Governance ReviewNo. 44Epochs 660 to 6626 Oct 2026 to 21 Oct 2026

Cardano proposal to lower the minimum pool fee to 75 ada expires at 44.2% DRep support

The cut of the minimum pool fee from 170 ada to 75 had reached 68.6% of DRep power when it was bundled with a Plutus memory change. YUTA and SIPO, which backed the bundle, abstained on the cut alone, both writing that pools have no vote on it.

44.2%
of DRep power for the 75 ada fee cut on its own, which needed 67%, expired at the start of epoch 661
68.6%
of DRep power for the same cut inside the bundle with the Plutus memory change, which expired at the start of epoch 653 on 34.7% of pool stake
₳32.5M
asked by three treasury requests submitted in epochs 661 and 662, with ₳42.6M left under the spending limit
213
DReps voted in the last 12 epochs at epoch 662, the fewest since epoch 537 (January 2025)

Yes votes carry ₳1.64B on the fee cut, no votes ₳539.5M

The fee cut expired at the start of epoch 661. It would have lowered the minimum fee a stake pool must charge from 170 ada to 75 and changed nothing else. It drew 87 yes votes, 37 no and 19 abstain.

The yes votes outweighed the no votes, but the yes side held 44.2%, because power that did not vote counts as no.

Five of the seven committee members voted yes, meeting the two-thirds requirement, and pool approval is not required, so the DRep side alone kept the cut from taking effect. For pools and their delegators the minimum fee stayed at 170 ada.

The fee and Plutus memory bundle had 34.7% of pool stake

Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada and increase Plutus Memory Limits (Part 2) carried the same cut together with higher Plutus memory limits and expired at the start of epoch 653. It had 68.6% of DRep power, above the 67% the DReps needed, and 34.7% of pool stake, below the 51% the pools needed. Pools had a vote on it because of the memory limits, a vote they do not have on the fee alone. Yes votes on the bundle carried ₳3.50B of DRep power.

The 75 ada fee cut inside the bundle and on its own

Share of DRep power voting yes at the close of voting, against the 67% the DReps needed

In the bundle with the memory limitsOn its own
DRep share for the cut67% neededIn the bundle with the memory limits: 68.6%On its own: 44.2%68.6%44.2%
The 67% the DReps needed lies between the two shares, which are 24.4 points apart.

YUTA and SIPO abstain on the fee cut

YUTA, the largest DRep, wrote that its own honest view is yes. What changed its judgment, YUTA wrote, was how pools had voted on the bundle: 59 of the 247 pools that voted on it voted no, and it read the default no of the pools that did not vote as “broad, silent opposition from operators on the ground”. With the cut standing alone, YUTA wrote, pools have no vote “and that opposition has no path into the tally”. It would consider yes on a proposal with a mitigation pools can accept, such as pairing it with a minimum margin. The fee proposal’s document describes that parameter as one that scales with pool rewards instead of a fixed fee.

SIPO called its abstention constructive. It wrote that after the bundle it looked at what the 2023 cut from 340 ada to 170 achieved, citing an Input Output Research report that finds 340 ada still the most common fee at every pool size. On a model with average block rewards of epoch 653 and a zero margin, SIPO wrote, a further cut materially changes delegator returns only for pools of roughly ₳0.5M to ₳3M, which hold about 2.2% of active stake.

SIPO also wrote that the cut comes before a minimum margin exists, and warned that a later reversal would not force pools that had lowered their fee to raise it again. SIPO wrote that its own pools declare 340 ada and that it would vote yes on a cut paired with a minimum margin.

Yoroi W₳llet and EMURGO abstained as well, both citing “the current situation”, as on the OpenZeppelin request. On 3 August EMURGO had announced that it would de-register its DReps in due course, to direct its resources to users affected by the security incident at SecondFi, the wallet service that replaced EMURGO’s Yoroi wallet.

Blockdaemon and the Eternl DRep Committee did not vote, so their power counted as no.

The Cardano Foundation voted yes, as it had on the bundle, writing that it sees “no change in circumstances that would warrant a different position”. Sebastien Guillemot セバ voted yes and wrote that a minimum margin is the end goal and the cut is fine “as long as it’s seen as a step towards that goal”. CryptoCrow and Everstake also voted yes.

SASA_nagamaru_ながまる voted no, writing that 75 ada is not sufficient to support sustainable pool operations and that a lower floor may increase competitive pressure on operators to reduce fees further.

The OpenZeppelin request for ₳11.8M expires at 4.0%

The OpenZeppelin request expired at the start of epoch 661 with 4.0% of DRep power, on 16 yes votes, 94 no and 17 abstain. It asked for ₳11,787,063 for 12 months of work administered by Intersect: three reference implementations, an audited contracts library for Cardano and a security retainer. Five of the seven committee members found it constitutional.

YUTA voted no, writing that the core deliverable duplicates the IO Developer Experience Initiative, already funded with ₳3,601,926, which promises “an OpenZeppelin-style collection of ready-to-use smart contracts”. The Cardano Foundation voted no, objecting to “this proposal’s scope, structure, and price”. SIPO voted no and invited “a coordinated, narrower resubmission”. Of the ten largest DReps, five voted no and none yes.

Toto Finance, Trivolve Tech and Fairway ask for ₳32.5M

The copper reserve, submitted in epoch 661, asks ₳22.0M for Toto Finance to buy copper with ₳14,724,409 of it, tokenize it, hold it for 18 to 24 months, then sell it and return the net proceeds and unused budget to the treasury by month 36. Voting on it runs until the start of epoch 668.

PFMS asks ₳9.6M over 15 months for Trivolve Tech to build an evidence management system for police forces, with its first deployment planned for the Indian state of Telangana and the Cardano Foundation as administrator. It was submitted in epoch 662, and voting on it runs until the start of epoch 669.

AURORA asks ₳940,000 for about five months of work by Fairway on shared infrastructure for finding, comparing and verifying credit opportunities across Cardano lending implementations. It was submitted in epoch 662 as well, with the same voting deadline.

No withdrawal was paid in these epochs. At the end of epoch 662, ₳457.4M of the ₳500M spending limit for epochs 613 to 713 had been paid out in 30 withdrawals and ₳42.6M remained, enough for all three.

The ₳42.6M left under the ₳500M spending limit at the end of epoch 662

In millions of ada, if the three new requests were paid in full

The three new requestsLeft after all three
The three new requests: ₳32.5M₳32.5MThe three new requestsLeft after all three: ₳10.1M₳10.1MLeft after all threeLeft under the limit: ₳42.6M
Paid in full, the copper reserve, PFMS and AURORA would leave ₳10.1M of the ₳500M limit for epochs 613 to 713.

By the close of epoch 662, YUTA, CryptoCrow and SASA_nagamaru_ながまる had voted no on the copper reserve. YUTA questioned the cost: only ₳14.7M of the ₳22M would buy copper, and by YUTA’s reading copper must rise about 49% to return the principal. The proposal’s own break-even illustration gives that rise only if all cost ceilings are used and the ada to dollar rate stays unchanged, and unused or unearned budget goes back to the treasury. Dori voted no, writing that the copper tokens are minted on Ethereum and only a bridged representation circulates on Cardano.

hix_coffeepool☕️ voted no on the copper reserve and on AURORA, writing that it votes no on every treasury withdrawal until total withdrawals are back within a sustainable limit, which it puts at roughly 15% of the previous year’s staking rewards, about ₳82M.

In the committee, Tingvard had voted no on the copper reserve and on AURORA and yes on PFMS.

The k poll at close: 2.2% of pool stake voting yes

The k poll asks pools whether there is enough support to propose raising k, the target number of fully saturated pools, from 500 to 1000. Its voting ran until the start of epoch 663. As of the close of epoch 662, 26 pools had voted yes, 48 no and 1 abstain, and 2.2% of pool stake had voted yes. The poll’s document takes yes votes from more than 50% of active pool stake as the measure of support, so the poll ended short of the standard it set for a mandate from pools.

Among DReps, whose votes the document leaves out of that measure, 44 voted yes, 38 no and 49 abstain. Army of Spies voted yes, writing that it supports “this increased decentralization of Cardano stake pools”.

Six of the ten largest DReps on the three actions whose voting ended

Final votes at the close of voting

YesNoAbstainDid not vote
YUTAYoroiBlockdaemonEMURGOEverstakeCardanoFoundationThe fee cutYUTA on The fee cut: Abstain−Yoroi on The fee cut: Abstain−Blockdaemon on The fee cut: did not vote·EMURGO on The fee cut: Abstain−Everstake on The fee cut: Yes✓Cardano Foundation on The fee cut: Yes✓The OpenZeppelin requestYUTA on The OpenZeppelin request: No✕Yoroi on The OpenZeppelin request: Abstain−Blockdaemon on The OpenZeppelin request: did not vote·EMURGO on The OpenZeppelin request: Abstain−Everstake on The OpenZeppelin request: No✕Cardano Foundation on The OpenZeppelin request: No✕The k pollYUTA on The k poll: Abstain−Yoroi on The k poll: Abstain−Blockdaemon on The k poll: did not vote·EMURGO on The k poll: Abstain−Everstake on The k poll: No✕Cardano Foundation on The k poll: No✕
The four largest DReps and two of the yes voters on the fee cut. YUTA, Yoroi and EMURGO each hold more delegated power than any DRep that voted yes on it, and Blockdaemon voted on none of the three. Equal cells show decisions, not weight.

The three new requests on 23 October, after these epochs

A snapshot taken on 23 October, early in epoch 663, had the copper reserve at 0.3% of DRep power, AURORA at 0.4% and PFMS at 3.0%. Ace Alliance and Tingvard had found the copper reserve and AURORA unconstitutional. Tingvard’s yes was the only committee vote on PFMS.

DReps voting in the last 12 epochs fall to 213

At epoch 662, 213 DReps had voted at least once in the last 12 epochs, down from 228 at epoch 659 and the fewest since epoch 537 (January 2025). DReps holding delegated power without such a vote rose to 643.

DReps that voted in the last 12 epochs, epochs 640 to 662

Count at each epoch

200240280320360Epoch 640: 341640Epoch 641: 341Epoch 642: 341Epoch 643: 342Epoch 644: 319Epoch 645: 316645Epoch 646: 318Epoch 647: 313Epoch 648: 307Epoch 649: 302Epoch 650: 286650Epoch 651: 286Epoch 652: 292Epoch 653: 287Epoch 654: 281Epoch 655: 271655Epoch 656: 250Epoch 657: 237Epoch 658: 231Epoch 659: 228Epoch 660: 224660Epoch 661: 218Epoch 662: 213662Epoch 662: 213213
The count peaked at 342 in epoch 643 and has fallen in every epoch since epoch 652.

Over these epochs voters cast 244 votes across DReps, pools and the committee. The count includes superseded votes, votes a voter later replaced. Final votes came from 98 distinct DReps and 35 pools.

Power delegated to DReps rose ₳81.2M, from ₳5.25B at epoch 660 to ₳5.33B at epoch 662.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)Undecided at the close of epoch 6627.8%
Cardano Strategic Copper Reserve | ₳22M RWA Tokenization₳22.0MVoting ends at the start of epoch 668n/a
AURORA: Open infrastructure for bringing real credit markets to Cardano.₳0.9MVoting ends at the start of epoch 669n/a
PFMS: Bringing Government Scale Adoption to Cardano by Trivolve Tech₳9.6MVoting ends at the start of epoch 669n/a

n/a: no DRep share is available from within these epochs. Any share the text gives for this action was read after they ended.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 660
₳5.25B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 662
₳5.33B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
244
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
98
Treasury, at the start of epoch 660
₳1,374.6M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 662
₳1,381.9M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
  • Pool shares are the share of stake, not of votes. Abstaining stake is left out, and a pool that did not vote counts as no, unless its reward account is delegated to the always abstain option, which counts it as abstaining.
  • Votes cast is every vote of epochs 660 to 662 across all three roles, superseded votes included.
  • The count of DReps with a vote in the last 12 epochs leaves out votes whose block time is not known, so it can come out lower than the true number. The count of DReps holding delegated power without such a vote can come out higher for the same reason.
  • Every lowest and highest reading named here is counted from epoch 508, one epoch after on-chain governance began.
  • The k poll is reported as of the close of epoch 662, when its voting ended. The three treasury requests still open at the end of epoch 662 are reported as they stood in a snapshot taken on 23 October, early in epoch 663, which can hold votes cast after these epochs. Their outcomes fall outside this edition's reporting period.

Sources and further reading

19 sources, open the list
  • The document behind Cerkoryn's fee proposal changes only the minimum pool fee, from 170 ada to 75, names Cerkoryn as author, describes the cut as an interim step toward a proportional minimum margin, a parameter that would scale with pool rewards instead of a fixed fee, and states that a change of the minimum pool fee alone does not require pool approval. the document behind Cerkoryn's fee proposal (PCP-006)
  • YUTA wrote that its own view on the fee cut is yes and that it voted yes on the bundle, that 59 of the 247 pools that voted on the bundle voted an explicit no, that it read the default no of pools that did not vote as broad, silent opposition from operators on the ground, that with the cut standing alone pools have no vote and that opposition has no path into the tally, and that it would consider yes on a proposal with a mitigation pools can accept, such as pairing it with a minimum margin. the rationale of YUTA on the fee cut
  • SIPO wrote that it voted yes on the bundle, that an Input Output Research report finds a fee of 340 ada still the most common at every pool size after the 2023 cut from 340 ada to 170, that on a model using average block rewards of epoch 653 at zero margin a further cut materially moves delegator returns only for pools of roughly ₳0.5M to ₳3M, which hold about 2.2% of active stake, that the cut comes before a minimum margin exists, that a later reversal would not force pools that had lowered their fee to raise it again, that because the cut is an economic parameter pools have no vote on it, that its own pools declare 340 ada, and that it would vote yes on a cut paired with a minimum margin. the rationale of SIPO on the fee cut
  • Yoroi wrote on the fee cut, as on the OpenZeppelin request and the k poll, that in light of the current situation it was withholding its vote and would reassess once conditions allow for a considered decision. the rationale of Yoroi on the fee cut
  • The document behind the OpenZeppelin request asks for 12 months of work in quarterly milestones: three reference implementations, an audited contracts library for Cardano and a security retainer, administered by Intersect. the document behind the OpenZeppelin request
  • YUTA wrote on the OpenZeppelin request that its core deliverable duplicates the IO Developer Experience Initiative, funded with ₳3,601,926, which promises an OpenZeppelin-style collection of ready-to-use smart contracts. the rationale of YUTA on the OpenZeppelin request
  • The document behind the copper reserve asks for ₳22,000,000 for Toto Finance to buy copper with ₳14,724,409 of it, tokenize it, hold it for 18 to 24 months and return the net sale proceeds and unused or unearned budget to the treasury by month 36. Its break-even illustration says that if full fee ceilings are used at an unchanged ada to dollar rate, copper has to reach about $10.06/lb from an illustrative $6.73/lb entry price to return the ₳22M. the document behind the copper reserve
  • YUTA wrote on the copper reserve that about ₳7.3M of the ₳22M is spent as fees regardless of the copper price and that, by the proposal's own numbers, copper must rise about 49% to return the principal. the rationale of YUTA on the copper reserve
  • Dori wrote on the copper reserve that the copper tokens are minted on Ethereum and only a bridged representation circulates on Cardano. the rationale of Dori on the copper reserve
  • hix_coffeepool wrote that it votes no on all treasury withdrawals until aggregate withdrawals are back within a sustainable limit, that it considers an appropriate limit to be roughly 15% of the previous year's staking rewards, about ₳82M, and that the limit in force is several times that amount. the rationale of hix_coffeepool on the copper reserve
  • The document behind PFMS asks for ₳9,600,000 over 15 months for Trivolve Tech to build an evidence management system for police forces, with its first deployment planned for the Indian state of Telangana and the Cardano Foundation as administrator. the document behind PFMS
  • The document behind AURORA asks for ₳940,000 for about five months of work by Fairway on shared infrastructure for finding, comparing and verifying credit opportunities across Cardano lending implementations. the document behind AURORA
  • The document behind the k poll asks pools whether there is enough support to propose raising stakePoolTargetNum, the target number of fully saturated pools, from 500 to 1000, and takes yes votes from more than 50% of active pool stake as the measure of support, with DRep votes not included in it. the document behind the k poll
  • YUTA voted yes on the bundle that combined the fee cut with the Plutus memory change. the vote of YUTA on the bundle
  • SIPO voted yes on the bundle that combined the fee cut with the Plutus memory change. the vote of SIPO on the bundle
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the bundle that combined the fee cut with the Plutus memory change. the vote of the Cardano Foundation on the bundle
  • EMURGO announced on 3 August, in a post titled EMURGO & Yoroi DRep Update, that while it supports users affected by the SecondFi security incident it resigns from the Intersect board and intends to de-register its DRep role in due course, to direct its full attention and resources to the recovery effort. EMURGO on X, EMURGO & Yoroi DRep Update
  • SecondFi, the wallet service that replaced EMURGO's Yoroi wallet, said after a theft from user wallets that it will not resume normal operations. CoinDesk on the SecondFi wallet theft
  • Epoch 537 began on 29 January 2025. Koios epoch information for epoch 537