I am casting a NO vote for the following reasons:

1. Premature Commitment for 2026
   The Cardano ecosystem is still in the early stages of experimenting with on-chain budgeting and treasury processes. Committing to a fixed Net Change Limit for 2026 at this point introduces unnecessary rigidity. I would be more comfortable making that decision in early Q4 2025, when we will have more data on 2025 treasury dynamics, ecosystem needs, and governance maturity.

2. NCL Should Be Defined as a Percentage
   Defining the Net Change Limit as an absolute value, rather than as a percentage of the treasury or forecasted inflows, fails to account for future variability in Treasury size and ecosystem conditions. A percentage-based approach offers more resilience, aligns better with good financial practices, and scales naturally with ecosystem growth.

3. We Cannot Afford to Fail the 2025 Budget Process
   Passing a budget for 2025 is essential for the functioning of Cardano’s governance and development cycle. For that reason, and in line with the Treasury Guardrails, I am inclined to support the Intersect budget, which is a core operational priority. However, passing two Net Change Limits simultaneously is not advisable. I strongly support the fact that the Net Change Limit is being proposed by the community

4. 300M ADA for 2025 Seems Reasonable — But This Proposal Overreaches
   While the 300M ADA limit for 2025 aligns with projected inflows and appears to be a rational cap, bundling it with a 2026 figure undermines the opportunity for annual review. The proposal would have been stronger had it focused solely on 2025, leaving room for deeper deliberation next year.

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In summary, while I support a sustainable and community-driven approach to treasury management, this proposal locks us into a multi-year commitment prematurely. I encourage the authors and community to resubmit a revised, single-year version that incorporates feedback given by the Cardano Community and improve on it.

VOTE0006

🗳️ Voting Rationale for the 2025 Vision & Roadmap Proposal

I am voting YES on this proposal because it outlines a strong technical vision for Cardano, with clear priorities in scalability, modular architecture, L2 expansion, and developer experience. The roadmap demonstrates a deep understanding of the technological evolution needed to position Cardano at the forefront of blockchain innovation. The emphasis on Leios, Midgard, Peras, and modular node implementations is exactly what we need to ensure security, performance, and decentralization at scale. 🚀

However, a great product needs more than just technical excellence—it needs a clear commercial vision. While this roadmap lays the foundation for a powerful, scalable blockchain, it does not yet address where we want to take Cardano in the market, who we are building this for, and how we plan to communicate its value.

What’s Missing? A Commercial Vision I believe.

To truly drive adoption, we must define the strategic positioning of Cardano in the global blockchain economy:

Who are our primary users? Enterprise? Governments? DeFi users? Developers?

What problem are we solving for them? Scalability? Compliance? Cost-efficiency?

How do we market these innovations? We need a narrative around why Leios, Hydra, and AVS matter to real-world users.

How do we engage businesses and institutions? We should proactively work on business development strategies alongside this technical roadmap.

Right now, Cardano has some of the best technology in the space, but without a clear go-to-market strategy, the risk is that we build an amazing product that struggles to find adoption. We must complement this roadmap with a focused effort on adoption, partnerships, and commercial viability.

VOTE0005

Rationale for Voting NO on This Proposal

While I recognize the importance of optimizing Cardano's economic model and agree with the long-term need to reassess the treasury cut, I do not believe that now is the right time to implement this change. My opposition is not based on disagreement with the core idea but rather on concerns about timing, governance stability, and sustainability. Below are my key reasons for voting NO at this moment:

1. Timing – Governance is in a Transition Phase

Cardano is in the process of transitioning to a more decentralized governance system, with new mechanisms being tested for the first time.

Major economic changes should be implemented only after we have at least +12 Months of governance experimentation to ensure stability and adaptability.

Making such a significant adjustment before governance mechanisms are fully operational could create unintended consequences that we may not be well-equipped to address yet.

1. Support for a Structured, Long-Term Approach

I would support a gradual reduction of the treasury tax over time, rather than an immediate drop from 20% to 10%.

A phased approach (e.g., a **1-2% reduction per year) **would allow the ecosystem to monitor the effects on staking incentives, treasury sustainability, and governance funding.

Sudden reductions may destabilize treasury planning, especially since Cardano is still developing long-term funding strategies for ecosystem growth.

If the proposer still wants to move forward ASAP, then a gradual decrease or a reduction to a smaller percentage might be a more balanced approach. The proposer could break this into smaller reduction proposals throughout the year. 

1. Maximizing Decentralization First

Most ADA holders are still staking on exchanges, which means the network is not as decentralized as it should be.

Instead of reducing the treasury tax now, I would prioritize educating users about the benefits of delegating to Stake Pool Operators (SPOs). I know many people have been saying this for years, but now we got a budget where this could be properly address with funding and a profesional team. 

Encouraging more users to delegate directly to SPOs would increase participation, decentralization, and network security before making structural changes to rewards and treasury inflows. There are other incentives outside APY to make this happen, for example DEFI products, ICOs and other events. 

1. Staking Rewards Increase is Marginal

While increasing staking rewards does incentivize participation, I belileve the impact of this change is limited.

A projected APY increase from 4.0% to 4.5% is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on delegator behavior. 

Instead of focusing on a small percentage boost in rewards, we should look at broader incentive mechanisms to increase network engagement beyond APY adjustments.

1. Treasury Stability & Future Growth

The treasury plays a critical role in funding ecosystem development, governance, and future projects.

A reduction of 50% in treasury inflows (from 20% to 10%) might be sustainable at higher ADA prices, but relying on price appreciation alone is a risky strategy. What if we go back to 0,2-0,3 range, are we willing to cut funding for the protocol that much to mantain treasury superavit?

Before making cuts, we need more data on treasury spending efficiency, funding gaps, and the impact of the upcoming governance framework.

If treasury spending is an issue, I would prioritize:

Optimizing the budget to make it as efficient as possible.

Exploring alternative treasury allocations, such as using a portion for stablecoin/DeFi liquidity to generate sustainable growth for the Ecosystem, rather than spending it directly. 

1. Prioritizing Stability Over Rapid Change

In a structure as large as Cardano, we should prioritize slow, steady, and well-measured changes over rapid decisions that risk breaking things.

Of course, there are exceptions where fast action is needed, but in this case, I strongly believe a cautious, multi-year plan is the best approach.

Cardano still needs significant adoption before we can safely reduce treasury inflows.

That is why I always favor gradual, long-term economic changes rather than sudden shifts.

1. Reassessing This Discussion in 12 Months

I support the idea of reducing the treasury cut, but I believe we should reassess this proposal in 12 months once governance mechanisms have been tested.

A measured, strategic decrease over time (rather than a drastic cut) would allow for better planning and risk management.

I would be open to voting YES on a revised proposal that includes a structured, long-term tax reduction plan rather than an immediate drop.

Conclusion

I agree that increasing staking rewards can enhance participation, but this proposal moves too fast without enough governance experience to guide it. The treasury remains an essential tool for funding Cardano’s growth, and we need a more cautious, data-driven approach before making major changes. I know the proposers are experienced and professional, and I deeply appreciate they are bringing this discussion to the table.

I am writing this rationale without looking at how others are voting, to avoid being influenced by external opinions.

For now, I am voting NO—not because I disagree with the concept, but because I believe the timing is premature and a structured, phased approach would be a far better path forward.

DREP ID: drep1y2jd3c4hg...2e9zm6

Vote0004

I'm voting YES on the Cardano Constitution for the following reasons:

As a pragmatic supporter of governance, I believe Cardano must not fall behind. While this constitution is not perfect, it is a necessary and well-structured step toward decentralization and increased governance participation. As a Constitutional Delegate, I have personally engaged with the drafters, voiced my concerns, and seen genuine efforts to address them.

There are still areas that could be improved—such as budget clarity, the administrator role, and the election process for the Constitutional Committee—but the opportunity cost of delaying far outweighs the benefit of marginal refinements. The governance framework is solid, and the time to act is now. Delaying this decision would only create uncertainty and hinder the progress of decentralized governance.

Security is a top priority, but it is not something that can be guaranteed solely by the constitution. True security comes from broader participation in governance. The more ADA holders engage, delegate, and vote, the more resilient and decentralized the system becomes. This constitution provides a strong foundation, but its real strength will come from the active involvement of the community. Delaying its adoption does not make the network safer—on the contrary, it prolongs uncertainty and discourages engagement at a critical time. (We are already seeing examples of this.)

On the topic of DRep compensation, which is not exactly defined on the constitution, my stance has evolved. Initially, I saw it as essential, but now I believe we should take a measured approach. The current workload remains manageable, yet incentivizing more participation could benefit the ecosystem. A trial incentive model in 2025—not as a salary but as an encouragement—could be a productive next step, and I would support its inclusion in the next governance budget in order to incentivize the creation of new DReps.

This vote is not about achieving a perfect document today—it is about laying the foundation for a governance system that can evolve. Cardano’s governance allows for iteration and improvement, but that can only happen if we take the first step.

The progress made is significant, and striving for minor refinements at the cost of forward momentum would be a disservice to the ecosystem. That is why I am voting Yes.

Vote0003

Voting YES on renaming the next Cardano hard fork to the "Plomin Hard Fork" honoring Matthew Plomin, a beloved Cardano community member whose contributions embodied our ecosystem’s values.

Matthew’s legacy includes founding Moneta’s $USDM and supporting countless community members with his expertise and enthusiasm.

I am voting yes to honor his work and memory as a passionate member of the Cardano Community.

We will all miss you, Matthew.

ID: #0002