Governance ReviewNo. 45Epochs 663 to 66721 Oct 2026 to 15 Nov 2026

EMURGO and Yoroi plan to deregister as DReps on 30 November

At epoch 667, ₳601M was delegated to the two DReps. Both said they would abstain on most treasury requests for the rest of their term. In epoch 664, both backed a ₳9.6M request to build an evidence management system for police forces.

₳601.0M
delegated to EMURGO and Yoroi at epoch 667, both set to deregister as DReps on 30 November
₳90.2M
drop in power delegated to EMURGO from epoch 662 to 667, the largest of any DRep
0.5%
of DRep power for the copper reserve as of the close of epoch 667, against the 67% a withdrawal needs
196
DReps voted in the last 12 epochs at epoch 667, the fewest since epoch 537 (January 2025)

EMURGO and Yoroi back PFMS and abstain on other treasury requests

Yoroi W₳llet, the second largest DRep, and EMURGO, the eighth largest, wrote in epoch 664 that they had announced their deregistration as DReps for 30 November.

Yoroi wrote that it finds it inappropriate to encumber the treasury “with discretionary commitments that outlive our active term”, and that for the rest of its mandate it will abstain on treasury requests unless an action demonstrates “an extraordinary, immediate strategic necessity”. EMURGO wrote that its policy is “to abstain on all discretionary funding actions” and to reserve a yes for rare initiatives that meet the same test. On those grounds both abstained on AURORA in epoch 664.

In the same epoch both voted yes on PFMS, which asks ₳9.6M for Trivolve Tech to build an evidence management system for police forces, with the Cardano Foundation as administrator. EMURGO wrote that it sees the request as “a high-impact strategic imperative” for Cardano’s institutional footprint. Yoroi wrote that “the strategic scale, proven operational track record, and structured treasury return warrant our support”. Neither rationale mentions the deregistration.

TokenPost reported on 28 October that EMURGO asked delegators of both DReps to delegate to another DRep before 30 November, and to look for consistent voting records and public explanations when choosing one. TokenPost added that the date could be extended in special circumstances.

Rewards from staking keep accruing. They can only be withdrawn once a stake credential has delegated its vote, to a DRep or to the always abstain or always no confidence option.

Delegated power to EMURGO falls ₳90.2M

Power delegated to EMURGO fell from ₳300.8M at epoch 662 to ₳210.7M at epoch 667, the largest drop of any DRep in that span. Yoroi fell ₳15.8M, to ₳390.3M.

Most of that drop came between epochs 663 and 664, when power delegated to EMURGO fell from ₳300.7M to ₳212.2M. Epoch 664 began on 26 October.

The largest drops and gains in delegated power, epochs 662 to 667

In millions of ada

Delegated power lostEMURGODelegated power lost, EMURGO: 90.2M90.2MChris-ODelegated power lost, Chris-O: 17.7M17.7MYoroiDelegated power lost, Yoroi: 15.8M15.8MDelegated power gainedPhil UPLCDelegated power gained, Phil UPLC: 150M150MSIPODelegated power gained, SIPO: 23.4M23.4MYUTADelegated power gained, YUTA: 13.8M13.8M
Phil UPLC gained more than EMURGO lost. The chart does not show who moved a delegation where, and a gain can also come from new delegations.

Power delegated to all DReps rose ₳79.8M, from ₳5.34B at epoch 663 to ₳5.42B at epoch 667.

Phil UPLC held ₳80.9M at epoch 663 and ₳230.6M at epoch 667, which made it the fifth largest DRep.

₳23.1M of unused Catalyst funds return to the Cardano treasury

Intersect reported that it facilitated the return of ₳23,063,600 to the treasury in two transactions on 6 and 10 November. The money was ₳21,000,000 set aside for Fund 15 of Project Catalyst and ₳2,063,600 for the remaining milestones of the Catalyst operations contract of Input Output. Intersect wrote that neither amount was needed after Catalyst administration moved from Input Output to the Cardano Foundation.

Treasury donations in epoch 666 came to the same ₳23,063,600. The treasury rose ₳26.7M between epoch 666 and epoch 667, against ₳3.6M between epoch 665 and epoch 666.

Treasury balance, epochs 643 to 667

In millions of ada at the start of each epoch

1,300M1,350M1,400M1,450M1,500MEpoch 663 to 667Epoch 643: 1,473M643Epoch 644: 1,476MEpoch 645: 1,474M645Epoch 646: 1,445MEpoch 647: 1,446MEpoch 648: 1,450MEpoch 649: 1,454MEpoch 650: 1,337M650Epoch 651: 1,341MEpoch 652: 1,345MEpoch 653: 1,349MEpoch 654: 1,353MEpoch 655: 1,356M655Epoch 656: 1,360MEpoch 657: 1,364MEpoch 658: 1,367MEpoch 659: 1,371MEpoch 660: 1,375M660Epoch 661: 1,378MEpoch 662: 1,382MEpoch 663: 1,386MEpoch 664: 1,389MEpoch 665: 1,393M665Epoch 666: 1,397MEpoch 667: 1,423M667Epoch 667: ₳1.42B₳1.42B
The rise at epoch 667 includes the ₳23.1M returned through Intersect. The treasury paid out ₳120M at the start of epoch 650.

No withdrawal was paid in these epochs, and ₳42.6M of the ₳500M spending limit for epochs 613 to 713 remained at the end of epoch 667. The treasury held ₳1.42B at epoch 667, up from ₳1.39B at epoch 663.

Yes votes on the copper reserve held 0.5% of DRep power at close

The copper reserve asks ₳22M for Toto Finance, including ₳14,724,409 to buy copper, which it would tokenize as CuTT. The document names Toto Finance as both recipient and administrator and says an independent oversight provider is still to be appointed. Voting on it ran until the start of epoch 668, so the tally below is as of the close of epoch 667.

It had 5 yes votes, 126 no and 8 abstain, and 0.5% of DRep power, against the 67% a treasury withdrawal needs. Yes votes carried ₳19.2M and no votes ₳2.86B.

The Cardano Foundation voted no, writing that the proposal “places 22,000,000 ada under the recipient’s sole control” and that the money would leave before any safeguard is in place.

SIPO voted no and wrote that it had backed treasury investments designed to return capital where the funds sat under independent controls, while here “Fund control rests with the recipient alone.” SASA_nagamaru_ながまる voted no, writing that the proposal gives insufficient evidence of prospective users, demand and plans for token liquidity. Yoroi and EMURGO abstained in epoch 664, citing their deregistration.

Three committee members, Tingvard, Ace Alliance and Leandros BSP, found it unconstitutional, and the other four had not voted by the close of epoch 667. Leandros BSP wrote that the proposal’s document sits on an ordinary web server and is not content-addressed, so it is not immutable as the constitution requires.

Six of the ten largest DReps on the copper reserve and the k poll

Final votes at the close of voting

YesNoAbstainDid not vote
YUTAYoroiCryptoCrowPhil UPLCEMURGOCardanoFoundationThe copper reserveYUTA on The copper reserve: No✕Yoroi on The copper reserve: Abstain−CryptoCrow on The copper reserve: No✕Phil UPLC on The copper reserve: No✕EMURGO on The copper reserve: Abstain−Cardano Foundation on The copper reserve: No✕The k pollYUTA on The k poll: Abstain−Yoroi on The k poll: Abstain−CryptoCrow on The k poll: No✕Phil UPLC on The k poll: did not vote·EMURGO on The k poll: Abstain−Cardano Foundation on The k poll: No✕
Yoroi and EMURGO abstained on both, the other four voted no on the copper reserve. Equal cells show decisions, not weight.

The k poll closes with 2.2% of pool stake voting yes

The k poll, which asked pools whether to propose raising k from 500 to 1000, closed at the start of epoch 663 with 2.2% of pool stake voting yes, the share the review of epochs 660 to 662 reported at its close.

Cardano Foundation opens its annual developer survey

The developer survey was submitted in epoch 664 by the Cardano Foundation. It asks developers to answer the annual survey of the developer ecosystem. It asks anyone who also wants to record a vote on the governance action to abstain. The document describes it as a survey whose questions and answers are recorded on chain. Voting on it runs until the start of epoch 671.

The open votes on 17 November, after these epochs

A snapshot taken on 17 November, early in epoch 668, had PFMS at 30.0% of DRep power, on 44 yes votes, 59 no and 10 abstain, with three committee members finding it constitutional. AURORA stood at 4.1%, and three committee members had found it unconstitutional. Voting on both runs until the start of epoch 669. Yes votes on the developer survey held 10.7% of DRep power.

DReps voting in the last 12 epochs fall to 196

At epoch 667, 196 DReps had voted at least once in the last 12 epochs, down from 209 at epoch 663 and the fewest since epoch 537 (January 2025). The count rose once in these epochs, from 197 at epoch 664 to 199 at epoch 665. DReps holding delegated power without such a vote numbered 653.

DReps that voted in the last 12 epochs, epochs 643 to 667

Count at each epoch

180225270315360Epoch 643: 342643Epoch 644: 319Epoch 645: 316645Epoch 646: 318Epoch 647: 313Epoch 648: 307Epoch 649: 302Epoch 650: 286650Epoch 651: 286Epoch 652: 292Epoch 653: 287Epoch 654: 281Epoch 655: 271655Epoch 656: 250Epoch 657: 237Epoch 658: 231Epoch 659: 228Epoch 660: 224660Epoch 661: 218Epoch 662: 213Epoch 663: 209Epoch 664: 197Epoch 665: 199665Epoch 666: 198Epoch 667: 196667Epoch 667: 196196
The count stood at 342 at epoch 643, the start of this span, and fell to 196 at epoch 667.

Over these epochs voters cast 358 votes across DReps, pools and the committee. The count includes superseded votes, votes a voter later replaced. Final votes came from 136 distinct DReps and 2 pools.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Cardano Strategic Copper Reserve | ₳22M RWA Tokenization₳22.0MUndecided at the close of epoch 6670.5%
PFMS: Bringing Government Scale Adoption to Cardano by Trivolve Tech₳9.6MVoting ends at the start of epoch 669n/a
AURORA: Open infrastructure for bringing real credit markets to Cardano.₳0.9MVoting ends at the start of epoch 669n/a
State of the Cardano Developer Ecosystem - 2026 SurveyVoting ends at the start of epoch 671n/a

n/a: no DRep share is available from within these epochs. Any share the text gives for this action was read after they ended.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 663
₳5.34B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 667
₳5.42B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
358
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
136
Treasury, at the start of epoch 663
₳1,385.7M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 667
₳1,423.2M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
  • Pool shares are the share of stake, not of votes. Abstaining stake is left out, and a pool that did not vote counts as no, unless its reward account is delegated to the always abstain option, which counts it as abstaining.
  • Votes cast is every vote of epochs 663 to 667 across all three roles, superseded votes included.
  • The power figures of named DReps are as of epoch 667 unless another epoch is named.
  • The count of DReps with a vote in the last 12 epochs leaves out votes whose block time is not known, so it can come out lower than the true number. The count of DReps holding delegated power without such a vote can come out higher for the same reason.
  • Every lowest and highest reading named here is counted from epoch 508, one epoch after on-chain governance began.
  • The copper reserve is reported as of the close of epoch 667, when its voting ended. PFMS, AURORA and the developer survey, still open at the end of epoch 667, are reported as they stood in a snapshot taken on 17 November, early in epoch 668, which can hold votes cast after these epochs. Their outcomes fall outside this edition's reporting period.

Sources and further reading

19 sources, open the list
  • Yoroi wrote on the copper reserve that, following its announcement to deregister as a DRep on 30 November 2026, it finds it inappropriate to encumber the treasury with discretionary commitments that outlive its active term, and that for the rest of its mandate it will abstain on treasury requests unless an action demonstrates "an extraordinary, immediate strategic necessity". the rationale of Yoroi on the copper reserve
  • EMURGO wrote on the copper reserve that, having announced its deregistration as a DRep on 30 November 2026, its policy is to abstain on all discretionary funding actions and to reserve yes for rare initiatives that present an extraordinary, immediate strategic necessity. the rationale of EMURGO on the copper reserve
  • TokenPost reported on 28 October that EMURGO had announced the deregistration of the EMURGO and Yoroi DReps for 30 November, that their delegators should delegate to another active DRep before then, that EMURGO recommended considering consistent voting records, public explanations, accountability to delegators and a long-term commitment to Cardano when choosing one, and that the date could be extended if special circumstances arise. TokenPost, EMURGO and Yoroi Plan to Exit Cardano DRep Roles
  • Phil UPLC held ₳80.9M of delegated power at epoch 663. Koios voting power history of Phil UPLC
  • The document behind the copper reserve asks for ₳22,000,000 for Toto Finance, named as recipient and administrator, to buy copper with ₳14,724,409 of it, tokenize it as CuTT, hold it for 18 to 24 months and return the net sale proceeds and unused or unearned budget to the treasury by month 36. It states that an independent oversight provider is to be appointed and is not yet engaged. the document behind the copper reserve
  • Treasury donations in epoch 666 came to ₳23,063,600. Koios totals for epoch 666
  • Intersect reported that it facilitated a combined return of ₳23,063,600 to the treasury in two transactions on 6 and 10 November: ₳21,000,000 set aside for Fund 15 of Project Catalyst and ₳2,063,600 for the remaining milestones of the Catalyst operations contract of Input Output, neither needed after Catalyst administration moved from Input Output to the Cardano Foundation. Intersect weekly update 137, 15 November
  • The document behind the developer survey, filed by the Cardano Foundation, asks developers to answer the annual survey of the developer ecosystem, says there is nothing to vote on and that anyone who wants to record a vote should abstain, and describes it as a survey whose questions and answers are recorded on chain. the document behind the developer survey (CIP-179)
  • Epoch 537 began on 29 January 2025. Koios epoch information for epoch 537
  • The document behind the k poll asks pools whether there is enough support to propose raising stakePoolTargetNum, the target number of fully saturated pools, from 500 to 1000. the document behind the k poll
  • Yoroi voted yes on PFMS in epoch 664 and wrote that "the strategic scale, proven operational track record, and structured treasury return warrant our support", in a rationale that does not mention the deregistration. the rationale of Yoroi on PFMS
  • EMURGO voted yes on PFMS in epoch 664 and wrote that it recognizes the proposal as "a high-impact strategic imperative for Cardano's global institutional footprint", citing the Cardano Foundation as administrator, in a rationale that does not mention the deregistration. the rationale of EMURGO on PFMS
  • EMURGO abstained on AURORA in epoch 664, with the same deregistration rationale as on the copper reserve. the rationale of EMURGO on AURORA
  • Yoroi abstained on AURORA in epoch 664, with the same deregistration rationale as on the copper reserve. the rationale of Yoroi on AURORA
  • The document behind PFMS asks for ₳9,600,000 for Trivolve Tech to build an evidence management system for police forces, with the Cardano Foundation as administrator. the document behind PFMS
  • Rewards from staking keep accruing, but they cannot be withdrawn until the stake credential has delegated its vote, to a DRep or to one of the predefined options, abstain or no confidence. Cardano Developer Portal, DReps and vote delegation
  • EMURGO held ₳300.7M of delegated power at epoch 663 and ₳212.2M at epoch 664. Koios voting power history of EMURGO
  • Epoch 664 began on 26 October 2026. Koios epoch information for epoch 664
  • Between epoch 662 and epoch 667, delegated power rose by ₳149.7M for Phil UPLC, ₳23.4M for SIPO and ₳13.8M for YUTA, the three largest gains of any DRep, read from the power of every DRep at epochs 662 and 667. Koios voting power of all DReps at epoch 667, compared with epoch 662