Cardano Builder DAO
On-chain changes
- 20,000,000 ₳paid tostake1uyc...hg6tqgh7
Abstract
The Cardano Builder DAO is an ecosystem-wide, purpose-built, smart contract-governed funding mechanism to support projects advancing Cardano’s Vision 2030 through measurable ecosystem KPIs. Its role is to allocate capital to builders who can drive growth in the metrics that matter most to Cardano’s long-term success, including monthly active users, monthly on-chain transactions, and TVL.
Motivation & rationale
Cardano’s long-term success depends on its ability to consistently fund, support, and retain builders who create real ecosystem usage. As Cardano advances toward Vision 2030, treasury funding should increasingly be connected to measurable outcomes, including monthly active users, monthly on-chain transactions, and total value locked.
The Cardano Builder DAO exists to create a more focused, accountable, and builder-led funding pathway for projects that can directly advance these outcomes. While Cardano has traditionally used community funding mechanisms, the ecosystem now needs specialized funding structures that can allocate capital with clearer mandates, stronger accountability, and better alignment with strategic KPIs.
The motivation behind this proposal is to strengthen Cardano’s ability to deploy treasury resources toward projects that create measurable ecosystem value. By organizing and inviting experienced builders into a smart contract-governed DAO, the Cardano Builder DAO gives the ecosystem a repeatable mechanism for evaluating proposals, coordinating feedback, distributing funds transparently, and tracking the results of funded work.
Ultimately, the Cardano Builder DAO is motivated by a simple goal: help Cardano fund the builders most capable of turning treasury resources into measurable ecosystem growth.
Alignment with the 2030 Vision KPI Framework
Supporting Cardano’s strategy KPIs is one of the core design goals of the Cardano Builder DAO.
The Strategy 2030 framework identifies TVL, monthly transactions, and monthly active users as three of the ecosystem’s key KPIs for measuring usage, adoption, and sustainability. The Builder DAO was intentionally designed to fund builders whose work can improve those outcomes over time.
That is exactly why, in the early stages of the DAO, we built both Version 1 and Version 2 of the DAO KPI dashboard. Version 1 created a public system for self-reported KPI tracking. Version 2 moved the DAO toward the model this mechanism ultimately needs: KPI tracking tied directly to live on-chain Cardano data. We want to work with dReps to continue to standardized how KPIs can be tracked in future versions. This shift reflects our belief that treasury-funded performance should become increasingly measurable, transparent, and verifiable. That evolution also allows the DAO to move from narrative-based reporting toward objective performance monitoring.
The CB DAO knows that KPI tracking is an area of high interest for dReps and the broader ecosystem. Our effort is to show willingness to work with dReps to improve tracking of KPIs on a repeating cadence. The CB DAO intends to be the oversight body that enforces and coordinates KPI based funding with strict accountability and standards for projects that receive funding. It is not an easy problem to solve, but year one shows that we are meaningfully striding towards creating an oversight body that effectively tracks core Cardano KPIs for funded projects.
The proposal directly supports these strategy KPIs in the following ways:
Monthly Active Users (MAU): Every funded project is expected to grow real usage of Cardano-based products and services. The DAO supports this by selecting builders with adoption potential, requiring KPI reporting, and prioritizing projects that can attract and retain users.
Monthly Transactions: The DAO funds projects that increase on-chain activity through applications, protocols, integrations, and user flows that generate repeat transaction volume. This makes treasury deployment more directly connected to measurable network usage.
Total Value Locked (TVL): The DAO supports builders whose products can deepen liquidity, strengthen DeFi participation, and increase the amount of value secured within Cardano-based applications. Since TVL is one of the clearest indicators of capital confidence and ecosystem usefulness, it is a core KPI for funded teams to track.
To ensure alignment with the strategy framework, funded projects are required to track core KPIs: monthly active users, TVL, and on-chain transactions. While different builders contribute in different ways, the shared purpose of the DAO is to improve Cardano’s 2030 KPI performance through disciplined treasury allocation, public reporting, and increasingly on-chain KPI verification.
CB DAO Track Record
We are well suited to deliver this work because the Cardano Builder DAO is already a proven operating system for builder-led treasury allocation. The CB DAO has already distributed 11.1 M ADA across 34 proposals in 2 funding rounds.
In Round 1, the DAO brought together 38 voting members and 27 requesting members, funded 20 companies building on Cardano, and achieved an 83% participation rate in governance actions. It also distributed 5,541,335 ADA through a transparent, smart contract-governed process, and the impact of that funding was measured through a public KPI dashboard.
Round 2 made improvements and built off of the momentum of Round 1, with 18 new members joining the DAO. Builders again engaged in a full process of review, debate, temperature checks, and final voting, resulting in 14 companies being funded with an 88% participation rate among members. That level of repeat participation demonstrates real governance durability, not just initial enthusiasm.
Just as important as the raw numbers is what those cycles proved operationally. The DAO successfully bootstrapped a serious builder community, created and amended governing documents, elected a board, added third-party assurance, implemented merit-based proposal review, and executed treasury withdrawals on-chain with full transparency. The process was iterative, rigorous, and built by the same operators now seeking to continue and expand it.
The Builder DAO is well positioned to facilitate ecosystem funding for dApps because it already has meaningful ecosystem adoption. Official Cardano developer documentation now describes the CB DAO as a smart contract-governed mechanism where more than 50 established Cardano projects participate in funding decisions, with KPI tracking tied to metrics like on-chain activity, users, and TVL. That means this proposal builds on an existing coordination layer of credible builders with real reach and an existing name, not an untested network that still needs to be assembled.
In short, our track record is clear: we have already designed the model, attracted the builders, run the governance, deployed capital, tracked outcomes, and improved the process across multiple cycles. This proposal scales what has already been demonstrated in practice.
Administrator:
Independent council. A council composed of members of the dRep DAO receive the treasury withdrawal, hold funds prior to deployment, and oversee disbursement in line with the milestones put forth in this proposal included in the references. Currently Cardano Yoda (https://x.com/JaromrTesar) and Marco Grendel Moshi (https://www.linkedin.com/in/marco-moshi/) have put their names forward and we will be adding one other non affiliated active dRep to conduct the reviews.
In compliance with Section 7 "Treasury Withdrawals" of the Cardano Constitution Action Standards, any ADA held by the administrator prior to further disbursement will be kept in one or more separate accounts auditable by the Cardano Community, will not be delegated to any stake pool operator, and will be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option.
All milestones will be dispersed from an independent multisig governed by assigned members of the dRep DAO. The Cardano Builder DAO only receives funds after milestone completion is validated and confirmed by administrator.
Repayment
Repayment would occur in the event that any DAO treasury funds remain unused or unallocated after completion of the approved work, governance processes, or funding activities. In that case, the unused portion would be returned to the Cardano Treasury, consistent with the Cardano Builder DAO’s prior practice and commitment to responsible treasury stewardship.
The CB DAO returned 354,790 ADA of unused funds to the treasury after the first two governance rounds completed: https://adastat.net/transactions/dfcf57c8c65c50bb208106db91b2db38c4a7512f9fbf100f9f5e1f6301ceb8fc
Have you previously received funding from Cardano or related ecosystem programs?
Yes. The Cardano Builder DAO previously received funding through the Cardano Treasury funding process. This proposal builds on that prior funded work and continues the development of the DAO as an operational, on-chain, KPI-driven funding mechanism for Cardano builders. Clarity, the technical and business development team responsible for enabling the facilitation of Initiative DAOs will not seek funding as a requesting member through any of the initiative DAOs. The tools and technology needed to enable these DAOs were funded by the Cardano Builder DAO in 2025.
Rationale highlights
Why some of the largest DReps voted for and against, in their own words. About vote rationales
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
This document includes the Cardano Foundation’s voting decisions and individual voting rationales for 3 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions connected to the 2026 Intersect-facilitated budget process: Ticketing Platform, Daedalus Wallet Maintenance &...
This document includes the Cardano Foundation’s voting decisions and individual voting
rationales for 3 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions connected to the 2026 Intersect-facilitated budget process: Ticketing Platform, Daedalus Wallet Maintenance & Improvements and Cardano Builder DAO.A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We apply a consistent evaluation framework (see "Cardano Foundation Voting Decisions for the 2026 Intersect Budget Process") and present our reasoning in a single document. Fund-administration clarity is a central consideration: our expectation is that treasury funds are held and released under diligent, transparent, independently-overseen administration with robust custody controls and milestone-based accountability.
For the Ticketing Platform and Daedalus withdrawals, no material change has emerged since our original budget assessment, and our YES votes reflect that assessment. For the Cardano Builder DAO, we are changing our vote from YES to NO due to a change in the proposal relating to the administration of the funds. The updated proposal discloses that the full 20,000,000 ada is paid upfront to a self-selected "independent council" and held under a three-person native multi-sig with only two of three signatories disclosed. This creates continuity and security risks which would usually mitigated by a setup such as the TRSC/PSSC framework with independent external oversight and milestone-gated disbursement.
Voting Record
Governance Action ID Title Vote Rationale gov_action1fda...ccn9gc Cardano Builder DAO (2026) NO The proposal aligns with Cardano governance and ecosystem growth, and the team has a demonstrated record of delivering ecosystem grants, running on-chain governance rounds, and returning unused funds to the treasury. However, the disclosed fund administration, 20,000,000 ada withdrawn upfront to a self-selected council held under a partially-disclosed three-person native multi-sig, outside the independently-overseen TRSC/PSSC framework used for comparable withdrawals, does not provide adequate custody security, key-management assurance, or governance-risk controls at this scale. On this basis, CF changes its vote from Yes to No. gov_action1xk6...p0ga3d Cardano Enterprise Adoption: Ticketing Platform YES This proposal by Anvil seems to credibly contribute to adoption and utility: the system uses CIP-68 metadata, native multi-asset issuance, and on-chain royalty enforcement to support a ticketing business already serving 200,000 users. The proposal is expected to generate meaningful on-chain activity through direct network usage with documented 12-month targets of NFT mints, on-chain interactions, new wallets, and in ticket revenue processed on-chain. Anvil team has a proven track record of Cardano delivery, and Sellout has operated a functioning ticketing platform since 2017. The budget is appropriately justifi ed given the clearly defi ned deliverables, milestone-gated disbursement, third-party security audit, and the equity provision to the Cardano treasury. However, Yellowstone Club anchor deployment and the relatively modest Sellout self-funding to date, compared to the requested amount, should be tracked through quarterly reporting. Based on this, CF votes Yes. gov_action1mr0...4yjd6j Se7en Labs: Daedalus Wallet Maintenance and Improvements 2026–2027 YES The Daedalus Wallet proposal credibly contributes to adoption, utility, and ecosystem growth because its deliverables provide essential maintenance and functional extensions to Cardano's foundational full-node wallet infrastructure. The proposal is expected to drive sustained protocol-level engagement by reactivating idle legacy user accounts and securing independent network access suffi cient to justify treasury investment. Furthermore, the team has demonstrated the necessary expertise to maintain the solution, and the budget is appropriately justifi ed given a fair balance between core upgrades and optional, refundable security audit allocations. However, the proposal would benefi t from clearer long-term fi nancial planning, with the understanding that approval should not imply a commitment to continued annual treasury support. Based on this, CF votes Yes. These three votes are the outcome of a review anchored in our publicly stated principles. The Ticketing Platform and Daedalus withdrawals carry forward our original YES assessments unchanged. For the Cardano Builder DAO we vote NO, due to security and continuity concerns related to the custody and administration arrangements.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well.As a DRep, I decided to vote YES on the proposal: Cardano Builder DAO. My rationale: My vote should not be perceived as an unconditional endorsement of the DAO as a perfect funding vehicle. It is a pragmatic decision based on the current state of Cardano...
As a DRep, I decided to vote YES on the proposal: Cardano Builder DAO.
My rationale:
My vote should not be perceived as an unconditional endorsement of the DAO as a perfect funding vehicle. It is a pragmatic decision based on the current state of Cardano treasury funding, the need for alternative funding mechanisms, and the improvements CB DAO has made since its previous round.
After the Intersect budget process, only a limited number of non-Intersect proposals reached the on-chain stage. Excluding Intersect-related proposals, only nine proposals were approved, and five of those are connected to one entity. These proposals are now on-chain and still do not have funding guaranteed.
Catalyst is expected to return in the fall with a budget of around ₳2M, which is small in the current market environment and especially limited given the low ADA price.
At the same time, several important teams and platforms in the Cardano ecosystem have struggled or gone out of business. Some of this is natural and even healthy market discipline, but from a user and ecosystem perspective, losing key tools, infrastructure, and applications can also become a serious problem.
I believe Cardano needs alternative funding vehicles. It is inefficient when large proposals from founding entities asking for tens of millions of ADA and smaller builder proposals asking for hundreds of thousands of ADA must compete in the same on-chain governance process.
This is especially problematic when many proposals are submitted at the beginning of an NCL period and DReps are expected to evaluate everything at once.
CB DAO is one of the few mechanisms currently capable of directing funding to ecosystem builders in a more focused way. The DAO targets existing Cardano applications, not random ideas. Cardano needs wallets, aggregators, bridges, dashboards, oracles, risk tools, DeFi products, and user-facing applications. If these products disappear, users feel the consequences directly.
Another important reason for my YES vote is the effort to introduce independent oversight through members of the DRep DAO. In my view, DReps should not only approve funding. They should also be involved in controlling milestones, reviewing deliverables, and stopping or delaying disbursements when conditions are not met.
If DReps carry responsibility for approving treasury withdrawals, they should also have a role in ensuring that treasury funds are used according to the approved mandate.
Last year, I voted NO on CB DAO. I shared many of the concerns raised by other DReps about the structure, rules, accountability, and possible conflicts of interest. I still have concerns today.
However, I also see a serious effort to improve the model, and that matters.
To be clear, CB DAO is not a perfect mechanism. Several commercial or tokenized projects have received funding even though, in my view, such projects should increasingly survive through revenue, private investment, token economics, or targeted performance-based funding rather than broad treasury subsidies. Treasury funding should not become a permanent runway for businesses that are unable or unwilling to commercialize.
Projects that fail to meet KPIs should not automatically receive further funding. In some cases, KPIs should be stricter, more objective, and more clearly connected to Cardano's strategic goals.
Accountability also needs to improve. The KPI dashboard is a useful step, but it is not enough by itself. If KPI data is self-reported, partially self-reported, or not independently verified, then DReps and the community should treat it with caution. Future funding rounds should move toward more verifiable, on-chain, independently auditable metrics wherever possible.
There is also a funding-need problem. Some CB DAO participants are commercial projects, tokenized projects, or teams that already had other funding routes. These projects should be assessed more strictly. Treasury funding should be used as a temporary runway toward sustainability, not as a replacement for a business model.
CB DAO is asking for more funding than last year. Normally, I would treat this as a significant concern. However, given the lower ADA price, the larger nominal ADA request is partly understandable. Still, more ADA must come with stronger accountability, stricter eligibility, and clearer milestone control.
For future rounds, I recommend several improvements:
CB DAO should set stricter KPIs and make KPI achievement a stronger condition for future eligibility. It should put more emphasis on previous funding history, commercial viability, and whether a project has already received significant support from Catalyst, the treasury, or other ecosystem programs. It should also consider caps on how much one project can receive across multiple rounds.
I also recommend avoiding repeated funding for successful commercial projects unless there is a clear public-good justification, strong evidence of ecosystem impact, and a credible path to sustainability. For commercial projects, funding should ideally come with stronger treasury alignment, such as revenue-sharing, token allocation, service commitments, open-source commitments, or other mechanisms that ensure the ecosystem receives value in return.
Finally, I strongly recommend prioritizing open-source projects, especially when treasury funding is repeated. If a project receives public funding several times and later shuts down, the ecosystem should ideally be able to continue, fork, or maintain the service. Treasury-funded work should not disappear completely when a private business closes.
Despite these concerns, I am voting YES because I believe Cardano needs builder-focused funding mechanisms, and CB DAO has shown enough willingness to improve to justify another controlled round. My support depends on stronger oversight, stricter KPI discipline, and a clear expectation that funding can be delayed or stopped if milestones, deliverables, or accountability standards are not met.
Disclaimer: I am a member of the DRep DAO and have been named as a potential independent oversight participant for this proposal. If this role is formalized, I may be involved in milestone review and disbursement control. I am in contact with the Clarity / CB DAO team, but I am not a CB DAO requesting member and I am not applying for CB DAO project funding. Any compensation, role, or responsibility connected to oversight must be clearly disclosed. My YES vote should therefore be read together with this disclosure.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqpSame rationale as my vote on the Intersect Budget.