Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction
7 of 7 committee members voted
- 68bb0b42…874668bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 653No rationale
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5YesActive · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Cardano Curia finds the “Dano Finance: DeFi Kernel” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional by a majority vote of four to one.
What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal governance action requests 3,333,000 ADA: 3,300,000 ADA for delivery and 33,000 ADA for budget administration. The funded work comprises a public DeFi Kernel registry and submission process, a Spot Leverage Order Book, an American Options protocol, and a Composable DeFi Transaction Builder SDK. Minswap Labs is identified as budget administrator.
Majority determination
By a four-member majority, Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional.
The majority considers the proposal sufficiently specific and auditable for a Treasury Withdrawal. It identifies the purpose of the withdrawal, the total amount, the delivery budget and administration fee, four defined work packages, milestone deliverables, measurable KPIs, reporting obligations, security-review gates, and circumstances in which funds will not be disbursed or will be returned.
The work packages are tied to concrete outputs. These include a public registry, compatibility documentation, testnet and mainnet deployments, published script hashes and schemas, security-review or audit reports, an SDK release, integration examples, usage reporting, and final work-package reports. The proposal also provides public on-chain KPIs for trading volume, option notional volume, registry publication, and external integration activity.
The majority further notes that Minswap Labs is designated to support fund administration, milestone review, and accountability. Critical unresolved security issues block affected mainnet milestones, and funds that are unearned, unnecessary, cancelled, blocked, or associated with undeliverable milestones are to remain unspent or be returned under the administrator’s process. Dano Finance also commits to return five percent of specified protocol fees for twelve months after mainnet launch.
On a holistic reading, the majority finds these provisions sufficient to meet the Constitution’s requirements concerning purpose, costs, delivery structure, administration, oversight, audit or security assurance, public reporting, and refund circumstances. The majority finds no demonstrated conflict with the Cardano Blockchain tenets or applicable Treasury Withdrawal guardrails.
Cardano Curia finds the “Dano Finance: DeFi Kernel” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional by an internal vote of four constitutional and one unconstitutional. The majority relies on the proposal’s defined purpose and budget, work packages, milestone deliverables, administrator, security-review gates, public reporting and KPIs, and non-disbursement and refund conditions. The minority dissent is recorded in full because it raises material questions about express disclosure, independent financial auditing, administrator custody controls, and fixed delivery dates.
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Dano Finance: DeFi Kernel” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
This governance action requests 3,333,000 ADA from the Cardano Treasury for Dano Finance to accelerate the DeFi Kernel as an open standard for shared liquidity, on-chain financial intents, and global order-book coordination on Cardano. The request consists of 3,300,000 ADA for delivery and a 33,000 ADA budget administration fee.
The proposal identifies the purpose of the withdrawal, the amount requested, the intended scope of work, and the relevant work packages. These include the DeFi Kernel registry website and submission process, a Spot Leverage Order Book, an American Options Protocol, and a Composable DeFi Transaction Builder SDK.
The proposal provides milestone-based delivery. Each work package includes deliverables, reporting expectations, security review or audit steps where applicable, mainnet deployment criteria, integration documentation, and final reporting.
The proposal identifies Minswap Labs as budget administrator. The administrator will support fund administration, milestone review, and accountability.
The proposal includes audit and oversight provisions. Smart contract workstreams include security review or audit before mainnet release, critical unresolved security issues block affected mainnet milestones, and public reports will show progress, deployment status, registry status, KPI status, and remaining risks.The proposal includes repayment and non-disbursement circumstances. It states that funds not disbursed, not earned through approved milestones, or not needed for approved delivery work will remain unspent or be returned to the Cardano Treasury according to the administrator’s process. It also states that cancelled, blocked, or undeliverable milestones will result in the unused portion remaining unspent or being returned.
The proposal further states that Dano Finance will return 5% of protocol fees generated by the Treasury-funded Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options market-making pool contracts for 12 months after mainnet launch, with reporting made public.
The proposal therefore identifies the purpose, costs, work packages, administrator, milestone structure, audit and security review requirements, reporting obligations, and repayment conditions.
Tingvard therefore finds that the proposal satisfies the relevant constitutional requirements for a Treasury Withdrawal governance action.
Tingvard finds the “Dano Finance: DeFi Kernel” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
The proposal identifies the purpose, amount, costs, administrator, delivery structure, oversight and audit arrangements, reporting obligations, and refund or repayment circumstances.
Tingvard therefore judges this governance action constitutional.
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action unconstitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
"Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" (gov_action1cpn...4h586r) is a Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. The Action seeks to withdraw 3,333,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury, 3,300,000 ada for delivery and a 33,000 ada budget administration fee, to fund Dano Finance's development of the DeFi Kernel as an open standard for shared liquidity, including a Spot Leverage Order Book, an American Options market, and a public compatibility registry. Minswap Labs is designated as budget administrator.
Several of the Action's elements meet their respective standards. Article II.6's procedural standards are satisfied: the metadata anchors to a document whose on-chain blake2b-256 hash (d2d4bf0c17716b9ce7cb8cae1d85af45c236fd64a142a367e030115521a558cf) matches the anchored body, and the document supplies the title, abstract, motivation, rationale, milestone plan, and supporting references that Article II.6.2 requires. Article II.7.1's terms are stated: purpose, a milestone-based delivery plan running through security review and mainnet release, itemized costs, and repayment conditions under which unused, unearned, or undisbursed funds remain unspent or return to the Cardano Treasury under the administrator's process, supplemented by a commitment to share revenue from the Treasury-funded market-making pool contracts for twelve months after mainnet launch. A Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada is in force for the period spanning epochs 613 through 713, agreed by the DReps through the Net Change Limit Info Action (gov_action15at...hakceq) at the greater-than-50-percent active voting stake threshold TREASURY-01a requires, superseding the prior 350,000,000 ada limit for the same period. The 3,333,000 ada requested here is well within it, on its own and in aggregate with the other withdrawals pending at the time of this review, satisfying guardrail TREASURY-02a; the withdrawal is denominated in ada, satisfying TREASURY-03a. Article II.7.4 is satisfied through the budget administration fee, the funded security review whose report is a milestone deliverable, and the registry's public documentation obligations. Article II.7.5 is satisfied on its face: Minswap Labs, an established ecosystem entity distinct from the recipient, is designated to support fund administration, milestone review, and accountability. On Article II.7.2 we note a deficiency: the metadata contains no prior treasury funding statement of any kind for Dano Finance. If the proposer has received no treasury funds in the last 24 months, silence may technically satisfy the Article's terms, but the omission of even a negative disclosure deprives reviewers of an affirmative record that recent Treasury Withdrawals have provided.
Article II.7.6 (Custody and Delegation of Held Funds). This is where the Action fails. The Article requires that any ada received from a treasury withdrawal, while held prior to further disbursement, be kept in separately auditable accounts that shall not be delegated to an SPO and must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option. We verified the on-chain withdrawal destination, stake1u9h9w7ssk3zne7mchccz8kugsncn2muhx2p2v26s9gysyqquxfv3z, at the time of this review: it is a key-hash stake credential (CIP-19 mainnet header byte 0xe1) that is delegated to the stake pool pool1fs2m5rmlx66crcwwrrsf2pcxjhvk7kzdurcqusd3v5gm65cufnj and delegated to drep1y2eu92qwy875nlslg3ahlh0hy5vhzpkrjay88ptvdp0z6cqm9h25x, a DRep other than the predefined abstain option. Both delegation prongs of Article II.7.6 are violated on the face of the on-chain record. Treasury funds arriving at this destination would immediately participate in consensus rewards and in governance through a discretionary DRep, which is precisely what the Article forbids, and the designation of a capable administrator elsewhere in the proposal cannot cure the non-compliant account the withdrawal itself pays into.
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action unconstitutional. The Action violates Article II.7.6 because the designated withdrawal destination is a key-hash stake address that is delegated to a stake pool and to a DRep other than the predefined abstain voting option, both verified on-chain at the time of this review. A resubmission directing the withdrawal to a compliant destination would cure the defect.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31NoActive · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be unconstitutional.
This proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action to withdraw ₳3,333,000 from the Cardano Treasury in connection with Dano Finance's "Global Order Book: Connect Cardano DeFi to Increase Transactions." With regard to Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Cardano Constitution, this proposal employs an off-chain reference fixed by a commit hash and presents the proposal's title, summary, rationale, justification, and relevant supplementary materials. These comply with the requirements regarding the format and supporting documentation for Governance Actions. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 1, this proposal aims to improve liquidity and increase trading volume in Cardano DeFi, and presents the work packages, budget breakdown, milestones, KPIs, deliverables, and conditions for repayment to the Treasury. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3, this proposal states that the requested amount of ₳3,333,000 complies with the current Net Change Limit. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 4, this proposal states that an independent security review or audit will be conducted, and that public reports on progress, deliverables, KPIs, and risks will be provided. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 5, this proposal designates Minswap Labs as the fund administrator and describes a framework for fund management, milestone verification, and accountability. However, Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 2 requires future recipients of Treasury Withdrawals to disclose whether they have received ADA from the Cardano Treasury within the past 24 months. Upon reviewing this proposal, we were unable to confirm such explicit disclosure. We interpret Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 2 as requiring explicit disclosure regarding whether funds have been received, even if no Treasury funds have been received. Therefore, we cannot confirm that this proposal meets the disclosure requirements of that paragraph. Furthermore, regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 6 of the Cardano Constitution, upon verifying the stake address of the withdrawal credential corresponding to the Governance Action, we found that, at the time of verification, there was a stake delegation to an SPO, and the DRep was delegated to Tempo.Vote. Consequently, we could not confirm that this proposal meets the requirements of that paragraph. Therefore, we determine that this proposal is unconstitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is unconstitutional.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecNoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is unconstitutional.
The governance action with ID “gov_action1cpn...4h586r” and title “Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction” is a Treasury Withdrawal, so is subject to ARTICLE II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution.
ARTICLE II, Section 7(1) states ""Treasury Withdrawals" actions must specify the terms of the withdrawal. This shall include: the purpose of the withdrawal, the period for delivery of proposed activities which the withdrawal shall be used for, the relevant costs and expenses of the proposed activities, circumstances under which the withdrawal might be refunded to the Cardano Treasury."
The governance action does not specify "the period for delivery of proposed activities which the withdrawal shall be used for".
ARTICLE II, Section 7(2) states ""Treasury Withdrawals" actions shall disclose whether the prospective recipient of the "Treasury Withdrawals" action has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months."
The governance action does not provide any information about whether the "prospective recipient" has "received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months."
ARTICLE II, Section 7(4) states "Treasury Withdrawals actions shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada."
The governance action does not provide any information about "periodic independent audits" or allocate ada to "to cover the cost" of audits.
ARTICLE II, Section 7(6) states "Any ada received from a Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawal, so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, must be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, and such accounts shall not be delegated to an SPO but must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option."
The governance action specifies the withdrawal address stake1u9h9w7ssk3zne7mchccz8kugsncn2muhx2p2v26s9gysyqquxfv3z, which at the time of assessment is delegated to an SPO with the ticker "BIRD" and is delegated to the DRep "Tempo.Vote", so is not compliant with ARTICLE II, Section 7(6).
We therefore find this governance action Unconstitutional.
This governance action does not sufficiently fulfil the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed unconstitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49NoActive · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Unfortunate
The proposal identifies Minswap Labs as the budget administrator, defines milestone-based delivery, specifies refund and non-disbursement conditions, provides measurable deliverables, and requires security review prior to mainnet deployment. However, the constitutional assessment must also consider the actual Treasury custody arrangement implemented by the governance action.
The reward account designated to receive the Treasury withdrawal is delegated both to a stake pool operator and to a DRep other than the predefined Abstain DRep. Treasury funds held in custody by the administrator must not participate in stake pool delegation or governance voting. These delegations are therefore incompatible with the constitutional requirements governing Treasury withdrawals.
Hence, I identify clear constitutional violations and consider the proposal constitutionally non-compliant.