Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Cardano Curia records a majority finding that the Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment Treasury Withdrawal is constitutional, with four constitutional votes and one unconstitutional vote.
What is being proposed
This governance action requests a Treasury Withdrawal of 9,000,000 ada for a twelve-month liquidity deployment associated with Strike Finance V2. The proposal contemplates conversion of ada into USDM, deployment into perpetual-futures liquidity, periodic reporting, and return of realized yield and remaining assets according to the published schedule.
Majority constitutional view
Four Cardano Curia members found the action constitutional. The majority considered that the proposal identifies a defined purpose, delivery period, administrators, segregated custody arrangements, reporting commitments, return mechanics, and independent assurance arrangements. The majority also credited Tingvard-related audit and assurance work as a meaningful safeguard supporting auditability and public oversight.
The majority determined that the action is capable of operating consistently with the Constitution's Treasury Withdrawal standards, provided the published administration, audit, reporting, custody, abstain-delegation, and return-to-treasury commitments remain binding and verifiable throughout execution.
Minority unconstitutional view
One Cardano Curia member found the action unconstitutional. The minority view was that the proposal does not state with sufficient clarity an explicit ada allocation within the withdrawal for periodic independent audits and oversight metrics, as required by the Treasury Withdrawal standards. The minority also considered the capital-preservation, conversion, custody, and mandatory wind-down controls insufficiently precise for a risk-bearing treasury deployment.
Determination
By a vote of four to one, Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. This determination addresses constitutional compliance and does not guarantee delivery performance, asset preservation, stablecoin solvency, protocol security, or financial return.
Cardano Curia finds governance action 8721696358acdd...dc70#0 constitutional by an internal vote of four constitutional and one unconstitutional, with no abstentions and no members recorded as not voting.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be constitutional.
This proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action to withdraw ₳9,000,000 from the Cardano Treasury for Strike Finance's "Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment." In accordance with Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Cardano Constitution, this proposal adopts an immutable off-chain reference using IPFS, and provides sufficient rationale, including a title, abstract, justification, and relevant supporting materials. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 1, this proposal aims to deploy funds to the Strike Finance V2 liquidity infrastructure for a period of 12 months. It details the requested amount, the implementation period, the method for converting ADA to USDM and deploying it as liquidity, the modeled yield, the return of the realized yield at the 6-month mark, the return of the remaining principal and realized yield at the 12-month mark, and the repayment terms in the event of early termination. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 2, it is disclosed that Strike Finance has not received funding from the Cardano Treasury or any related ecosystem treasury programs, including within the past 24 months. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3, it is confirmed that the requested amount of ₳9,000,000 falls within the ₳350,000,000 Net Change Limit covering Epoch 613 through Epoch 713. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 4, in addition to conducting an official audit of Strike V2, the proposal stipulates the provision of independent third-party assurance reports at the time of deployment confirmation, the sixth-month yield distribution, and the twelfth-month fund repayment. Furthermore, a framework is outlined to continuously monitor deployment status, profit and loss, yields, drawdowns, and other metrics through monthly public transparency reports. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 5, it is stated that an independent council consisting of Rami from Snek, Phil from Surf, and James from Monetra is designated as the administrator, responsible for overseeing the receipt of funds, their holding prior to deployment, and expenditures in accordance with this proposal. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 6, it is stated that the ADA held by the administrator prior to additional expenditures shall be held in one or more segregated accounts auditable by the Cardano Community, shall not be delegated to an SPO, and shall be delegated to the prescribed abstention voting option. Therefore, as no clear conflict with the Cardano Constitution has been identified, this proposal is deemed constitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Ok
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The proposal seeks to deploy Treasury assets into Cardano-native liquidity infrastructure with the objective of strengthening the ecosystem while returning both principal and realized yield to the Treasury. It therefore presents a reasonable case for advancing the long-term sustainability of Cardano under Article I - Section 1.
The proposal identifies an independent administrator, defines custody arrangements, discloses previous Treasury funding, specifies reporting obligations, early termination procedures, and return-of-funds conditions, and provides content-addressed governance metadata. It also establishes a comprehensive oversight framework including regular public reporting and independent third-party assurance.
Importantly, the proposal contains several quantitative claims regarding Strike Finance's position within the Cardano ecosystem; I have cross-checked those claims on two independent sources (https://bending.ai and https://konnektr.net) and the reported TVL, transaction count, and active wallets mentioned are plausible. However, the "over 50% of Cardano trading activity" claim could be misinterpreted and become misleading, as it appears to depend on how 'trading activity' is defined.
Also, while mentioned in several occurrences, greater specificity regarding the independent financial audits required under Article II - Section 7.4 would have been appreciated.
Nevertheless, I do not consider this deficiency sufficient to render the proposal unconstitutional. Hence, I do not identify a clear constitutional violation and consider the proposal constitutionally compliant.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799No rationale
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
This governance action requests 9,000,000 ADA from the Cardano Treasury for a 12-month liquidity deployment into Strike Finance V2.
The proposal identifies the purpose of the withdrawal, the amount requested, the deployment period, and the intended return structure. It states that this is not grant funding, that treasury ownership is retained, and that realized yield will be returned at month 6, with remaining principal and realized yield returned at month 12.
The proposal discloses that Strike Finance has not previously received Cardano Treasury funding and states that the requested amount fits within the current Net Change Limit.
The proposal designates an independent administrator council composed of Rami from Snek, Phil from Surf, and James from Monetra. It states that Strike Finance will not have unilateral custody or control of treasury assets.
The proposal also addresses treasury custody and delegation. Any ADA held before deployment will be kept in auditable accounts, will not be delegated to an SPO, and will be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option.
The proposal includes independent third-party assurance, monthly public reporting, risk disclosures, review triggers, wind-down conditions, and return-of-funds terms.
Tingvard therefore finds that the proposal satisfies the relevant requirements for a Treasury Withdrawal governance action.
Tingvard finds the “Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action Unconstitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
"Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment" (gov_action1sus...kz5nwj) is a Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. The Action seeks to withdraw 9,000,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury for a twelve-month productive liquidity deployment: the ada is to be sold for USDM and deployed as stablecoin-denominated liquidity in Strike Finance V2, a Cardano-native perpetual futures protocol, with realized yield returned to the Treasury at month six and the full treasury-owned position, principal plus remaining realized yield, returned at month twelve. The proposer is Strike Finance. The administrator is a council of three named individuals, Rami of Snek, Phil of Surf, and James of Moneta, who receive the withdrawal, hold the funds prior to deployment, and oversee disbursement. This is the first liquidity-deployment Treasury Withdrawal this Committee has reviewed, and it does not follow the Intersect-administered Treasury Reserve Smart Contract pattern; we assess it on its own structure.
Article II.6's procedural standards are satisfied. The action anchors to an IPFS-hosted document with the on-chain blake2b-256 hash 14534696e4b6c02f210e50dc4813ee8d5a5518837bbff82cb4f180599c4b0bcc, a content-addressed form that is immutable once posted, and the metadata supplies the title, abstract, motivation, rationale, allocation table, performance data, risk summary, and supporting references that Article II.6.2 requires. Article II.7.1's terms-of-withdrawal requirement is met with unusual specificity for the refund prong: the proposal states the purpose (deepening Cardano-native perpetual futures liquidity), the twelve-month duration, the deployment structure, a midpoint distribution of realized yield at month six, a full return of principal plus remaining realized yield at month twelve, and an early-termination framework with defined triggers, a wind-down process controlled by the administrator council rather than by Strike Finance, and an audited reconciliation report within thirty days of any wind-down. Article II.7.2 is satisfied by the proposal's disclosure that Strike Finance has never received funding from the Cardano Treasury or any related ecosystem treasury program, including within the last 24 months. Article II.7.3 is satisfied because the 9,000,000 ada requested is well within the 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit in force for the period spanning epochs 613 through 713.
Article II.7.4 (Audits and Oversight). Article II.7.4 requires that a Treasury Withdrawals action include "an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada." The funding request contains no such allocation. The allocation table assigns the entire 9,000,000 ada to a single purpose, sale for USDM and deployment as Strike Finance V2 liquidity, and no budget line, percentage, or reserve anywhere in the proposal's terms sets aside ada for audits or oversight. The proposal does promise assurance work: independent third-party assurance reports accompanying deployment confirmation, the month-six yield distribution, and the month-twelve return of funds, plus monthly public transparency reports. But it never identifies who pays for that work, and none of it is funded from the request. The one named audit, the protocol audit expected in July 2026, reviews the Strike V2 smart contracts rather than the use of the withdrawn ada and is likewise not funded from the request. Nor can the audits be funded implicitly from returns, because the proposal commits one hundred percent of realized yield back to the Treasury at months six and twelve, leaving no carve-out. The requirement is written in mandatory terms and applies to every Treasury Withdrawal; the fact that the principal is to be returned rather than consumed may bear on how large an allocation is appropriate, but it does not excuse the absence of one. Deployed treasury funds need funded, independent verification no less than spent ones. The audit and oversight requirement is not satisfied, and this defect renders the Action unconstitutional.
Article II.7.5 (Administrator). The administrator is a council of three named individuals operating as an assumed general partnership. Upon transfer of the withdrawal to the designated account, custodianship of the funds passes to these three administrators, who are legally responsible for seeing that the funds are appropriately deployed, accounted for, and returned. We correct one characterization in the proposal text: the proposal states that the Treasury retains ownership throughout the deployment, and that is not accurate. When the funds are transferred to the listed address, custody is given to the three administrators under the assumed general partnership; what the Treasury holds from that point is the administrators' legal responsibility to return the principal and realized yield on the stated schedule, not continuing possession. Article II.7.5 is nevertheless satisfied, because the structure the Article requires exists at the moment of withdrawal: an administrator other than the recipient, identified by name in the metadata, standing between the Treasury funds and Strike Finance, which has no unilateral custody or control of the deployed assets. Whether these three individuals should be entrusted with 9,000,000 ada of Treasury funds is a question of confidence in the administrators, and that question is committed to the Cardano Community and its DReps to decide, not to the Constitutional Committee.
Article II.7.6 (Holding Requirements). The proposal tracks the Article's language directly: ada held by the administrator prior to deployment will be kept in one or more separate accounts auditable by the Cardano Community, not delegated to any stake pool operator, and delegated to the predefined abstain voting option. We verified the on-chain withdrawal destination, stake1u8vadh7hzuganqempk7kqu7e9dktl6pappdg5clr8q5dn5c98w6yj, at the time of this review: it is delegated to the predefined always-abstain DRep and is not delegated to any stake pool. We note that this destination is a key-hash stake credential (CIP-19 mainnet header byte 0xe1) rather than a script address, so the two-of-three signing arrangement the proposal describes is not enforced by the destination credential itself; the administrators have the ability to transfer the funds onward to a multisig arrangement. The Constitution does not require script-locked custody, and the Article's stated requirements, separate auditable accounts, no stake pool delegation, and abstain delegation, are met. The adequacy of the administrators' key management, like the choice of the administrators themselves, is a matter for the DReps' confidence in the named individuals.
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action Unconstitutional. The withdrawal's terms, disclosures, and holding arrangements satisfy Articles II.6, II.7.1, II.7.2, II.7.3, II.7.5, and II.7.6, custodianship passes at withdrawal to three named administrators who bear legal responsibility for deployment and return of the funds under an assumed general partnership, and the question of whether those administrators merit the community's trust remains committed to the Cardano Community and its DReps to decide. The Action nevertheless fails Article II.7.4: no ada is allocated as a part of the funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics, a mandatory requirement for every Treasury Withdrawal, and on that ground the Action is unconstitutional.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecNoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is unconstitutional.
The governance action with ID “gov_action1sus...kz5nwj” and title “Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment” is a Treasury Withdrawal, so is subject to ARTICLE II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. While most of the requirements under this section were met by this governance action, it did not fulfil the requirements under ARTICLE II, Section 7(4).
ARTICLE II, Section 7(4) states "Treasury Withdrawals actions shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada."
While the governance action does state that "Independent third-party assurance reports will accompany deployment confirmation, the month-6 yield distribution, and the month-12 return of funds, verifying balances, profit and loss, drawdown, and distributions against on-chain data.", it does not refer to an allocation of ada to cover the cost of doing so.
We therefore find this governance action Unconstitutional.
This governance action does not sufficiently fulfil the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed unconstitutional.