Governance ReviewNo. 43Epochs 656 to 65916 Sept 2026 to 6 Oct 2026

Ikigai's ₳103,000 reimbursement goes unpaid for the third time

The request expired although 129 DReps voted yes and only five voted no. It reached 65.2% of DRep power, short of the 67% a withdrawal needs.

65.2%
of DRep power for Ikigai's deposit reimbursement, which needed 67%, expired at the start of epoch 656
228
DReps voted in the last 12 epochs at epoch 659, the fewest since epoch 537 (January 2025)
₳500.9M
net rise in power delegated to the always abstain option between epoch 655 and epoch 656
23
pools had voted no in the poll on raising k to 1000 by the close of epoch 659, against 17 yes

Ikigai’s reimbursement expires with ₳2.89B yes against ₳55.0M no

Ikigai’s deposit reimbursement expired at the start of epoch 656. It asked for ₳103,000: a ₳100,000 deposit on a symbolic info action of September 2024 that, its document says, a node bug kept from being returned, plus ₳3,000 for staking rewards forgone.

Yes votes carried ₳2.89B of DRep power and the no votes ₳55.0M. Power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option count as no. Five of the seven committee members voted yes, meeting the two-thirds requirement, so the DRep side alone kept it from being paid.

The two treasury requests that expired at the start of epoch 656

Share of DRep power voting yes at the close of voting, against the 67% a withdrawal needs

The Ikigai reimbursementThe Ikigai reimbursement: 65.2%65.2%The Governance Incentives FrameworkThe Governance Incentives Framework: 1.7%1.7%67% needed
The Ikigai reimbursement ended 1.8 points below the line.

Blockdaemon and Sebastien Guillemot セバ, the third and eighth largest DReps, did not vote on it, so their power sat on the no side. Yoroi W₳llet and EMURGO abstained, which took their power out of the count.

The same ₳103,000 has now been asked for three times, through an info action that could not pay anything out and two withdrawal requests, as the review of epochs 653 to 655 sets out. The ₳100,000 deposit stays unreimbursed.

SASA_nagamaru_ながまる wrote in its yes rationale that reimbursing a loss caused by an issue in Cardano’s own infrastructure matters for fairness and trust in the governance system. Pitkind, the only committee member to vote no, wrote that the constitution requires every withdrawal to allocate ada for audits and oversight metrics, and found the action unconstitutional because it allocates none.

The Governance Incentives Framework expires at 1.7%

The Governance Incentives Framework asked for ₳4.2M to evaluate governance incentive mechanisms through research, data and modelling before putting any of them to governance for adoption. It expired at the start of epoch 656 with 1.7% of DRep power, on 12 yes votes, 98 no and 19 abstain. In the committee only Leandros BSP voted yes, and four members found it unconstitutional.

SIPO wrote that governance incentives are necessary and that its objection was to “the price of studying it”. SIPO wrote that the project would deliver a framework, research and a dashboard rather than a working incentive mechanism, and that the pilot meant to test one would receive ₳333,333. It also objected that no line-item budget was published and that 21.6% went to administration and contingency. Army of Spies questioned whether the request was a prudent use of funds, writing that the treasury is on a trajectory toward zero within the next ten years.

No withdrawal was paid in these epochs. Between the start of epoch 656 and the start of epoch 659, the treasury grew by ₳10.9M to ₳1.37B. Under the ₳500M spending limit for epochs 613 to 713, ₳42.6M remained.

23 pools vote no and 17 yes in the poll on raising k to 1000

The k poll was submitted in epoch 656. It asks pools whether there is enough support to propose raising k, the target number of fully saturated pools, from 500 to 1000. At the proposal’s drafting baseline that would lower the saturation point, the stake above which a pool’s rewards stop growing, from about ₳75M to ₳37.5M, without enlarging the reward pot.

The poll cannot change k itself. Its document takes more than 50% of active pool stake voting yes as the measure of support and leaves DRep votes out of it. Voting runs until the start of epoch 663.

By the close of epoch 659, 17 pools had voted yes and 23 no. In the committee Ace Alliance found it constitutional and Tingvard abstained.

YUTA, the largest DRep, abstained because “this is an SPO poll and DRep votes do not affect the outcome”. CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) abstained for the same reason and wrote that it would likely vote yes on the parameter change itself.

The Cardano Foundation voted no, writing that a higher k “would redistribute a fixed reward pot without addressing the factors that determine whether independent operators can remain viable”, and that the view applies to its stake pools too. CryptoCrow also voted no. Martin Lang voted no and wrote that redelegated stake would, if anything, flow to midrange pools near the new saturation point rather than to small ones.

Cerkoryn’s 75 ada fee proposal remains open

Cerkoryn’s fee proposal, which would lower the minimum pool fee from 170 ada to 75, and the OpenZeppelin request for ₳11.8M both remain up for a vote until the start of epoch 661. For pools and their delegators the minimum fee stayed at 170 ada and k at 500 through these epochs.

The three open votes on 7 October, after these epochs

A snapshot taken on 7 October, early in epoch 660, had Cerkoryn’s fee proposal at 32.7% of DRep power, on 68 yes votes, 30 no and 14 abstain, up from 6.2% in the snapshot behind the previous review. Three committee members had voted yes on it. The OpenZeppelin request stood at 3.8%, on 13 yes votes, 70 no and 11 abstain. On the k poll, 17 pools had voted yes and 26 no, with 0.7% of pool stake voting yes.

DReps voting in the last 12 epochs fall to 228

At epoch 659, 228 DReps had voted at least once in the last 12 epochs, down from 271 at epoch 655 and the fewest since epoch 537 (January 2025). The count fell in each of these four epochs. DReps holding delegated power without such a vote rose from 605 at epoch 655 to 633.

Over the same epochs, voters cast 277 votes across DReps, pools and the committee. The count includes superseded votes, votes a voter later replaced. Final votes came from 102 distinct DReps and 40 pools.

Among the ten largest DReps, Yoroi and EMURGO abstained on the k poll in epoch 658, as they had on the Ikigai reimbursement and the incentives request before that voting closed. Yoroi wrote each time that it was withholding its vote, citing “the current situation”, and would reassess once conditions allow. EMURGO wrote that it prefers to withhold judgment until “the current situation reaches resolution”. Blockdaemon, Sebastien Guillemot セバ, the Eternl DRep Committee and Everstake had not voted on the k poll.

Power delegated to DReps fell ₳59.7M, from ₳5.30B at epoch 656 to ₳5.24B at epoch 659. Power delegated to the always abstain option rose ₳500.9M between epoch 655 and epoch 656, to ₳10.30B.

Between epoch 655 and epoch 659 the Cardano Foundation lost ₳35.7M of delegated power and Yoroi ₳29.4M, the two largest drops, and AKYO deregistered with ₳12.0M.

Six of the ten largest DReps on the two expired requests and the k poll

Final votes, the two requests at the close of their voting, the k poll as of the close of epoch 659

YesNoAbstainDid not vote
BlockdaemonYUTASebastien GuillemotセバYoroiEMURGOCardanoFoundationThe Ikigai reimbursementBlockdaemon on The Ikigai reimbursement: did not vote·YUTA on The Ikigai reimbursement: Yes✓Sebastien Guillemot セバ on The Ikigai reimbursement: did not vote·Yoroi on The Ikigai reimbursement: Abstain−EMURGO on The Ikigai reimbursement: Abstain−Cardano Foundation on The Ikigai reimbursement: Yes✓The incentives requestBlockdaemon on The incentives request: did not vote·YUTA on The incentives request: No✕Sebastien Guillemot セバ on The incentives request: did not vote·Yoroi on The incentives request: Abstain−EMURGO on The incentives request: Abstain−Cardano Foundation on The incentives request: No✕The k pollBlockdaemon on The k poll: did not vote·YUTA on The k poll: Abstain−Sebastien Guillemot セバ on The k poll: did not vote·Yoroi on The k poll: Abstain−EMURGO on The k poll: Abstain−Cardano Foundation on The k poll: No✕
The first, second, third, fourth, eighth and ninth largest DReps. Yoroi and EMURGO abstained on all three actions, Blockdaemon and Sebastien Guillemot セバ voted on none. Equal cells show decisions, not weight.

DReps that voted in the last 12 epochs, epochs 636 to 659

Count at each epoch

200240280320360Epoch 636: 326636Epoch 637: 329Epoch 638: 337Epoch 639: 337Epoch 640: 341640Epoch 641: 341Epoch 642: 341Epoch 643: 342Epoch 644: 319Epoch 645: 316645Epoch 646: 318Epoch 647: 313Epoch 648: 307Epoch 649: 302Epoch 650: 286650Epoch 651: 286Epoch 652: 292Epoch 653: 287Epoch 654: 281Epoch 655: 271655Epoch 656: 250Epoch 657: 237Epoch 658: 231Epoch 659: 228659Epoch 659: 228228
Among the epochs shown, the count peaked at 342 in epoch 643. It has fallen in most epochs since, and in every epoch from 656 to 659, to 228.

Decided in this window

ActionAmountOutcomeDRep yes
Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.₳0.1MExpired 65665.2%
Governance Incentives Framework 2026₳4.2MExpired 6561.7%

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)Voting ends at the start of epoch 663n/a
Reduce minPoolCost to 75 adaVoting ends at the start of epoch 661n/a
Withdraw 11,787,063 ada for the OpenZeppelin Stack administered by Intersect₳11.8MVoting ends at the start of epoch 661n/a

n/a: no DRep share is available from within these epochs. Any share the text gives for this action was read after they ended.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 656
₳5.30B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 659
₳5.24B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
277
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
102
Treasury, at the start of epoch 656
₳1,360.1M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 659
₳1,371.0M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
  • Pool shares are the share of stake, not of votes. Abstaining stake is left out, and a pool that did not vote counts as no, unless its reward account is delegated to the always abstain option, which counts it as abstaining.
  • Votes cast is every vote of epochs 656 to 659 across all three roles, superseded votes included.
  • The count of DReps with a vote in the last 12 epochs leaves out votes whose block time is not known, so it can come out lower than the true number. The count of DReps holding delegated power without such a vote can come out higher for the same reason.
  • Every lowest and highest reading named here is counted from epoch 508, where the data behind this review begins, one epoch after on-chain governance began.
  • The three actions still open at the end of epoch 659 are reported as they stood in a snapshot taken on 7 October, early in epoch 660, which can hold votes cast after these epochs. Their outcomes fall outside this edition's reporting period.

Sources and further reading

8 sources, open the list
  • The document behind the Ikigai reimbursement describes a ₳100,000 deposit on a symbolic info action of September 2024 that a bug in the node kept from being returned, and adds ₳3,000 to compensate for staking rewards forgone. the document behind the Ikigai reimbursement
  • The document behind the k poll asks pools whether there is enough support to propose raising stakePoolTargetNum, the target number of fully saturated pools, from 500 to 1000. At the drafting baseline this would lower the saturation point from about ₳75M to ₳37.5M of stake, and it does not enlarge the reward pot. The document counts support the way pool votes are normally counted, with yes stake above 50% of active pool stake, a pool that does not vote counting as no, and DRep votes not counted. As an info action the poll cannot change the parameter. It follows a poll of pools on k in 2023 and asks about k alone. the document behind the k poll
  • The document behind Cerkoryn's fee proposal changes only the minimum pool fee, from 170 ada to 75, and names Cerkoryn as author. the document behind Cerkoryn's fee proposal
  • The snapshot behind the previous review, taken in epoch 656, had Cerkoryn's fee proposal at 6.2% of DRep power. the Governance Review for epochs 653 to 655
  • Yoroi wrote on the k poll, as on the Ikigai reimbursement and the incentives request, that it was withholding its vote in light of the current situation and would reassess once conditions allow for a considered decision. the rationale of Yoroi on the k poll
  • Epoch 537 began on 29 January 2025. Koios epoch information for epoch 537
  • The document behind the Governance Incentives Framework proposes to evaluate candidate governance incentive mechanisms through research, data, modelling and evidence before presenting them to governance for a decision on adoption. the document behind the Governance Incentives Framework
  • SIPO wrote that governance incentives are necessary and that its objection is to the price of studying them: the project delivers a framework, research and a dashboard rather than a mechanism, the controlled pilot that would test a mechanism gets ₳333,333 of the request, the budget is published only at workstream level, and administration and contingency take 21.6% of it. the rationale of SIPO on the Governance Incentives Framework