Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653

Rationale highlights

Why some of the largest DReps voted for and against, in their own words.

• YUTA

  Yes435.8M ₳

  I'm going to vote conditionally YES on CC compensation. First of all, as a matter of principle, compensation should be provided. CC work is very important and, in some cases, requires a lot of time and highly technical consideration. However, the issue is...

  I'm going to vote conditionally YES on CC compensation.

  First of all, as a matter of principle, compensation should be provided. CC work is very important and, in some cases, requires a lot of time and highly technical consideration.

  However, the issue is the amount. Many DRep feel that it is too expensive, and to be honest, it's difficult to judge whether it is or is not.

  Therefore, I would appreciate it if you could provide the following points in your treasury withdraw. Presenting this does not necessarily mean I'll vote YES, but I will take it into consideration.

  1. Current effort by type of governance action and estimated future effort. Make it as clear as possible what is taking up time.

  This will make it easier for DRep to determine the reasonableness of the amount.

  In addition, you can identify governance action consideration items that are taking particularly long, and in some cases consider amending the constitution to reduce governance costs, such as removing clauses that result in unnecessary time spent on consideration but do not add much value. Budget info actions are, in my opinion, an example of an area of ​​constitutional reform where cost reductions can be made reasonably.

  1. Present an SLA: In particular, explain the differences in service between cases where a reward is received and cases where it is not.

  This will discourage the idea that "CC will evaluate governance actions regardless of whether a reward is received, so there is no need to provide a reward."

  For example, the following: Providing the following services will benefit the entire ecosystem.
  "If a reward is received, announce the planned voting date within two epochs of the submission of the governance action." (Not voting within two epochs!)
  "If a reward is received, provide non-binding, casual constitutional advice on the constitutionality of draft governance actions sponsored by 20% of DRep's stake within three epochs." (Following all of the advice does not guarantee that the action will be constitutional!)

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  CC報酬について、条件付きYESの投票をしようと思います。

  まず原則論として、報酬の提供自体は、行うべきでしょう。CCの業務は非常に重要かつ場合によっては高度に技術的な時間をかけた検討が必要な場合もあります。

  ただ、問題は、金額の多寡です。これを割高に感じるDRepが多く、また正直に言うとこれが割高なのかどうかの判断も困難な状況にあることです。

  よって次のような点をトレジャリーウィズドローで提示していただけますと幸いです。これを提示したから必ずYES投票すると言うわけではありませんが、考慮材料にします。

  1. 現在のところの１つのガバナンスアクション種類別の工数と今後の工数の見積もり。何に時間がかかっているのかできるだけ可視化します。

  これによりDRepが金額の合理性を判断しやすくなります。
  また、特に時間が余分にかかっているガバナンスアクションの検討項目を特定し、場合によっては不必要に検討に時間を要する結果をうむがそれほど価値のない条文を削除するなど憲法を改正してガバナンスコストを引き下げることも検討できます。Budget info actionは、私の考えでは合理的にコスト削減できる憲法改正分野の１つの例です。

  1. SLAの提示：特に報酬を受け取ったケースと受け取らないケースでどのようなサービスの違いが生まれるかについて説明します。

  これにより「CCは報酬を受け取っても受け取らなくてもどちらにせよガバナンスアクションを評価するので、報酬は提供しなくて良い」と言う考え方を抑制できます。

  例えば、次のようなものです。次のようなサービスが提供されることはエコシステム全体にメリットがあります。
  「報酬を受け取る場合は、ガバナンスアクションの提出時から２エポック以内に投票予定日をアナウンスする」（２エポック以内に投票するではなく）
  「報酬を受け取る場合は、DRepの20%のステークにスポンサードされたガバナンスアクションのドラフトの合憲性について非拘束的でカジュアルな合憲性に関するアドバイスを３エポック以内に行う」（アドバイスに全て従っても合憲とするとは限らない）

• Cardano Foundation

  No120.2M ₳

  The Cardano Foundation, as a DRep, votes NO. While we support the principle of CC compensation, this proposal lacks an explanation of how the requested amount was calculated, an accountability framework and it risks creating misaligned incentives. We...

  The Cardano Foundation, as a DRep, votes NO. While we support the principle of CC compensation, this proposal lacks an explanation of how the requested amount was calculated, an accountability framework and it risks creating misaligned incentives. We encourage the proposers to revisit this proposal.

  A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  This governance action has successfully initiated an important, ecosystem-wide discussion on how to fairly and sustainably compensate key governance roles. The Cardano Constitution explicitly provides for the compensation of the Constitutional Committee (CC). The Cardano Foundation, acting as a DRep, supports this principle.

  Our NO vote is not a rejection of the principle of compensation but of this specific implementation. Our concerns are based on the following points:

  • Improper Sequencing: This proposal is premature as it requests funding before a necessary accountability framework is in place. Compensating these key role players without a framework against which to hold them accountable for performing their duties is unwise. A public-facing framework defining the CC's duties, minimum participation standards, and conditions for non-payment should be established before a budget for compensation is approved.
  • Misaligned Incentive Structure: A high, pre-determined compensation amount of 200,000 ada per seat without an accountability framework risks creating a problematic incentive structure. It may attract future candidates who are i) unsuited to the role (by background, incentive or expertise) and ii) primarily motivated by the payment rather than by commitment to fulfilling their role - potentially compromising the quality of the CC in subsequent terms.
  • Potential Governance Design Issue: The proposal's justification of a high workload points to a potential governance design flaw. If the burden on a small number of CC members is unsustainable, the solution should be to fix the governance design (e.g., by expanding the CC to distribute the load, and incentivising CC members to take decisions efficiently) rather than compensating a few members to endure a structural bottleneck.
  • Lack of a Calculation for the Proposed Amount: The proposal does not explain how the 200,000 ada figure per seat was calculated. This makes it hard to know whether this figure is based on estimated time and effort, and if it considers single-person CC members vs collectives. The approximate effort in reviewing GAs per seat should be equal and not differ drastically.

  Recommendations for a Future Submission

  This "no" vote is intended to be constructive. We believe a supportable CC budget is achievable and would be prepared to review a future submission that addresses the following key points:

  • Establish an Accountability Framework First: A future proposal should be preceded by, or at least contain, a clear public-facing framework, such as a formal Code of Conduct. This document should define the minimum duties, participation levels (e.g., voting frequency, rationale submission), and specific conditions under which a member would not be eligible for compensation.
  • Propose a Modular and Flexible Payment Structure: Instead of a single, automatic budget, a more defensible model would be modular (e.g., paid per governance action reviewed on a monthly basis) and tied to active participation. This ensures compensation is for services rendered and allows the system to flexibly manage costs if a member resigns or becomes inactive.
  • Address the Governance Design: We encourage a broader discussion on the underlying problem of workload. A long-term solution should focus on improving the governance design itself, which may in turn lead to a more sustainable and cost-effective compensation model.

  The Cardano Foundation as a DRep votes NO on this governance action. We believe this conversation is vital, but this specific proposal is not the right model for ensuring the long-term, independent, and sustainable operation of the Constitutional Committee. We are committed to working with the community to develop a more appropriate and robust framework and encourage the proposers to use this feedback to craft a new, more supportable submission.

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  NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
  The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well.

• CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool)

  No91.5M ₳

  As a DRep, I have decided to vote NO on the Constitutional Committee Compensation. A PDF version of this rationale is also made available. To the best of my knowledge, the proposal was not preceded by any debate with DReps and the community. CC members only...

  As a DRep, I have decided to vote NO on the Constitutional Committee Compensation.

  A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  To the best of my knowledge, the proposal was not preceded by any debate with DReps and the community. CC members only debated among themselves. Only 5 out of 7 CC members are requesting compensation. The details of this debate are not public.

  The proposal seems to me inconceptual and does not address any specific problem that we can currently observe. If we are to make changes, we should stick to a vision and strategy. It makes no sense to introduce compensation for one group of governance bodies without knowing how we will compensate DReps. We also do not know what the community and DReps think about compensation.

  I will not approve compensation for CC members without simultaneously introducing the same benefits for DReps.

  I dare say that the work of DReps is much more demanding than the work of CC members.

  • While CC members are elected from a relatively small number of interested parties and then have their position secured, DReps have to try harder to get delegations from ADA holders. This is time-consuming.

  • CC members only deal with the constitutionality of proposals, which is just a binary decision based on a clear text of the Constitution. If the proposal is in accordance with the Constitution, CC members just vote YES (regardless of their opinion). DReps have to deal with the merit of proposals, which is more time-consuming. It is necessary to analyze all aspects of proposals from different perspectives. They have to communicate with teams and delegators. In some cases, they are even asked for their opinion before submitting proposals. They have to give detailed feedback to teams (if they want and have the time).

  • DReps have to explain their decisions to the community much more often, communicate with their delegates, and even face criticism. One prominent DRep even retired after such criticism. Also in this respect, the work of DReps is more demanding.

  • It is DReps who approve proposals. While CC members can all vote YES for a proposal that is in accordance with the Constitution, it is up to DReps to reject a proposal that has low impact, or is even submitted by fraudsters. The role of DReps is more responsible.

  • CC members have performed their role flawlessly without compensation so far. Many DReps are not willing to write rationales. Many DReps do not even explicitly vote NO if they do not want to vote YES. Perhaps their fatigue can be observed. In this case, compensation could address specific governance issues (there are plenty of issues).

  If the position of CC members were to become more lucrative than the position of DReps due to compensation, it could introduce an imbalance into the system.

  If there is agreement that CC members deserve compensation, I dare say that DReps deserve it too.

  While in the case of CC members, introducing compensation is relatively easy, since there is a fixed number of them and their voting power is the same. In the case of DReps, it would be more complicated. They have different voting power and a different number of delegators.

  This complexity is not a reason to introduce compensation for CC members before we introduce it for DReps.

  Intersect requires a relatively large sum for Cardano governance. Governance tools also require funding. Let’s define the vision, determine how much we want to spend on governance from the Treasury, and then make decisions regarding other costs.

  Volunteer work can have its limits and shortcomings. If DReps, but also CC members, put more time and effort into their work, maybe it would be beneficial for Cardano. Compensation would be attractive to experts, which we definitely need.

  My opinion is that we should not pay governance bodies through Treasury withdrawals. Instead, we should integrate governance with staking. But that would be a different debate.

  If we were to use 1M ADA for compensation, let’s divide this amount between CC members and active DReps. Governance bodies decide on hundreds of millions of ADA per year. This is a responsible role that should probably be compensated. However, doing it voluntarily is still a valid option.

  Maybe it would be fair to do an analysis first and discuss the pros and cons. This proposal is unprepared and completely ignores the complexity of Cardano governance.

• hix_coffeepool

  Yes50.4M ₳

  I am voting "Yes" for CC compansation. CC role is an essential feature of governance security, and their activities should be sufficiently supported by our ecosystem.