DRepTalk
Sign in
Enter as DRepEnter as delegatorEnter as SPOEnter as CC memberEnter as proposerRegister as DRep
Governance ActionsDiscussionsTreasuryDRepsAnalyticsReview
Sign in
More ways to sign in
Enter as delegatorEnter as SPOEnter as CC memberEnter as proposerRegister as DRep
Install app

2025 Net Change Limit Extension

System9mo ago1 post
DReps 220SPOs 32CC 7

7 of 7 committee members voted

  • Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04
    YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale

    Ace Alliance finds the proposed "2025 Net Change Limit Extension" Info Action Constitutional, subject to meeting the required DRep voting threshold of >50% of the active voting stake when the Action expires at epoch boundary 603-604.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    If approved, this Net Change Limit (NCL) type Info Action (gov_action169kllwhfmp488je5x5rwvufd08p8sztdcf0ghf5sp6ey2gnjdwaqql47xry) would extend the duration of the previously approved 2025 NCL (gov_action1nd3t833j7v5sz65k3tp9yyvztw60sjcjgcgjr37682s3m7frwrusqmd2k80)by eight (8) epochs, concluding at the end of Epoch 612, without changing the total authorized amount of 350 million ada.

    We find that this Action satisfies the applicable requirements of the Cardano Constitution.

    Constitutional Alignment

    This governance action::

    • Satisfies the procedural requirements of Article III, Section 5: The action is presented in a standardized, legible format including a URL and hash for off-chain materials. It provides sufficient rationale for the extension, satisfying the transparency requirements of the Constitution.
    • Is the appropriate mechanism for changing the NCL state (Article III, Section 4): Because the Net Change Limit is currently enforced through Constitutional Committee oversight rather than engrained protocol parameters, an Info Action is the correct mechanism for this adjustment. This Action creates an on-chain record of the community's intent to extend the NCL duration, applied and enforced by the Constitutional Committee through its evaluation of pertinent Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions.
    • Adheres to Guardrail TREASURY-01a: The Constitution mandates that "A net change limit for the Cardano treasury's balance per period of time must be agreed by the DReps via an on-chain governance action with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake". Because the "period of time" is a defining parameter of any Net Change Limit, modifying the expiration date requires the explicit agreement of the DReps. This Info Action serves as the constitutionally prescribed mechanism to solicit and secure such agreement on-chain.

    This Net Change Limit type Info Action meets the applicable constitutional requirements.

  • Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5
    YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale

    This governance action is constitutional and supports continuity of treasury operations.

    This governance action extends the duration of the existing 2025 Net Change Limit without changing its approved amount. Under the Cardano Constitution, a valid Net Change Limit must be in effect for any treasury withdrawal to be constitutionally enacted. Extending the NCL ensures this required constraint remains continuously applicable and avoids a governance gap. The proposal preserves the originally approved spending ceiling and modifies only the period during which it applies, which is permitted under the Constitution.

    By extending the existing Net Change Limit without modifying its approved amount, this governance action remains fully aligned with the Cardano Constitution and supports uninterrupted and constitutionally compliant treasury operations. Cardano Curia therefore votes YES.

  • Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31
    YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale

    We consider this governance action to be constitutional.

    This governance action extends the term of the existing Net Change Limit (NCL) without modifying its total amount. As such, it remains fully compliant with the Treasury Guardrails defined in Appendix I, Section 3 — particularly TREASURY-01a(x) and TREASURY-02a(x) — which govern the application and continuity of a previously established NCL. The extension ensures continued treasury operations beyond the original expiration date and preserves the spending ceiling agreed upon by the Cardano Community. Therefore, we deem this governance action to be constitutional.

    For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.

  • KtorZ64f97568…3a49
    YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale

    The propose info action qualifies as a Net-Change Limit (NCL) extension and rightfully extends the previously established "2025 NCL" of 350M ADA by 8 epochs (thus ending at the end of Epoch 612).

    There's no explicit constitutional duties for constitutional committee (CC) members regarding NCLs, nor is there any formal definition of what an NCL is.

    However, it is my interpretation that whether an info action qualifies as an NCL is a constitutional matter and thus, pertains to CC duties.

    While unusual, this info action can only be framed in the context of an NCL. Furthermore, the information provided is accurate.

  • Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746
    YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale

    This proposal does not violate any of the binary criteria of the constitution, thus I consider it constitutional.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    This proposal does not violate any of the binary criteria of the constitution, thus I consider it constitutional.

  • Tingvard646d1b3a…be43
    YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale

    Tingvard records this vote to express its position for future assessments.

    This governance action proposes an extension of the previously adopted 2025 Net Change Limit (NCL) for an additional eight epochs. Under Article IV, § 3 of the Cardano Constitution, withdrawals from the Treasury may not exceed the “applicable net change limit,” and a valid NCL must be in effect for any treasury withdrawal to be constitutionally enacted. Extending the NCL therefore directly supports the constitutional framework governing treasury operations by ensuring that this mandatory constraint remains continuously applicable.

    While the Constitution does not mandate a binding vote by the Constitutional Committee on Net Change Limit Info Actions, Tingvard records its vote in order to clearly state its constitutional interpretation of this proposed NCL in accordance with Article VII, § 4. Because the ledger does not enforce Net Change Limits and because their applicability must be assessed off-chain when reviewing treasury withdrawals, articulating a clear position at the NCL stage provides important context for future constitutional evaluations under Article IV, § 3.

    The proposal clearly explains the temporal boundary of the existing NCL, the enactment mechanics governing treasury withdrawals, and the reason an extension is required to avoid a governance gap. It preserves the originally approved limit of 350,000,000,000,000 lovelace while extending only the period during which that limit applies. Article IV, § 3 imposes no restriction on defining or extending an NCL period, requiring only that a “period of time” be specified and that treasury withdrawals do not exceed the community-approved limit. This governance action satisfies those conditions.

    The submission meets the requirements of Article III, § 5 by presenting a complete and legible rationale with sufficient supporting detail to allow DReps and the Constitutional Committee to understand its purpose and intended effect. It also reflects the correct constitutional procedure for establishing an NCL, which requires agreement by more than 50% of the active voting DRep stake.

    By extending the established NCL without altering the previously approved numerical limit, this governance action maintains continuity in treasury constraints and avoids ambiguity in fiscal oversight. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits extending an NCL, and the structure and intent of this action align fully with the design of Article IV.

    Tingvard records this vote to document its constitutional assessment of the proposed Net Change Limit Extension. The action satisfies Articles III, § 5 and IV, § 3 of the Cardano Constitution and supports uninterrupted application of the Net Change Limit required for future treasury withdrawals. This position is expressed to provide clarity and consistency when assessing the constitutionality of subsequent treasury withdrawal governance actions that rely on this NCL.

  • Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ec
    AbstainActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale

    We have determined that this Info action does not meet the criteria deemed necessary for the Constitutional Committee to assess its constitutionality.

    Article VII, Section 1 of the Cardano Constitution states "The Constitutional Committee shall comprise a set of owners of ada that is collectively responsible for ensuring that on-chain governance actions prior to enactment on-chain, are constitutional."

    Additionally; Article VII, Section 4, Paragraph 2 states "Because "Info" actions have no on-chain effect and, accordingly, are neither constitutional nor unconstitutional, Constitutional Committee members may not prevent "Info" actions from being recorded on-chain. Members of the Constitutional Committee may nevertheless record a vote on-chain regarding an "Info" action in order to express their view on such "Info" action, including whether the suggested course of action proposed in such "Info" action, would be, in the view of such member, unconstitutional if it were to be enforced by on-chain mechanisms."

    Finally; Article VII, Section 4, Paragraph 3 states "In the case of "Info" actions that propose a Cardano Blockchain ecosystem budget, Constitutional Committee members shall record a vote on-chain that sets forth their opinion as to whether the proposed budget, if it were to be implemented in the form contained in the "Info" action, would violate this Constitution."

    The governance action with ID "gov_action169k...l47xry" and title "2025 Net Change Limit Extension", as an Info governance action, does not relate to a budget proposal, nor does it gauge sentiment towards another type of governance action which could be enacted on-chain, so the Constitutional Committee is not empowered to assess its constitutionality, ensuring DReps and SPOs are the only ones able to influence its outcome.

    We therefore Abstain.

    We abstain from assessing the constitutionality of this governance action.