8Ball

Rationale for voting No to Cardano GovTool Budget - 12 months full active maintenance and development

1. Past Performance
   Govtool's past performance does not justify renewed funding. While the team has responded to community feedback, the changes are not clear or proportionate to the size of the request.

2. Insufficient Cost Transparency
   The requested budget, particularly for node and indexer operations, seems high without a clear and detailed breakdown. More financial clarity is needed to assess value for money.

3. Unclear Funding Channels
   As a platform developed under Intersect, GovTool should be financed through Intersect’s Treasury budget, not a seperate Treasury Withdrawal.

4. Low Adoption and Preference
   GovTool is not the voting interface for many in the community. Funding should follow demonstrated usage and demand—not precede it. Other options replacing govtool look attractive.

I voted NO to Intersect’s approach to coordinating and funding these projects, there are many initiatives lacking sufficient support for treasury withdrawal approval. Many proposals are more suitable for other means of funding. Also the proposed total funding exceeds a prudent target of 200 million ADA, as outlined in my prior governance action rationales. I woulld like to see a comprehensive review of the emergent budget process to develop a streamlined, efficient method that better supports Cardano’s treasury withdrawal proactices.

I vote YES on this governance action, which consolidates community-driven projects that enhance Cardano’s development and application ecosystem. The proposal’s focus on high-value projects distinguish it from the Intersect 275M ADA budget, which I oppose due to its inclusion of less compelling proposals. Ideally, the Intersect budget info action would have preceded this vote to avoid confusing voters.
I commend the community builder's grass-roots approach.
I will be looking for the proposal to foster individual treasury withdrawal actions, each subject to on-chain DRep voting for each project.

I support the 300M ADA NCL for 2025-2026 to enforce fiscal discipline, restricting the current 350M NCL and aligning more closely with treasury inflows and my preference for a 200M NCL.
This ceiling, covering 2025 and much of 2026, ensures development continuity while pressuring Treasury Withdrawal actions to further justify their proposals and amounts asked. My Eckklesia Budget Poll choices (~196M ADA) will reflect my voting on Treasury Withdrawals going forward, omnibus bills will be voted down.

Fully support the idea of cost effective alternate nodes produced by competent teams in the Cardano blockchain ecosystem.
I vote yes.

The current immaturity and inconsistency of the voting process reinforce my commitment to fiscal conservatism. During the current Eckklesia Budget Poll, I supported proposals totaling approximately 196 million ada, which aligns with a more restrained spending approach.
Setting a lower Net Change Limit (NCL) creates greater accountability and incentivizes proposers to deliver transparent bids. It also reinforces community oversight and discourages poorly justified allocations.
The argument that the NCL is "just a limit" and can be set higher is not persuasive. Accepting this reasoning opens the door to arbitrary increases, including the full use of the 350 million ada cap. This concern has already materialized in a plan to submit budgets that aim to use the entire 350 million ada.
I voted No on the 2025 NCL of 350M ada, and while I voted Yes on the 2025–2026 NCL of 300M ada, this was done while expressing a preference for a lower limit of 200 million ada.
I now cast a clear Yes vote for a 2025 NCL of 200 million ada, consistent with my belief in responsible treasury management.

Rationale for Voting No on the 2025 NCL Info Action Proposal

1. Constitutionality of Threshold
   The proposal sets a "50+1 lovelace%" threshold for approval, while TREASURY-01a specifies "a threshold of greater than 50%" If the 50% threshold is intrinsic to the guardrail, this slight deviation could render the infoAction unconstitutional. Still, I acknowledge a vote greater than 50% is needed to agree on an NCL.

2. Supporting a 67% Threshold
   I support a 67% DRep ratification threshold for the NCL to bolster governance rigor, ensuring stronger consensus on treasury withdrawals. This aligns with community input noted in the proposal. Though TREASURY-01a sets >50%, a threshold of 67% strengthens trust in treasury withdrawal decisions.

3. Budget Period and Timeline Misalignment
   With Q1 2025 gone, the 350 million ada NCL for a full year risks covering undeclared back payments for past work, which I oppose. The NCL should align with the remaining 2025 timeline to ensure accurate funding allocation.

4. Urgent Need for a 2025 Budget
   A budget ceiling is needed to limit 2025 roadmap withdrawals, but a competing infoAction I expect to pass reduces this urgency, reducing the need for this 350 million ada proposal.

5. NCL Value and Budget Prudence
   The 350 million ada NCL for 2025 exceeds the infoAction's base line inflow (336 million ada), leaving a deficit. I favor budgets with a surplus to ensure fiscal stability.

6. Conclusion
   I support a lower, surplus-maintaining NCL and thus vote NO.

Rationale for Voting Yes on the 2025-2026 NCL Info Action Proposal

1. Recognition of Effort
   I want to recognize the efforts of those who prepared this Info-Action under tight time constraints and with minimal precedent to guide them.
   This acknowledgment underpins my pragmatic support for the proposal, despite its shortcomings.

2. Unclear Definition of NCL Withdrawal Amount
   The Net Change Limit (NCL) is not clearly defined in either the Cardano constitution or the proposal, diverging from the community’s emerging understanding of a "net change limit".
   While this lack of clarity is significant, it does not warrant rejecting the proposal.

3. Constitutionality of Threshold
   The proposal specifies a 67% threshold of the active voting stake to pass.
   This raises a question of the constitution's guardrail TREASURY-01a intent for it leaves unclear whether the "threshold" value of 50% is an intrinsic part of the guardrail’s identity or merely part of a mechanism to establish if the NCL proposal is agreed.
   Specifically, does 'TREASURY-01a' mean an NCL requires approval by more than 50% of the active voting stake, with the threshold as a core part of the guardrail? Or does it imply the NCL must exceed a standalone threshold of at least 50%, with the proposal’s support measured against it in a separate step to confirm agreement?".
   If the constitution's 50% threshold is intrinsic to the guardrail, attempting to change the threshold to 67% could be deemed unconstitutional. However, if the guardrail is a standalone benchmark and its conditions are met the proposal is constitutional and the approval process continues. If the proposal does not garner approval exceeding the proposer's threshold of 67% the proposal cannot be agreed. I believe allowing a threshold above 50% enhances governance rigor and support proposers setting it, as they can set the voting period. However, enabling this functionality would require amending the constitution, updating ledger rules, and revising voting tools. Thus, I accept that the vote must exceed only 50% to agree an NCL.

4. Immutability of Supporting Documents
   The ability to edit supporting documents after approval poses a significant risk, potentially undermining the proposal’s integrity.
   This issue requires attention from the Constitutional Committee to enforce immutability and maintain trust in the process.

5. Multi-Year Scope Concern
   Given the current maturity of Cardano’s governance, a single-year budget scope might be more appropriate, with a new NCL proposal potentially superseding this proposal before 2026. However, the delay in finalizing the 2025 budget makes the inclusion of 250 million ada as next year's NCL advantageous. It encourages discussions for the 2026 budget process earlier.
   I would expect a new 2026 NCL limit proposal to supercede this info action but not before the end of 2025.

6. Budget Period and Timeline Misalignment
   With the 2025 first quarter past, the NCL’s full-year value of 300 million ADA raises concerns about potential back payments for prior work, which I oppose unless explicitly specified.
   The NCL should proportionally reflect the remaining timeline being funded to ensure accuracy in resource allocation.

7. Urgent Need for a 2025 Budget
   A budget ceiling is urgently needed to cap treasury withdrawals for the 2025 roadmap and budget, including work on Ouroboros Leios and ZK technologies. This limit must balance treasury stability with the demand for improved performance to keep Cardano competitive. While the proposed 300 million ada maximum is high, it’s acceptable given current budget discussions.

8. NCL Value Alignment and Budget Prudence
   The NCL values (300 million ada for 2025 and 250 million for 2026) align reasonably with projected treasury inflows over the two-year period. I prefer budgets that maintain a surplus, especially given the current volatile cryptocurrency climate. A lower NCL for 2025, around 200 million ada, would reflect the nascent state of the budget process, reinforce prudent monetary policy and mitigate the negative effect on ada price by treasury withdrawls.
   However, the pressing need for a budget decision supersedes my preference for a reduced value.

9. Percentage based limits
   Adopting percentage-based limits based on treasury inflows could enhance predictability and serve as guardrails to streamline future budget processes.

10. Conclusion
    Despite irregularities in constitutional requirements, and other concerns, the urgent need for a 2025 budget justifies overlooking these issues. While I’d favor a lower NCL value out of fiscal caution, the priority of passing a budget compels me to vote YES. The Constitutional Committee can address the issues raised here to refine governance practices.

1. Scalability: I approve that the Cardano 2025 Vision Roadmap prioritizes scalability through initiatives like Leios, Midgard, Hydra, and Peras, while also focusing on performance optimization.
2. Multi-Node: I support a decentralized ecosystem where multiple nodes compete based on merit. I trust that Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) have the expertise to effectively evaluate and oversee these implementations.
3. Bitcoin DeFi, zkProofs, and Nested Transactions: I endorse these forward-looking developments.
4. Criticisms: The absence of specific timelines for Leios, a key scaling component, leaves its implementation uncertain. The focus on Layer 2 expansion—such as AVS linked to Midnight and the introduction of Minotaur—seems premature for Cardano. Additionally, I support the SPO incentive enhancements, like min-margin and pledge-benefit curves, but they warrant more attention and a broader scope.
5. Urgency: There is a pressing need to get a roadmap and budget in place for 2025

Despite reservations, the roadmap’s emphasis on scalability, multi-node development, and zkProofs justifies my support with a yes vote.

1. Exercise Your Right to Vote:

   The proposal for changing the taxation parameter from 20% to 10% is an important governance issue that directly impacts the ecosystem. Voting on this matter is not only a responsibility but also an opportunity to exercise our right to influence the taxation structure in Cardano.

2. Impact on Pool Decentralization:

   My primary concern with reducing the taxation to 10% is that it disproportionately benefits multiple pools over single pools. The larger multiple pools would receive a larger share of the returns, which undermines the goal of decentralization. A reduction in the tax rate would make it easier for multi-pool SPOs (Stake Pool Operators) to further consolidate staking power and rewards, rather than encouraging the distribution of rewards among a wider variety of smaller pools. I believe we should prioritize the strengthening of decentralization by supporting the smaller pools, and only vary the taxation parameter in conjunction with other stake pool decentralization parameters.

3. Constitutional Constraints:

   If the parameter change is accepted, the governance system will prevent any further changes to the taxation parameter for another 6 months. This significant period of inaction could leave us with a tax rate that doesn't align with the dynamic needs of the ecosystem at this time. Such a long period without the possibility of revision could be detrimental if unforeseen issues arise in the future.

4. Governance Bootstrap Period and Treasury Concerns:

   As we are still in the governance bootstrap period, with a complex roadmap ahead, it is crucial that we maintain a healthy treasury. A reduction in the taxation rate could significantly impact the resources available for future development, especially as we work towards implementing a wide range of improvements and innovations. A stable and sufficiently funded treasury is essential to fund critical initiatives and ensure the long-term success of the network.

5. Strategic Use of the 10% Tax:

   Rather than reducing the tax rate, I propose we keep the taxation for a strategic move. The tax can be used for future, more targeted initiatives, such as incentivizing the decentralization of the SPO network to smaller pools, or provide stable coin liquidity on Cardano, or fast-tracking development projects that are aligned with increased scalability. Using the extra tax for these initiatives could provide greater long-term value than simply reducing the tax rate.

Conclusion:

While the proposal to reduce the taxation parameter from 20% to 10% benefits stake-holders, the broader implications for decentralization amd treasury flexibility outweigh the benefits. Therefore, I will be voting No on this proposed parameter change.