Governance Incentives Framework 2026

System24d ago9 posts

On-chain changes

  • 4,207,967 ₳paid tostake1uyl...3s90c7as

Abstract

Cardano is approaching consequential decisions about governance incentives without a shared evidence base for determining which mechanisms work, what they cost, or who should remain accountable for their outcomes. The project separates evidence-based validation from governance legitimacy: candidate incentive mechanisms will first be evaluated through research, data, modeling, and evidence, and then presented to governance for a decision on adoption.

Significant work already exists across Cardano on governance compensation, participation, rationale incentives, reward distribution, voting-power concentration, and governance reward design. The Governance Incentives Working Group has already created a mapping document identifying 49 relevant efforts, proposals, research papers, tools, and related initiatives across this space [1]. This includes work developed through CPS-0020 [2], as well as CPS-0033 [3], CIP-0149 [4], Beyond MVG [6], formal reward-scheme research [7], process-first DRep compensation research [8], and Input Output Research’s Cardano Vision 2026 work [9]. The project will consider these existing ideas and approaches, examine their assumptions, advantages, disadvantages, and potential unintended effects, and combine them with further research, governance data, modeling, controlled testing, and community input to build research-backed community consensus around the most suitable governance incentive models for Cardano.

The result will be a practical Governance Incentives Framework, public dataset and dashboard, documented model and formula outputs, research publications, findings from a controlled incentive pilot, and a governance integration pathway. This directly supports Cardano 2030 Pillar 3 and, through its research and data infrastructure, Pillar 1.

Motivation & rationale

Cardano governance depends on sustained, informed, and high-integrity participation from governance actors and stakeholders. However, there is currently no structured and data-driven framework for determining how these contributions should be incentivized, measured, or supported over time.

This creates several risks, and early governance data already shows reasons for concern. During Cardano’s first year of on-chain governance, the number of active DReps declined in every 12-epoch period. At the same time, voting power became increasingly concentrated: the DRep Gini coefficient increased from 0.92 to 0.94, and between 11-16 DReps represent 51% of voting power [6]. The State of Governance research also identified an “incentive deficit” as one of five major structural barriers to effective governance. Sustainability concerns extend beyond DReps: one Constitutional Committee consortium retired due to lack of compensation [6]. Yet incentives also create risks of their own. Poorly designed mechanisms could reward surface-level activity, reinforce existing voting-power concentration, encourage gaming, or spend treasury resources without creating meaningful governance value.

Without a clear incentive framework that defines objectives and measures of success, Cardano lacks a way to identify which of the 49 approaches and findings make sense and risks making compensation decisions reactively, politically, or inconsistently. The ecosystem needs a coordinated way to determine which governance problems are actually incentive-related, which behaviors and contributions create value, which metrics are reliable, which actor groups require different treatment, and which mechanisms can strengthen sustained participation without undermining decentralization, accountability, or governance integrity.

Solution

The Governance Incentives Framework will create a structured, evidence-based approach for designing, testing, and evaluating governance incentives in Cardano. The framework is important because it defines the methodology and what should be achieved for governance incentives. Individual incentive models define specific reward mechanisms developed and tested within that framework.

We have mapped the existing landscape of governance incentive work. This will help avoid duplicated work and create a shared understanding of what already exists, what is missing, and where different initiatives can collaborate. The project will then define actor-specific incentive problems and distinguish between different types of contribution to establish a clear scope and a detailed roadmap toward a sustainable incentives framework.

Using governance activity data, community feedback, and expert input, the project will develop and simulate incentive models. These models will be assessed not only by whether they increase participation, but also by whether they support decentralization, reduce concentration risks, improve accountability, and avoid reward gaming, shallow compliance behavior, and other unintended effects. The modeling approach will build on both formal reward-scheme research and process-first Cardano-specific analysis [7, 8].

Where relevant, the project will reproduce and evaluate existing governance reward models, including the behavioral and cost assumptions developed in Reward Schemes and Committee Sizes in Proof of Stake Governance [7]. The project will test how well these assumptions transfer to Cardano’s live governance environment

A public website with information, dashboard and dataset will make the work transparent, educational and easier for the community to understand and review. In addition, a dedicated controlled incentive pilot work package will fund one clearly defined, controlled incentive experiment.

The final result will be a complete Governance Incentives Framework, including public research and community feedback reports, structured governance activity data, a public dashboard, documented incentive models and formula outputs, findings from controlled incentive pilot testing, and a clearly defined implementation pathway for future governance incentive mechanisms in Cardano. The project will produce and submit a Governance Incentives Framework CIP, supported by the project’s research, governance data, incentive models, community feedback, and controlled testing findings.

Strategic Alignment

The framework aligns primarily with Cardano 2030 Pillar 3 — Governance [5], and secondarily with Pillar 5 — Ecosystem Sustainability & Resilience and Pillar 1 — Infrastructure & Research Excellence.

Primary Alignment: Pillar 3 — Governance

Alignment with G.1 — Incentivized & Accessible Governance

Governance participation can depend on contributors having sufficient time, financial security, or institutional support. The project will evaluate how incentives can sustain broader participation while preserving accountability, decentralization, and governance integrity.

Alignment with G.2 — Turnout-Aware Voting with Delegator Safeguard

Higher activity or turnout will not be treated as sufficient evidence of success. Mechanisms will also be evaluated for participation quality, reward distribution, concentration, gaming risk, and effects on delegators to avoid rewarding superficial activity or reinforcing dominant actors.

Secondary Alignment: Pillar 5 — Ecosystem Sustainability & Resilience

By examining incentives for sustained participation across different actor types, the framework aims to reduce burnout, attrition, and dependence on highly resourced contributors, strengthening long-term governance resilience.

Secondary Alignment: Pillar 1 — Infrastructure & Research Excellence

Governance research, structured datasets, monitoring infrastructure, incentive models, and a public dashboard will create reusable evidence and infrastructure for future governance design and monitoring.

Milestones and Deliverables

The project will be delivered over 12 months through seven staged milestones. The work moves from discovery and framework design into data collection, modeling, community validation, dashboarding, controlled testing, and culminates in a submitted Governance Incentives Framework CIP and a practical governance integration pathway. Each milestone produces reviewable outputs that will be documented publicly.

Milestone 1: Initial Setup and Discovery

Estimated duration: Month 1–2

Establish the project foundation, review existing work, map related governance incentive initiatives, and define the initial problem space.

Key deliverables

  • Project kickoff and internal coordination structure.
  • Initial project roadmap and delivery plan.
  • Initial governance incentives initiative map.
  • Review summary of relevant prior work.
  • Initial incentive-design problem framing.
  • Initial actor and contribution landscape.
  • Initial community engagement plan.
  • Public communication channels and feedback process.
  • Public-facing website including basic information and question submission form.

Acceptance criteria

  • Governance Incentives Mapping Document finalized and filtered to the most relevant initiatives, research, and approaches.
  • Discovery outputs sufficient to define the initial incentive-design scope and roadmap for Milestone 2.
  • Public feedback channels operational.

Milestone 2: Framework and Parameter Definition

Estimated duration: Month 3–4

Develop the preliminary Governance Incentives Framework and define the initial categories of governance behaviors, parameters, risks, and incentive design constraints.

Key deliverables

  • Preliminary Governance Incentives Framework draft with supporting rationale.
  • Initial actor-specific incentive analysis.
  • State-of-the-Art Evidence Review synthesizing the relevant scientific and Cardano-specific evidence base for governance incentive design.
  • Initial parameter landscape for governance contributions and behaviors.
  • Initial risk and anti-gaming framework.
  • Initial governance integration considerations.
  • First structured community feedback sessions or open discussions.
  • Updated initiative map based on community input and related work.
  • Early requirements for data collection and monitoring.
  • Produce a report assessing possible technical pathways for delivering rewards, including protocol-level and smart-contract-based approaches.
  • Controlled incentive pilot testing plan, including a predefined experimental duration.
  • Measurement and reporting plan.

Acceptance criteria

  • Preliminary framework completed, clearly distinguishing governance actor groups and incentive contexts.
  • Initial parameter categories and key incentive-design risks documented without locking in final formulas.
  • Community feedback documented and routed into relevant work packages.
  • State-of-the-Art Evidence Review completed and 10+ research questions submitted to researchers.
  • Pilot testing plan completed, with the intended middle-out basis and material pre-launch changes documented publicly.

Milestone 3: Community Engagement and Data Collection Start

Estimated duration: Month 5–6

Begin governance activity monitoring and deepen community validation of the framework assumptions. The middle-out pilot is an early controlled test of one existing mechanism and does not prejudge the project’s final incentive-model selection; its findings will inform the later comparison, refinement, and validation of multiple candidate mechanisms.

Key deliverables

  • Initial governance data collection infrastructure.
  • First working version of monitoring scripts or data pipelines.
  • Initial structured governance activity dataset.
  • Public update on framework progress and open questions.
  • Community feedback sessions focused on incentive risks, actor-specific needs, possible parameters, anti-concentration concerns, and relationship to existing initiatives.
  • Updated framework assumptions based on early data and feedback.
  • Documentation of data sources, limitations, and reliability considerations.
  • Apply the finalized pilot specification.
  • Pilot/Experiment started.

Acceptance criteria

  • Governance data can be collected and structured, with sources and known limitations documented.
  • Stakeholder feedback summarized and open modeling questions identified for the next milestone.
  • Pilot script successfully tested and controlled middle-out pilot launched.

Milestone 4: Incentive Modeling and Simulation

Estimated duration: Month 7–8

Develop and test initial incentive models using collected data, community-validated assumptions, and relevant formal and process-first reward research [7, 8].

Key deliverables

  • Initial incentive model designs.
  • Simulation scenarios for different incentive mechanisms.
  • Initial payment or reward calculation logic.
  • Analysis of potential effects on participation, rationale quality, sustained engagement, reward distribution, voting-power concentration, gaming risks, and budget sustainability.
  • Initial technical feasibility review.
  • Community-facing explanation of early modeling assumptions.
  • Updated risk and trade-off documentation.

Acceptance criteria

  • At least one model or mechanism family documented and simulated, with assumptions clearly explained.
  • Simulations cover intended effects and relevant failure modes, including concentration, gaming, and budget risks.
  • Results shared in a form governance stakeholders can review.

Milestone 5: Dashboard, Public Review, and Model Refinement

Estimated duration: Month 9–10

Make the project’s data, assumptions, and model outputs easier to inspect, and refine the framework based on testing and feedback.

Key deliverables

  • Initial dashboard or dashboard prototype.
  • Visualizations of relevant governance activity data.
  • Updated incentive model based on testing and feedback.
  • Updated framework architecture.
  • Public explanation of what the dashboard shows and does not show.
  • Feedback cycle on dashboard usability, model interpretation, and incentive risks.
  • Updated documentation of assumptions, limitations, and next steps.

Acceptance criteria

  • Public-facing dashboard or prototype available with documented data, visualizations, and limitations.
  • Stakeholder feedback on dashboard usability and model interpretation collected.
  • Model and framework refined based on data, testing, and feedback.

Milestone 6: Final Validation

Estimated duration: Month 11

Finalize and validate the framework.

Key deliverables

  • Final candidate incentive mechanism set.
  • Final community feedback sessions.
  • Final validation report covering the framework, model performance, pilot evidence, risks, and trade-offs.

Acceptance criteria

  • Final validation report completed, covering framework performance, model evidence, pilot findings, risks, and trade-offs.
  • Final community feedback, remaining risks, limitations, and unresolved questions documented.

Milestone 7: Final Report and Governance Integration Pathway

Estimated duration: Month 12

Conclude the project with final documentation, handover materials, and a practical pathway for future governance integration.

Key deliverables

  • Final Governance Incentives Framework report.
  • Final governance activity dataset.
  • Final dashboard and documentation.
  • Final candidate incentive models and formula documentation.
  • Final controlled incentive pilot findings report.
  • At least one publication-ready research paper completed and submitted to an appropriate peer-reviewed venue.
  • Community feedback report.
  • Completed and submitted Governance Incentives Framework CIP.
  • Governance integration pathway identifying any complementary CPS, treasury-withdrawal, protocol, or governance-action routes required for implementation.
  • Handover documentation for future maintainers, data auditors, reviewers, or governance bodies.
  • Final financial and milestone report.
  • Governance action submitted to DReps seeking approval of the completed Governance Incentives Framework and its recommended incentive-model pathway.

Acceptance criteria

  • Final framework, report, dataset, dashboard, model documentation, and pilot findings publicly available.
  • Final framework traces recommendations to research, data, modeling, community feedback, and pilot evidence.
  • Governance Incentives Framework CIP completed, published, and submitted through the established CIP process.
  • Governance integration pathway documented and governance action submitted to DReps for consideration.
  • Final financial and delivery reporting completed according to administration and audit requirements.

Metrics and KPIs

1. Framework Development

Governance Incentives Mapping: Completed by end of Month 2

First Framework draft: by end of Month 4

2. Active Community Engagement (12 month period)

Unique Governance actors engaged: 50+

Public Workshops held: 10+

Feedback Documentation: Material stakeholder feedback documented and incorporated or addressed with rationale.

Public Progress Updates: 12 monthly public project updates published.

3. Modeling of Incentives

Parameter validation: 100% of parameters are available

Preliminary models archived & available: 100% (while website is maintained by us)

Simulation Scenarios: 50+ scenarios

Failure-Mode Testing Against: anti-gaming, anti-concentration, and budget constraints.

Developer Feedback: positive feasibility assessment

4. Data Engineering & Governance Monitoring

Monitoring service availability: ≥99%

Data processing and database update latency: <1 hour

Data Documentation: Published datasets include definitions, sources, methodology, and known limitations.

5. Website and Dashboard

Website & Dashboard Launch: On schedule (Milestones)

Amount of meaningful Dashboards created: 5+

Page Load Speed: <3 seconds

6. Administration

Timeline Adherence: 95%+ of deliverables finished on time

Milestones Reported: 100%

Risk Management: 100% of high and critical risks have an owner & mitigation plan.

Public Reporting: 12 monthly progress reports

7. Research (IOR dependency)

Research Question: 10+ research questions submitted

Research Output: 1+ publication-ready research paper completed and submitted for peer review

Experiment: pilot-related research questions addressed and findings documented

State-of-the-Art Evidence Review: completed and published by end of Month 4

8. Pilot

Pilot Findings Report: Pilot methodology, results, deviations, limitations, and implications published

Team / Track Record

In late 2024, Sebastian and Seomon met at the Cardano Tech Hackathon shortly before the Constitution Summit. There, they began examining Cardano governance incentives and developed an initial model for rewarding governance actors. A few months later, they stepped back to define the underlying problem more rigorously, resulting in CPS-0020 - Governance Stakeholder Incentivization [2]. They concluded that designing an effective incentive model for governance actors required a dedicated research and development effort rather than a side project. This proposal seeks the resources needed to undertake that work for the wider Cardano community.

Seomon:

  • Cardano Builder (https://zkpoker.io)
  • Civics Committee member - elected on a governance incentives platform; Governance Incentives Working Group Lead
  • Cardano Ambassador
  • Constitutional Alternate Delegate
  • Successfully closed out 10+ Catalyst proposals

Sebastian Pereira:

  • Led a project to design better citizen ID collection in Bolivia for the CAN (Comunidad Andina)
  • Worked for the Bolivia Ministry of Planning as part of the Government Subsidy Department
  • EMURGO Blockchain Instructor
  • Copywriter on over 20 projects
  • Co-creator of Cardano Smart developer bot
  • Blockchain consultant
  • Successfully closed out:
  • Cardano Smart: AI assistant for documentation and on-chain/off-chain development - 170,000 ADA
  • Smart Pack: parcels damage verification system on Cardano - 100,000 ADA
  • Littlefish - Coordinating Action - 43,500 ADA

Cerkoryn - Consultant and Research Contributor:

As part of the Cardano Incentives Working Group, Cerkoryn has proposed multiple CIPs addressing stake-pool incentives. His paper, Beyond Binary Outcomes: A Process-First Reward Design for dRep Compensation [8], analyzes how alternative reward mechanisms may affect participation, decentralization, and reward concentration, and informs his contribution to this proposal.

Budget Summary

The proposal presents workstream-level allocations rather than every operational line item.

Budget area ADA

Conceptualization ₳445,000.00

Active Community Engagement ₳366,400.00

Modeling of Incentives ₳884,000.00

Data Engineering & Governance Monitoring ₳295,000.00

Website and Dashboard ₳253,333.33

Administration and Coordination ₳472,000.00

Science and Research ₳476,666.67

Pilot ₳333,333.33

Additional Costs (tooling, legal, and travel) ₳118,666.67

Contingency Reserve ₳437,328.00

Independent Audit and Oversight ₳126,239.00

Total ₳4,207,967.00

The detailed operational budget is maintained separately for audit, administration, and delivery management. This proposal presents only workstream-level allocations. The Website and Dashboard allocation covers 12 months of project delivery and six months of post-project maintenance.

Expected Value and Impact

The Governance Incentives Framework will create value by reducing uncertainty before Cardano adopts permanent governance incentive mechanisms. Rather than assuming that increased activity or compensation automatically improves governance, the project will provide the research, data, models, public review processes, and controlled testing needed to evaluate which mechanisms create value and which introduce new risks.

Reducing long-term incentive risk

This one-year R&D investment is intended to inform governance incentive mechanisms that could distribute substantial treasury funds for many years. Poorly designed incentives can create recurring costs without gaining substantial value by rewarding low-value activity, reinforcing concentration, encouraging gaming, excluding smaller actors, or requiring expensive redesign after implementation.

Better-informed governance decisions

The current 2026–27 Net Change Limit permits up to ₳350 million in treasury withdrawals over its applicable period. The ₳4.21 million project budget represents approximately 1.20% of that limit, illustrating the scale of this one-time R&D investment relative to the treasury resources that governance mechanisms can influence over time.

Reduced duplication and fragmentation

The project has already identified 49 related efforts, proposals, papers, tools, and initiatives. This will identify overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for coordination, therefore reducing the risk that the community funds duplicative work or develops incompatible approaches in parallel.

Reusable public infrastructure

Without shared infrastructure, every future governance-incentive proposal may need to pay again for data collection, metric definition, analysis, and visualization. The project will create reusable datasets, pipelines, metrics, models, and dashboard components that reduce the setup cost of later governance research and monitoring.

Tested incentive mechanisms

Candidate incentive mechanisms will be modeled and simulated against participation, reward distribution, voting-power concentration, gaming risks, budget sustainability, and other relevant criteria, informed by prior formal and Cardano-specific reward-design research [7, 8]. A controlled incentive pilot will provide practical evidence about at least one selected mechanism, subject to the project’s defined safeguards.

Implementation readiness and accountability

The project will translate its findings into a submitted Governance Incentives Framework CIP and a practical pathway covering governance, treasury, protocol, and implementation needs. Public datasets, model assumptions, milestone reporting, financial oversight, and refund conditions will allow the community to scrutinize both the recommendations and the use of funds.

Contributor sustainability

A better understanding of governance workloads, contribution types, and incentive requirements can help Cardano address burnout, attrition, inconsistent participation, and dependence on contributors with substantial personal or institutional resources.

Risks and Challenges

Risk Overview

The project faces potential risks across technical, organizational, community, and governance dimensions. This section lists some of the more likely risks, mitigation strategies and contingency plans.

1 Community Engagement

Risk: Low participation or skepticism limits project value. Probability: High | Impact: High

Mitigation: Monthly workshops, transparent documentation, continuous community engagement on different platforms (X, GitHub, YouTube, Cardano Forum, Intersect)

Contingency: Increase engagement activities, address concerns transparently, adjust communication strategy.

2 Governance Framework Changes

Risk: Framework changes invalidate recommendations. Probability: Medium | Impact: Medium

Mitigation: Monitor governance evolution, design flexible models, maintain leadership communication, plan updates.

Contingency: Develop alternative scenarios, update models if changes occur, extend timeline.

3 Technical Integration

Risk: Ledger integration faces technical obstacles. Probability: Low-Medium | Impact: Medium

Mitigation: Early developer engagement, technical planning, and architectural support.

Contingency: Develop alternative approaches, extend timeline, collaborate on protocol modifications.

4 Model Validation

Risk: Models may not accurately predict real-world participation patterns. Probability: Medium | Impact: High

Mitigation: Rigorous backtesting, sensitivity analysis, edge-case testing, expert review, Pilot program.

Contingency: Refine parameters, expand model complexity, extend validation timeline.

Administration / Audit / Oversight Support

The budget includes ₳126,239.00 for Administration / Audit / Oversight Support. This allocation represents 3% of the complete project budget, including the audit allocation itself.

This allocation supports proportional administration and required independent auditing connected to the treasury withdrawal process. The goal is to provide accountability without creating unnecessary administrative overhead for a grant-style governance R&D project.

Pilot / Controlled Experiment

The middle-out mechanism [8] will serve as an early controlled experiment, not as the project’s final incentive model. It will test how DReps respond to real financial incentives and whether predicted effects on participation, reward distribution, decentralization, and concentration persist when participants can adapt their behavior.

The pilot will examine sustained voting activity, which DRep types respond, strategic adaptation and gaming, and differences between observed reward distributions and model predictions. A script will apply the finalized pilot specification and distribute eligible ADA rewards with minimal technical overhead; findings will inform later comparison and refinement of candidate mechanisms.

The middle-out mechanism is the basis of the pilot. Before launch, parameters, safeguards, eligibility rules, and implementation details may be refined through research, simulation, technical testing, expert review, and community feedback; material changes will be documented publicly. Once launched, rules remain fixed except for predefined safety or termination conditions.

Contingency use

The proposal includes a 12% contingency reserve of ₳437,328.00 for justified unforeseen costs during the 12-month project.

The contingency reserve is not an unrestricted spending line. Any use of contingency funds will be documented through milestones or financial reporting to the auditors.

Refund Conditions

Unused restricted reserves, such as unused contingency or unused pilot funds, will be returned to the Cardano Treasury if they are not needed for the approved project scope. A final reconciliation will be published as part of the oversight reporting cycle. In the event of partial delivery or scope reduction, unspent funds associated with cancelled or reduced deliverables will be returned proportionally.

Input Output Research (IOR) includes research on governance incentives in its funded Cardano Vision 2026 proposal [9]. To avoid duplicating work already funded by the community, any overlapping research subjects will be coordinated with IOR. Where overlap makes a planned work package unnecessary, in whole or in part, the corresponding unused allocation will be returned to the Cardano Treasury.

Rationale highlights

Why some of the largest DReps voted for and against, in their own words. About vote rationales

  • No441.6M ₳

    I vote NO on the Governance Incentives Framework 2026. I agree that governance incentives are needed. My main reason for voting NO is that this proposal does not build the real bottleneck — consensus formation — into its success conditions, and is therefore...

    I vote NO on the Governance Incentives Framework 2026.
    I agree that governance incentives are needed. My main reason for voting NO is that this proposal does not build the real bottleneck — consensus formation — into its success conditions, and is therefore likely to end as the addition of a 50th research artifact.

    1.The bottleneck is not a lack of research. The proposal itself counts 49 existing studies and initiatives it would consolidate (CPS-0020, CIP-0149, reward-scheme research, and more). The reason that years of research have still not led to the adoption of any mechanism is not missing knowledge — it is the difficulty of reaching agreement.

    2.No numerical consensus target — such as the 67% of DRep stake required for treasury withdrawals (or 51% of active DRep IDs) — is built into the milestone stages. The KPIs measure engagement volume only (10+ workshops, 50+ actors engaged); zero indicators measure the degree of agreement achieved. In other words, by design, the project can complete 100% of its milestones and receive the full ₳4.21M while ending with zero DRep consensus.

    3.Having attempted this problem myself and abandoned it, I can say this is a political-coordination problem, not a research problem. Principled opposition to the very idea of incentives, disagreements over amounts, over whether penalties should be tied to voting metadata, over how to treat abstain — roughly 1,300 active DReps each hold their own different opinions on reward formulas and parameters. Researching and adding one more excellent formula simply turns 1,300 opinions into 1,301. The center of this work should be coordination requiring strong interpersonal negotiation skills — in practice, lobbying.

    4.And the measured data has repeatedly argued against that consensus materializing. The same proposers' 2025 version (₳515k) was not funded. In the 2026 community budget vote, adjacent proposals that explicitly stated in their own texts that they would integrate with this team's research (submitted separately by Voltaire Swarm OÜ) were rejected by wide margins — 12.9% Yes share (rank 54 of 69) and 2.9% (rank 63), while the 13 approved proposals ranged from 70–95%. And this proposal itself is on the same trajectory: Yes 4 DReps / ₳4.3M vs No 12 DReps / ₳128.6M (a 3.2% Yes share) as of epoch 650.


    Governance Incentives Framework 2026にNOを投票します。

    ガバナンス・インセンティブの必要性には同意します。その上でNOとする主な理由は、この提案が真のボトルネックである「合意形成」を成功条件に組み込んでおらず、最終的に50個目の研究資料の追加に終わる可能性が高いと考えるためです。

    1.ボトルネックは研究不足ではありません。提案自身が、統合対象として49の既存研究・取り組み(CPS-0020、CIP-0149、報酬設計研究など)を数え上げています。何年も研究されてきて、いまだどの仕組みも採用に至っていない理由は、知見の不足ではなく合意形成の困難さです。

    2.国庫引き出しに必要なDRepステークの67%(あるいは有効DRep IDの51%)といった合意の数値目標はマイルストーンの段階に組み込まれておらず、KPIはワークショップ10回以上・関与アクター50名以上といったエンゲージメントの量のみで、合意の達成度を測る指標はゼロです。つまり、全マイルストーンを100%達成して全額₳4.21Mを受け取りながら、DRepの合意はゼロのまま終わることが設計上可能です。

    3.私自身、以前この課題に取り組んで挫折した経験から言えば、これは研究の問題ではなく政治的調整の問題です。インセンティブという発想自体への原理的反対、金額の多寡、投票メタデータへのペナルティの是非、abstainの扱い——約1,300のアクティブDRepが、それぞれ異なる報酬式とパラメータの意見を持っています。優れた計算式をもう1つ研究して追加しても、1,300の意見が1,301になるだけです。この仕事の中心は高い対人交渉能力による調整(実質的なロビー活動)であるべきです。

    4.そしてその合意の見通しを、実測データが繰り返し否定しています。同じ提案者による2025年版(₳515k)は資金化されず。2026年のコミュニティ予算投票では、本チームの研究との統合を提案文中で明記していた隣接提案(提出者は別のVoltaire Swarm OÜ)が、Yes率12.9%(69件中54位)と2.9%(63位)で大差の否決(承認13件は70〜95%)。そして本提案自体も、epoch 650時点でYes 4 DRep/₳4.3M対No 12 DRep/₳128.6M(Yes率3.2%)と、同じ軌道にあります。

  • No170.6M ₳

    The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We support evidence-led work on governance incentives, however this proposal's principal deliverable duplicates research the treasury has already funded, and its administration does not secure the 4,207,967 ada requested. A...

    The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We support evidence-led work on governance incentives, however this proposal's principal deliverable duplicates research the treasury has already funded, and its administration does not secure the 4,207,967 ada requested.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Governance incentive design is a public good, and the proposers' work on CPS-0020 and within the Governance Incentives Working Group has helped frame the problem for the ecosystem. Our decision is driven by the following factors:

    • The terminal deliverable is already funded. Input Output Research's Cardano Vision 2026, ratified at Epoch 636 with 74.96 percent approval at 32,916,000 ada, carries WP6, "Governance Incentive Models & Mechanism [Report/Paper + CIP]", targeted for Q4 2026, ahead of this proposal's month-twelve CIP. The stated mitigation is coordination with IOR, but no specific work package, ada value, or trigger is attached to it, and the refund commitment it supports is therefore undefined.
    • The funds are not secured. The withdrawal pays to a key-controlled account registered one day before submission and identical to the deposit return address. The proposal names no administrator, which Article II.7.5 requires. On enactment the full sum is released upfront and the seven milestones, monthly reports, unnamed auditor and refund conditions become voluntary undertakings.
    • The motivating figures do not verify. Measured over active, non-expired DReps, we do not find the reported Gini rise from 0.92 to 0.94: the coefficient peaked at 0.9167 in Epoch 555 and stands at 0.8931. Nor do active DRep counts decline in every 12-epoch period. Neither claim states its DRep population — and on the top of the distribution the proposal understates the concern, with 9 DReps holding 51 percent of active voting power against the 11 to 16 cited.
    • The budget is presented without justification. Workstream totals carry no headcount, FTE allocation, rates, or milestone-level split, including 472,000 ada of administration and coordination for three named contributors. The pilot, the one component IOR's work does not cover, is 333,333 ada.

    The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We encourage the proposers to pursue this subject through the Working Group, the CIP process and coordination with the research already funded, rather than through a further treasury request.

    ---

    > **_NOTE on 'Internal Voting':_**

    > The fields _constitutional_ and _unconstitutional_ below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are _for_ or _against_ the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well.

  • Yes16.3M ₳

    Vote: YES This is a Treasury Withdrawal (gov_action174lclj6wswk3km6chl755vp24ja44yy8fjput7z20795hdpuax7qq67pvcp), proposed in epoch 649 and expiring epoch 656, requesting ₳4,207,967 for a twelve-month research program into Cardano's governance incentive...

    Vote: YES

    This is a Treasury Withdrawal (gov_action174l...67pvcp), proposed in epoch 649 and expiring epoch 656, requesting ₳4,207,967 for a twelve-month research program into Cardano's governance incentive mechanisms. The work is led by Seomon, Sebastian Pereira and Cerkoryn of the Governance Incentives Working Group, structured across seven milestones producing an incentives mapping, actor-specific models, simulations against real governance data, a governance activity dataset and dashboard, one controlled pilot, and a final framework submitted as a CIP. No compensation scheme is enacted by this action; the deliverable is evidence and a recommendation the community can then accept or reject on its merits.

    Dracula DAO judges research proposals on whether the question is worth answering, whether the answer is worth its price, and whether it will actually improve governance. On the first test this clears comfortably. The problem is documented rather than speculative: the number of active DReps has declined in every twelve-epoch period since governance went live, and between eleven and sixteen DReps now control fifty-one percent of voting power. Concentration at that level is a threat to the legitimacy of on-chain governance itself, and it is precisely the sort of slow-moving structural risk that an ultra long-term approach demands be addressed before it hardens. The alternative to funding this work is not saving ₳4.2M; it is deciding DRep compensation reactively, under pressure, with no evidence base — and a badly designed incentive that rewards superficial voting or further entrenches large holders would cost the ecosystem far more than this proposal asks.

    On the third test the proposal is better hedged than most research asks. A framework CIP can be ignored, and Dracula DAO does not assume this one will be adopted. But the governance activity dataset, the dashboard, and the pilot results retain their value independently of whether the framework is ratified: they become shared infrastructure for anyone reasoning about participation, and they outlast this particular team's conclusions. The commitment to test one mechanism in a controlled pilot with predefined termination conditions, rather than modeling in the abstract, is the right methodology. The proposal also returns unused contingency and pilot reserves to the treasury, and refunds proportionally where deliverables are cancelled or reduced.

    The honest concern is price. ₳472,000 for administration and ₳437,328 held as contingency together account for roughly a fifth of the ask, ₳253,333 for a website and dashboard is generous for what it is, and the proposal states that the detailed operational budget is maintained separately rather than exposing it here. The seven milestones read as a delivery plan rather than as payment gates, and the ₳126,239 audit and oversight allocation is thinly specified. Dracula DAO's standing preference remains payment against signed-off delivery with unspent funds returning to the treasury, and this proposal approximates that only partially. Dracula DAO expects the oversight function to be independent of the delivery team and the milestone reporting to be public, and will judge any follow-on request from this working group against what was actually produced.

    Weighed against the value of the question, the durability of the artifacts, and an amount that sits below other governance and infrastructure work this DREP has supported, the concerns are about efficiency rather than merit. The health of the DRep body is foundational to everything else Cardano governance decides, and it is currently deteriorating on measurable trend. Dracula DAO votes YES.

  • Yes8.9M ₳

    RCADA votes YES on Governance Incentives Framework 2026 . RCADA supports this proposal because healthy governance is critical to the long-term security, decentralisation, and sustainability of Cardano. Governance is not a side issue; it underpins how...

    RCADA votes YES on Governance Incentives Framework 2026.

    RCADA supports this proposal because healthy governance is critical to the long-term security, decentralisation, and sustainability of Cardano. Governance is not a side issue; it underpins how Treasury funds are allocated, how protocol changes are reviewed, how representatives remain accountable, and how the ecosystem makes decisions over time.

    RCADA recognises that governance participation is already showing signs of strain. DRep activity, voter fatigue, voting-power concentration, and the sustainability of unpaid governance work are real issues. RCADA has also experienced the workload and fatigue involved in reviewing complex governance actions responsibly. These problems should not be ignored or addressed only through informal debate.

    At the same time, RCADA does not believe that governance incentives should be rushed or based on assumptions. Poorly designed incentives could reward shallow activity, increase concentration, encourage gaming, or create recurring Treasury costs without improving governance quality. The proposal correctly recognises that incentives can create risks as well as benefits.

    RCADA supports this proposal because it takes a research-first approach. The project aims to build a public evidence base, structured datasets, dashboards, modelling, simulations, community feedback, and a controlled pilot before any permanent incentive mechanism is proposed. This is the right sequence: evidence first, governance decision later.

    RCADA also sees value in the visibility this work could bring to wider governance discussions. A shared dataset and public dashboard could help DReps, delegators, SPOs, Constitutional Committee members, researchers, and ecosystem participants have more informed discussions about governance participation, contribution quality, voting concentration, workload, and incentive design. This could also support more mature marketplace discussions around delegation, representation, and accountability.

    The proposal identifies significant existing work across Cardano, including governance compensation, participation, rationale incentives, voting-power concentration, reward distribution, and governance reward design. It also states that the Governance Incentives Working Group has mapped 49 relevant efforts, proposals, research papers, tools, and related initiatives, which should help reduce duplication and improve coordination.

    RCADA’s support should not be interpreted as approval of any specific future DRep compensation model or permanent incentive scheme. This vote supports research, data infrastructure, modelling, controlled testing, public review, and a governance integration pathway. Any permanent incentive mechanism should return to governance for separate review and approval.

    RCADA expects strong attention to anti-gaming design, concentration risk, transparency, auditability, budget discipline, and independence. Governance incentives must strengthen decentralisation and accountability, not reward participation for its own sake or entrench already-powerful actors.

    On balance, RCADA supports this action because Cardano needs hard data and structured analysis to make meaningful decisions about governance incentives. Healthy governance is essential to Cardano’s future, and resolving voter fatigue, participation decline, and voting-power concentration requires evidence-based work rather than guesswork.

    RCADA’s full vote assessment can be found here:
    https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/

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