Governance ReviewNo. 7Epochs 535 to 53719 Jan 2025 to 3 Feb 2025
The Plomin hard fork is ratified with 66.0% of pool stake
The Plomin hard fork took effect in epoch 537, making DRep approval a requirement for treasury withdrawals, committee changes and other binding governance actions. A proposal to replace Cardano's interim constitution arrived in the same epoch and drew 146 DRep votes.
All seven committee members find Plomin constitutional
Hard Fork to Protocol Version 10 (“Plomin” Hard Fork) was ratified at the start of epoch 536 with 66.0% of counted pool stake behind it against a 51% bar. Pool shares in this edition are yes stake over counted pool stake: abstaining stake is left out, and on a hard fork stake that did not vote counts as no, whatever a pool’s reward account is delegated to. All seven committee members found it constitutional: Input Output and the Cardano Japan Council in epoch 534, the Cardano Atlantic Council, the Eastern Cardano Council, the Cardano Foundation, the Intersect Constitutional Council and Emurgo in epoch 535. Pools had been voting on it since epoch 529.
Plomin against the pool and committee thresholds
Yes share of counted stake for the pools, yes votes over active members for the committee
Input Output wrote in epoch 534 that more than 90 days had passed since the Chang hard fork, that the technical review in that time had included monitoring of live networks, independent testing, a regression suite and benchmark reporting, and that at least 85% of pools by active stake ran a node able to process the new rules. The Intersect Constitutional Council wrote in epoch 535 that the readiness report of Intersect’s hard fork working group showed 86% of blocks produced with the safe node release, and that it read the 85% target as a recommendation rather than a hard rule. It also found that the minimum of 18 epochs the interim guardrails gave DReps to register and campaign had passed. The Cardano Atlantic Council added that tooling, applications and a majority of centralized exchanges by managed liquidity had indicated readiness. The Eastern Cardano Council found the action constitutional on a 5 to 1 vote among its members, acknowledging “meaningful risks regarding DRep participation” and finding that the action’s technical compliance outweighed them.
The HEPHY pool voted yes in epoch 535 after its own readiness check: 61.3% of exchange liquidity reported ready and another 24.8% in progress, 86% of that epoch’s blocks validated by nodes on the new release, and most tooling, wallets and applications ready. It named DRep distribution and ada holder participation as “the only reservation remaining” and counted 16 DReps that together could reach the 60% threshold a future hard fork needs.
Plomin takes effect and DReps get a binding vote
The hard fork took effect at the start of epoch 537, ending the bootstrap phase of Cardano governance and making DRep approval a requirement for every kind of action that can be enacted, a treasury withdrawal, a committee change and a new constitution among them.
DReps cast 146 votes on the constitution proposal
From epoch 529 to epoch 536 no DRep cast a vote, while the hard fork, on which DRep votes did not count, was the only proposal open. At epoch 536, 575 of the 673 DReps holding delegated power had no vote in the previous twelve epochs.
Cardano Constitution to Replace the Interim Constitution, the first proposal filed under the new rules, was submitted in epoch 537. Its document gives the date as 30 January 2025, one day before the interim constitution’s deadline for submitting its replacement on chain. DReps cast 146 votes on it in that epoch, 142 yes, 3 no and 1 abstain, and its voting could run until the start of epoch 544.
The count of DReps with a vote in the previous twelve epochs rose from 99 at epoch 536 to 190 at epoch 537, and 137 DReps cast a final vote in the window. At the epoch 537 reading, 686 DReps held ₳3.00B of delegated power, ₳161.4M more than at epoch 535 and the highest reading up to then. Power delegated to the always abstain option, which that total leaves out, rose from ₳1.76B to ₳2.39B over the same two readings. The window holds 243 votes with superseded votes included, 146 from DReps, 92 from pools and 5 from committee members. The treasury reading rose ₳8.9M to ₳1.66B, with no withdrawal paid.
Decided in this window
| Action | Outcome | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Hard Fork to Protocol Version 10 ("Plomin" Hard Fork) | Enacted 537 | n/a |
n/a: DReps had no vote on this action under the rules then in force.
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Cardano Constitution to Replace the Interim Constitution | Voting ends at the start of epoch 544 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 535
- ₳2.83B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 537
- ₳3.00B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 243
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 137
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 535
- ₳1,655.1M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 537
- ₳1,664.0M
- Pool shares are yes stake over counted pool stake, with abstaining stake left out and stake that did not vote counted on the no side, whatever a pool's reward account is delegated to. This is the rule for a hard fork and not the rule for every action type. Pool vote counts are every pool vote recorded on the hard fork. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
- How many pools voted yes is not settled in the record: its decision tally holds 666 and its separate pool summary 671, and it does not reconcile the two. No pool yes count is quoted here for that reason, only the stake share, which both agree on.
- The record stores no DRep vote and a DRep share of zero for the hard fork, so the table shows no share for it rather than a nought. That DRep votes did not count on a hard fork before this one took effect, and which kinds of proposal the upgrade made possible, come from the governance design and the documents named under the sources below.
- The constitution proposal is submitted here and not decided here. Its vote counts are the DRep votes of epoch 537, superseded votes included, and no share is given for it, because the only tally stored for it was read after the window closed.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 535 to 537 across all three roles, superseded votes included. DRep vote counts per epoch and the counts of recently voting and silent DReps exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options. The reasons quoted are the rationales the committee members and the pool named attached to their votes, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who gave none. Each committee vote is dated by the epoch it was cast in.
Sources and further reading
9 sources, open the list
- Input Output voted yes on the hard fork as a committee member in epoch 534, writing that more than 90 days had elapsed since the Chang hard fork, that sufficient technical review had been conducted in that time, including monitoring of real networks, independent testing, a regression suite and benchmark reporting, and that at least 85% of stake pools by active stake had upgraded to a node version able to process the new protocol. the rationale of Input Output on the hard fork
- The Intersect Constitutional Council voted yes on the hard fork in epoch 535, writing that it enables all seven governance actions and allows staking rewards to be withdrawn only after delegation to a DRep or a predefined option, that the interim requirement of at least 18 epochs for DReps to register and campaign had been met, that the 85% threshold for upgraded pools is a should and not a must rule and should count only nodes safe to hard fork into after a new node release was meant to mitigate a possible denial of service attack, and that the readiness report of the hard fork working group of Intersect showed 86% of blocks produced with that release. the rationale of the Intersect Constitutional Council on the hard fork
- The Eastern Cardano Council voted yes on the hard fork in epoch 535, writing that it found the action constitutional by way of a split decision on a 5 to 1 vote, acknowledging meaningful risks regarding DRep participation but finding that the action's technical compliance with the constitutional requirements and guardrails outweighed those concerns. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the hard fork
- The Cardano Atlantic Council voted yes on the hard fork in epoch 535, writing that more than 85% of stake pool operators by stake weight and block production had upgraded to a node version capable of transitioning through the hard fork, that ecosystem tooling and applications had indicated readiness, and that a majority of centralized exchanges by managed liquidity had indicated their readiness. the rationale of the Cardano Atlantic Council on the hard fork
- The Cardano Japan Council voted yes on the hard fork as a committee member, with its vote cast in epoch 534. the vote of the Cardano Japan Council on the hard fork
- The HEPHY pool voted yes on the hard fork in epoch 535 after its own readiness check: 61.26% of exchange liquidity reported ready with a further 24.84% in progress, 86% of blocks that epoch validated by nodes on the new release, and most tooling, wallets and applications reported ready, with DRep distribution and ada holder participation the only reservation remaining and 16 DReps able to reach the 60% threshold needed for future hard forks. the rationale of HEPHY on the hard fork
- The upgrade took the protocol to version 10 at epoch 537 and switched on the full set of governance actions, so that ada holders could decide protocol updates, treasury withdrawals and future hard forks through their DReps. It was enacted after approval by the stake pools and the interim committee, which the page calls the first community driven hard fork in Cardano history. Cardano Docs on the Plomin hard fork
- During the bootstrap phase the only proposals possible were parameter changes, hard fork initiations and information actions: a committee vote was sufficient for a parameter change and a committee vote with a sufficient pool vote for a hard fork, with DRep votes no part of either requirement. The phase ends when the committee and the pools ratify a subsequent hard fork, enabling the remaining governance actions and DRep participation, and the ratification table gives the DReps a threshold on every action type. On a hard fork the pool threshold is a share of the stake held by all stake pools, and the predefined voting option a pool sets through its reward account does not apply. CIP-1694 on the bootstrap phase
- The document behind the constitution proposal states that the interim constitution required its replacement to be submitted on chain no later than 31 January 2025, that this proposal was submitted on 30 January 2025, and that the text had been approved by the elected delegates at a convention in December 2024. the document behind the constitution proposal