Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program
161 DReps voted · 65 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote · 4 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 2 to yes, together voting with 27.1M ₳ of voting power.
Voting concentration
7 of 161 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 14.8%, top 5 combined 43.4% of 4.7B ₳ voted.
The 13 largest voters together held as much voting power as the 67.0% threshold required in yes votes.
- No48K ₳No rationale
- No45.3K ₳Rationale
12 million ADA is huge amount. I think such and similar project should seek the smaller and modest funding via Project Catalyst and go through the process of community checking, reviews and voting.
- No31.8K ₳Rationale
I do not support this Treasury Withdrawal.
The proposal asks for 12,000,000 ada over 36 months while leaving too much operational authority unresolved, undefined, or deferred until after approval.
The central issue is not whether open source maintenance matters. It does. The issue is whether this proposal gives ada holders enough certainty, control, and protection before releasing a large amount of treasury funds. In my view, it does not.
The administrator structure is a major concern. The proposal begins with Open Source Cowboy Consulting, then intends to transfer responsibility to a future dOSPO legal entity that does not yet exist, has no named jurisdiction, and is only promised to be formed later. DReps are being asked to approve funding now for an administrative structure that is partly still theoretical.
That is not good enough for a 12,000,000 ada withdrawal.
The proposal also creates multiple councils, reserves, rubrics, future selection processes, and operator-replacement mechanisms, but much of the actual decision-making framework depends on things being created after the funds are approved. This places too much trust in future process design rather than giving voters clear, fixed terms at the time of approval.
There are also significant budget concerns. Large amounts are allocated to operations, reserves, program management, councils, audits, dashboards, activation programs, and future discretionary deployment. Some funds may be returned if unused, but that does not fix the core problem: the treasury is still being asked to authorize a broad mandate before the final governance and administrative machinery exists.
As a DRep, I am not comfortable approving treasury withdrawals where key safeguards depend on later implementation by the same program structure receiving the funds.
Cardano absolutely needs sustainable open source maintenance. But that does not mean every large, complex, multi-year program should be approved because the mission sounds important.
A stronger proposal would first establish the legal entity, name the administrator, finalize the governance documents, define council membership rules, lock the decision process, and then request funding in smaller, verifiable stages.
This proposal asks for too much, too soon, with too many critical details deferred.
For that reason, I vote No.
- No26.7K ₳No rationale
- No19.4K ₳No rationale
- No15.7K ₳No rationale
- NoRevoted6.8K ₳History
Earlier votes
No3mo agoSuperseded
- Abstain4.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes3.6K ₳No rationale
- No1.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes688.8 ₳No rationale