Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5

Rationale highlights

Why some of the largest DReps voted for and against, in their own words.

• YUTA

  Yes435.8M ₳

  I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5]. Current Risk At present, the actual number of Constitutional Committee (CC) members is equal to the minimum required size. In this situation, if even one CC...

  I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5].

  Current Risk

  At present, the actual number of Constitutional Committee (CC) members is equal to the minimum required size. In this situation, if even one CC member resigns, the committee would fall below the minimum threshold and become non-functional. This would prevent not only ordinary governance actions but also critical actions such as urgent security updates. This represents a serious structural risk that must be addressed urgently.

  Available Options

  In principle, there are only two ways to mitigate this risk (or a combination of both):
(1) Increase the actual number of CC members
(2) Reduce the minimum CC size
  I support option (2) reducing the minimum CC size.

  1. Addressing Concerns About Reducing the Minimum CC Size

     I acknowledge concerns that lowering the minimum CC size could lead to future concentration of power. However, this change affects only the minimum threshold. As long as the actual CC size remains at seven members, there is no change from the current situation. Even if the number temporarily drops to six or five, an election can be held to restore the CC to seven members. In addition, as stated in the metadata, the original rationale for setting the minimum CC size to seven no longer applies under current conditions. Therefore, the argument that lowering the minimum CC size would immediately lead to centralization is an oversimplification.

  2. Why Increasing the Actual CC Size Is Not Supported
Increasing the actual CC size requires a highly costly and complex process. In practice, a previous attempt to increase the CC from seven to eight members failed to obtain DRep support, and some DReps called for even more costly procedures. In most cases, an election would be required, and consensus would first need to be reached on whether such costs are justified. This issue is not something that can be addressed “eventually”; it is an urgent risk. However, in reality, there are no individuals or entities willing to commit the necessary resources to actively pursue an increase in the actual CC size.

  3. Alignment With CC Compensation (TENET 4)
Increasing the actual CC size would further complicate the implementation of TENET 4 regarding CC compensation. Last year, a CC member resigned and the CC fell below the minimum size because DReps did not approve compensation even for five CC members. In simple terms, many DReps judged compensation for five CC members to be too high. Given this voting behavior, it is likely to be even more difficult to support compensation for eight or more CC members, making this approach politically and practically unviable.

  Conclusion
The current situation allows a single resignation to potentially halt the entire governance process. Increasing the actual CC size is not a realistic or timely solution. From the perspective of immediacy, feasibility, and risk mitigation, reducing the minimum CC size is the most practical option. For these reasons, I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5].

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  [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。
  現在のリスク認識
現在、実際の憲法委員会（CC）人数が最小CC人数と一致しています。この状態では、CCメンバーが1人でも退任すると最小CC数を下回り、CCが機能不全に陥ります。その結果、通常のガバナンス行為だけでなく、セキュリティ上の緊急アップデート等も実行できなくなる可能性があり、これは早急に対処すべき深刻な構造的リスクです。

  解決手段の選択肢
このリスクを解消する方法は、原理的に次の2つ（またはその組み合わせ）しかありません。
(1) 実際CC人数を増やす
(2) 最小CC人数を減らす
  私は、このうち (2) 最小CC人数の減少 を支持します。

  1. 最小CC人数減少に対する懸念への整理
最小CC人数の減少が、将来的な権力集中につながる可能性があるという懸念は理解します。ただし、これはあくまで「最小値」の変更に過ぎません。実際のCC人数が7名のままであれば、現状と何も変わりません。仮に6名または5名まで減少した場合でも、選挙を実施することで7名へ回復させることは可能です。また、メタデータに記載されている通り、当初「最小CC数＝7」とした理由は、現在の状況には当てはまりません。したがって、「最小CC数を下げる＝直ちに権力集中」という主張は、過度に単純化された議論だと考えます。

  2. 実際CC人数の増加を支持しない理由
実際CC人数の増加は、非常に高コストかつ複雑なプロセスを伴います。実際に、7名から8名への増加は一度DRepの支持を得られず失敗しており、その際には、より高コストな手続きを求める意見もありました。多くの場合、選挙の実施が必要となり、そのコストを正当化するための合意形成自体が困難です。本件は「できれば改善したい」話ではなく、今すぐ対処すべきリスクですが、現実として、実際CC人数の増加に積極的にリソースを投下しようとする個人やエンティティは存在していません。

  3. CC報酬（TENET 4）との整合性
実際CC人数の増加は、TENET 4 に基づくCC報酬設計の実現をさらに困難にします。昨年、CCが1名退任し最小CC数を下回った背景には、5名分のCC報酬に対してDRepの賛同が得られなかったという事実があります。多くのDRepは、5名分の報酬ですら「高すぎる」と判断しました。この投票傾向を踏まえると、実際CC人数を8名以上に増やし、それに見合う報酬を支えることは、政治的・実務的に成立しにくいと考えられます。

  結論
現状は、CCメンバー1人の退任によってガバナンス全体が停止し得る危険な状態です。実際CC人数の増加は現実的な選択肢とは言い難く、即効性と実行可能性を考慮すると、最小CC人数の減少が最も現実的なリスク対処策です。以上の理由から、[Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。

• Cardano Foundation

  Yes120.2M ₳

  The Cardano Foundation votes YES on this Parameter Change. While acknowledging a technical conflict with another Parameter Change, we support reducing the minimum committee size to 5. This change provides a buffer against governance stalls caused by member...

  The Cardano Foundation votes YES on this Parameter Change. While acknowledging a technical conflict with another Parameter Change, we support reducing the minimum committee size to 5. This change provides a buffer against governance stalls caused by member resignations or removals.

  A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  Establishing a minimum Constitutional Committee size of 5 instead of 7 creates a safety margin for operational resilience. This adjustment allows the committee to remain functional even if two members resign unexpectedly, preventing the governance stall experienced in December 2025. This is a practical governance improvement that ensures constitutional necessity and continuity of ecosystem operations. Furthermore, this reduction in minimum size does not change the percentage of the committee required to ratify actions; it simply lowers the floor for what constitutes a valid, active committee.

  We also acknowledge a technical "root-reference" conflict because the “Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2)” proposal has already successfully passed. Since every parameter change must reference the hash of the last ratified change, the current proposal will be technically invalidated. Additionally, while 5 is a responsible minimum, it should not be viewed as a target total size. Reducing the active committee to 5 significantly changes the veto delta—the number of dissenting votes required to block an action. Specifically, a committee of 5 requires only 2 dissenting votes to block a Governance Action, whereas a committee of 7 requires 3 dissenting votes. Therefore, we encourage maintaining a Committee size above the minimum in future voting rounds.

  The Cardano Foundation votes YES. Despite the proposal being invalidated on technical grounds, we vote based on the merit of the change itself. We endorse this reduction to ensure the long-term sustainability of Cardano governance, while maintaining that the actual committee size should ideally remain higher to preserve a robust veto threshold.

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  NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
  The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well.

• Army of Spies

  No84.3M ₳

  This governance action goes in the wrong direction. I want more decentralization, not less. While it is important to keep the Constitutional Committee running smoothly, reducing its seats is not the answer. I also note the proposer seems to be the same as...

  This governance action goes in the wrong direction. I want more decentralization, not less. While it is important to keep the Constitutional Committee running smoothly, reducing its seats is not the answer. I also note the proposer seems to be the same as the recent constitutional rewrite. I found the outcome of that governance action to be highly undesirable. (See https://x.com/ArmyofSpies/status/2013807559476682878). The level of disclosure and transparency around how the Constitution was re-written was also unacceptable from my perspective. (See https://x.com/ArmyofSpies/status/2015848641085464848). That only further deters me from this governance action and further governance actions by such proposer.

• SASA_nagamaru_ながまる

  No74.5M ₳

  I understand the intention behind this proposal to improve operational resilience by reducing the minimum size of the Constitutional Committee. Mitigating the risk of governance inoperability due to temporary unavailability or resignation of members is a...

  I understand the intention behind this proposal to improve operational resilience by reducing the minimum size of the Constitutional Committee. Mitigating the risk of governance inoperability due to temporary unavailability or resignation of members is a reasonable objective, and I acknowledge that the proposal complies with the relevant guardrails from a technical and formal perspective.

  However, I do not view this as merely a numerical adjustment. In my view, it represents a meaningful shift in governance design.

  I do not currently perceive the Constitutional Committee to be in a state of critical dysfunction. At the same time, I believe the overall governance structure is still evolving. In particular, I observe concentration dynamics within DRep voting power. In such an environment, lowering the minimum size from seven to five may increase the relative influence of individual members and, over time, heighten the risk of centralization. This is a concern for me from a structural governance perspective.

  While operational continuity is important, I believe it should not be achieved by reducing decentralization safeguards. If strengthening functionality is necessary, I would prefer exploring options that expand committee capacity while maintaining a strong minimum threshold, rather than lowering the minimum requirement.

  For these reasons, I cannot support this proposal.

  僕は、本提案の趣旨である「運用上の可用性向上」という目的自体は理解しています。委員の一時的な不在や辞任によってConstitutional Committeeが機能停止に陥るリスクを軽減したいという考えは合理的であり、技術的・形式的にもGuardrail要件を満たしていることは確認しています。

  しかし、僕はこの変更を単なる数値調整とは捉えていません。制度設計の方向性に関わる重要な変更だと考えています。

  現時点でConstitutional Committeeが重大な機能不全に陥っているとは認識していません。一方で、ガバナンス構造全体は依然として発展途上にあり、特にDRep投票においては投票力の集中傾向が見られるというのが僕の認識です。そのような環境下で最小人数を7から5に引き下げることは、将来的に相対的な影響力が強まりやすくなり、中央集権化リスクを高める可能性があると僕は懸念しています。

  僕は、可用性の向上は重要である一方で、それが分散性の安全余白を縮小する形で実現されるべきではないと考えています。もし機能強化を図るのであれば、最小人数を下げる方向ではなく、奇数を維持しつつ委員数を拡張するなど、分散性を強める設計の方がより健全だと考えます。

  以上の理由から、僕は本提案には賛成できません。