Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653
174 DReps voted · 75 with a rationale · 10 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain584.2M ₳Rationale
Summary
Yoroi votes ABSTAIN on the Budget Info Action to compensate Constitutional Committee members. We are strongly supportive of CC compensation, as outlined in the Cardano Constitution. However, several aspects of this proposal require further clarification before it can be fully endorsed.
Rationale
Yoroi strongly supports ensuring that CC members receive appropriate compensation, consistent with the Constitution’s provision that CC members may be compensated for their efforts. Their constitutional responsibilities are central to maintaining Cardano’s governance and long-term system integrity.
However, while we fully agree with the principle, the requested 1,000,000 ADA lacks a clear explanation of how the total was derived and what underlying assumptions it represents. Without this clarity, we find it challenging to understand the intended scope, proportionality, and sustainability of the model.
Yoroi believes that a structured discussion among relevant stakeholders would be valuable to mature the proposal. Such a forum would help clarify objectives, align expectations, and establish shared assumptions before progressing toward a Treasury Withdrawal.
In conclusion, Yoroi supports the constitutional principle that CC members may be compensated but abstains on this version to encourage clearer details and aligned expectations before funding is requested. We also believe a focused stakeholder forum would help consolidate information and refine the assumptions needed for a well-structured compensation model.
Potential Discussion Points for the Forum:
To support the development of a clear and shared compensation model, Yoroi suggests that a dedicated stakeholder forum could explore the following topics:
How should compensation be structured to incentivize timely and high-quality rationalization for proposers?
What mechanisms should be used to determine appropriate compensation levels?
On what criteria should payment be triggered?
Should compensation be paid in ADA or in stablecoins?
- Yes435.8M ₳Rationale
I'm going to vote conditionally YES on CC compensation.
First of all, as a matter of principle, compensation should be provided. CC work is very important and, in some cases, requires a lot of time and highly technical consideration.
However, the issue is the amount. Many DRep feel that it is too expensive, and to be honest, it's difficult to judge whether it is or is not.
Therefore, I would appreciate it if you could provide the following points in your treasury withdraw. Presenting this does not necessarily mean I'll vote YES, but I will take it into consideration.
- Current effort by type of governance action and estimated future effort. Make it as clear as possible what is taking up time.
This will make it easier for DRep to determine the reasonableness of the amount.
In addition, you can identify governance action consideration items that are taking particularly long, and in some cases consider amending the constitution to reduce governance costs, such as removing clauses that result in unnecessary time spent on consideration but do not add much value. Budget info actions are, in my opinion, an example of an area of constitutional reform where cost reductions can be made reasonably.
- Present an SLA: In particular, explain the differences in service between cases where a reward is received and cases where it is not.
This will discourage the idea that "CC will evaluate governance actions regardless of whether a reward is received, so there is no need to provide a reward."
For example, the following: Providing the following services will benefit the entire ecosystem.
"If a reward is received, announce the planned voting date within two epochs of the submission of the governance action." (Not voting within two epochs!)
"If a reward is received, provide non-binding, casual constitutional advice on the constitutionality of draft governance actions sponsored by 20% of DRep's stake within three epochs." (Following all of the advice does not guarantee that the action will be constitutional!)
CC報酬について、条件付きYESの投票をしようと思います。
まず原則論として、報酬の提供自体は、行うべきでしょう。CCの業務は非常に重要かつ場合によっては高度に技術的な時間をかけた検討が必要な場合もあります。
ただ、問題は、金額の多寡です。これを割高に感じるDRepが多く、また正直に言うとこれが割高なのかどうかの判断も困難な状況にあることです。
よって次のような点をトレジャリーウィズドローで提示していただけますと幸いです。これを提示したから必ずYES投票すると言うわけではありませんが、考慮材料にします。
- 現在のところの１つのガバナンスアクション種類別の工数と今後の工数の見積もり。何に時間がかかっているのかできるだけ可視化します。
これによりDRepが金額の合理性を判断しやすくなります。
また、特に時間が余分にかかっているガバナンスアクションの検討項目を特定し、場合によっては不必要に検討に時間を要する結果をうむがそれほど価値のない条文を削除するなど憲法を改正してガバナンスコストを引き下げることも検討できます。Budget info actionは、私の考えでは合理的にコスト削減できる憲法改正分野の１つの例です。- SLAの提示：特に報酬を受け取ったケースと受け取らないケースでどのようなサービスの違いが生まれるかについて説明します。
これにより「CCは報酬を受け取っても受け取らなくてもどちらにせよガバナンスアクションを評価するので、報酬は提供しなくて良い」と言う考え方を抑制できます。
例えば、次のようなものです。次のようなサービスが提供されることはエコシステム全体にメリットがあります。
「報酬を受け取る場合は、ガバナンスアクションの提出時から２エポック以内に投票予定日をアナウンスする」（２エポック以内に投票するではなく）
「報酬を受け取る場合は、DRepの20%のステークにスポンサードされたガバナンスアクションのドラフトの合憲性について非拘束的でカジュアルな合憲性に関するアドバイスを３エポック以内に行う」（アドバイスに全て従っても合憲とするとは限らない） - Abstain332.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain293M ₳Rationale
Rationale
We are highly supportive of ensuring that Constitutional Committee members receive sustainable compensation for their meaningful contributions. Their constitutional oversight is central to Cardano’s governance, and the Constitution itself anticipates that key governance roles should be fairly and appropriately compensated.
At the Cardano Summit in Berlin, EMURGO and Intersect organized a brief session with DReps, CC members, stake pool operators, and other governance enthusiasts to gather broader feedback. It became apparent that there is a gap in how the proposer and the DReps interpret the clarity of this Budget Info action.
Some DReps noted that the 1,000,000 ADA figure remains unclear, or that they are unsure where to find the most up-to-date supporting materials, while the proposer has provided certain rationales on X and other platforms.
This difference in perception highlights the need for a shared space where all relevant information can be presented transparently and discussed before moving forward. We acknowledge the materials and explanations provided by current CC members, but a common forum would help refine assumptions and strengthen collective understanding of the proposed compensation model.
Conclusion
Our abstention reflects the need for additional clarity and alignment. We remain highly supportive of establishing sustainable compensation for the Constitutional Committee; however, this proposal requires clearer justification and stronger consensus across stakeholders before we can fully endorse it.
- No222.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain165.7M ₳No rationale
- No120.2M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation, as a DRep, votes NO. While we support the principle of CC compensation, this proposal lacks an explanation of how the requested amount was calculated, an accountability framework and it risks creating misaligned incentives. We encourage the proposers to revisit this proposal.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This governance action has successfully initiated an important, ecosystem-wide discussion on how to fairly and sustainably compensate key governance roles. The Cardano Constitution explicitly provides for the compensation of the Constitutional Committee (CC). The Cardano Foundation, acting as a DRep, supports this principle.
Our NO vote is not a rejection of the principle of compensation but of this specific implementation. Our concerns are based on the following points:
- Improper Sequencing: This proposal is premature as it requests funding before a necessary accountability framework is in place. Compensating these key role players without a framework against which to hold them accountable for performing their duties is unwise. A public-facing framework defining the CC's duties, minimum participation standards, and conditions for non-payment should be established before a budget for compensation is approved.
- Misaligned Incentive Structure: A high, pre-determined compensation amount of 200,000 ada per seat without an accountability framework risks creating a problematic incentive structure. It may attract future candidates who are i) unsuited to the role (by background, incentive or expertise) and ii) primarily motivated by the payment rather than by commitment to fulfilling their role - potentially compromising the quality of the CC in subsequent terms.
- Potential Governance Design Issue: The proposal's justification of a high workload points to a potential governance design flaw. If the burden on a small number of CC members is unsustainable, the solution should be to fix the governance design (e.g., by expanding the CC to distribute the load, and incentivising CC members to take decisions efficiently) rather than compensating a few members to endure a structural bottleneck.
- Lack of a Calculation for the Proposed Amount: The proposal does not explain how the 200,000 ada figure per seat was calculated. This makes it hard to know whether this figure is based on estimated time and effort, and if it considers single-person CC members vs collectives. The approximate effort in reviewing GAs per seat should be equal and not differ drastically.
Recommendations for a Future Submission
This "no" vote is intended to be constructive. We believe a supportable CC budget is achievable and would be prepared to review a future submission that addresses the following key points:
- Establish an Accountability Framework First: A future proposal should be preceded by, or at least contain, a clear public-facing framework, such as a formal Code of Conduct. This document should define the minimum duties, participation levels (e.g., voting frequency, rationale submission), and specific conditions under which a member would not be eligible for compensation.
- Propose a Modular and Flexible Payment Structure: Instead of a single, automatic budget, a more defensible model would be modular (e.g., paid per governance action reviewed on a monthly basis) and tied to active participation. This ensures compensation is for services rendered and allows the system to flexibly manage costs if a member resigns or becomes inactive.
- Address the Governance Design: We encourage a broader discussion on the underlying problem of workload. A long-term solution should focus on improving the governance design itself, which may in turn lead to a more sustainable and cost-effective compensation model.
The Cardano Foundation as a DRep votes NO on this governance action. We believe this conversation is vital, but this specific proposal is not the right model for ensuring the long-term, independent, and sustainable operation of the Constitutional Committee. We are committed to working with the community to develop a more appropriate and robust framework and encourage the proposers to use this feedback to craft a new, more supportable submission.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Abstain92.2M ₳No rationale
- No91.5M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I have decided to vote NO on the Constitutional Committee Compensation.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
To the best of my knowledge, the proposal was not preceded by any debate with DReps and the community. CC members only debated among themselves. Only 5 out of 7 CC members are requesting compensation. The details of this debate are not public.
The proposal seems to me inconceptual and does not address any specific problem that we can currently observe. If we are to make changes, we should stick to a vision and strategy. It makes no sense to introduce compensation for one group of governance bodies without knowing how we will compensate DReps. We also do not know what the community and DReps think about compensation.
I will not approve compensation for CC members without simultaneously introducing the same benefits for DReps.
I dare say that the work of DReps is much more demanding than the work of CC members.
While CC members are elected from a relatively small number of interested parties and then have their position secured, DReps have to try harder to get delegations from ADA holders. This is time-consuming.
CC members only deal with the constitutionality of proposals, which is just a binary decision based on a clear text of the Constitution. If the proposal is in accordance with the Constitution, CC members just vote YES (regardless of their opinion). DReps have to deal with the merit of proposals, which is more time-consuming. It is necessary to analyze all aspects of proposals from different perspectives. They have to communicate with teams and delegators. In some cases, they are even asked for their opinion before submitting proposals. They have to give detailed feedback to teams (if they want and have the time).
DReps have to explain their decisions to the community much more often, communicate with their delegates, and even face criticism. One prominent DRep even retired after such criticism. Also in this respect, the work of DReps is more demanding.
It is DReps who approve proposals. While CC members can all vote YES for a proposal that is in accordance with the Constitution, it is up to DReps to reject a proposal that has low impact, or is even submitted by fraudsters. The role of DReps is more responsible.
CC members have performed their role flawlessly without compensation so far. Many DReps are not willing to write rationales. Many DReps do not even explicitly vote NO if they do not want to vote YES. Perhaps their fatigue can be observed. In this case, compensation could address specific governance issues (there are plenty of issues).
If the position of CC members were to become more lucrative than the position of DReps due to compensation, it could introduce an imbalance into the system.
If there is agreement that CC members deserve compensation, I dare say that DReps deserve it too.
While in the case of CC members, introducing compensation is relatively easy, since there is a fixed number of them and their voting power is the same. In the case of DReps, it would be more complicated. They have different voting power and a different number of delegators.
This complexity is not a reason to introduce compensation for CC members before we introduce it for DReps.
Intersect requires a relatively large sum for Cardano governance. Governance tools also require funding. Let’s define the vision, determine how much we want to spend on governance from the Treasury, and then make decisions regarding other costs.
Volunteer work can have its limits and shortcomings. If DReps, but also CC members, put more time and effort into their work, maybe it would be beneficial for Cardano. Compensation would be attractive to experts, which we definitely need.
My opinion is that we should not pay governance bodies through Treasury withdrawals. Instead, we should integrate governance with staking. But that would be a different debate.
If we were to use 1M ADA for compensation, let’s divide this amount between CC members and active DReps. Governance bodies decide on hundreds of millions of ADA per year. This is a responsible role that should probably be compensated. However, doing it voluntarily is still a valid option.
Maybe it would be fair to do an analysis first and discuss the pros and cons. This proposal is unprepared and completely ignores the complexity of Cardano governance.
- Abstain86M ₳Rationale
🗳️ SIPO DRep Comment — Abstain
SIPO recognizes that this proposal — “Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581–653” — represents an important and necessary step in building a sustainable and fair governance framework for Cardano.
It aims to formalize a transparent compensation structure for the Constitutional Committee (CC), ensuring that committee members can continue their work independently, without relying on external or personal financial support. I fully acknowledge the motivation and good faith behind this effort.At the same time, SIPO believes that the governance system as a whole is still in a formative stage. The Constitution, the replacement and review processes for the CC, and the standards for oversight and audit are all being tested for the first time in a real-world context.
In this phase, the most valuable action for the community may not be to finalize a financial structure, but to observe, measure, and refine the operational model through transparent and inclusive discussion.From SIPO’s perspective, defining a long-term compensation mechanism now — before the system’s full functionality and accountability processes are validated — risks fixing the institutional form too early.
It could unintentionally limit future flexibility or set precedents that later conflict with more mature governance norms.
SIPO values the principle that “the system should evolve organically through experience and consensus,” not by early codification.We also note that several current CC members themselves have declined compensation or expressed reservations.
This diversity of opinion within the Committee highlights the need for more dialogue and mutual understanding among CC, DReps, SPOs, and the broader community before formalizing such frameworks.
Therefore, while SIPO supports the spirit of ensuring fair and independent governance, we consider this particular step to be premature in timing.In light of these considerations, SIPO has chosen to Abstain from voting on this proposal.
Our abstention does not mean opposition to the idea of CC compensation; rather, it reflects a desire to promote further consensus-building, transparency, and institutional maturity before establishing a permanent standard.We encourage continued open discussion between all governance actors — CC members, Intersect, DReps, and community participants — to co-create a compensation framework that is both principled and adaptive to future governance evolution.
SIPO remains committed to supporting the growth of Cardano’s governance ecosystem in a way that is inclusive, verifiable, and sustainable for the long term.In summary:
SIPO abstains, with respect for the intent of this proposal, and with a view toward the long-term health and credibility of Cardano’s constitutional governance.⸻
SIPOは、この提案「Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581–653」が、カルダノのガバナンスをより持続可能で公正なものにしていくための重要な一歩であることを理解しています。
この提案は、憲法委員会（Constitutional Committee, CC）のメンバーに対して透明性のある報酬構造を整備し、委員たちが外部資金や自己負担に頼らず、独立して活動を継続できるようにすることを目的としています。
その意図や誠実な動機には、SIPOも共感しています。しかし一方で、SIPOは現時点のカルダノ・ガバナンス全体がまだ形成途上にあると考えています。
憲法の最終的な定義や、憲法委員会の交代・監査・報告の手続きなどは、まだ初期段階で実験的に運用されている状態です。
このような時期に制度的な報酬モデルを先に固定してしまうことは、今後の制度設計の柔軟性を損ねるおそれがあると感じています。SIPOが重視しているのは、「制度はまず経験と対話を通じて成熟させ、その上で正式な形を整えるべきだ」という原則です。
現時点では、報酬スキームを確定させるよりも、運用・監査・意思決定のプロセスをコミュニティ全体で検証し、長期的な信頼を積み上げていくことが大切だと考えています。また、今回の提案においては、現職のCCメンバーの中にも報酬を辞退した方や、制度設計に対して慎重な意見を持つ方がいます。
この点は、委員会内部でも多様な見解が存在することを示しており、ガバナンス全体としてより広い合意形成と対話のプロセスを経る必要があることを示唆しています。
SIPOはそのプロセスを尊重したいと考えています。したがって、SIPOはこの提案に対して「Abstain（棄権）」の立場を取ります。
これは提案の理念や目的に反対するものではなく、「もう少し時間をかけて制度的な合意と成熟を進めたい」という意思の表明です。
より健全で透明な仕組みを構築するためには、ガバナンスの各主体──CC、DRep、SPO、Intersect、そしてコミュニティ──が協力し、オープンな議論を続けていくことが重要だと考えています。SIPOは、カルダノの憲法ガバナンスが長期的に信頼される仕組みとして定着していくことを願っており、
今回の棄権判断はそのための慎重で責任あるステップだと位置づけています。最終的に、SIPOの立場をまとめると次の通りです。
SIPOは本提案に対し「Abstain（棄権）」の投票を行います。
その理由は、制度の意義を尊重しつつも、ガバナンスの方向性をより多くの関係者と共に検証し、成熟した合意を築く時間が必要だと判断したためです。
SIPOは今後も、カルダノのガバナンスがより包摂的で、検証可能で、持続的な仕組みとして発展していくよう尽力してまいります。 - No84.3M ₳Rationale
See post on x.com regarding this vote.
- Abstain75.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain74.5M ₳Rationale
As I have a direct interest in this proposal, I would not be able to maintain neutrality in this decision. Therefore, I will abstain.
That said, I believe developing a sustainable and transparent compensation framework for the CC is important for the long-term health of Cardano governance, and I look forward to continued community discussion on this topic.
僕は本提案に利害を有する立場であり、中立性を維持できないため棄権いたします。
ただし、憲法委員会の職務は、Cardano ガバナンスの健全性を支える重要なものであり、その持続に必要な仕組みや報酬体系の整備をコミュニティとして前向きに議論していくことを期待します。
- No73.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO. I value our CC members, but this ask is way too high. It creates an unfair pay gap, especially since this committee stepped in without a promise of compensation for this term. We need more governance maturity before we can commit to a spend like this.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting NO. While I greatly value our CC members and the critical role they perform, this ask is way too high.
My concern is that it creates an unfair compensation gap between the CC and other vital contributors, additionally it sets a standard which is difficult to reverse. More importantly, this committee stepped in and committed to this role without any promise of compensation for this term.
For the sake of our long-term sustainability and decentralization, I believe we need more governance maturity before we can commit to a spend like this.
- No66M ₳Rationale
I think rewarding CC members is necessary in the long run. But 200k per member for one year is excessive even at current ADA price levels.
- No62.7M ₳Rationale
No, I thought we were all working for free? Will update the vote upon review if needed.
- Abstain53.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting "Yes" for CC compansation. CC role is an essential feature of governance security, and their activities should be sufficiently supported by our ecosystem.
- No50M ₳Rationale
Compensation for participating in governance can be discussed. However, at this point, I do not support it for any entities - neither for dReps, nor for SPOs, nor for the CC members. It's worth noting that SPOs receive rewards not for participating in governance, so trying to put existing pool rewards and the lack of rewards for dReps or the CC members under the same umbrella doesn't seem right to me.
- Yes49.5M ₳No rationale
- No48.6M ₳Rationale
It is simply absurd for CC to ask for compensation when CC are not legally trained, not doing the hard work like DReps in analysing the benefit of proposal on Cardano.
- No47.6M ₳No rationale
- No40.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes38.1M ₳Rationale
Support.
Fair and transparent compensation helps keep the Constitutional Committee independent and effective — a necessary step for mature governance. - No37.8M ₳No rationale
- No34.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain34.3M ₳Rationale
We abstained on this proposal. The compensation framework for Constitutional Committee members is an important governance matter. However, since some members of the Socious DRep are members of the Constitutional Committee, we determined that abstaining was the appropriate action to avoid any potential conflict of interest and to maintain impartiality.
- AbstainRevoted33.5M ₳Rationale
Abstain because of conflict of interest but support fair CC compensation to ensure unbiased and professional governance.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am abstaining from this vote as it involves compensation for Constitutional Committee members, which would be a conflict of interest given my current position. I still support the intent behind this proposal since fair compensation ensures qualified and unbiased individuals can dedicate the necessary time and attention to their duties.
Paying members for their service encourages fairness, accountability, and professionalism. It allows capable contributors to focus fully on governance responsibilities and strengthens the ecosystem’s integrity.
Earlier votes
Abstain9mo agoSuperseded
Voting YES to v2.3 update for simplifying governance and budget processes, removing unnecessary complexity, and strengthening efficiency, accountability, and sustainability across the Cardano ecosystem.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The Cardano Constitution v2.3 update simplifies the governance and budget processes while maintaining alignment with the ecosystem’s core principles of decentralization, transparency, and fiscal responsibility.
This revision removes unnecessary complexity and redundant sections, improving readability and operational efficiency without weakening constitutional safeguards. The streamlined budget process enhances accountability and enables more agile decision-making in the management of community resources.
By focusing on clarity, sustainability, and efficiency, the v2.3 update strengthens Cardano’s governance framework and supports long-term ecosystem growth. Therefore, the vote is YES.
- Yes30.7M ₳No rationale
- No27.9M ₳Rationale
I am supportive of the idea of constitutional committee members receiving some compensation, but I feel like this ask is too much too soon. It is my opinion that this compensation should be more of a supplementary income rather than a full-time salary. Additionally, I feel like the amount asked for, per seat, is too much. In the future I would consider supporting a smaller amount of compensation, and probably even a smaller constitutional committee.
- No27.9M ₳No rationale
- No26.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
This is more a solidarity vote then anything, it does look as though it wont pass sadly, but the fact were sitting on minimum viable governance a year on, speaks to wider problem. This at least should spark a conversation amongst the community that the sheer amt of work thats done by dreps/CC and committee seat members, is not a small thing. We ignore tis at our peril, the total amount of people currently doing this is very small, you dont want it to get smaller JS
- Yes25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES because ensuring execution of Constitutional Committee duties is a responsibility critical to government function. We get what we pay for.
- Yes23.5M ₳No rationale
- No21.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.5M ₳Rationale
I choose to vote ABSTAIN on this budget info action for Constitutional Committee compensation at this time. Having been one of the few people to have participated in all three arms of Cardano governance (SPO, DRep and ICC) I know the level of work that goes into being a member on the Constitutional Committee and absolutely agree that there should be some level of compensation for the work. Having completed a term on the Interim Constitutional Committee, as one of ten members chosen to fulfil the role of the Intersect seat, I can attest to amount of time and energy that it can take.
In my opinion, consortiums are the best option for CC seats, they offer greater resilience to outside influence and flexibility when one or more members are unable to be present for one reason or another. With that said, they also come with greater organisational requirements; each member does their own research, meetings have to be co-ordinated to discuss and debate findings, votes have to be taken, rationale documents prepared and votes submitted. All of this work is carried out, usually alongside full-time jobs and other commitments. During my tenure as a team of 8-10 members I can confirm that by the end of the ICC term, I was exhausted. To expect this work to continue uncompensated is unsustainable and I welcome the discussion on this topic that this proposal has brought to the forefront.
Despite these words, I have chosen to vote ABSTAIN at this time due to the lack of clarity around the numbers in the budget info action and the lack of socialisation beforehand. I think that the submission caught the community by surprise and although cost breakdowns have been provided on social channels, I feel that this proposal would have been stronger for having had them included within the text.
It has been sad to hear of the Cardano Atlantic Council’s plans to retire their seat as a result of the community response to this proposal but I thank them for their services to date and for bringing this topic to the forefront of conversation once again.
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- No19.9M ₳Rationale
I would be very careful setting a precedent here, albeit I understand the need to think about this. I would argue we should first have a more holistic community-wide discussion on this including DReps, CC and SPOs.
I believe there is also good potential to ease the workload on CC members with AI tools. I would like to see this explored first. - No17.4M ₳No rationale
- AbstainChanged17.3M ₳Rationale
Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653
Earlier votes
No9mo agoSuperseded
- No16.7M ₳Rationale
We voted No because the requested 1,000,000 ADA compensation for the Constitutional Committee is not proportionate to the committee’s limited mandate and lacks sufficient justification or workload transparency. The proposal sets an unsustainable precedent for administrative spending, prioritizing institutional salaries over broader ecosystem needs. While smart-contract oversight and reporting are positive, the overall scale and structure do not meet our standards for efficient, accountable treasury use.
- Yes16.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
I am choosing to ****abstain ****on this Info action for Constitutional Committee compensation.
First, I want to be clear on principle: I fully support the idea that Constitutional Committee (CC) members can and should be compensated for their work. The Cardano Constitution explicitly anticipates compensation for governance roles, including CC members, and the reality of the workload is well known to anyone who has followed governance closely. Reviewing governance actions for constitutional alignment, drafting rationales, and operating across time zones is demanding work. It is neither sustainable nor fair to expect long-term, high-quality service to be carried out indefinitely on a purely voluntary basis.
My abstention is therefore not a rejection of CC compensation, but a response to the way this particular budget has been framed and introduced.
There are three broad concerns that prevent me from voting Yes:
Lack of clear justification for the requested amount.
The proposal asks for up to 200,000 ₳ per seat, but the on-chain metadata does not explain how this number was derived. There is no visible model of expected hours, rate assumptions, or comparison with similar public-service or governance roles. Without a transparent breakdown of workload and costing, it is very difficult for DReps or the wider community to judge whether the amount is proportionate.Missing accountability and performance framework.
Several DReps have rightly pointed out that a durable compensation model should sit on top of a clear, public framework that describes the CC’s duties, minimum participation standards, and conditions for non-payment. This proposal relies primarily on smart-contract mechanics and peer oversight at the contract level, but does not yet define what “good performance” looks like from a constitutional governance perspective. I believe a CC code of conduct / SLA-style document should either precede or accompany a budget like this.Fairness, precedent and ecosystem coherence.
CC work is important, but so is the work done by DReps and SPOs. Approving a relatively large, CC-only compensation package—especially for a committee that accepted its term without an explicit compensation promise—risks setting an uneven precedent. Many in the community quite reasonably ask why CC compensation is being addressed in isolation instead of as part of a broader, coordinated framework for rewarding all governance roles. I share that concern and would prefer to see this discussion evolve into a more comprehensive, ecosystem-wide approach.I do want to acknowledge the positive aspects of the design. Using per-member smart contracts with vesting, clawback, and peer-controlled pause mechanisms is a strong architectural choice. Unused funds being swept back to the Treasury after expiry aligns with good stewardship of common resources. In many ways, the technical and contractual structure is ahead of the political and economic framing.
However, the combination of an under-explained amount, the absence of a clear accountability framework, and the limited prior socialisation of this proposal means I cannot actively endorse it in its current form. A No vote from me would risk being interpreted as opposition to CC compensation itself, which is not my position. Instead, I am abstaining to signal conditional support for the principle while urging a revised, more mature proposal.
I would be open to supporting a future submission that:
Provides a transparent cost model for the requested amounts, including estimated workload per governance action type and per epoch;
Is paired with a public-facing CC responsibilities and accountability framework, including minimum participation expectations and conditions under which compensation may be withheld;
Is developed alongside, or at least clearly situated within, a broader conversation about compensation for other governance roles such as DReps; and
Is better socialised with the community before submission, so that key details live in the proposal itself rather than scattered across social media threads.
This proposal has started an important conversation about how we sustain our governance institutions. My abstention is intended as a constructive contribution to that conversation: yes to CC compensation in principle, but not yet, and not quite like this.
- No12.1M ₳Rationale
We have reviewed the proposal “Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581–653” and acknowledge the critical role the Constitutional Committee (CC) continues to play in safeguarding the governance process, interpreting constitutional provisions, and ensuring procedural integrity. The proposal requests ₳1,000,000 from the treasury to compensate five of the seven currently serving CC members for their work over a 73-epoch term. The intent to formalize fair remuneration for essential governance work is understandable and, in principle, supports professional accountability and sustainability within Cardano’s evolving governance system.
However, we hold the view that governance equity must remain central to any compensation framework. Cardano’s governance ecosystem functions as an interconnected structure comprising DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee, each fulfilling distinct yet equally vital duties that sustain decision-making legitimacy. To compensate one body in isolation risks distorting that balance, particularly when the other two operate under similarly demanding workloads with significant community-level responsibility. A selective compensation model could introduce unintended behavioural biases or weaken the collaborative equilibrium among governance actors.
We therefore believe that compensation for governance roles should not be designed or approved unilaterally by any single body that stands to benefit from it. Instead, a comprehensive, community-driven compensation framework should be developed; one that establishes transparent standards, clear eligibility criteria, equitable rates, and peer-reviewed oversight for all recognized governance participants. Such a model would not only mitigate potential perceptions of privilege or self-authorization but also strengthen accountability and preserve fairness across governance layers.
Until such a unified and community-endorsed framework is introduced, we are unable to fully support isolated compensation actions. Our position is not a rejection of the Constitutional Committee’s value or effort but rather a principled call for parity, transparency, and collective design in how governance service is rewarded and we are more than happy to contribute to the development of a compensation framework that captures all governance actors. For this reason, we as Wada DRep will vote no on this proposal, while encouraging further dialogue to develop an ecosystem-wide compensation policy that treats all governance bodies with equal recognition and fairness.
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- No10.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.4M ₳Rationale
I think it's important to compensate people for their work.
- Abstain8.8M ₳Rationale
本提案の内容と目的は理解していますが、私は現憲法委員会メンバーであり、利害関係を有するため、中立性と公平性を保つ観点から棄権します。\n\nI understand the purpose and content of this proposal. However, as a current Constitutional Committee member with a conflict of interest, I will abstain to maintain neutrality and fairness.