Governance ReviewNo. 6Epochs 529 to 53420 Dec 2024 to 19 Jan 2025
Intersect files the Plomin hard fork, 581 pools vote yes by epoch 534
By the end of epoch 534, 581 stake pools had voted for the Plomin hard fork, which would give DReps a binding role in Cardano governance. Hazelpool and AKYO supported the upgrade despite concerns about delegation to DReps and the network's readiness.
Intersect files the Plomin hard fork
Hard Fork to Protocol Version 10 (“Plomin” Hard Fork) was the only proposal open in these six epochs. Intersect filed it in epoch 529, after its Hard Fork Working Group recommended the submission and its Technical Steering Committee approved it. Its document says the upgrade would enable all seven kinds of governance action with DRep voting on each, and that staking rewards would keep accruing but could only be withdrawn once the holder had delegated to a DRep or to a predefined option. It also says that more than 90 days would pass after the Chang hard fork before ratification and that at least 85% of pools by stake should have upgraded to a node supporting the new protocol version by then, conditions for the interim committee and the pools to verify with readiness reports from the Hard Fork Working Group.
Under the rules of the bootstrap phase then in force, a hard fork needed a committee vote and a sufficient pool vote, and DRep votes were part of neither requirement. No DRep vote was recorded in any of the six epochs.
581 pools vote yes on Plomin
By the close of epoch 534, 619 pools had cast a final vote on the hard fork, 581 yes, 4 no and 34 abstain, out of 622 pool votes with superseded ones included. Input Output and the Cardano Japan Council found it constitutional in epoch 534, the only committee votes cast on it by then. Voting ran until the start of epoch 536.
Hazelpool voted yes in epoch 534 while writing that it had “significant concerns” about the share of ada delegated to DReps, 7.5% against 58% delegated to pools, and about how that delegation was distributed. It wrote that it had discussed delaying the hard fork over those concerns, but that control had to rest with all ada holders and not only the interim committee. The AKYO pool voted yes in epoch 533 despite reservations about the delegation rate to DReps and the readiness of the ecosystem, because “continued hesitation will not get us anywhere”. The ABLE pool abstained in epoch 531. Its operator wrote that the pool would abstain, and the operator’s personal and pool wallets would be delegated to the automatic abstain option, for as long as the operator sat on the constitutional committee.
The Plomin rename signal closes at 76.5%
Rename the Chang 2 Hard Fork to the Plomin Hard Fork closed at the start of epoch 529 with 76.5% of DRep power behind it, on 209 yes votes to 9 no and 8 abstain, ₳1.71B of power voting yes against ₳3.2M voting no. Intersect filed it for its Hard Fork Working Group to name the upgrade in memory of Matthew Plomin, a community contributor who died in November 2024, as the previous one was named after Phil Chang. Six committee members voted yes and the Eastern Cardano Council abstained. The review of epochs 526 to 528 quotes the reasons DReps gave.
Delegation to DReps rises ₳417.0M to ₳2.72B
At the epoch 534 reading, 657 DReps held ₳2.72B of delegated power, ₳417.0M more than at epoch 529, when 599 DReps held ₳2.30B. The total and the number of DReps holding power were both the highest since epoch 508.
The power delegated to DReps, epochs 509 to 534
In billions of ada, the two default options excluded
The count of DReps with a vote in the previous twelve epochs fell from 198 at epoch 529 to 180 at epoch 534, as older votes dropped out of it and no proposal open to a DRep vote added new ones. The ten largest DReps held 44.7% of the power at epoch 529 and 46.5% at epoch 534, and the Gini coefficient of that power among the DReps holding any rose to 0.9173, the highest since epoch 508. The treasury reading rose ₳22.4M to ₳1.65B, with no withdrawal paid, since treasury withdrawals could not yet be proposed in the bootstrap phase.
Decided in this window
| Action | Outcome | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Rename the Chang 2 Hard Fork to the Plomin Hard Fork | Closed 529 | 76.5% |
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Hard Fork to Protocol Version 10 ("Plomin" Hard Fork) | Voting ends at the start of epoch 536 | n/a |
n/a: DReps had no vote on this action under the rules then in force.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 529
- ₳2.30B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 534
- ₳2.72B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 624
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 0
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 529
- ₳1,628.2M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 534
- ₳1,650.6M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. The only DRep share in this edition is the one of the rename signal, submitted in epoch 522, whose votes were all cast before this window.
- The hard fork is submitted here and not decided here. Its pool counts are the final vote of each of the 619 pools that voted by the close of epoch 534, out of 622 pool votes with superseded ones included, and no pool stake share is given for it, because the only tally stored for it was read after the window closed. Each committee vote is dated by the epoch it was cast in.
- That DRep votes were part of no requirement for a hard fork in this phase, what the upgrade would enable and who filed it come from the documents named under the sources below, not from the record, which simply stores no DRep vote on it. Pool names are the names in the metadata each pool registered, and the reasons quoted are the rationales those pools attached to their votes, which say nothing about pools that gave none.
- The count of DReps with a recent vote is a rolling window over the previous twelve epochs, so it falls on its own as older votes age out of it. The Gini figure measures how unequally delegated power is spread across the DReps that hold some, not across ada holders, and 1 would mean one DRep held everything.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 529 to 534 across all three roles, superseded votes included. Per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power and the concentration measures exclude the predefined delegation options.
Sources and further reading
10 sources, open the list
- The document behind the hard fork proposal, published in Intersect's governance actions repository, states that its submission was recommended by Intersect's Hard Fork Working Group and approved by Intersect's Technical Steering Committee. It says the upgrade enables all seven governance actions with DRep voting on each and that staking rewards can still accrue but can only be withdrawn after delegating to a DRep or a predefined option. In line with the interim constitution, more than 90 days will have elapsed from the Chang hard fork before ratification and at least 85% of stake pools by stake should have upgraded to a node version that can support protocol version 10, conditions the interim committee and the pools verify with readiness reports from the Hard Fork Working Group. the document behind the hard fork proposal
- During the bootstrap phase a vote from the constitutional committee is sufficient to change the protocol parameters, and a vote from the constitutional committee together with a sufficient stake pool vote is sufficient to initiate a hard fork, with DRep votes part of neither requirement. No action other than these and info actions is possible in that phase. CIP-1694 on the bootstrap phase
- Input Output voted yes on the hard fork as a committee member in epoch 534, writing that the governance action is constitutional. the rationale of Input Output on the hard fork
- The Cardano Japan Council voted yes on the hard fork as a committee member, with its vote cast in epoch 534. the vote of the Cardano Japan Council on the hard fork
- Hazelpool voted yes on the hard fork in epoch 534, writing that it had significant concerns about the share of ada delegated to DReps, only 7.5% against 58% delegated to stake pools, and about how that delegation was distributed, that it had discussed delaying the hard fork over those concerns, but that control must be in the hands of all ada holders and not just the interim committee and the hard fork was necessary to improve the ecosystem. the rationale of Hazelpool on the hard fork
- The metadata registered for the stake pool that cast the Hazelpool vote names it Hazelpool, with the ticker HAZEL. the registered metadata of Hazelpool
- The AKYO pool voted yes on the hard fork in epoch 533, naming itself AKYO in its rationale and writing that it had reservations about the current delegation rate to DReps and the readiness of the ecosystem, but that continued hesitation would get nobody anywhere and that a vote against remains possible later. the rationale of the AKYO pool on the hard fork
- The ABLE pool abstained on the hard fork in epoch 531, its operator writing that it would abstain with the pool and delegate its personal and pool wallets to the automatic abstain option for as long as it is a member of the committee, and engage with the pool again once its term as a Constitutional Committee member is complete. the rationale of the ABLE pool on the hard fork
- The metadata registered for the stake pool that cast the ABLE vote names it ABLE Stakepool, with the ticker ABLE. the registered metadata of the ABLE pool
- The rename signal was filed by the Intersect Hard Fork Working Group and asks for the upgrade to be named in memory of Matthew Plomin, a community contributor who died in November 2024, following the naming of the previous one after Phil Chang. the document behind the rename signal