CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed “Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4” New Constitution Governance Action Constitutional.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The proposed Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4 complies with the amendment requirements of Article VIII. It satisfies the documentation standards of Article III, Section 5, by providing immutable IPFS references, indicating differences from previous versions, and including supporting rationale.
This governance action seeks to reinforce the existing balance of powers between DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee without altering the framework established in the current Constitution.
We found the previous version of this action (gov_action1ezp...xjlfrc) Constitutional on the above grounds, assess this Action on the same grounds, and reach the same conclusion.
We find this “Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4” New Constitution Governance Action Constitutional. The Action meets relevant procedural requirements and provides a consistent text for community consideration.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Cardano Curia judges this governance action constitutional and supports adoption of the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4.
This governance action proposes an update to the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution, introducing version 2.4. The action is correctly framed as a constitutional update and is presented with clear, structured supporting material, including immutable IPFS references and documented change logs. This satisfies the documentation and transparency expectations for constitutional amendments under the Constitution’s amendment framework.
Substantively, Constitution v2.4 improves enforceability and reduces ambiguity by distinguishing binding constitutional requirements from aspirational guidance. The removal of non-binding “expectation” and “encouragement” clauses streamlines the Constitution to focus on enforceable governance rules, while leaving community norms and operational best practices to evolve through off-chain processes.
The removal of the Budget Info Action mechanism is a coherence improvement rather than a weakening of safeguards. Treasury-related accountability requirements are consolidated into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, ensuring that auditability, oversight, and accountability apply at the point of actual fund movement. This reduces procedural duplication while preserving—indeed strengthening—clarity around when safeguards must be met.
The introduction and unification of defined terms (including concepts such as Active Voting Stake, Net Change Limit, and Treasury Withdrawal Recipient) improves interpretability and reduces the risk of inconsistent application across governance participants. Clear terminology is essential for predictable constitutional review and for minimizing disputes arising from divergent readings of key terms.
We particularly support the explicit requirement that proposal documents referenced by URL must be immutable. This materially strengthens procedural integrity by ensuring that governance actions are evaluated against fixed, verifiable texts, protecting voters and reviewers from post-submission changes and improving trust in the governance process.
Finally, the reversion of specific wording changes introduced in v2.3 in response to EMURGO’s concerns reflects prudent, consensus-driven constitutional evolution. Restoring the original wording for custodian- and audit-related provisions preserves continuity with established interpretation while still allowing the broader v2.4 improvements to move forward.
Taken together, these amendments are procedurally sound, consistent with the Constitution’s intent as a binding governance framework, and constructive for the long-term stability and legitimacy of Cardano’s on-chain governance.
Cardano Curia judges this governance action constitutional and supports adoption of Constitution v2.4. The proposal is well-documented, procedurally appropriate, and improves clarity, enforceability, and accountability while preserving the balance of powers and essential treasury safeguards.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be constitutional.
This proposal operates within the framework of the existing constitutional principles and guardrails. It removes non-binding and advisory provisions, as well as redundant mechanisms such as the Budget Info Action, while clarifying definitions, ensuring the immutability of proposal documents, and applying audit and accountability requirements uniformly to treasury withdrawals. The objective of these changes is to simplify governance and strengthen transparency and accountability. These amendments do not infringe upon the separation of powers among DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee, nor do they alter voting thresholds or undermine constraints imposed by constitutional guardrails. Furthermore, the proposal has been submitted as a formal constitutional update in accordance with the prescribed amendment procedures. Based on the above, we determine that this governance action is constitutional under the spirit and provisions of the Cardano Constitution.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
LGTM
As per Article VIII - Section 1, amendments to the constitution are allowed and the constitution shall be treated as a living document. This is exactly the road taken by the authors who have been repeatedly bringing constitution updates to the table while incorporating feedback from the community.
I believe that the content of the new constitution is not subject to any review from the constitutional committee (CC); for the CC's role is to be the guardian of the constitution, whatever it is decided to be. A new constitution cannot -- by construction -- be unconstitutional. Only the process for establishing one could.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
This doesn't violate any binary criteria of the constitution; thus I consider it constitutional.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This doesn't violate any binary criteria of the constitution; thus I consider it constitutional.
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges this governance action constitutional.
This governance action proposes an update to the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution, introducing version 2.4. The proposal is properly framed as a constitutional amendment and follows the procedures set out for modifying the Constitution. The changes are clearly articulated, well-documented, and presented in a structured and legible format, satisfying the requirements of Article III, §5.
The removal of non-binding “expectation” and “encouragement” clauses streamlines the Constitution by distinguishing enforceable constitutional rules from aspirational guidance. This aligns with the role of the Constitution as a binding governance framework rather than a policy or best-practice document. Removing these provisions does not weaken governance, but rather clarifies where authority and obligations formally reside.
The elimination of the Budget Info Action mechanism further simplifies governance by consolidating treasury-related requirements into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions. This change preserves constitutional safeguards by ensuring that auditability, oversight, and accountability requirements continue to apply at the point where funds are actually withdrawn, while avoiding redundancy and procedural complexity. The reassignment of these requirements strengthens clarity without reducing protections.
The introduction of additional definitions and unified terminology improves interpretability and reduces ambiguity in constitutional application. Explicitly defining terms such as Net Change Limit, Active Voting Stake, and Treasury Withdrawal Recipient supports consistent interpretation across governance actors and reduces the risk of divergent readings.
The requirement that proposal documents referenced by URL be immutable enhances procedural integrity by ensuring that governance actions are assessed based on fixed, verifiable texts. This change directly supports transparency, trust, and legal certainty in governance processes.
Finally, the reversion of specific wording changes introduced in v2.3, in response to feedback from EMURGO, reflects a pragmatic and consensus-oriented approach to constitutional evolution. Restoring the original wording for custodial and audit-related provisions preserves established interpretations while maintaining continuity with earlier constitutional intent.Tingvard judges this governance action constitutional. The proposed Constitution v2.4 improves clarity, enforceability, and coherence while preserving essential safeguards for treasury governance, accountability, and oversight. The changes are procedurally sound, substantively consistent with constitutional intent, and represent a constructive evolution of the Cardano governance framework.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecNoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this new constitution governance action is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Cardano Constitution states "Except as otherwise so provided in the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails Appendix, amendments to this Constitution, including to the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails Appendix, shall be approved by a collective decision-making process, requiring an on-chain governance action by owners of ada satisfying a threshold of no less than 65% of the then active voting stake."
This provision contains two distinct requirements for valid constitutional amendments, being that they "shall be approved by a collective decision-making process" and "requiring an on-chain governance action by owners of ada satisfying a threshold of no less than 65% of the then active voting stake."
The inclusion of both clauses within a single sentence implies that the first clause "collective decision-making process" is not redundant, but an intentional and additional constitutional expectation. It suggests that beyond a successful on-chain vote, the amendment should also emerge from an inclusive and structured deliberative process. As a suitable "collective decision-making process" has not been defined or agreed via an on-chain Info governance action, the process that was used to agree on the current constitution could therefore be considered as a benchmark.
The governance action with ID "gov_action1jxn...p6vp3p" and title "CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4", as a new constitution governance action, did not emerge from a "collective decision-making process" that the Eastern Cardano Council considers comparable to the process used for agreeing the current constitution.
We strongly recommend that a constitution amendment process be developed and approved via an on-chain Info governance action.
We therefore find this governance action Unconstitutional.
This governance action does NOT sufficiently fulfil the criteria specified in the Cardano Constitution for making constitution amendments, so is deemed unconstitutional.