Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction

System4mo ago2 posts

137 DReps voted · 56 with a rationale

Open a row to read the rationale.

Voting concentration

6 of 137 DReps cast half of the voted power.

Largest voter 14.5%, top 5 combined 46.4% of 4B ₳ voted.

The 9 largest voters together held as much voting power as the 67.0% threshold required in yes votes.

  • Yes3.9M ₳Rationale

    [Portuguese]
    Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança "Global Order Book Connect Cardano DeFi to Increase Transaction" (gov_action1cpn...4h586r), pois entendemos que a proposta aborda um desafio relevante do ecossistema Cardano: a fragmentação da liquidez e a limitada interoperabilidade entre protocolos DeFi. A criação de um padrão aberto para livros de ofertas, de um registro público, de novos produtos financeiros e de um SDK reutilizável pode aumentar a composabilidade entre aplicações, ampliar a atividade on-chain e facilitar o desenvolvimento de novas soluções no ecossistema. Embora o valor solicitado, de ₳3.333.000, seja significativo, avaliamos que o orçamento apresenta uma boa relação entre custo e benefício por estar estruturado em entregas concretas, com marcos claramente definidos, critérios de aceitação e indicadores mensuráveis. Esse modelo permite acompanhar a execução do projeto e verificar de forma objetiva a entrega dos resultados propostos. Também consideramos positivos os mecanismos de governança, controle e transparência previstos, incluindo revisão independente de segurança antes da implantação em mainnet, relatórios públicos periódicos, acompanhamento pela Minswap Labs, possibilidade de retenção ou devolução de recursos não utilizados e compartilhamento de parte das taxas geradas pelos protocolos. Esses elementos reforçam a responsabilidade na utilização dos recursos da Tesouraria e oferecem meios adequados para acompanhamento e prestação de contas pela comunidade.
    [English]
    We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action "Global Order Book Connect Cardano DeFi to Increase Transaction" (gov_action1cpn...4h586r), because we believe the proposal addresses a significant challenge within the Cardano ecosystem: fragmented liquidity and limited interoperability between DeFi protocols. By introducing an open order book standard, a public registry, new financial products, and a reusable SDK, the initiative has the potential to improve composability across applications, increase on-chain activity, and simplify the development of new decentralized services. Although the requested ₳3,333,000 is substantial, we believe the proposal offers a reasonable cost-benefit balance because the budget is tied to concrete deliverables, clearly defined milestones, measurable acceptance criteria, and objective performance indicators. This structure enables effective monitoring of project execution and verification of the proposed outcomes. We also view the proposal’s governance, oversight, and transparency mechanisms positively. These include an independent security review before mainnet deployment, regular public reporting, oversight by Minswap Labs, provisions for withholding or returning unused funds, and a commitment to share a portion of protocol-generated fees. Together, these mechanisms strengthen accountability, improve transparency, and provide the community with effective oversight of Treasury resource utilization.

  • Yes78.9M ₳Rationale

    I am voting YES to support Dano Finance’s request to accelerate the DeFi Kernel, SDK, and new financial primitives.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    I am voting YES to support Dano Finance’s request to accelerate the DeFi Kernel, SDK, and new financial primitives.
    As the protocol holding the largest TVL on Cardano, Dano Finance has proven its ability to deliver high-utility DeFi infrastructure.
    Standardizing shared liquidity and contract metadata directly addresses critical fragmentation across our ecosystem.
    I am happy to support our builders and back reusable, open tooling that drives long-term value for Cardano.

  • Yes215.3M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain55.4K ₳Rationale

    I vote ABSTAIN for this proposal

  • No10.2M ₳No rationale
  • Yes3.4M ₳Rationale

    Happy to vote yes for this, DANO finance has regularly delivered open source tooling for the Cardano ecosystem for free, and this time they are asking for funding for open sourced tooling that will benefit the financial ecosystem of Cardano. Seems like a necessary spend from a trusted source that has constantly delivered for Cardano.

  • No35.1M ₳Rationale

    Vote: No. This action requests 3,333,000 ADA for a DeFi Kernel registry, transaction-building SDK, leveraged spot order book, and American options protocol.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Cardano needs better DeFi composability, shared liquidity standards, and reusable transaction tooling. The problem identified by this proposal is valid. The Cardano First framework nevertheless reads No under Economic Sustainability and Adoption.
    The proposal asks the treasury to fund too many unproven layers at once. It combines the proposed standard, its public registry, an integration SDK, a leveraged trading product, and an American options market. The treasury would finance both the underlying framework and the products intended to prove that framework.
    The adoption case is not strong enough for the combined scope. Product-volume targets begin only after development and launch, while the external SDK target may be satisfied by an integration merely being started. The proposed return of 5 percent of protocol fees for 12 months provides limited compensation for the treasury assuming the development and market risk.
    A narrower proposal could fund the registry and SDK after securing committed integrations, or fund one protocol after demonstrating demand. This action instead asks the treasury to finance the standard, products, and hoped-for adoption together.
    I vote No.

  • Yes993.4K ₳No rationale
  • No228.7M ₳Rationale

    We voted NO, while recognizing that the proposal addresses a real challenge for Cardano DeFi and that Dano Finance is a capable team.

    Our main concern is that the proposal combines public infrastructure with significant funding for Dano’s commercial products. We would prefer these elements to be assessed separately.

    We also believe the proposal needs a more detailed budget, and a more meaningful long-term return for the Treasury.

    We would reconsider a revised proposal addressing these points.

  • Abstain73.3M ₳Rationale

    I am voting Abstain on the Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction proposal.

    This proposal bundles two tracks of different nature: the DeFi Kernel standard and registry, and two new commercial protocols from Dano Finance. My positions on these two are clearly different, and since the structure does not allow separate evaluation, I am voting Abstain.

    I believe the DeFi Kernel has real value. Its three principles, permissionless operation without a privileged batcher, publicly documented datum schemas, and on-chain discoverability, could be a practical answer to Cardano DeFi's fragmentation, and running the registry as free, CC0 public domain is exactly what a public good should look like. Had this been proposed on its own, I would have voted Yes.

    However, 60% of the budget, 2,000,000 ADA, funds fee-generating products, a Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options, whose fees accrue entirely to the operator after a 5% return for just twelve months. There is no commitment to open-source the code, and beyond the stated purpose of proving the standard, there is no guarantee that these protocols remain public goods. If they were meant as reference implementations, an open-source commitment would have been the natural choice.

    I recognize the value of the DeFi Kernel, but I cannot support public funds building commercial products, so I vote Abstain. If the registry and standard work were resubmitted standalone, I would gladly support it.

  • No474.2K ₳Rationale

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  • Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain30.8M ₳No rationale
  • Yes0 ₳No rationale
  • Yes29M ₳Rationale

    As a huge fan of the DeFi Kernel, my first impression was that this would be an easy YES. However, I do have some concerns about using public funds to subsidize commercial ventures. Dano Finance makes up for this by providing a 5% royalty to for the first 12 months for the order book and options platform to pay back the treasury, which may not be enough to pay it back in full, but it is enough for me to lean YES on this proposal.

  • No12.5M ₳Rationale

    We acknowledge that liquidity fragmentation and interoperability remain important challenges for Cardano's DeFi ecosystem. The vision of a shared order-book infrastructure capable of connecting decentralized exchanges, lending protocols, and other financial applications is strategically interesting and could potentially contribute to greater composability in the long term. However, treasury funding decisions require a high degree of confidence that the proposed solution is technically sound, broadly supported by the ecosystem, and capable of delivering measurable public value. In its current form, the proposal does not provide sufficient evidence to justify the requested allocation of treasury resources, and we therefore vote No.

    Our primary concern is the absence of clear evidence that the proposed infrastructure will achieve the central objective of increasing transaction activity on Cardano. The proposal asserts that a global order book will improve liquidity efficiency and stimulate network usage, but it does not provide concrete projections, benchmarks, or economic analysis demonstrating how these outcomes will be measured or achieved. What evidence supports the claim that the DeFi Kernel will materially increase transaction volume, total value locked, or overall economic activity on Cardano, and what specific metrics and targets will be used to evaluate success?

    We are also concerned about ecosystem adoption risk. The value of a shared liquidity layer depends entirely on widespread integration by existing and future protocols, yet the proposal does not clearly identify which projects have formally committed to adopting the standard or how adoption barriers will be addressed. Which Cardano DeFi protocols have explicitly committed to integrating the DeFi Kernel, and what mechanisms or incentives exist to ensure ecosystem-wide participation?

    The proposal further lacks sufficient transparency regarding the requested budget of ₳3.33 million. While infrastructure initiatives can require substantial investment, the proposal does not adequately break down how funds will be allocated across engineering, audits, operations, maintenance, and ecosystem onboarding. How is the budget distributed across individual workstreams, and how will the community determine whether the expected return on investment justifies the expenditure?

    Another critical issue is governance and long-term stewardship. A shared financial infrastructure layer must remain neutral, transparent, and resilient beyond the initial development period, yet the proposal does not clearly explain how future upgrades, standards decisions, or disputes will be managed. Who will govern the evolution of the DeFi Kernel after deployment, and what safeguards will ensure that control remains decentralized and aligned with the interests of the wider Cardano ecosystem?

    Finally, the proposal does not sufficiently address sustainability and operational continuity beyond the funding period. Treasury-funded infrastructure requires a credible long-term maintenance model to prevent abandonment or ecosystem dependency on a single team. What sustainable funding, maintenance, and support structure will exist once treasury funding has been exhausted, and how will the infrastructure continue to operate if the original team is no longer involved?

  • Abstain817.5K ₳No rationale
  • No16.4M ₳Rationale

    Vote: NO

    This is a Treasury Withdrawal, "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" (gov_action1cpn...4h586r), submitted June 30, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. It requests 3,333,000 ADA — 3,300,000 ADA for delivery plus 33,000 ADA in administration fees — for Dano Finance to build four work packages over a 12-month window: a DeFi Kernel contract-metadata registry, a spot leverage order book, an American options protocol, and an SDK. No ADA burning is involved.

    The proposal is better specified than much of what has come before it. It names concrete deliverables rather than a research direction, attaches measurable KPIs — a registry with at least two documented contracts, $1M rolling 30-day volume on each of the two trading protocols within 90 days of launch, an SDK with at least one external integration — and phases each work package through testnet, security review, and mainnet adoption. It carries return-of-funds language for unearned or surplus amounts, an administrator, and a requested amount that is modest against the treasury. The DeFi Kernel registry component is also the most defensible piece: shared contract metadata standards and a discovery SDK are genuine public goods that benefit builders who are not Dano Finance.

    The structure is nonetheless a 12-month program budget for a single pre-selected team, not a grant paid on completed features. The return clauses are generic rather than structurally enforced — they describe an administrator process, not an escrow that releases only against verified delivery and returns the remainder automatically. No individuals are named; the team is a corporate identity with self-reported figures of roughly $18M TVL and 10,000+ transactions and no disclosed prior treasury track record. Two of the four work packages — a leveraged spot order book and an options market-making protocol — are Dano Finance's own commercial product line, and public funds would build private trading venues whose economics accrue to their operator. The KPIs measure trading volume, which is the easiest metric in DeFi to manufacture and among the weakest evidence of durable ecosystem value. DReps have so far voted approximately ₳3.06B against and ₳699M in favor.

    Dracula DAO votes NO. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — the ecosystem specifies what it wants built and pays once it exists and has been verified. It should not finance a named team's twelve-month roadmap, and it should not underwrite the construction of leveraged trading products that compete with other Cardano venues receiving no such public backing. Dracula DAO's standing position is that it will not support treasury funds used for speculation unless the ecosystem benefit is compelling and the risk is low; leverage and options infrastructure, built by its future commercial operator on public money, does not clear that bar.

    The DeFi Kernel registry and SDK are a different matter. Resubmitted on their own, as a defined public-good deliverable paid on verified completion rather than as a slice of a team's operating budget, that work would receive serious consideration from Dracula DAO.

  • Yes9.2K ₳Rationale unavailable
  • Abstain31.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes150.5M ₳Rationale

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES. The proposal seeks to address liquidity fragmentation in Cardano DeFi through an open standard, reusable tooling, and two production primitives, and its substance is unchanged from the version we supported during the Intersect budget process.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    We recognise Dano Finance and its collaborators as an experienced team working on infrastructure that Cardano DeFi currently lacks. Having assessed this governance action, our decision is driven by the following factors:

    1. Consistency with our prior assessment: We supported this proposal during the off-chain signalling phase of the Intersect budget process 2026. The changes in the on-chain submission are minimal and the substance of the proposal remains the same, so our position remains the same.
    2. A structural gap addressed with public goods: DeFi Kernel is presented as an open, fee-free and royalty-free compatibility standard, with a public registry, published script hashes and datum/redeemer schemas, and an SDK that makes that metadata usable by wallets, bots and indexers. This aligns with the principles set out in "Our Cardano", in particular open-source core development and permissionless access. The registry and SDK retain value to the ecosystem independently of the adoption of any single protocol.
    3. Demonstrated operational traction: The team points to an operating protocol with on-chain usage and to prior work across lending, concentrated liquidity and composable transaction flows. In our view this lowers execution risk relative to a proposal without a delivery record.
    4. Measurable commitments: The proposal defines volume KPIs verifiable from public on-chain data, gates mainnet milestones on security review, and commits to returning 5% of protocol fees from the funded contracts for 12 months.

    Our YES vote is not an endorsement of every element. The request is large relative to demonstrated adoption, and the three protocol and tooling work packages are each priced at 1,000,000 ada in broad terms that we would expect to see decomposed further. Four concurrent tracks introduce execution complexity, and the milestone acceptance criteria would benefit from tighter, measurable definitions. We also encourage the team to articulate how the neutrality and long-term governance of the DeFi Kernel standard will be maintained once this funding ends. We expect Minswap Labs, as budget administrator, to disburse against verified milestones and to make progress and spending publicly verifiable.

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES on this governance action. We look forward to the registry, the SDK and the two protocols reaching mainnet, and we encourage the team to publish milestone evidence and KPI results as they are delivered. We will consider that reporting, and the clarity of the standard's long-term governance, when assessing any future request from this team.

    ---

    > **_NOTE on 'Internal Voting':_**

    > The fields _constitutional_ and _unconstitutional_ below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are _for_ or _against_ the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well.

  • No109.5K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain0 ₳Rationale

    本提案が目指す方向性や、Cardano DeFiの相互運用性向上を目指す取り組みには一定の価値があると考えます。しかし、現時点では提案内容を踏まえて賛成または反対のいずれかを判断するだけの確信を持つことができません。そのため、本提案については棄権します。\n\nI recognize the potential value of this proposal and its goal of improving interoperability within the Cardano DeFi ecosystem. However, based on the proposal as presented, I do not have sufficient confidence at this time to vote either Yes or No. Therefore, I abstain on this proposal.

  • Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
  • Yes614.1K ₳Rationale

    Vote Yes on Dano Finance DeFi Kernel. Funds public registry SDK and two protocols proving global orderbook standard. Team #1 in TVL on Cardano today. Registry and SDK are public goods. Scope is broad but value is strong at 3.3 million ADA.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    I am voting Yes on this proposal. The DeFi Kernel addresses a genuine structural gap in Cardano DeFi and Dano Finance is a credible team with demonstrated track record. The registry and SDK work packages are clear public goods that justify the ask on their own. The Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options protocols serve as both commercial products and reference implementations that prove the standard works in production.

    I acknowledge the scope is broad and the commercial terms for the protocols are weaker than ideal. The 5 percent fee return to Treasury is modest and there is no named security auditor yet. However the overall value proposition is strong and the risks are manageable at 3.3 million ADA. I particularly support this proposal because the DeFi Kernel vision aligns with my belief that Cardano's eUTxO model can host financial infrastructure that exceeds what is possible on account model chains.

    I will be watching execution closely. If milestones slip or KPIs are missed I will factor that into future votes on follow on funding. For now the team has earned the benefit of the doubt based on their existing operations and the clear public value of the registry and SDK.

  • No32M ₳Rationale

    While the DeFi Kernel registry and SDK provide public‑good value, the majority of this 3.33M ADA request funds new proprietary protocols (Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options). This mixes ecosystem standards with product development, and the expected outcomes depend heavily on market adoption, making the value‑for‑money case uncertain. Given the scale of the budget, limited public‑good proportion, and risk profile, I vote No.

  • Abstain347.8M ₳No rationale
  • No3.7M ₳Rationale

    I agree with others that have well written rational that this proposals bundles a public good, which should be treasury funded, with 2 commercial products for Danogo which would be built upon the public good. Those products while potentially valuable should be financed with risk based money, not public money.

    I suggest to the team splitting these apart and submitting the public good only for treasury funding.

    Note: I will be specifically looking for included padding in such a proposal or hidden funding for the commercial product. Such behavior would cause me to vote no on such a proposal and prejudice any future funding requests from Danogo.

  • No102.1K ₳Rationale

    Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

    Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

    My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

    In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

    At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

    Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

    Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

    This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

    Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

    • Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
    • Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
    • Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
    • Lack of credible execution capacity;
    • Structural governance or transparency concerns;
    • Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

    Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

    This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

    Governance Action Review Report

    1. Introduction

    This governance action requests a total Treasury withdrawal of ₳3,333,000 for Dano Finance, consisting of ₳3,300,000 for delivery and ₳33,000 for the 1% budget administration fee payable to Minswap Labs.

    The proposal seeks to develop the DeFi Kernel as an open standard for shared liquidity, financial-intent discovery, contract metadata, and composable execution across Cardano DeFi applications. Delivery is divided into four work packages: a public DeFi Kernel registry and submission process, a Spot Leverage Order Book, an American Options Market-Making protocol, and a Composable DeFi Transaction Builder SDK.

    The work packages include testnet and mainnet deployments, documentation, integration support, security reviews or audits, public reporting, and adoption monitoring. The principal quantitative targets include US$1 million in rolling 30-day volume for each protocol within 90 days of mainnet launch, with stretch targets between US$3 million and US$5 million within 180 days. The proposal also establishes non-disbursement or repayment conditions for unused or unearned funds and the return of 5% of protocol fees for 12 months after mainnet launch.

    2. Governance Action Analysis

    Positive aspects

    Cardano DeFi’s fragmented liquidity and low volume are real, longstanding, and unresolved problems. There is merit in the intention to develop a common layer for coordination, discovery, and composition among different DeFi applications. In theory, a public registry, common metadata standards, and a shared SDK could reduce integration difficulties among protocols, wallets, bots, and indexers.

    The proposal presents KPIs with quantitative targets and defined deadlines, which is a relevant quality. The Spot Leverage Order Book targets at least US$1 million in rolling 30-day volume within 90 days of mainnet launch. The American Options protocol establishes the same target for rolling 30-day notional volume. Stretch targets range from US$3 million to US$5 million within 180 days. The SDK must achieve at least one external integration started or completed.

    These indicators are measurable and superior to the complete absence of targets found in many other proposals. The requirements for security review or audit before mainnet deployment are also positive, particularly because the leverage and options protocols involve complex financial operations.

    The proposal includes milestones, external budget administration, public reporting, conditions for non-disbursement or repayment of unused funds, and a mechanism returning 5% of protocol fees generated by the funded contracts for 12 months after mainnet launch. This return mechanism is better than the complete absence of an economic return.

    Negative aspects

    This type of promise must be evaluated against the ecosystem’s previous investments. Over several years, mainly through Project Catalyst, eight-figure dollar amounts were allocated to proposals and teams developing Cardano DeFi applications and infrastructure. Numerous protocols were funded using different models, products, and technical approaches.

    Despite this significant allocation of resources, many projects ceased to exist, ended operations, or lost relevance for different reasons. Even among the projects that remained active, none produced a structural transformation capable of making Cardano competitive in liquidity and volume with the leading smart-contract blockchains or became a decisive factor in attracting significant liquidity providers from other ecosystems.

    Cardano DeFi’s low liquidity and volume remain chronic problems despite all the capital already directed to the sector. This does not mean that every new DeFi initiative should be rejected, but the burden of proof must be significantly higher. Several previous proposals were presented as innovative, technically promising, or capable of transforming the ecosystem. Many also had qualified teams, convincing narratives, and adoption expectations. Nevertheless, their aggregate results remained far below what would have been required to structurally change Cardano DeFi.

    It is therefore not prudent to repeat the same funding patterns based mainly on intention, conceptual innovation, or expectations of future impact. The proposal identifies a legitimate problem and presents a potentially useful approach to reducing fragmentation, but it is not the first innovative Cardano DeFi solution proposed and funded by the ecosystem. After the accumulated history, demonstrating that a solution could work is insufficient. Stronger evidence of demand, external adoption, economic proportionality, and a realistic capacity to produce results superior to previous investments is required.

    The quantitative KPIs remain modest when compared with the size of the problem, the requested funding, and the historical level of DeFi investment. Reaching US$1 million in monthly volume may provide initial product validation, but it does not represent a structural transformation of Cardano’s liquidity or volume. Even the US$3 million to US$5 million stretch targets remain far from a transformative impact or an ecosystem inflection point.

    There is also an important distinction between the performance of products developed by Dano Finance and ecosystem-level adoption of the DeFi Kernel. The most concrete KPIs focus on Spot Leverage Order Book volume, American Options notional volume, and the SDK release. These indicators may show that the products were built and achieved some usage, but they do not necessarily demonstrate that the DeFi Kernel became a shared standard or materially reduced fragmentation among different applications.

    The target requiring at least two smart-contract packages from this proposal to be documented as DeFi Kernel-compatible primarily represents internal validation. Because the funded protocols themselves can satisfy the target, it does not constitute evidence of independent adoption. Similarly, requiring only one external integration that may be either “started or completed” sets a very low threshold and allows the KPI to be formally achieved without a functional production integration or meaningful third-party usage.

    A more convincing shared-infrastructure thesis would require stronger external-adoption targets, such as multiple independent protocols integrated, wallets and indexers using the SDK in production, third-party contracts voluntarily registered, and volume or transactions originating from external integrations. None of these outcomes is established as a central requirement.

    The KPIs are therefore neither nonexistent nor irrelevant, but they are insufficiently convincing to justify the investment. They are more suitable for demonstrating initial validation of the team’s own products than for demonstrating a transformative impact on Cardano DeFi.

    The principal problem is the budget. The ₳3,300,000 delivery budget is divided into ₳300,000 for the DeFi Kernel registry and submission process, ₳1,000,000 for the Spot Leverage Order Book, ₳1,000,000 for the American Options protocol, and ₳1,000,000 for the Composable DeFi Transaction Builder SDK.

    This division identifies the major funding destinations but does not provide sufficient granularity to understand how the costs were calculated. The budget is separated by products or work packages but remains extremely superficial regarding the composition of the requested amounts.

    The number of people involved, FTEs, allocation periods, roles, seniority, compensation rates, estimated work duration, and person-months required for each package are not provided. There is also no clear separation of smart-contract development, frontend, backend, integration, design, management, infrastructure, documentation, support, and audit costs.

    Security costs are especially important because the two protocols involve complex leverage and options operations. Although a security review or audit is required before mainnet launch, the proposal does not disclose how much of the budget is reserved for this work, the expected scope, the number of audits, or how the costs were estimated.

    Individual values are not assigned to milestones. The deliverables for each stage can be identified, but the amount disbursed at each stage remains unknown. This prevents an understanding of the Treasury’s exposure before delivery, the amount protected if a protocol fails its audit, or the savings if a stage is cancelled.

    Three substantially different work packages receive exactly ₳1 million each. A leverage protocol, an options protocol, and an SDK have different characteristics, risks, and development requirements. No cost composition explains why all three reached the same amount. The division appears to establish ceilings for each package rather than demonstrate detailed estimates based on the work required.

    Without this information, a serious cost-benefit evaluation cannot be conducted. There is no basis for determining whether ₳1 million per work package is competitive, inflated, or even insufficient. The requested costs also cannot be compared with execution alternatives, team size, or the effective complexity of each deliverable.

    Milestones, KPIs, external administration, and conditions for non-disbursement or repayment do not eliminate this insufficiency. These mechanisms help verify whether outputs were delivered, but they do not demonstrate that the requested price is proportional. Execution accountability and cost justification are different dimensions, although proposals frequently attempt to treat them as though a milestone table possessed supernatural accounting powers.

    Risks and concerns

    The ecosystem risks repeating previous funding patterns in which substantial resources are committed to technically promising DeFi projects without sufficient evidence that their outcomes will differ materially from earlier investments.

    The modest product-level KPIs may be formally achieved without meaningful independent adoption of the DeFi Kernel. Internal compatibility and one external integration merely started do not demonstrate that a shared ecosystem standard has been established.

    The lack of budget granularity prevents verification of economic proportionality and makes it impossible to determine whether the Treasury is paying a competitive price for the work. The absence of milestone-level disbursement values also limits visibility into Treasury exposure if delivery is cancelled, blocked by security issues, or only partially completed.

    3. Vote and Rationale

    Vote: NO

    The proposal addresses a real problem, presents a potentially useful architecture, and includes quantitative KPIs that should not be ignored. However, Cardano’s history of substantial DeFi investment and limited aggregate results requires a much higher level of evidence than the proposal provides.

    The KPIs are modest and do not demonstrate potentially transformative impact. They measure mainly the delivery and initial usage of Dano Finance’s own products, while independent adoption of the DeFi Kernel remains weakly demonstrated and weakly required.

    The decisive factor is the superficial budget. The absence of FTEs, rates, duration, roles, audit costs, infrastructure costs, and milestone-level disbursement amounts prevents an understanding of how the requested values were formed and prevents an adequate evaluation of proportionality among cost, risk, and benefit.

    Approval would require stronger evidence of demand and independent adoption, more ambitious KPIs directly connected to ecosystem-level DeFi Kernel usage, and a detailed budget capable of demonstrating that the requested amounts are proportional to the work, risks, and expected outcomes.

    4. Conclusion

    Cardano has already invested substantial resources in DeFi without resolving its structural liquidity and volume problems. Technical merit, quantitative targets, and good intentions do not overcome modest external-adoption requirements, limited economic return, and an insufficiently detailed budget that prevents a responsible cost-benefit evaluation.


    Nota sobre a Metodologia de Revisão [PT]

    Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Ações de Governança de Retirada do Tesouro e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à ausência de incentivos significativos para que os DReps realizem o trabalho de análise das propostas, não é viável aplicar integralmente meu framework padrão de revisão e meu template de relatório a todas as propostas.

    Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Ação de Governança. Durante esse processo, pesquiso a proposta, reviso os materiais de apoio, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema e avalio tanto os argumentos positivos quanto os negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e melhorar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e compreensão contextual.

    Além disso, esse trabalho não termina com o voto em si. Ele também envolve a redação e publicação de justificativas, a preparação de relatórios ou resumos, a comunicação pública do raciocínio e a divulgação da análise por meio de canais públicos e redes sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser revisadas em um período curto.

    Atualmente, esse trabalho não oferece um incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas um incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo ao tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de remuneração ou apoio institucional.

    Como tenho um padrão claro para meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, reduzirei o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de apressar decisões ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma due diligence focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

    Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará na identificação de riscos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Em termos práticos, isso significa direcionar minha pesquisa para as lacunas mais críticas que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco grave desse tipo for identificado, poderei utilizá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

    Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com lacunas claras e materiais provavelmente exigiriam reformulação de qualquer maneira, portanto votar contra elas quando essas lacunas forem significativas pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar a capacidade de revisão enquanto se mantém um nível mínimo de due diligence.

    Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, entre outros:

    • Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
    • Atrasos significativos não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
    • Problemas relevantes de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
    • Ausência de capacidade de execução confiável;
    • Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
    • Riscos orçamentários ou de coordenação graves.

    Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais aprofundada e nenhuma red flag significativa ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

    Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade das propostas não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais restrito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve um nível mínimo de due diligence, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

    Relatório de Revisão da Ação de Governança

    1. Introdução

    Esta ação de governança solicita uma retirada total de ₳3.333.000 do Tesouro para a Dano Finance, composta por ₳3.300.000 para execução e ₳33.000 referentes à taxa de 1% de administração orçamentária destinada à Minswap Labs.

    A proposta busca desenvolver o DeFi Kernel como um padrão aberto para liquidez compartilhada, descoberta de intenções financeiras, metadata de contratos e execução composável entre aplicações DeFi da Cardano. A execução está dividida em quatro pacotes de trabalho: um registro público e processo de submissão do DeFi Kernel, um Spot Leverage Order Book, um protocolo de American Options Market-Making e um Composable DeFi Transaction Builder SDK.

    Os pacotes de trabalho incluem implementações em testnet e mainnet, documentação, suporte a integrações, revisões de segurança ou auditorias, relatórios públicos e monitoramento da adoção. Os principais alvos quantitativos incluem US$1 milhão em volume móvel de 30 dias para cada protocolo dentro de 90 dias após o lançamento em mainnet, com metas estendidas entre US$3 milhões e US$5 milhões dentro de 180 dias. A proposta também estabelece condições de não desembolso ou devolução de recursos não utilizados ou não adquiridos e o retorno de 5% das taxas dos protocolos durante 12 meses após o lançamento em mainnet.

    2. Análise da Ação de Governança

    Aspectos positivos

    A fragmentação da liquidez e o baixo volume do ecossistema DeFi da Cardano são problemas reais, antigos e ainda não resolvidos. Existe mérito na intenção de desenvolver uma camada comum de coordenação, descoberta e composição entre diferentes aplicações DeFi. Em tese, um registro público, padrões comuns de metadata e um SDK compartilhado poderiam reduzir as dificuldades de integração entre protocolos, wallets, bots e indexadores.

    A proposta apresenta KPIs com alvos quantitativos e prazos definidos, o que é uma qualidade relevante. O Spot Leverage Order Book tem como meta alcançar pelo menos US$1 milhão em volume móvel de 30 dias dentro de 90 dias após o lançamento em mainnet. O protocolo de American Options estabelece a mesma meta para o volume nocional móvel de 30 dias. As metas estendidas variam entre US$3 milhões e US$5 milhões dentro de 180 dias. O SDK deve alcançar pelo menos uma integração externa iniciada ou concluída.

    Esses indicadores são mensuráveis e superiores à ausência completa de metas encontrada em muitas outras propostas. As exigências de revisão de segurança ou auditoria antes da implementação em mainnet também são positivas, especialmente porque os protocolos de leverage e opções envolvem operações financeiras complexas.

    A proposta inclui milestones, administração orçamentária externa, relatórios públicos, condições para não desembolso ou devolução de recursos não utilizados e um mecanismo de retorno de 5% das taxas dos protocolos geradas pelos contratos financiados durante 12 meses após o lançamento em mainnet. Esse mecanismo de retorno é melhor do que a ausência completa de retorno econômico.

    Aspectos negativos

    Esse tipo de promessa precisa ser avaliado diante dos investimentos anteriores do ecossistema. Ao longo de vários anos, principalmente por meio do Project Catalyst, valores de oito dígitos em dólares foram destinados a propostas e equipes voltadas ao desenvolvimento de aplicações e infraestrutura DeFi na Cardano. Diversos protocolos foram financiados utilizando diferentes modelos, produtos e abordagens técnicas.

    Apesar dessa alocação significativa de recursos, muitos projetos deixaram de existir, encerraram suas operações ou perderam relevância por diferentes razões. Mesmo entre os projetos que permaneceram ativos, nenhum produziu uma transformação estrutural capaz de tornar a Cardano competitiva em liquidez e volume com as principais blockchains de smart contracts ou se tornou um fator decisivo para atrair provedores de liquidez relevantes de outros ecossistemas.

    A baixa liquidez e o baixo volume do DeFi da Cardano continuam sendo problemas crônicos, apesar de todo o capital já direcionado ao setor. Isso não significa que toda nova iniciativa DeFi deva ser rejeitada, mas o ônus da prova precisa ser significativamente maior. Diversas propostas anteriores foram apresentadas como inovadoras, tecnicamente promissoras ou capazes de transformar o ecossistema. Muitas também possuíam equipes qualificadas, narrativas convincentes e expectativas de adoção. Ainda assim, seus resultados agregados permaneceram muito abaixo do que seria necessário para alterar estruturalmente o DeFi da Cardano.

    Portanto, não é prudente repetir os mesmos padrões de financiamento com base principalmente em intenção, inovação conceitual ou expectativas de impacto futuro. A proposta identifica um problema legítimo e apresenta uma abordagem potencialmente útil para reduzir a fragmentação, mas não é a primeira solução inovadora para o DeFi da Cardano proposta e financiada pelo ecossistema. Depois do histórico acumulado, demonstrar que uma solução poderia funcionar é insuficiente. São necessárias evidências mais fortes de demanda, adoção externa, proporcionalidade econômica e capacidade realista de produzir resultados superiores aos investimentos anteriores.

    Os KPIs quantitativos permanecem modestos quando comparados ao tamanho do problema, ao financiamento solicitado e ao nível histórico de investimento em DeFi. Alcançar US$1 milhão em volume mensal pode proporcionar uma validação inicial do produto, mas não representa uma transformação estrutural da liquidez ou do volume da Cardano. Mesmo as metas estendidas de US$3 milhões a US$5 milhões permanecem distantes de um impacto transformador ou de um ponto de inflexão para o ecossistema.

    Também existe uma distinção importante entre o desempenho dos produtos desenvolvidos pela Dano Finance e a adoção do DeFi Kernel no nível do ecossistema. Os KPIs mais concretos estão concentrados no volume do Spot Leverage Order Book, no volume nocional do American Options e no lançamento do SDK. Esses indicadores podem demonstrar que os produtos foram construídos e alcançaram alguma utilização, mas não demonstram necessariamente que o DeFi Kernel se tornou um padrão compartilhado ou reduziu materialmente a fragmentação entre diferentes aplicações.

    A meta que exige que pelo menos dois pacotes de smart contracts desta proposta sejam documentados como compatíveis com o DeFi Kernel representa principalmente uma validação interna. Como os próprios protocolos financiados podem cumprir a meta, ela não constitui evidência de adoção independente. Da mesma forma, exigir apenas uma integração externa que possa estar “iniciada ou concluída” estabelece um limite muito baixo e permite que o KPI seja formalmente atingido sem uma integração funcional em produção ou uma utilização significativa por terceiros.

    Uma tese mais convincente de infraestrutura compartilhada exigiria alvos mais fortes de adoção externa, como a integração de múltiplos protocolos independentes, wallets e indexadores utilizando o SDK em produção, contratos de terceiros registrados voluntariamente e volume ou transações originadas de integrações externas. Nenhum desses resultados é estabelecido como um requisito central.

    Portanto, os KPIs não são inexistentes nem irrelevantes, mas são insuficientemente convincentes para justificar o investimento. Eles são mais adequados para demonstrar a validação inicial dos produtos da própria equipe do que para demonstrar um impacto transformador sobre o DeFi da Cardano.

    O principal problema é o orçamento. O orçamento de execução de ₳3.300.000 é dividido em ₳300.000 para o registro e processo de submissão do DeFi Kernel, ₳1.000.000 para o Spot Leverage Order Book, ₳1.000.000 para o protocolo de American Options e ₳1.000.000 para o Composable DeFi Transaction Builder SDK.

    Essa divisão identifica os principais destinos do financiamento, mas não oferece granularidade suficiente para compreender como os custos foram calculados. O orçamento é separado por produtos ou pacotes de trabalho, mas permanece extremamente superficial quanto à composição dos valores solicitados.

    Não são informados o número de pessoas envolvidas, os FTEs, os períodos de alocação, as funções, a senioridade, as taxas de remuneração, a duração estimada do trabalho e a quantidade de person-months necessária para cada pacote. Também não há uma separação clara dos custos de desenvolvimento de smart contracts, frontend, backend, integração, design, gestão, infraestrutura, documentação, suporte e auditoria.

    Os custos de segurança são especialmente importantes porque os dois protocolos envolvem operações complexas de leverage e opções. Embora seja exigida uma revisão de segurança ou auditoria antes do lançamento em mainnet, a proposta não informa quanto do orçamento está reservado para esse trabalho, o escopo esperado, o número de auditorias ou como os custos foram estimados.

    Não são atribuídos valores individuais aos milestones. Os entregáveis de cada etapa podem ser identificados, mas o valor desembolsado em cada etapa permanece desconhecido. Isso impede a compreensão da exposição do Tesouro antes da entrega, do valor protegido caso um protocolo não passe pela auditoria ou da economia obtida caso uma etapa seja cancelada.

    Três pacotes de trabalho substancialmente diferentes recebem exatamente ₳1 milhão cada. Um protocolo de leverage, um protocolo de opções e um SDK possuem características, riscos e necessidades de desenvolvimento diferentes. Nenhuma composição de custos explica por que os três chegaram ao mesmo valor. A divisão parece estabelecer tetos para cada pacote, em vez de demonstrar estimativas detalhadas baseadas no trabalho necessário.

    Sem essas informações, não é possível realizar uma avaliação séria de custo-benefício. Não há base para determinar se ₳1 milhão por pacote de trabalho é um valor competitivo, inflado ou até mesmo insuficiente. Os custos solicitados também não podem ser comparados com alternativas de execução, com o tamanho da equipe ou com a complexidade efetiva de cada entregável.

    Milestones, KPIs, administração externa e condições para não desembolso ou devolução não eliminam essa insuficiência. Esses mecanismos ajudam a verificar se os outputs foram entregues, mas não demonstram que o preço solicitado é proporcional. Accountability de execução e justificativa de custo são dimensões diferentes, embora propostas frequentemente tentem tratá-las como se uma tabela de milestones possuísse poderes contábeis sobrenaturais.

    Riscos e preocupações

    O ecossistema corre o risco de repetir padrões anteriores de financiamento, nos quais recursos substanciais são comprometidos com projetos DeFi tecnicamente promissores sem evidências suficientes de que seus resultados serão materialmente diferentes dos investimentos anteriores.

    Os modestos KPIs no nível dos produtos podem ser formalmente atingidos sem uma adoção independente significativa do DeFi Kernel. A compatibilidade interna e uma única integração externa apenas iniciada não demonstram que um padrão compartilhado para o ecossistema foi estabelecido.

    A falta de granularidade orçamentária impede a verificação da proporcionalidade econômica e torna impossível determinar se o Tesouro está pagando um preço competitivo pelo trabalho. A ausência de valores de desembolso por milestone também limita a visibilidade sobre a exposição do Tesouro caso a execução seja cancelada, bloqueada por problemas de segurança ou concluída apenas parcialmente.

    3. Voto e Justificativa

    Voto: NÃO

    A proposta aborda um problema real, apresenta uma arquitetura potencialmente útil e inclui KPIs quantitativos que não devem ser ignorados. Entretanto, o histórico da Cardano de investimentos substanciais em DeFi e resultados agregados limitados exige um nível de comprovação muito superior ao apresentado pela proposta.

    Os KPIs são modestos e não demonstram um impacto potencialmente transformador. Eles medem principalmente a entrega e a utilização inicial dos produtos da própria Dano Finance, enquanto a adoção independente do DeFi Kernel permanece pouco demonstrada e pouco exigida.

    O fator decisivo é a superficialidade do orçamento. A ausência de FTEs, taxas, duração, funções, custos de auditoria, custos de infraestrutura e valores de desembolso por milestone impede a compreensão de como os valores solicitados foram formados e impede uma avaliação adequada da proporcionalidade entre custo, risco e benefício.

    A aprovação exigiria evidências mais fortes de demanda e adoção independente, KPIs mais ambiciosos e diretamente relacionados à utilização do DeFi Kernel no nível do ecossistema e um orçamento detalhado capaz de demonstrar que os valores solicitados são proporcionais ao trabalho, aos riscos e aos resultados esperados.

    4. Conclusão

    A Cardano já investiu recursos substanciais em DeFi sem resolver seus problemas estruturais de liquidez e volume. Mérito técnico, metas quantitativas e boas intenções não superam requisitos modestos de adoção externa, retorno econômico limitado e um orçamento insuficientemente detalhado que impede uma avaliação responsável de custo-benefício.

  • No63.3K ₳No rationale
  • No29.1M ₳Rationale

    I do not believe this is the right use of Treasury funds at the current stage of the ecosystem, especially given the current price of ADA. I will vote NO.

  • No960.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes202.9K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain170.3M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain1.2M ₳Rationale

    I vote ABSTAIN on "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction." The DeFi Kernel registry and reusable SDK could improve Cardano DeFi discoverability and composability, and Dano Finance has relevant delivery experience. However, most of the 3,333,000 ADA request funds two Dano commercial products, while independent adoption commitments, detailed cost breakdowns, and a proportionate, enforceable Treasury return remain insufficient. I would support a revised, separately assessable proposal for neutral registry and SDK infrastructure with external integration evidence and stronger milestone-gated accountability.

  • No1M ₳No rationale
  • No57.9K ₳No rationale
  • No146.3K ₳Rationale

    I vote no because I consider a 5% return over 12 months insufficient. I would vote yes with a 5% return until the financing is fully repaid to the treasury. I would support this proposal as presented.

  • No120.1M ₳Rationale

    SIPO DRep votes NO on the treasury withdrawal "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" (3,333,000 ada), and invites a narrower resubmission.

    This is a vote against the structure of the request, not against the team. Dano Finance has a real delivery record on Cardano - the Danogo protocol since 2023, the daken and stdlib Aiken libraries, and continuing public development. The proposal came through the Intersect Budget 2026 process, its scope was reduced from that version, and its accountability design is sound: milestone gating, security review before mainnet, unused funds returned, Minswap Labs as budget administrator, and 5% of protocol fees returned to the Treasury for twelve months. SIPO records all of this as creditable.

    SIPO's objection is that the public-good case and the proposer's own product build are bundled into a single, non-separable request. Of the 3,300,000 ada delivery budget, 300,000 funds the DeFi Kernel registry and 1,000,000 funds the SDK - the components that serve the whole ecosystem. The remaining 2,000,000, roughly 61%, funds two new standalone protocols belonging to the proposer: a Spot Leverage Order Book and an American Options market-making protocol. A proposal whose stated purpose is to reduce fragmentation devotes most of its budget to adding two more venues, and DReps cannot approve the shared infrastructure without also funding the proposer's product line.

    Two further points bear on the ecosystem case. The DeFi Kernel's three rules - permissionless, composable, discoverable - restate CIP-0089, Distributed DApps and Beacon Tokens, which is already an active CIP; four of the eight contracts currently in the registry are that CIP author's own reference implementations. Building a registry and an SDK on top of CIP-89 is legitimate and useful work, but it should be presented as that rather than as a new standard. And the first rule, requiring that no batcher be involved, structurally excludes the batcher-based automated market makers that hold most of Cardano's DeFi liquidity today, which limits how much fragmentation this standard can actually resolve. Separately, the American Options work package overlaps cardano-options, an existing CIP-89 options protocol that the proposal's own registry lists.

    Adoption evidence is thin. The registry repository has received no commits since 8 April 2026 and has no forks, no pull requests, no issues, and no external submission; the website loads that same static file set. Fund control is the weakest class among the withdrawals before DReps this epoch: the on-chain recipient is a single key credential at stake1u9h9w7ssk3zne7mchccz8kugsncn2muhx2p2v26s9gysyqquxfv3z, not a script, and not a milestone-gated treasury contract.

    SIPO would support a resubmission limited to the registry and the SDK - the components that are genuinely shared infrastructure - paid to a script-controlled recipient and accompanied by evidence of adoption, meaning independent protocols that have actually submitted to the registry rather than been listed in it. A shared SDK for CIP-89-style contracts is a real gap in Cardano's tooling and is worth funding on its own terms. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.


    SIPO DRep は、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction」(3,333,000 ADA)に反対(NO)を投じ、範囲を絞った再提出を促します。

    これは要求の構造に対する反対であり、チームに対する反対ではありません。Dano Finance は Cardano における実績を持つ開発体です。2023 年からの Danogo プロトコル、Aiken ライブラリ daken および stdlib、そして継続的な公開開発があります。本提案は Intersect Budget 2026 プロセスを経ており、その版から範囲が縮小されています。アカウンタビリティ設計も健全です。マイルストーンゲート、メインネット前のセキュリティレビュー、未使用資金の返還、予算管理者としての Minswap Labs、そしてプロトコル手数料の 5% を 12 ヶ月間 国庫へ還流させる設計。SIPO はこれらをいずれも評価すべき点として記録します。

    SIPO の反対理由は、公共財としての論拠と提案者自身のプロダクト開発が、分離不能な一つの要求に束ねられている点にあります。3,300,000 ADA の実施予算のうち、DeFi Kernel レジストリが 300,000 ADA、SDK が 1,000,000 ADA で、これらがエコシステム全体に資する部分です。残る 2,000,000 ADA、約 61% は、提案者に帰属する新規の独立プロトコル 2 本、すなわち Spot Leverage Order Book と American Options のマーケットメイキングプロトコルに充てられます。断片化の解消を目的として掲げる提案が、予算の大半を新たな取引の場を 2 つ増やすことに充てており、DRep は提案者のプロダクトラインを同時に資金供与することなしに共通インフラだけを承認することができません。

    エコシステム上の論拠について、さらに 2 点あります。DeFi Kernel の 3 ルール(パーミッションレス、コンポーザブル、ディスカバラブル)は、既に有効な CIP である CIP-0089「Distributed DApps & Beacon Tokens」を言い換えたものです。現在レジストリに掲載されている 8 件の contract のうち 4 件は、その CIP 作者自身の参照実装です。CIP-89 の上にレジストリと SDK を構築すること自体は正当かつ有用な仕事ですが、新しい標準としてではなく、そのようなものとして提示されるべきです。また第一のルールであるバッチャー不要という要件は、現在 Cardano の DeFi 流動性の大半を保持しているバッチャー方式の AMM を構造上除外します。これは本標準が実際に解消し得る断片化の範囲を限定します。加えて American Options のワークパッケージは、本提案自身のレジストリが掲載している既存の CIP-89 オプションプロトコル cardano-options と重複します。

    採用の実証も乏しい状況です。レジストリのリポジトリは 2026 年 4 月 8 日以降 commit がなく、fork も pull request も issue も外部からの提出もありません。ウェブサイトは同じ静的ファイル群を読み込んでいるだけです。資金統制は、本エポックで DRep の前にある引き出しの中で最も弱い類型です。オンチェーン受領先は script ではなく単一鍵の credential(stake1u9h9w7ssk3zne7mchccz8kugsncn2muhx2p2v26s9gysyqquxfv3z)であり、マイルストーンゲートを備えた treasury contract でもありません。

    SIPO は、真に共通インフラである レジストリと SDK に限定した再提出であれば支持します。その際は script 統制下の受領先とし、採用の実証、すなわちレジストリに掲載されただけでなく実際に自ら提出した独立プロトコルの存在を伴うことを求めます。CIP-89 型の contract に対する共通 SDK は Cardano のツーリングにおける実在のギャップであり、それ単独で資金供与に値します。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。

  • No4.5M ₳No rationale
  • No6.6M ₳No rationale
  • No21.5M ₳No rationale
  • No394.8K ₳No rationale
  • No1.1M ₳No rationale
  • No2.8M ₳No rationale
  • Yes204.2K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain1.6M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain10.7M ₳Rationale

    Agreed. I’d frame it as a constructive ABSTAIN, not a rejection of the idea.

    Draft rationale:

    RCADA votes ABSTAIN on Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction.

    This is a constructive abstention.

    RCADA supports the proposal’s overall goal of improving Cardano DeFi composability, liquidity discovery, and transaction coordination. Cardano DeFi remains fragmented across separate protocols, contract formats, datum and redeemer schemas, discovery methods, and integration paths. A shared registry, clearer contract metadata, and reusable transaction-building tools could help wallets, bots, indexers, dApps, and protocols integrate with each other more easily.

    RCADA sees particular value in the DeFi Kernel registry and the idea of publishing script hashes, datum and redeemer schemas, integration instructions, discovery mechanisms, audit or security status, and other metadata in a public, fee-free, royalty-free format. This kind of shared infrastructure could reduce duplicated integration work and make Cardano DeFi easier to build on.

    RCADA also recognises that Dano Finance has practical experience in Cardano DeFi. The proposal states that Dano Finance has approximately $18 million in TVL and more than 10,000 on-chain transactions, and the team’s experience across lending, concentrated liquidity, oracle aggregation, borrowing, and composable transaction flows is relevant to the proposed work.

    However, RCADA is not comfortable voting YES on the proposal in its current form because the public-good boundary is not clear enough. Only 300,000 ADA is allocated to the DeFi Kernel registry and submission process, while 3,000,000 ADA is allocated to a transaction-builder SDK and two new DeFi protocol primitives: a Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options Market-Making Pools. These may become useful for Cardano, but they are also closely connected to Dano Finance’s own product expansion.

    RCADA is cautious about using the Cardano Treasury to fund product-specific DeFi development where the benefits, risks, and future value capture are not clearly separated from the proposing team’s own commercial or protocol interests. Leveraged trading and options markets are high-risk DeFi primitives. They introduce smart-contract risk, oracle and pricing risk, liquidation risk, liquidity risk, market-risk complexity, user-protection concerns, and potential reputational risk if users misunderstand the products or if risk controls fail.

    RCADA also has concerns about standard-capture risk. The DeFi Kernel may be valuable as an open standard, but an ecosystem standard should be governed neutrally and should not become primarily a pathway for one protocol builder’s own products to receive Treasury-funded development support. The registry, metadata standard, SDK, and compatibility process should be clearly independent, transparent, and open to all builders on equal terms.

    The proposal includes positive accountability features, including Minswap Labs as budget administrator, milestone-based work packages, security review or audit before mainnet deployment, public reporting, KPIs, non-disbursement or return of unused funds, and a commitment to return 5% of protocol fees from the Treasury-funded Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options contracts for 12 months after launch. RCADA views these as helpful safeguards.

    Even so, those safeguards do not fully resolve the concern that the Treasury is being asked to fund a package that combines neutral ecosystem infrastructure with protocol-specific DeFi products. The proposed 5% fee return for 12 months is positive, but it does not by itself make the funding model feel sufficiently aligned with the scale of Treasury support requested for product-level risk.

    RCADA would be more comfortable supporting a future version that more clearly separates the public-good components from the product-specific components. A stronger proposal could focus on the DeFi Kernel registry, schema standards, documentation, neutral governance, open-source SDK, reference adapters, integration support, and independent audit standards, while leaving Dano-specific leverage and options products to be funded separately through protocol revenue, private capital, user incentives, or a more clearly separated commercial-risk proposal.

    On balance, RCADA abstains because the proposal contains useful ideas and potentially valuable infrastructure, but the current structure does not provide enough separation between open ecosystem standards and Dano Finance’s own DeFi product development. RCADA encourages the team to continue developing the DeFi Kernel concept and to return with a clearer public-good proposal that better isolates shared infrastructure from protocol-specific product funding.

    RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here:
    https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/

  • No275.3K ₳Rationale

    I am voting NO on “Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction.” The proposal identifies a genuine problem: Cardano DeFi remains fragmented, with liquidity, metadata, and integration paths split across multiple protocols, which creates friction for users, wallets, bots, and integrators. The DeFi Kernel concept, together with a public registry, SDK, and concrete protocol implementations, is a thoughtful attempt to address that gap by standardizing how DeFi contracts publish financial intent, expose schemas, and become discoverable across the ecosystem.

    I also acknowledge that the team behind Dano Finance appears well suited to deliver what they are proposing. They report meaningful TVL and on-chain activity, and have already built lending, concentrated liquidity, oracle aggregation, and composable transaction flows on Cardano, which are directly relevant to the leveraged spot and options primitives in this proposal. The structure of the request is generally sound: work is divided into four clear work packages, delivery is milestone-based, smart-contract work includes security review or audit before mainnet release, Minswap Labs acts as budget administrator, and there are explicit KPIs around deployment, trading volume, and SDK integrations.

    Nevertheless, I do not consider a global order-book standard and new leveraged trading and options protocols to be essential priorities for this Treasury cycle when set alongside other core infrastructure, security, maintenance, and continuity proposals. Fragmented liquidity and composability are important issues, but they are not the most pressing concerns to address with limited Treasury capacity in this round. In relative terms, this proposal focuses on expanding the DeFi product surface and trading complexity rather than on foundational capabilities that the broader ecosystem cannot do without.

    In addition, the approach introduces non-trivial systemic risk. If the DeFi Kernel pattern and the associated leveraged and options protocols become widely adopted as coordination mechanisms across Cardano DeFi, any serious design or implementation flaw could affect multiple integrated applications at once rather than being contained within a single protocol. That kind of cross‑protocol coupling deserves careful consideration and, in my view, is better explored after more of the core infrastructural priorities are secured.

    For these reasons, while the idea and team have merit, I do not believe this is the right proposal to fund in this budget cycle, and I am voting NO.

  • No940.4K ₳No rationale