Cardano Builder DAO
6 of 7 committee members voted
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be constitutional.
This proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action to withdraw ₳20,000,000 from the Cardano Treasury in connection with the "Cardano Builder DAO" proposal, submitted by the Cardano Builder DAO. This proposal refers to the proposal document on IPFS and presents the proposal's title, summary, rationale, justification, and related supplementary materials. These comply with the requirements of Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Cardano Constitution. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 1, this proposal aims to fund projects that advance Cardano's Vision 2030 through measurable ecosystem KPIs. The supplementary materials outline the implementation periods and total costs of ₳20,000,000 for three milestones. Additionally, the proposal states that any unused or unallocated funds remaining after the completion of approved work, governance processes, or funding activities will be returned to the Cardano Treasury. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 2, this proposal discloses that it has previously received funding through the Cardano Treasury's funding process. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3, it confirms that the requested amount of ₳20,000,000 falls within the applicable Net Change Limit. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 4, the supplementary materials include DAO service provider fees, which cover the KPI dashboard and third-party auditors. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 5, this proposal designates the Independent Council (a council composed of dRep DAO members) as the administrator, responsible for holding funds prior to deployment, overseeing expenditures in accordance with milestones, and verifying milestone completion. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 6, this proposal states that any ADA held by the administrator prior to further disbursement will be kept in one or more separate accounts auditable by the Cardano Community, will not be delegated to any SPO, and will instead be delegated to the predefined abstention voting option. Furthermore, it states that milestone funds will be disbursed from an independent multisig wallet. Therefore, as no clear conflict with the Cardano Constitution has been identified, we determine that this proposal is constitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799No rationale
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Cardano Builder DAO” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
This governance action requests ada from the Cardano Treasury to fund the Cardano Builder DAO, an ecosystem-wide, smart contract-governed funding mechanism intended to support projects advancing Cardano’s Vision 2030 through measurable ecosystem KPIs.
The proposal identifies the purpose of the withdrawal: to allocate capital to builders who can contribute to ecosystem growth, including monthly active users, monthly on-chain transactions, and total value locked.
The proposal explains the delivery model. Funding will be distributed through the Cardano Builder DAO process, with project review, governance participation, KPI reporting, milestone validation, and disbursement through an independent multisig.
The proposal identifies an administrator. It states that an independent council composed of members of the dRep DAO will receive the treasury withdrawal, hold funds prior to deployment, and oversee disbursement in line with the proposal milestones. It further identifies Cardano Yoda and Marco Grendel Moshi as named members who have put themselves forward, with one additional non-affiliated active DRep to be added.
The proposal addresses custody and delegation. It states that any ADA held by the administrator before further disbursement will be kept in separate accounts auditable by the Cardano community, will not be delegated to any stake pool operator, and will be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option.
The proposal includes refund circumstances. It states that repayment would occur if DAO treasury funds remain unused or unallocated after completion of the approved work, governance processes, or funding activities. In that case, the unused portion would be returned to the Cardano Treasury.
The proposal also discloses prior treasury funding. It states that the Cardano Builder DAO previously received funding through the Cardano Treasury funding process, and that this proposal builds on that prior funded work.
Tingvard also notes that the proposal references a separate Milestone and Budget Document. That document is relevant to the assessment of delivery period, costs, expenses, milestones, and implementation details.
Tingvard therefore finds that the proposal satisfies the relevant constitutional requirements for a Treasury Withdrawal governance action.
Tingvard finds the “Cardano Builder DAO” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
The proposal identifies the purpose of the withdrawal, the administrator, the custody and delegation arrangements, refund circumstances, prior funding disclosure, and the intended accountability structure.
Tingvard therefore judges this governance action constitutional.
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Cardano Builder DAO" Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action Unconstitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
"Cardano Builder DAO" (gov_action1fda...ccn9gc) is a Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution, together with the Appendix I.3 guardrails. The Action seeks to withdraw 20,000,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury to capitalize the Cardano Builder DAO, a smart contract-governed funding mechanism that allocates capital to builders working toward the ecosystem KPIs named in the Strategy 2030 framework, including monthly active users, monthly on-chain transactions, and total value locked. The Action was proposed in epoch 639 and expires at the end of epoch 646. The proposer is Clarity, operating the Cardano Builder DAO, and is not IOG or IOG-affiliated.
The Action fails a mandatory Treasury Withdrawal requirement, and that failure is dispositive. Our analysis walks the engaged articles in order.
Article II.6 (Governance Action Standards). The procedural standards are satisfied. The Action anchors to an IPFS-hosted document with the on-chain blake2b-256 hash f7ec2c08c624012b41fc101a8da8687e5bc7d395bf39467b14e11e7387362735, a content-addressed form that is immutable once posted, and the metadata supplies the title, abstract, motivation, rationale, and supporting references that Article II.6.2 requires.
Article II.7.1 (Terms of the Withdrawal). The proposal specifies a purpose (funding builders whose work advances the Strategy 2030 KPIs), a milestone-gated delivery and disbursement structure administered by an independent council, and refund circumstances under which unused or unallocated funds are returned to the Cardano Treasury, consistent with the DAO's disclosed prior return of 354,790 ada. The terms are present, though the itemized milestone costs are carried largely by reference rather than tabulated in the on-chain metadata.
Article II.7.2 (Disclosure of prior Treasury receipts). Satisfied. The proposal discloses that the Cardano Builder DAO has previously received funding through the Cardano Treasury funding process and that this Action continues that prior funded work.
Article II.7.3 (Net Change Limit). The Action fails this requirement. The Net Change Limit currently in force is 350,000,000 ada for the period spanning epochs 613 through 713, set by the DReps via an on-chain governance action (gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q). Article II.7.3 requires that a Treasury Withdrawals action not exceed the Net Change Limit for that period, and the limit operates cumulatively across the period: each enacted withdrawal consumes headroom against the 350,000,000 ada ceiling, so a later action must fit within the headroom that remains at the point it would be enacted. This Action was proposed in epoch 639 and expires at the end of epoch 646, so the only epoch boundary at which it could be ratified and enacted before it expires is the transition from epoch 645 to epoch 646 on 28 July 2026. As of that boundary, only 14,389,704 ada of headroom remains under the 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit for the period, after accounting for the withdrawals already enacted earlier in the period. The Action requests 20,000,000 ada. Because 20,000,000 ada exceeds the 14,389,704 ada of remaining headroom, enacting this withdrawal would carry the cumulative net treasury change for the period past the 350,000,000 ada limit, in direct violation of Article II.7.3. Furthermore, while a new governance action has been proposed to increase the Net Change Limit to 500,000,000 ada for this same duration (gov_action15at...hakceq), it does not salvage this proposal. The new NCL proposal itself only expires at the end of epoch 646; only after this action period concludes can the new limit be considered officially approved, provided it meets the constitutionally defined guardrail threshold (TREASURY-01a) of greater than 50% of the active voting stake of DReps. Consequently, even if approved, any new Net Change Limit would only take effect starting in epoch 647. This timeline does not apply to the Builder DAO withdrawal, as that governance action expires at the end of epoch 645 and must meet the limits in effect at its point of enactment. This is a mandatory constraint, and its breach alone renders the Action unconstitutional.
Articles II.7.4 through II.7.6 (Audit allocation, Administrator, Custody). Because the Article II.7.3 breach is dispositive, we do not need to resolve whether these requirements are fully met. For completeness, we note that the proposal designates an administrator distinct from the recipient (an independent council of dRep DAO members, with named individuals put forward) as Article II.7.5 contemplates, and commits that administrator-held funds will be kept in separately auditable accounts, not delegated to any stake pool operator, and delegated to the predefined abstain voting option, tracking the language of Article II.7.6. We take no position here on whether the audit and oversight-metric allocation required by Article II.7.4 is adequately provided.
Appendix I.3 (Treasury Guardrails). TREASURY-01a is satisfied because the Net Change Limit was set by the DReps via on-chain governance action. TREASURY-03a is satisfied because the withdrawal is denominated in ada. TREASURY-02a, which requires that withdrawals not exceed the Net Change Limit for the period, fails for the same reason given under Article II.7.3: the 20,000,000 ada ask exceeds the 14,389,704 ada of Net Change Limit headroom remaining at the sole boundary at which the Action could be enacted.
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Cardano Builder DAO" Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action Unconstitutional.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecNoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is unconstitutional.
The governance action with ID “gov_action1fda...ccn9gc” and title “Cardano Builder DAO” is a Treasury Withdrawal, so is subject to ARTICLE II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. While most of the requirements under this section were met by this governance action, it did not fulfil all the requirements under ARTICLE II, Section 7(1).
ARTICLE II, Section 7(1) states ""Treasury Withdrawals" actions must specify the terms of the withdrawal. This shall include: the purpose of the withdrawal, the period for delivery of proposed activities which the withdrawal shall be used for, the relevant costs and expenses of the proposed activities, circumstances under which the withdrawal might be refunded to the Cardano Treasury."
The governance action does not specify "the period for delivery of proposed activities which the withdrawal shall be used for" or "the relevant costs and expenses of the proposed activities".
We therefore find this governance action Unconstitutional.
This governance action does not sufficiently fulfil the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed unconstitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49NoExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
No; unclear administrator and individual intermediate custodian
The proposal seeks to fund the Cardano Builder DAO as a smart contract-governed mechanism for allocating Treasury resources to ecosystem projects. Although this objective may reasonably support the long-term sustainability of Cardano under Article I - Section 1, the withdrawal does not satisfy the constitutional requirements governing the administration and custody of Treasury funds.
The proposal states that an independent council composed of dRep DAO members will administer the withdrawal and that funds will be disbursed from an independent multisignature account. However, the council is not fully constituted, the final administrator is not clearly identified, and the multisignature arrangement is not defined. More importantly, the actual withdrawal recipient is a single-key stake address (type 14) rather than the described multisignature or smart-contract arrangement. This would place custody of Treasury funds under an individual key while the proposed administration is still being established. The administrator and custody structure must be clearly defined and operational before a Treasury withdrawal is submitted.
The recipient stake credential is also delegated to the ANVIL stake pool. This directly conflicts with the proposal’s statement that Treasury funds held by the administrator will not be delegated to any stake pool operator and violates the constitutional restrictions applicable to Treasury withdrawals.
Hence, I identify clear constitutional violations and consider the proposal constitutionally non-compliant.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5Not votedActive · term ends epoch 799No rationale