Wolfoden

I support both paramter changes.

In particular, reducing the minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA should significantly improve the economics of one block pools per epoch. The benefit for delegators of these pools increases substantially, making smaller pools more competitive and potentially supporting further decentralization.

As an SPO, I intend to reduce my own pool cost to 75 ADA once this parameter change becomes active.

I also welcome the reduction in treasury inflow caused by the lower minPoolCost!

The increase in Plutus memory limits is also a very welcome effect.

If you want to support my SPO, please consider staking with Pool: 300

• luckiest pool on-chain

I vote yes, as I did last time, for the same reason.

"The 100k ADA repayment is of course a given. I gladly agree to the interest rate."

Translated:
I have thought about this for a long time.

First, in Cardano’s current situation, research spending should face a very high bar. Treasury capital should primarily be allocated where we can expect direct and measurable benefits for adoption and the Cardano economy.

Second, my role as a DRep is a democratic one: to decide whether and how collective capital should be used in Cardano’s best interest. I do not believe Treasury funds should be used simply to financially incentivize more people to vote more often.

If money becomes the incentive for governance participation, the system will increasingly attract people for whom the payment itself is part of the motivation. In my view, monetizing democratic participation in this way does not strengthen democracy; it weakens it.

We can revisit DRep compensation in the future, when Cardano’s financial situation and the actual need for such a mechanism justify it more clearly.

Original:
Ich habe lange darüber nachgedacht. 1st haben Research-Ausgaben für mich in Cardanos aktueller Situation eine sehr hohe Hürde: Kapital sollte derzeit primär dort eingesetzt werden, wo ein direkter und messbarer Nutzen für Adoption und die Cardano zu erwarten ist. Zweitens ist meine Rolle als DRep eine demokratische: darüber zu entscheiden, ob und wie gemeinschaftliches Kapital im Interesse Cardanos eingesetzt wird. Ich halte es für falsch, Treasury-Geld dafür einzusetzen, mehr Menschen finanziell zum Abstimmen zu bewegen. Wenn Geld zum Incentive für Governance wird, zieht Governance Menschen an, für die das Geld selbst Teil der Motivation ist. Meiner Ansicht nach stärkt das Demokratie nicht, sondern schwächt sie. Über DRep Kompensation können wir zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt erneut entscheiden, wenn Cardanos finanzielle Situation und der tatsächliche Bedarf einen solchen Mechanismus klarer rechtfertigen.

I came here as a DRep because I want to vote for businesses.

I want Cardano´s Treasury to support companies; but the voting around PRIME is ... interesting.

The Inconsistency

Some of the same DReps who rejected of criticised proposals such as $Cash and Strike argued that the Treasury was constrained, that the NCL had to be respected and that there might not be enough room in the current budget period.

Those were not unreasonable concerns.

But it is difficult to take those concerns seriously when the same people are now prepared to approve a request of 120M ADA ($19.2M)

Treating proposals with comparatively small ,clearly defined business proposal as an unacceptable Treasury risk and than support a program asking 12-24x the amount. That´s peak inconsistency.

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Why I Vote Yes

I vote yes on AlphaGrowth´s Cardano PRIME, because it´s business and they have proven to invest in the right companys. I understand what they do and that work will be valuable for the Cardano Ecosystem.

But I do not believe Cardano should automatically prefer funding an intermediary that decides where money should go over funding individual businesses that already know what they need the money for. Alpha gets a vote of confidence from me; still -

I actually would like to know beforhand: Which businesses/protocols will receive it? How much will be spent on research, management, administration and incentives? How much capital is expected to remain on Cardano after the incentive period ends?

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The Infrastructure Problem

Cardano has already invested enormous amounts of time, capital and intellectual energy into infrastructure. We have repeatedly been told that once the infrastructure exists, users, businesses and liquidity will follow.

But they have not followed at the scale required. "If we build it, they wil come" has not worked. Building more of the same thing and expecting a different result is not a strat. It is institutional stubborness. (insert chicken trying to push its head through a fence analogy here)

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For the Future

For the future: Fund companies with identifiable teams, defined budgets, commercial plans and measurable milestones. Welcome to Finance 101.

Not every business proposal will succeed. Some will fail. Some DReps will dislike how a company intends to use the funds. That is part of investing in businesses.

Many DReps come from technical backgrounds rather than a business background. That is not an insult, but it creates a blind spot. A technically elegant plan is not automatically a commercially successful one, and a business does not become unworthy of funding merely because a DRep would have implemented a product differently.

In software development, there is almost never only one valid solution. The same applys in funding businesses.

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Bottom Line

A Treasury that never invests is useless. I am voting yes because Cardano needs liquidity, distribution and economic growth.

Following clarification regarding the allocation of funds, I will reassess my vote. I am changing my vote from affirmative to negative due to the lack of clarity surrounding Blockfrost's ownership, management, and decision-making processes.