Pallamus

ABSTAIN — I see merit in exploring an increase of stakePoolTargetNum from 500 to 1000, particularly if it can improve stake distribution and create greater opportunity for independent SPOs. However, I am not yet convinced that doubling k will necessarily translate into greater operator decentralization rather than simply a larger number of pools.

Before supporting a future parameter change, I would like to see clearer analysis of its likely effects on operator concentration, delegation behavior, pool economics, and smaller SPOs.

I therefore abstain on this poll while remaining open to supporting the change if the evidence demonstrates a meaningful decentralization benefit.

YES — I previously supported reducing minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA when it was included in the earlier parameter-update action. That proposal did not take effect because the bundled action failed to meet the required SPO threshold.

My position on the underlying parameter change has not changed. Lowering minPoolCost gives smaller stake pools greater flexibility, reduces the fixed-cost burden on their delegators, and can support a more competitive and decentralized stake-pool ecosystem.

Because this proposal addresses the minPoolCost change directly and separately, I support it and vote YES.

NO — I recognize the potential value OpenZeppelin can bring to Cardano and I support efforts to strengthen the ecosystem’s developer infrastructure and security tooling. However, I am not convinced that the requested 11,787,063 ADA expenditure has been sufficiently demonstrated to be distinct from existing or ongoing Cardano ecosystem initiatives.

At this level of expenditure, the burden of proof should be high. The community should have a clear accounting of what capabilities already exist, what work is currently underway elsewhere in the ecosystem, what specific gaps remain, and why this particular scope requires an additional treasury commitment of this magnitude.

The proposal includes milestone-based controls and oversight, which I acknowledge positively. However, good administration does not by itself resolve questions of potential duplication, scope, necessity, or overall value to the treasury.

Until those questions are addressed with greater clarity, I cannot justify this withdrawal. I am therefore voting NO.

I voted YES on the proposal to reimburse the Ikigai governance action deposit.

I initially withheld my vote because I did not believe the proposal, on its own, provided enough evidence to justify reimbursement from the Cardano Treasury. When treasury funds are involved, especially in cases involving an individual loss or mistaken transaction, I believe DReps should require clear and independently verifiable evidence before approving reimbursement.

Following additional discussion, supporting information was provided that clarified the relationship between the original governance action, the deposit address, and the relevant withdrawal activity. After reviewing that information, I believe there is sufficient evidence to establish that the reimbursement request is legitimate.

It is also important to distinguish between a protocol failure and user error.

Based on the information provided, this does not appear to have been a Cardano protocol bug or a failure of the governance system itself. Rather, the loss appears to have resulted from user error within functionality that is operating according to the current CIP-1694 design and specification.

That distinction materially affected my decision.

I do not believe the Cardano Treasury should become an automatic insurance mechanism for mistakes made by users. Establishing such an expectation could create an unhealthy precedent in which ordinary operational errors are routinely transferred to the broader community.

However, governance also requires judgment. Not every situation can be reduced to a rigid rule without considering the specific facts involved.

In this instance, the circumstances have been documented sufficiently, the relevant transactions and addresses can be examined, and the amount being requested corresponds to the governance action deposit involved. I therefore believe reimbursement is reasonable and proportionate.

My support should not be interpreted as establishing a general policy that every lost governance deposit should be reimbursed. Future requests should continue to be evaluated individually and should meet a meaningful evidentiary standard.

At minimum, I believe reimbursement requests should demonstrate:

A clearly identifiable governance action and deposit.
Verifiable transaction history linking the funds to the claimant.
A credible explanation of how the funds became inaccessible or were lost.
Evidence sufficient for independent review by DReps and the community.
A reimbursement amount directly tied to the demonstrated loss.
No indication of fraud, manipulation, or an attempt to shift ordinary financial risk onto the Treasury.

This proposal now satisfies those concerns sufficiently for me.

An important part of responsible governance is also being willing to change a preliminary position when new evidence becomes available. My initial concern was the absence of adequate supporting information. Once members of the community provided additional context and evidence, continuing to oppose the proposal simply because I had previously expressed skepticism would have served no useful governance principle.

DRep voting should be based on evidence, not attachment to an earlier position.

For those reasons, I believe approving this reimbursement is fair, reasonable, and consistent with responsible treasury governance.

Vote: YES

Vote: NO

I am voting NO on the Governance Incentives Framework 2026 proposal in its current form.

I want to be clear that I am not opposed to the underlying objective of this proposal. Cardano governance needs sustainable participation, and the questions surrounding DRep engagement, voter participation, concentration of voting power, and the long-term sustainability of governance actors are important ones.

I also believe there is value in researching whether carefully designed incentives could improve governance participation without undermining decentralization.

My concern is with the level of specificity provided for the funding request itself.

The proposal requests more than ₳4.2 million from the Cardano Treasury to research, model, test, and pilot potential governance incentive mechanisms. I understand that the purpose of this work is to determine what an effective incentive framework might ultimately look like. I therefore do not expect the proposers to already know the final reward formula or permanent compensation model before the research is completed.

However, there is an important distinction between leaving the final research outcome open and leaving the structure of the funded experiment insufficiently defined.

Before authorizing a Treasury withdrawal of this size, I believe DReps and ADA holders should have greater clarity regarding how the funded pilot will operate, how Treasury funds will be controlled, and what safeguards will govern the experiment.

In particular, I would like to see clearer answers to several questions.

How will participants in the real-ADA incentive pilot be selected?

What eligibility requirements will apply?

How much of the overall Treasury request is specifically intended for incentive distribution, and how much is allocated to research, administration, development, community engagement, data collection, and other expenses?

How will ADA used in the pilot be distributed among participants?

What limits or caps will be placed on individual distributions?

Who will have authority over those distributions, and what oversight will exist over that process?

What safeguards will prevent conflicts of interest between the parties designing, administering, evaluating, and potentially benefiting from the incentive system?

What mechanisms will be used to prevent gaming, superficial participation, vote farming, or behavior designed primarily to maximize rewards rather than improve governance quality?

How will the pilot avoid reinforcing the very concentration of voting power that the proposal identifies as a concern?

What objective criteria will determine whether the pilot is successful, unsuccessful, or produces mixed results?

What conditions would cause the experiment to be modified, paused, or terminated?

What happens to ADA that is budgeted but ultimately not required?

How will expenditures and distributions be reported to the community throughout the project?

These questions matter because incentive systems can change behavior in ways that are difficult to reverse once financial expectations become established.

Cardano should be especially careful when introducing monetary incentives into governance. Poorly designed incentives could encourage participation in quantity while reducing participation in quality. They could reward activity rather than judgment, create new opportunities for gaming, advantage already dominant governance actors, or unintentionally encourage further concentration of delegated voting power.

The proposal itself recognizes many of these risks, which is one reason I believe the subject deserves serious research.

But recognizing those risks also strengthens the argument for clearly defining the boundaries and safeguards of the experiment before Treasury funds are approved.

A research proposal does not need to predetermine its conclusions. It should, however, clearly define the experiment being funded.

For a Treasury withdrawal exceeding four million ADA, I believe the community should be able to understand with reasonable precision what is being purchased, how funds will be deployed, what financial controls will apply, how success will be measured, and how the community will be protected if the experiment produces unintended consequences.

At this stage, I do not believe the proposal provides enough clarity in those areas for me to responsibly support the withdrawal.

This should not be interpreted as opposition to governance incentives themselves.

I am open to the possibility that governance incentives could eventually play a useful role in Cardano. Meaningful governance participation requires time, research, analysis, communication, and accountability, and there is a legitimate discussion to be had about whether those contributions should be compensated.

But supporting the research question does not automatically mean supporting every funding structure proposed to investigate it.

Treasury governance requires us to evaluate not only whether an idea has merit, but whether the specific request before us is sufficiently defined, accountable, and proportionate.

My responsibility as a DRep is not simply to determine whether I like the intended outcome. It is also to determine whether I can reasonably explain to my delegators what their Treasury is funding and what protections exist around that expenditure.

In this case, I do not yet believe I can do that with sufficient confidence.

For those reasons, I am voting NO in its current form.

I would be willing to reconsider a revised proposal that provides greater detail regarding the pilot design, participant selection, distribution mechanics, spending controls, oversight, conflict-of-interest protections, anti-gaming safeguards, measurable success criteria, reporting requirements, and treatment of unused Treasury funds.

Governance experimentation can be valuable, and Cardano should continue exploring ways to improve participation and decentralization.

But experimentation funded by the Treasury should have clearly defined boundaries and accountability from the beginning.

Before committing more than ₳4.2 million, I believe we should understand not only why this research is worth pursuing, but also how the experiment will be conducted, how Treasury ADA will be controlled, who may receive it, under what conditions, and with what safeguards.

Until those questions are answered more clearly, I can't responsibly support this Treasury withdrawal.