Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5
96 DReps voted · 35 with a rationale · 1 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes435.8M ₳Rationale
I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5].
Current Risk
At present, the actual number of Constitutional Committee (CC) members is equal to the minimum required size. In this situation, if even one CC member resigns, the committee would fall below the minimum threshold and become non-functional. This would prevent not only ordinary governance actions but also critical actions such as urgent security updates. This represents a serious structural risk that must be addressed urgently.Available Options
In principle, there are only two ways to mitigate this risk (or a combination of both): (1) Increase the actual number of CC members (2) Reduce the minimum CC size
I support option (2) reducing the minimum CC size.Addressing Concerns About Reducing the Minimum CC Size
I acknowledge concerns that lowering the minimum CC size could lead to future concentration of power. However, this change affects only the minimum threshold. As long as the actual CC size remains at seven members, there is no change from the current situation. Even if the number temporarily drops to six or five, an election can be held to restore the CC to seven members. In addition, as stated in the metadata, the original rationale for setting the minimum CC size to seven no longer applies under current conditions. Therefore, the argument that lowering the minimum CC size would immediately lead to centralization is an oversimplification.Why Increasing the Actual CC Size Is Not Supported Increasing the actual CC size requires a highly costly and complex process. In practice, a previous attempt to increase the CC from seven to eight members failed to obtain DRep support, and some DReps called for even more costly procedures. In most cases, an election would be required, and consensus would first need to be reached on whether such costs are justified. This issue is not something that can be addressed “eventually”; it is an urgent risk. However, in reality, there are no individuals or entities willing to commit the necessary resources to actively pursue an increase in the actual CC size.
Alignment With CC Compensation (TENET 4) Increasing the actual CC size would further complicate the implementation of TENET 4 regarding CC compensation. Last year, a CC member resigned and the CC fell below the minimum size because DReps did not approve compensation even for five CC members. In simple terms, many DReps judged compensation for five CC members to be too high. Given this voting behavior, it is likely to be even more difficult to support compensation for eight or more CC members, making this approach politically and practically unviable.
Conclusion The current situation allows a single resignation to potentially halt the entire governance process. Increasing the actual CC size is not a realistic or timely solution. From the perspective of immediacy, feasibility, and risk mitigation, reducing the minimum CC size is the most practical option. For these reasons, I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5].
[Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。
現在のリスク認識 現在、実際の憲法委員会（CC）人数が最小CC人数と一致しています。この状態では、CCメンバーが1人でも退任すると最小CC数を下回り、CCが機能不全に陥ります。その結果、通常のガバナンス行為だけでなく、セキュリティ上の緊急アップデート等も実行できなくなる可能性があり、これは早急に対処すべき深刻な構造的リスクです。解決手段の選択肢 このリスクを解消する方法は、原理的に次の2つ（またはその組み合わせ）しかありません。 (1) 実際CC人数を増やす (2) 最小CC人数を減らす
私は、このうち (2) 最小CC人数の減少 を支持します。最小CC人数減少に対する懸念への整理 最小CC人数の減少が、将来的な権力集中につながる可能性があるという懸念は理解します。ただし、これはあくまで「最小値」の変更に過ぎません。実際のCC人数が7名のままであれば、現状と何も変わりません。仮に6名または5名まで減少した場合でも、選挙を実施することで7名へ回復させることは可能です。また、メタデータに記載されている通り、当初「最小CC数＝7」とした理由は、現在の状況には当てはまりません。したがって、「最小CC数を下げる＝直ちに権力集中」という主張は、過度に単純化された議論だと考えます。
実際CC人数の増加を支持しない理由 実際CC人数の増加は、非常に高コストかつ複雑なプロセスを伴います。実際に、7名から8名への増加は一度DRepの支持を得られず失敗しており、その際には、より高コストな手続きを求める意見もありました。多くの場合、選挙の実施が必要となり、そのコストを正当化するための合意形成自体が困難です。本件は「できれば改善したい」話ではなく、今すぐ対処すべきリスクですが、現実として、実際CC人数の増加に積極的にリソースを投下しようとする個人やエンティティは存在していません。
CC報酬（TENET 4）との整合性 実際CC人数の増加は、TENET 4 に基づくCC報酬設計の実現をさらに困難にします。昨年、CCが1名退任し最小CC数を下回った背景には、5名分のCC報酬に対してDRepの賛同が得られなかったという事実があります。多くのDRepは、5名分の報酬ですら「高すぎる」と判断しました。この投票傾向を踏まえると、実際CC人数を8名以上に増やし、それに見合う報酬を支えることは、政治的・実務的に成立しにくいと考えられます。
結論 現状は、CCメンバー1人の退任によってガバナンス全体が停止し得る危険な状態です。実際CC人数の増加は現実的な選択肢とは言い難く、即効性と実行可能性を考慮すると、最小CC人数の減少が最も現実的なリスク対処策です。以上の理由から、[Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。
- Yes120.2M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes YES on this Parameter Change. While acknowledging a technical conflict with another Parameter Change, we support reducing the minimum committee size to 5. This change provides a buffer against governance stalls caused by member resignations or removals.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Establishing a minimum Constitutional Committee size of 5 instead of 7 creates a safety margin for operational resilience. This adjustment allows the committee to remain functional even if two members resign unexpectedly, preventing the governance stall experienced in December 2025. This is a practical governance improvement that ensures constitutional necessity and continuity of ecosystem operations. Furthermore, this reduction in minimum size does not change the percentage of the committee required to ratify actions; it simply lowers the floor for what constitutes a valid, active committee.
We also acknowledge a technical "root-reference" conflict because the “Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2)” proposal has already successfully passed. Since every parameter change must reference the hash of the last ratified change, the current proposal will be technically invalidated. Additionally, while 5 is a responsible minimum, it should not be viewed as a target total size. Reducing the active committee to 5 significantly changes the veto delta—the number of dissenting votes required to block an action. Specifically, a committee of 5 requires only 2 dissenting votes to block a Governance Action, whereas a committee of 7 requires 3 dissenting votes. Therefore, we encourage maintaining a Committee size above the minimum in future voting rounds.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. Despite the proposal being invalidated on technical grounds, we vote based on the merit of the change itself. We endorse this reduction to ensure the long-term sustainability of Cardano governance, while maintaining that the actual committee size should ideally remain higher to preserve a robust veto threshold.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Abstain92.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes91.5M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote YES for the proposal: Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5
We currently have 7 elected CC members, and the required minimum number of CC members is also set to 7.
Having the same number of CC members as the required minimum is a risk, as the governance process can halt after the resignation of a single CC member.
This situation would be especially burdensome in the combination of another crisis, such as the need to quickly upgrade the node version.
The DReps recently refused to add a new CC member, Christina, which would increase the number of CC members to 8. This setting would provide the necessary buffer. One of the arguments was that the election of a new CC member should be preceded by a costly election process.
It makes no sense to have the following process in the event of a crisis:
- Invite candidates to register.
- Elect a new CC member(s).
- Submit an on-chain proposal.
- Wait for the proposal to be approved by the DReps and SPOs.
Let me add that many DReps and SPOs often vote just before the expiration of proposals. It is not certain that they would vote faster in the event of a crisis. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the election of a new CC member would take at least about a month.
It seems that the only way to mitigate the risk of halt governance is to reduce the required minimum.
From my point of view, it boils down to this question: Is the reduction acceptable?
I believe so. Here are my arguments:
CC members supervise the constitutionality of proposals. The DReps decide on the merits of proposals. CC members cannot decide anything on their own, so the risk of a higher concentration of power is acceptable in this particular case.
Ideally, all CC members should interpret the Constitution in the same way, i.e., come to similar conclusions. Practice shows that this happens in most cases. Only occasionally does a CC member have a different opinion from the majority.
If we carefully select quality CC members and support their education and engagement, there is no need to stick to quantity.
5 out of 7 CC members are groups of people. They internally debate and vote on proposals. In the background, a larger group of individuals debates proposals. It is a higher number than the number of CC members.
Governance is flexible. In case of suspicion of abuse of power, it is possible to elect new CC members or submit a No-Confidence proposal at any time.
DReps did not approve compensation even for 5 CC members, which was the reason for the resignation of one member. Many DReps and community members considered the requested compensation to be high. It makes sense to reduce the number of CC members, as it reduces the overall budget for this gov body if we were to reconsider compensation.
I admit that reducing committeeMinSize is not ideal, but maintaining the current setting is a worse option. If it is not possible to easily increase the number of CC members for various reasons, reducing it is the only way to mitigate the risk of governance stalling.
- No84.3M ₳Rationale
This governance action goes in the wrong direction. I want more decentralization, not less. While it is important to keep the Constitutional Committee running smoothly, reducing its seats is not the answer. I also note the proposer seems to be the same as the recent constitutional rewrite. I found the outcome of that governance action to be highly undesirable. (See https://x.com/ArmyofSpies/status/2013807559476682878). The level of disclosure and transparency around how the Constitution was re-written was also unacceptable from my perspective. (See https://x.com/ArmyofSpies/status/2015848641085464848). That only further deters me from this governance action and further governance actions by such proposer.
- Yes76.8M ₳Rationale
There is no reason to have such a high requirement of minimum CC members. This also doesn't mean we cannot add more CC members, and indeed soon after this proposal we should add more CC members.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
There is no reason to have such a high requirement of minimum CC members. This also doesn't mean we cannot add more CC members, and indeed soon after this proposal we should add more CC members.
- Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
- No74.5M ₳Rationale
I understand the intention behind this proposal to improve operational resilience by reducing the minimum size of the Constitutional Committee. Mitigating the risk of governance inoperability due to temporary unavailability or resignation of members is a reasonable objective, and I acknowledge that the proposal complies with the relevant guardrails from a technical and formal perspective.
However, I do not view this as merely a numerical adjustment. In my view, it represents a meaningful shift in governance design.
I do not currently perceive the Constitutional Committee to be in a state of critical dysfunction. At the same time, I believe the overall governance structure is still evolving. In particular, I observe concentration dynamics within DRep voting power. In such an environment, lowering the minimum size from seven to five may increase the relative influence of individual members and, over time, heighten the risk of centralization. This is a concern for me from a structural governance perspective.
While operational continuity is important, I believe it should not be achieved by reducing decentralization safeguards. If strengthening functionality is necessary, I would prefer exploring options that expand committee capacity while maintaining a strong minimum threshold, rather than lowering the minimum requirement.
For these reasons, I cannot support this proposal.
僕は、本提案の趣旨である「運用上の可用性向上」という目的自体は理解しています。委員の一時的な不在や辞任によってConstitutional Committeeが機能停止に陥るリスクを軽減したいという考えは合理的であり、技術的・形式的にもGuardrail要件を満たしていることは確認しています。
しかし、僕はこの変更を単なる数値調整とは捉えていません。制度設計の方向性に関わる重要な変更だと考えています。
現時点でConstitutional Committeeが重大な機能不全に陥っているとは認識していません。一方で、ガバナンス構造全体は依然として発展途上にあり、特にDRep投票においては投票力の集中傾向が見られるというのが僕の認識です。そのような環境下で最小人数を7から5に引き下げることは、将来的に相対的な影響力が強まりやすくなり、中央集権化リスクを高める可能性があると僕は懸念しています。
僕は、可用性の向上は重要である一方で、それが分散性の安全余白を縮小する形で実現されるべきではないと考えています。もし機能強化を図るのであれば、最小人数を下げる方向ではなく、奇数を維持しつつ委員数を拡張するなど、分散性を強める設計の方がより健全だと考えます。
以上の理由から、僕は本提案には賛成できません。
- No69.4M ₳No rationale
- No62.7M ₳Rationale
Guardrails are good. Having more members on the CC means more eyes are on Governance and the treasury, helping ensure they are safe.
On the other hand, we are creating more work for people in the ecosystem. Reducing the number can increase participation, but it also centralises control.
Because I'm for decentralisation and representation, I'll vote NO and keep the number at 7. Keep us in check and ensure we are operating within the bounds of the Constitution.
- No53.8M ₳No rationale
- No50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting clearly against the governance action to reduce the minimum number of Constitutional Committee seats to five. While I support discussing the problem of governance halting when a single seat becomes vacant, reducing the minimum to five seats does not address the root cause. It would only lead to greater concentration within the Constitutional Committee. Under this proposal, if the number of seats were to decrease further and one of the remaining five members were to resign, governance would still grind to a halt in exactly the same way. Furthermore, reducing the minimum to five seats carries the significant downside of increasing centralization beyond what we have today. Rather than pursuing this path, we should be discussing an expansion of the Committee to something in the range of twenty seats. [Japanese version follows] 憲法委員の最低議席数を5に削減するガバナンスアクションに対し、明確に反対票を投じます。1議席が空席になった際にガバナンスが停止するという問題について議論することは支持しますが、最低数を5議席に減らしても根本的な解決にはなりません。それどころか、憲法委員会内の集中化をさらに招くだけです。本提案のもとでは、議席数がさらに減少し、残り5議席のうち1名が辞任した場合、まったく同様にガバナンスが停止することに変わりはありません。さらに、最低数を5議席に削減することは、現状よりも中央集権化を強めるという大きなデメリットをもたらします。この方向性を追求するのではなく、委員会を20議席程度に拡大することを議論すべきです。
- No49.5M ₳No rationale
- No48.6M ₳Rationale
Current CC selection process is not ideal, done offchain with limited DReps participation, so quality of CC members are not yet certified, hence reducing CC size now is not preferred. Constitutional changes should be slow and steady, and should not be optimized for efficiency and may cause mistakes
- Yes38.1M ₳Rationale
Supporting this for resilience. The current 7/7 structure is operationally fragile, so adding flexibility makes sense. Long term, though, I’d rather see expansion — e.g., 9 members with 7 operational — even if that’s not realistic yet.
- No34.6M ₳No rationale
- No31.1M ₳No rationale
- No30.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
Although this parameter change cannot be enacted due to conflicts with another parameter change that was approved first, I am greatly in favor of lowering the MINIMUM size of the Constitutional Committee. There are some opinions that this might lead to an lowering of the ACTUAL committee size, but I don't think that is a necessary outcome that I would expect. The result of lowering the minimum should instead give us some leeway to continue governance operations in the case that one or more CC members retires suddenly, which has already happened before.
- No27.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.3M ₳Rationale
I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5].
Current Risk
At present, the actual number of Constitutional Committee (CC) members is equal to the minimum required size. In this situation, if even one CC member resigns, the committee would fall below the minimum threshold and become non-functional. This would prevent not only ordinary governance actions but also critical actions such as urgent security updates. This represents a serious structural risk that must be addressed urgently. - No23.5M ₳Rationale
Increase the number of CC members instead of reducing the minimum size. Replace seats who aren't active and blocking governance.
- No21.5M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on this Parameter Update proposal” Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5” (dfdac5921ab657241fce58583d61bef59a369e01d2ba78191d6df6632a07fdfd#0). I have many thoughts on this proposal and the wider state of Cardano governance recently and that particular rationale was becoming extensive. As it stands now though, the future of this proposal is unclear as it is about to become null and void and so this vote is submitted in urgency to maintain voting record.
What? Exactly. When certain governance action types are submitted, they are required to reference the previously enacted action of that type. The four types are Update Committee, Update Constitution, Hard Fork and Parameter Update. The previous Parameter Update action was “Plutus V3 Cost Model Parameter Changes Prior to Chang#2” (b2a591ac219ce6dcca5847e0248015209c7cb0436aa6bd6863d0c1f152a60bc5#0) way back in November 2024.
This proposal was submitted at the same time as another existing Parameter Update proposal, “Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2)” (c21b00f90f18fce4003edf42b0b0d455126e01c946e80cc5341a9f9750caf795#0). It referenced the same previously enacted governance action, which means that there would be a conflict if both were to pass as the earliest one would render the later one invalid. The newly enacted parameter update becomes the new “prevGovActionId”, meaning that the second proposal then have an incorrect reference.
Could this have been avoided? Yes. First witnessed on SanchoNet during simultaneous Update Committee actions, and then shortly after on mainnet, someone can submit a second proposal of the same type, if they pre-emptively reference the currently active proposal. There remains a risk here in the event that the earlier live action could still fail to pass, in which case the later one would too as it would once again be referencing an action that wasn’t enacted.
What this situation highlights is, the need for greater communication and co-ordination when it comes to governance action proposals with on-chain effects. It may be okay to throw as many Info Actions out there as you like at any one time, they have no on-chain effects. While we exist in a permissionless system and anyone is free to submit their own actions, if they have access to the required deposits, Update Committee, Update Constitution, Hard Forks and Parameter Updates, are usually submitted after much co-ordination, effort and research. They are often timed in order to avoid issues such as this. This year alone we have two Mem Unit updates, a Plutus Cost Model update and a Hard Fork action in the pipeline, that I know of. To have an individual essentially running around and playing with all of the governance knobs and dials that they can get their hands on at the moment is, frankly, counter-productive. The Parameter and Hard Fork committees may be put on edge unnecessarily now, unsure of whether their extensively co-ordinated and timed proposals now run the risk of colliding with a proposal from out of nowhere.
This is a theme that has continued since the recent Constitution update. For those that missed the recording of the Technical Steering Committee meeting dated January 21, 2026, one aspect that was overlooked in the rewriting of the Constitution was that changing the wording of the “PARAM-04a” guardrail. It was changed from “3 months” to “90 days” and as a result, the guardrail name should have also changed to “PARAM-04b” to highlight this amendment as per the Parameter Committee guidelines. They were not consulted, this did not happen and they have been left reasonably perplexed at the whole process. (Source: https://youtu.be/_jS-egZUH4c?t=3118).
I bring all of this up because it highlights a pattern of behaviour heading into an already busy Parameter Update period this year that really requires much better co-ordination going forward. Cardano is an ecosystem, not an individual.
- No21.4M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I vote NO on this GA.
While I understand the intention to improve operational resilience, reducing the minimum Constitutional Committee size from 7 to 5 introduces greater governance risk than benefit. The Constitutional Committee serves as a core constitutional safeguard, where representativeness, diversity of perspectives, and mutual checks are essential to maintaining legitimacy and community trust.
Lowering the minimum threshold weakens collective judgment and increases the risk of power concentration at a critical layer of governance. Operational challenges should instead be addressed through timely elections, clearer succession planning, and improved processes.
Rather than reducing the committee size, I believe a more robust approach would be to expand the number of Constitutional Committee members, supported by clear selection and transition mechanisms, to improve resilience without compromising constitutional integrity.
For these reasons, I do not support reducing committeeMinSize at this time.
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes18.2M ₳No rationale
- No17.3M ₳Rationale
Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5
- Yes16.4M ₳No rationale
- No13.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on governance action dfdac5921ab657241fce58583d61bef59a369e01d2ba78191d6df6632a07fdfd, which adjusts the minimum constitutional committee size. I agree with the direction of this change, but it was prepared without consideration of the memory limit budget, which I voted yes for, and thus these two would conflict.
You can find a larger writeup of my beliefs and values here.
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes7.6M ₳Rationale
I am pragmatic minded about governance in the early days of Voltaire. Everything stops when one CC member is removed or stops voting. Real time is lost, real momentum is killed and outsiders will see that paralyzed Cardano governance can freeze critical decisions for indetermined amounts of time. A buffer makes sense in the real world. Governance should be efficient when possible. It should not become a new stumbling block to normal blockchain operations. A majority of DReps voted NO to add an 8th volunteer member to the Constitutional Committee recently. I voted YES. That was one possible pragmatic solution to governance paralysis that we have already experienced when one CC member retired. So as DReps recently voted No to an eight member, Yuta-san proposed another pragmatic solution to avoid governance paralysis. Again I vote YES. If this is not an ideal solution, it does not stop the holding of a new CC member election and voting in 2 or more CC members. Then, if centralization is a concern, later increase the (committeeMinSize) from 5 to 7 again. Navel gazing is no solution.
- Yes5.9M ₳Rationale
Voting yes to help secure governances ability to keep moving forward without disruptions of CC members coming and going. Since we have not met the threshold to increased CC members we must look to other avenues to help ensure we remain operational. The 7 to 5 move in minsize accomplishes this. It's not permanent, and can always be increased in the future should we add more members.
- No5.8M ₳No rationale
- No5.5M ₳No rationale
- No5.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting against the proposal to reduce the minimum Constitutional Committee seats to five. While governance stagnation due to vacant seats is a valid concern, lowering the threshold fails to address the underlying issue and risks diminishing collective decision-making while concentrating power at this essential governance layer. A larger committee enhances oversight of governance and the treasury. I advocate increasing membership and replacing inactive members rather than reducing the minimum. This was something I was quite vocal about in the 2024 governance workshops.
- No4.4M ₳Rationale
I support maintaining the current minimum of 7 Constitutional Committee members. Reducing this number to five, is both risky and unnecessary.
- No3M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳Rationale
It's not a bad idea, but I think the minimum Constitutional Committee size of 5 is too small. If we want to build resilience we should increase the total committee members to 9 and then make 7 minimum in case 2 are indisposed.
- No2.7M ₳Rationale
Reducing the minimum requirement is never the way to achieve the desired consensus. It's the path toward centralization. Do not support this.
- Yes2.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.6M ₳Rationale
本提案は、Constitutional Committee（CC）の権限や判断基準を緩めるものではなく、偶発的な欠員・病欠・辞任によってガバナンスが停止するリスクを回避するための運用上の安全弁と評価します。
CCは7人運用を前提としていますが、現行の最小人数（min=7）では1人でも非稼働になると即時停止する脆弱性があります。本提案はこの状態を是正し、2人までの一時的欠員があっても憲法ガバナンスを継続可能にする調整です。
5人はあくまで緊急時の下限であり、7人原則を前提とした運用規律を維持すべきと考えます。本変更は憲法防衛を弱めるものではなく、実効性と信頼性を高める成熟した改善として賛成します。
This proposal does not weaken the authority or decision standards of the Constitutional Committee (CC).
It introduces an operational safeguard to prevent governance from becoming inoperable due to accidental absences, illness, or resignations.
While the CC is designed to operate with seven members, the current minimum (min=7) creates a practical fragility, as the committee stops functioning if even one member becomes unavailable.
Reducing the minimum to five allows the CC to remain operational during temporary absences, without changing its role or decision thresholds.
Five members should be understood as an emergency lower bound, not a new norm.
With the seven-member principle maintained, this adjustment strengthens the effectiveness and reliability of constitutional governance.
For these reasons, I support this proposal. - Abstain2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.3M ₳Rationale
This reason is not convincing enough. Instead of reducing the number of members, carefully select high-quality CC members and require them to commit to their responsibilities.
- No2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
In order to be considered a "Constitutional Committee", the minimum requirements for the body should not be lowered.
- No2M ₳No rationale
- No1.7M ₳No rationale