Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment
163 DReps voted · 56 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain575M ₳Rationale
Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision.
- Abstain384.3M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
- Abstain331.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain299.7M ₳Rationale
EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment, with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved.
- No258.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain219.4M ₳Rationale
While we appreciate the attempt, but the remaining NCL needs to be spend on voted Intersect budget items. Not saying NO to future attempts.
- No171.3M ₳No rationale
- No123.7M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes NO. While we recognize Strike Finance as a leader in Cardano-native derivatives, we believe that treasury liquidity of this scale should be deployed through an ecosystem-wide framework rather than a single protocol.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This vote is not a reflection on the Strike Finance team or their V2 launch, both of which we highly value. Our objection lies with the mechanism and timing of this 9,000,000 ada request based on five core factors:
Ecosystem vs. Single-Protocol Approach: Treasury liquidity should be deployed holistically through independent curators to strengthen the ecosystem as a whole.
Insufficient Custody Standards: Relying on a three-person community multisig for custody falls below the administrative and operational standards required for large-scale treasury assets. We highly encourage the usage of the open source smart contracts to manage treasury funds that have been built by SundaeLabs and are being used by Intersect, or otherwise to build in additional security measures and redundancy into this proposal’s setup.
Short Track Record & Unpublished Audit: This deployment would more than double the protocol's current TVL, based on only two months of publicly available performance data. Additionally, the referenced protocol audit remains unpublished, making security and yield assumptions unverifiable at this scale.
Unhedged Ada Price Exposure: Swapping treasury ada for USDM to provide stablecoin liquidity introduces heavy directional exposure. If ada appreciates, the treasury risks significant underperformance without a sufficient mechanism to offset the loss.The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We value the Strike Finance team and their contribution to Cardano DeFi, and we would welcome their participation through an ecosystem-wide liquidity program or a resubmission in a future NCL cycle supported by a published audit and a longer track record at scale. We look forward to seeing Cardano-native liquidity deepened through a framework that grows the ecosystem as a whole.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Abstain92.2M ₳No rationale
- No90.6M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment proposal.
My rationale:
I want to be clear at the beginning. I want to support Strike. It is one of the most visible DeFi protocols on Cardano. I recognize the importance of liquidity and trading infrastructure for the ecosystem.
I also appreciate that the proposal is not framed as a grant, but as a productive treasury deployment intended to return principal and yield to the Treasury.
However, as a responsible DRep, I must apply a high standard when Treasury assets are exposed to significant risks. For a 9M ADA request, the proposal does not yet provide enough detail, safeguards, or evidence to justify a YES vote. I remain open to supporting a revised proposal if these issues are addressed.
One concern is trade transparency. Strike reports strong growth numbers. However, because Strike V2 trading happens on the Strike execution layer rather than fully on-chain, DReps and the community need more information to verify the quality of this activity.
Strike should publish anonymized V2 trade concentration data, including the top 5, top 10, and top 20 accounts by volume and trade count, the percentage of volume generated by market makers, the percentage generated by the official liquidity vault, self-trade prevention rules, wash-trading controls, and a clear definition of what “unique traders” means.
Another concern is the need for support from the public treasury. The proposal states that Strike has generated millions of dollars in profit for liquidity providers and over $1M in protocol revenue. These numbers make Strike look successful, but they also weaken the argument that Treasury support is necessary.
If the protocol has already generated substantial LP profit and revenue, Strike should explain why the required liquidity cannot come from reinvested protocol revenue, LP profits, or the STRIKE token treasury.
I am also concerned about market timing. The proposal requires Treasury ADA to be sold into USDM. ADA is currently trading at low levels, which makes this a high-conviction treasury decision. Selling ADA at low prices to support USDM liquidity and a private DeFi protocol is difficult to justify without stronger Treasury protection and upside alignment.
Custody is another important issue. A 3-person council is relatively small for a 9M ADA deployment. I would expect a larger and more independent structure, potentially something like a 5-of-7 multisig. Including respected top DReps or other independent ecosystem representatives would add legitimacy and reduce concentration risk. The proposal should also provide exact signers, thresholds, wallet addresses, responsibilities, and conflict-of-interest disclosures before approval.
Audit readiness is also not sufficient yet. Strike has public evidence of prior audit work for older smart-contract components, but the official Strike V2 audit relevant to this 9M ADA deployment has not been published yet. DReps should require the final V2 audit report, audited commit hashes, and deployed contract addresses before approving a treasury deployment of this size.
The proposal should also include a clear commitment that, during the 12-month Treasury liquidity deployment, Strike will not unilaterally change protocol settings or economic terms in a way that materially increases Treasury risk or reduces Treasury upside. Any necessary changes should be disclosed publicly, clearly justified, reviewed by the independent council, and included in regular transparency reporting.
Finally, the proposal does not sufficiently describe how the ADA-to-USDM conversion will be executed. Since the Treasury position depends on selling 9M ADA into USDM, execution fees, spreads, slippage, and counterparties are material risks. These details should be specified before approval, not only reported afterwards.
Overall, I see a potentially interesting idea, but the proposal form is not adequate for the size and risk of the request. It describes the intention, but not enough of the execution plan, audit status, custody mechanics, conflict management, and downside protection.
For these reasons, I vote NO on the current proposal, while remaining open to a revised version with stronger Treasury protection and a more complete risk framework.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
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https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - Abstain88.4M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes ABSTAIN on the treasury withdrawal "Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment."
This action requests a 12-month deployment of 9,000,000 ADA into Strike Finance V2 perpetual-futures liquidity. It is framed not as a grant but as a productive treasury investment: the ADA would be sold for USDM and deployed as liquidity, with realized yield returned to the Cardano Treasury at month six and 100% of the deployed principal plus realized yield returned at month twelve, and with any continuation requiring a fresh governance proposal. Operational custody is described as an independent multisig council (Rami of Snek, Phil of Surf, James of Moneta), with Strike Finance stated not to hold unilateral custody. Strike reports strong organic traction — cumulative volume above 1.13 billion USD, over 968,000 trades, and more than 50% of Cardano trading activity over the past six months — with roughly half of its volume originating from Ethereum-ecosystem users.
SIPO supports the underlying objective. Deepening Cardano-native DeFi liquidity and retaining trading activity within the ecosystem is a legitimate aim, and a productive, returnable treasury deployment is a category SIPO considers on its merits rather than rejecting outright. Strike's traction appears to reflect genuine product-market fit rather than an unproven concept, which distinguishes this proposal from speculative asks.
SIPO does not, however, endorse deploying 9,000,000 ADA of treasury capital under the present structure, and therefore does not vote Yes. Three concerns remain unresolved. First, on fund control: the on-chain withdrawal address is a single-key reward account (stake1u...), not a script or on-chain multisig. The independent-council custody and, critically, the month-six and month-twelve return-to-treasury commitments therefore rest on off-chain trust rather than on-chain enforcement — a materially weaker assurance than a script-escrowed, milestone-gated withdrawal, and a gap between the "independent multisig council" description and the key-based on-chain recipient that warrants verification. Second, on principal risk: providing liquidity to a perpetual-futures venue places the treasury as counterparty to traders, so the deployed principal can be lost if traders profit against the pool; the modeled ~10% annual yield is explicitly not guaranteed, and this is a concentrated, at-risk position in a single private protocol rather than a grant that is simply spent. Third, the deployment converts 9,000,000 treasury ADA into USDM, adding sell pressure and reducing the treasury's ADA exposure, with returns denominated in ADA-equivalent.
SIPO also does not vote No, because Strike is a real, high-traction, Cardano-native protocol and the proposal's explicit return schedule and independent-custody design are made in good faith; a flat rejection would understate that. Consistent with its objective of building sustainable decentralized governance and its duty of care over treasury capital, SIPO abstains: it supports the growth of Cardano DeFi liquidity and recognizes Strike's traction, but cannot entrust 9,000,000 ADA of treasury principal under a fund-control structure whose return and custody are not enforced on-chain, in an at-risk, single-protocol position funded by converting treasury ADA to a stablecoin.
SIPO would be open to reconsidering support for a revised structure that (1) routes the deployment and the return commitments through an on-chain-enforced escrow or a genuine on-chain multisig (a script credential), (2) caps or bounds the treasury's downside on an at-risk liquidity position, and (3) stages the deployment against verifiable performance rather than committing the full amount up front. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep として、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment」に棄権（ABSTAIN）を投じます。
本件は、Strike Finance V2 の無期限先物（perpetual futures）流動性へ、国庫の 9,000,000 ADA を 12 ヶ月間投下することを求めるものです。助成金ではなく「収益を生む国庫投資」として設計されており、ADA を USDM に換えて流動性として投下し、実現利回りを 6 ヶ月目に、投下元本の 100% ＋実現利回りを 12 ヶ月目に Cardano Treasury へ返還する、継続には新たなガバナンス提案が必要、とされています。運用 custody は独立マルチシグ council（Snek の Rami・Surf の Phil・Moneta の James）が担い、Strike Finance は単独 custody を持たない、と説明されています。Strike は強い自然成長 — 累計出来高 11.3 億ドル超・取引 96.8 万件超・直近 6 ヶ月で Cardano 取引の 50% 超 — を報告し、出来高の約半分が Ethereum 圏ユーザー由来だとしています。
SIPO はこの目的を支持します。Cardano ネイティブの DeFi 流動性を深め、取引活動をエコシステム内に留めることは正当な狙いであり、収益を生み返還される国庫投資は、SIPO が頭ごなしに否定せず是々非々で検討してきた類型です。Strike の traction は未証明の構想ではなく実際の product-market fit を反映しているように見え、この点で投機的な要求とは一線を画します。
しかし SIPO は、現在の構造で国庫資本 9,000,000 ADA を投下することを是認するものではなく、したがって賛成（Yes）は投じません。3 つの懸念が未解決です。第一に fund-control。オンチェーンの引き出し先は単一鍵の reward account（stake1u…）であり、script でもオンチェーン multisig でもありません。したがって独立 council による custody も、そして決定的に重要な 6 ヶ月目・12 ヶ月目の国庫返還コミットも、オンチェーンで強制されずオフチェーンの信頼に依存します。これは script escrow・マイルストーンゲート付きの引き出しに比べ著しく弱い保証であり、「独立マルチシグ council」という説明とオンチェーンの単一鍵受領先との乖離は検証を要します。第二に元本リスク。無期限先物の場に流動性を供給することは、国庫をトレーダーの取引相手に置くことを意味し、トレーダーがプールに対して利益を上げれば投下元本は毀損しうるものです。モデル上の年 ~10% 利回りは明示的に「保証なし」であり、これは単に支出される助成金ではなく、単一の民間プロトコルへの集中した、リスクにさらされたポジションです。第三に、本投下は国庫の 9,000,000 ADA を USDM に転換するため、売り圧を加え、国庫の ADA エクスポージャを縮小させます（返還は「ADA 相当」建て）。
一方で SIPO は反対（No）も投じません。Strike は実需のある高 traction の Cardano ネイティブプロトコルであり、明示的な返還スケジュールと独立 custody 設計は good faith でなされているからです。頭ごなしの否定はそれを過小評価します。持続可能な分散型ガバナンスの構築という目標と、国庫資本への注意義務に忠実に、SIPO は棄権します — Cardano DeFi 流動性の成長は支持し、Strike の traction も認めるが、返還と custody がオンチェーンで強制されない fund-control 構造のもと、国庫 ADA をステーブルに転換して単一プロトコルのリスクポジションに置く形で、9,000,000 ADA の国庫元本を託すことはできない、という立場です。
SIPO は、以下を満たす改訂構造であれば支持の再検討に開かれています。(1) 投下と返還コミットをオンチェーン強制の escrow または実体ある on-chain multisig（script credential）を通す (2) リスクにさらされる流動性ポジションの国庫の下方リスクに上限・境界を設ける (3) 全額前払いでなく、検証可能なパフォーマンスに対して段階的に投下する。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No85M ₳Rationale
I am unconvinced this is prudent spending given competing demands on the Cardano Treasury and how quickly the Treasury will reach zero given current spending levels.
- Yes77.8M ₳No rationale
- No75.9M ₳Rationale
I appreciate the underlying concept of this proposal. Exploring productive Treasury deployments that generate returns rather than acting solely as grants is an interesting direction and one that deserves consideration for Cardano's long-term sustainability.
However, this proposal requires Treasury-held ADA to be sold and converted into USDM. If ADA appreciates significantly during the deployment period, the Treasury could face a substantial opportunity cost. In addition, a deployment of this size may not only introduce additional selling pressure but could also negatively influence investor sentiment simply because the Treasury is selling ADA.
Given the current Net Change Limit (NCL), I also believe priority should be given to essential ecosystem infrastructure such as Mithril, Daedalus, and other core protocol components before allocating significant Treasury capital to productive investment strategies.
While I recognize the merit of the proposal, I do not believe it should be prioritized under the current circumstances.
本提案の考え方自体には賛同します。Treasuryを単なる支出ではなく、生産的に運用し、リターンを生み出すという発想は非常に興味深く、今後のCardanoにとって検討すべき方向性の一つだと考えています。
一方で、本提案ではTreasuryが保有するADAを売却してUSDMへ転換する仕組みとなっており、ADA価格が大きく上昇した場合にはTreasuryが機会損失を被る可能性があります。また、この規模のADA売却は市場へ一定の売り圧力を与えるだけでなく、「TreasuryがADAを売却する」という事実そのものが投資家心理へ与える影響も無視できないと考えています。
さらに、現在はNet Change Limit（NCL）が限られており、MithrilやDaedalusなど、Cardano全体を支える基盤インフラへの投資を優先すべき局面であると考えます。
提案そのものは評価していますが、現時点では優先順位とリスクの観点から支持には至りません。
- No74.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes73.6M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES. We must balance infrastructure funding with ecosystem investment; this proposal offers productive returns when viable yield options are strictly limited. The perpetuals market is thriving, and anchoring this volume on-chain is a strategic necessity.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am formally registering a YES vote on the Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment proposal.
Each budget cycle demands a pragmatic balance between core infrastructure and ecosystem investment. I support this proposal because it offers productive returns when our viable yield-generation options are strictly limited. The perpetuals market is thriving globally, and anchoring this volume on Cardano is a strategic necessity. The Strike team has executed well—I have used the platform frequently in the past, though I hold no Strike tokens. Crucially, I strongly encourage the team to collaborate with L2 teams (like Hydra and Midgard) to ensure our scaling infrastructure is driven by genuine, high-volume market feedback rather than purely technical theories.
Structurally, securing funds via an independent 3-of-3 multisig is a strong defense against collusion. However, future deployments of this magnitude must expand these committees to further decentralize control and eliminate single points of failure. While I ultimately advocate for a generic, ecosystem-wide stablecoin liquidity mechanism rather than protocol-specific applications, this proposal's strict drawdown limits and 12-month timeline make it a responsible, risk-managed deployment today.
Thank you to the Strike team for building on Cardano.
To all other projects, there is opportunity here, and we are watching and listening. - YesRevoted69.3M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes1mo agoSuperseded
- Abstain62.7M ₳No rationale
- No53.8M ₳Rationale
I'm voting No on the Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment proposal.
First off, I do recognize what Strike Finance has contributed to Cardano. I've used Strike Finance myself and written promotional posts about it more than a few times, so I genuinely think they've done a lot for the Cardano network.
But, as much as it pains me to say it, Strike Finance in its current form is hard to even call a Cardano-native product. I'm voting No for two reasons.
The proposal says it will "increase on-chain trading activity," but Strike V2's trade execution happens off-chain on the Strike Node, and L1 only handles deposits, withdrawals, and settlement. What the treasury funds create isn't on-chain transactions or fees, but market-making liquidity for an off-chain CLOB. On top of that, this off-chain processing doesn't even run on Hydra, the scaling solution built on Cardano's eUTXO model. It runs on Strike's own execution layer.
In other words, it isn't even going in the direction of using Cardano's own infrastructure to become a reference point for the ecosystem. So Strike Finance's growth in trading volume doesn't translate into a direct contribution to the Cardano network.
The proposal doesn't prove the link between "more Strike traders" and "more users and liquidity for the Cardano ecosystem." Even with a target of 5,000 traders, there's no basis to assume they'll hold ADA, use other Cardano dApps, and stay in the ecosystem.
If anything, the fact that around 50% of the trading volume comes from Ethereum users shows that these people are just using Strike, which is a different thing from actually coming into the Cardano ecosystem.
To sum up, this proposal reads more like the treasury investing liquidity for yield into a protocol that's hard to even call Cardano-native. I believe treasury funds should be used in a direction that genuinely brings users and liquidity to the ecosystem as a whole, and since I don't think this proposal meets that bar, I'm voting No.
- Abstain51M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- No50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on this proposal. This year's Net Change Limit (NCL) has been set well above the level I consider sustainable. Under my published voting framework, an appropriate NCL is roughly 15% of the previous year's staking rewards (on the order of ₳82M), whereas the NCL currently in force is several times that amount. Because the treasury is already authorized to disburse far beyond my personal NCL threshold, I am voting No on all treasury withdrawal proposals until aggregate withdrawals are brought back within a sustainable limit — regardless of the individual merits of any single proposal. This vote reflects a position on total treasury spend, not a judgment on the value of your specific project. Reference: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/ [Japanese version follows] 本提案に反対票を投じます。今年のNet Change Limit（NCL）は、私が持続可能と考える水準を大幅に上回って設定されています。公開済みの投票フレームワークでは、適正なNCLは前年のステーキング報酬の約15%（₳82M程度）ですが、現行のNCLはその数倍に達しています。トレジャリーは既に私のpersonal NCL（個人として許容する上限）を大きく超える出金が認められている状態にあるため、出金総額が持続可能な範囲に戻るまで、個別提案の良し悪しに関わらず、すべてのトレジャリー出金提案に反対票を投じます。本投票はトレジャリー支出全体に対する立場の表明であり、貴提案の価値そのものを否定するものではありません。参照: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem-jp/
- Yes50.2M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES because this proposal is structured as a productive treasury deployment rather than a traditional grant or expense. While there are risks, I believe they should be compared fairly against the execution risks of other treasury proposals, many of which are 100% expenses with no direct return mechanism.
In this case, the Treasury retains ownership of the deployed capital, the structure includes potential yield, reporting, oversight, and a defined return of funds. Strike also has a proven track record of delivering high-quality products and has already demonstrated strong organic traction.
I believe deeper liquidity on Strike can directly benefit the Cardano ecosystem by attracting more users and increasing on-chain activity.
- Yes49.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes47.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes39.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain37.4M ₳No rationale
- No37.3M ₳No rationale
- No34.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain34.4M ₳Rationale
Socious abstains. This proposal is not a grant but a 12-month "productive treasury" deployment: 9,000,000 ADA would be sold for USDM and deployed as liquidity into Strike Finance V2's perpetual-futures infrastructure, with yield accruing to the Treasury. Strike's traction figures (over $1.13B cumulative volume per the proposal) are notable, but converting treasury ADA into a stablecoin position concentrated in a single protocol raises market, smart-contract, and accountability questions — who bears drawdown risk, how the position is unwound, how performance is verified — that we have not independently assessed.
- No31.4M ₳Rationale
I vote NO.
I recognize the value and importance of the work presented in this proposal. However, given the current Treasury balance and the remaining Net Change Limit, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not essential to Cardano’s operational continuity.
To preserve long‑term financial sustainability, I must vote against this proposal. - No28M ₳No rationale
- No27.9M ₳Rationale
This is a difficult vote for me. I'm extremely happy to see the success that Strike Finance has had, bringing a huge amount of TVL to Cardano. That being said, the most important thing Cardano needs right now for sustainability is to generate more transactions on chain. Unfortunately most of Strike's execution happens on their own layer, which doesn't generate transaction fees for Cardano. The ask is also quite high, but since what they are asking for is a loan that would be something I can look past. However, I don't think it is enough to justify using treasury funds for.
- Yes27.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
Here is the tightened 2-paragraph version in the new format:
Disclaimer: I serve as a proposed independent administrator and multisig signer for this deployment. I am not Strike management, not the protocol operator, and not the recipient of treasury funds. My role would be limited to treasury stewardship: custody oversight, reporting verification, risk monitoring, drawdown review, wind-down participation, and ensuring treasury-owned assets are returned according to the proposal terms. Treasury capital should be productive, but stewardship must remain independent. Conclusion: Pass. Vote: YES. Strike has already demonstrated meaningful usage with over $1.1B in cumulative volume, over 1M trades, over $3.2M in LP profits, over $1.1M in protocol revenue, and a major share of Cardano-native trading activity. This proposal is not a grant; it is a temporary productive deployment of treasury-owned capital into Cardano-native liquidity infrastructure intended to deepen markets, increase trading activity, generate treasury yield, and strengthen Cardano’s derivatives layer.
The strongest feature is structure: treasury assets remain ecosystem-owned, are deployed temporarily, generate potential yield, and are subject to return, reporting, drawdown triggers, independent assurance, and wind-down controls. Stablecoin utilization is strong because the proposal converts ADA into USDM to provide stablecoin-denominated liquidity, reducing short-term ADA volatility exposure while supporting market depth. The core risk is not constitutional intent but market performance: modeled returns are not guaranteed, ADA appreciation could outperform the deployment, and success depends on continued volume, liquidity demand, and trader growth. Take-and-run risk is low due to independent multisig administration, named administrators, no unilateral Strike control, public reporting, and wind-down authority. The end-user benefit is simple: traders get deeper markets, LPs get larger opportunities, Cardano keeps more activity on-chain, and the treasury tests whether ecosystem-owned capital can become productive without becoming a permanent grant.
- No25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on the Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment. Strike has moved away from on-chain transparencies in favor of user experience. While I strongly believe in prioritizeing user experience, I also believe scaling a financial business utilizing public funds requires transparency and risk mitigation. If Strike wants to purusue scaling via treasury funds, it's only fair to the ecosytem we mitigate that risk via inspection (third-party audit of backend financial mechanics and health)
- Abstain23.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.5M ₳Rationale
I vote ABSTAIN on the treasury withdrawal action “Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment” (8721696358acdd43e34e5ed9ef1b3e2a1d2af9c1aa1972e017b9b9271b7ddc70#0).
At this hour it does not look like this proposal is anywhere near close to passing. I am choosing to abstain out of acknowledgement of my lack of understanding around the subject rather than attempting to vote blindly on something I am not fully informed about.
- Abstain21.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes20M ₳Rationale
Whilst ADA is trading very low right now, Strike is a good and strong player in the ecosystem and injecting liquidity will significantly strengthen the liquidity flywheel. We can't all just hold funds and wait for better times. We need activity on chain, I am confident in the team and that this will help, thus I vote YES.
- No17.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes17.4M ₳Rationale
Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment
- No16.9M ₳Rationale
We recognize Strike Finance as a strong Cardano DeFi protocol with real usage.
However, this proposal asks the treasury to convert ADA into USDM and deploy it as liquidity into one commercial protocol. That creates market, stablecoin, smart-contract, custody, and ADA opportunity-cost risk.
The value capture is not strong enough. The treasury takes the downside risk, while much of the upside benefits Strike and its ecosystem. The proposal lacks sufficient first-loss protection, guaranteed return, revenue sharing, or broader treasury investment standards.
This is not a vote against Strike. It is a vote against using public funds as concentrated liquidity for a single protocol without stronger safeguards.
- No16.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA abstains on the Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment proposal.
This is a positive and constructive abstention.
RCADA recognises the strength of the proposal and the importance of what it is trying to achieve. Strike Finance has demonstrated real traction within Cardano DeFi, with significant trading volume, active users, protocol revenue, and liquidity-provider returns. The proposal is also not structured as a conventional grant. It is presented as a 12-month productive Treasury deployment, with Treasury-owned capital converted into USDM, deployed into Strike Finance V2 liquidity infrastructure, and returned to the Cardano Treasury with realized yield at the end of the term. This is an innovative model and could represent an important step toward making the Cardano Treasury more productive rather than purely distributive.
RCADA is supportive of exploring productive Treasury deployment as a concept. Cardano should be willing to consider responsible ways for Treasury assets to support ecosystem liquidity, strengthen Cardano-native DeFi, retain trading activity on-chain, and potentially generate returns for the Treasury. Strike is a credible candidate for that conversation because it has demonstrated usage, a clear liquidity bottleneck, and a proposal that includes reporting, independent administration, yield return, and a defined 12-month term.
However, this proposal also asks the Cardano Treasury to enter a new and higher-risk category of governance action. Unlike a grant, this deployment places Treasury-owned capital into live DeFi liquidity infrastructure. That introduces risk to principal, smart contract and protocol risk, drawdown risk, custody and multisig governance risk, stablecoin exposure, execution risk, and precedent risk. These risks do not make the proposal bad, but they do raise the standard required for full support.
RCADA’s largest concern is custody and operational governance. The use of an independent multisig council is a positive safeguard, and Strike Finance not having unilateral custody is important. However, a 9,000,000 ADA Treasury deployment depends heavily on named individuals coordinating custody, deployment, reporting, risk response, and return of funds. For this scale of public capital, RCADA would prefer to see stronger and more formalised procedures around signer responsibilities, emergency response, signer replacement, dispute handling, wind-down authority, public account publication, and independent verification.
RCADA is also concerned about smart contract and protocol risk. The proposal states that an official audit is expected and will be published, but for a deployment of this size, RCADA believes the completed audit report should be public, reviewed, and understood before Treasury capital is deployed. This is especially important because the deployment would expose the Treasury not only to ordinary market risk but also to the specific mechanics and security assumptions of Strike V2 liquidity infrastructure.
The drawdown and market-making risks are also material. Even without fraud, a hack, or mismanagement, liquidity provision can lose money. In volatile or one-sided markets, the vault may absorb adverse trader PnL, inventory imbalance, poor execution conditions, or strategy underperformance. The proposal includes review and wind-down triggers, which is positive, but review triggers are not the same as automatic protection. Losses may already have occurred before a review or wind-down process begins.
RCADA does not view the ADA-to-USDM conversion as automatically negative. Holding more stablecoin liquidity may become useful for the Cardano Treasury in future, especially if the community develops a deliberate Treasury liquidity or sub-treasury strategy. However, this proposal effectively asks the community to accept stablecoin exposure and productive deployment risk before such a broader framework has been clearly established. USDM may be a credible and familiar Cardano-native stablecoin, but stablecoin exposure still introduces redemption, liquidity, issuer, regulatory, and depeg considerations that should be explicitly governed.
The precedent question is central. This proposal may become a test case for Treasury assets being deployed into specific DeFi protocols. That could be a valuable evolution for Cardano, but it should not happen casually. RCADA would prefer to see clearer ecosystem-level standards for productive Treasury deployment, including eligibility criteria, concentration limits, custody requirements, audit requirements, reporting standards, stablecoin exposure rules, emergency procedures, and fairness principles for other protocols that may seek similar support.
RCADA also notes the concentration and fairness issue. A 9,000,000 ADA deployment into one protocol would provide a significant liquidity advantage to Strike Finance. That may be justified by Strike’s traction and ecosystem value, but future proposals of this type should ideally be assessed within a broader framework so that Treasury liquidity is not perceived as preferential support for one venue over another.
At the same time, RCADA does not want to dismiss the proposal. The structure is more thoughtful than a simple subsidy. The independent council, monthly reporting, third-party assurance, midpoint yield return, final return of principal and yield, risk disclosures, and requirement for any future participation to come back through governance are all positive elements. RCADA also agrees that even a break-even pilot could produce useful learning for Cardano if principal is protected and reporting is transparent.
For these reasons, RCADA abstains rather than voting no. This abstention is not opposition to Strike Finance, nor is it opposition to productive Treasury deployment. It is a signal that the concept is promising, but the safeguards and governance framework are not yet mature enough for RCADA to give full approval to a 9,000,000 ADA deployment into protocol-specific DeFi liquidity.
RCADA would be more comfortable supporting future proposals of this type if they include a completed and published audit before deployment, stronger custody and multisig operating procedures, clearer automatic drawdown and wind-down rules, independent assurance before and during deployment, public reporting standards, and a broader Treasury deployment framework that can apply fairly across the ecosystem.
RCADA abstains constructively, encouraging continued development of productive Treasury models while asking for stronger risk controls before public Treasury capital is deployed at this scale.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here: "https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/."
- No12.1M ₳Rationale
We recognize the innovation behind this proposal and appreciate the effort to explore productive uses of Treasury assets rather than one-time grant spending. Strengthening liquidity for Cardano-native DeFi and creating sustainable revenue streams for the Treasury are worthwhile objectives that deserve continued exploration. However, we do not believe this proposal represents a sufficiently prudent deployment of Treasury assets under the current conditions.
Our primary concern is the proposed conversion of 9 million ADA into USDM at the outset of the deployment. Treasury stewardship requires careful consideration of the timing and opportunity cost of converting one of the ecosystem's most valuable strategic assets. At current market conditions, converting such a large amount of ADA exposes the Treasury to the risk of forfeiting significant upside should ADA appreciate during the 12-month deployment period. We believe a conversion of this nature would be considerably more responsible during periods of materially higher ADA valuations (for example, when ADA is trading above approximately $1), where fewer ADA would need to be exchanged to obtain the same amount of USDM. Such an approach would better preserve the Treasury's long-term holdings while still achieving the proposal's liquidity objectives.
Beyond the timing of the conversion, we remain concerned that the proposal asks governance to assume investment risk rather than fund a public good. Although the Treasury is intended to retain ownership of the deployed capital, the assets would become exposed to multiple layers of financial and operational risk, including market volatility, stablecoin risk, smart contract risk, and execution risk. The projected returns are based on modeled assumptions rather than guaranteed outcomes, while the downside scenarios are comparatively less developed.
We also find that the proposal relies heavily on the continued stability and liquidity of USDM. Any prolonged depeg, redemption constraints, or deterioration in market liquidity could materially affect the Treasury's ability to recover value. While the proposal includes monitoring mechanisms and governance review thresholds, these measures are reactive rather than preventative and do not eliminate the underlying exposure.
In addition, the proposal requests the full deployment of the entire 9 million ADA from the beginning of the program instead of adopting a phased or pilot-based approach. Given that this represents a novel model for Treasury capital deployment, we would have preferred an incremental rollout with clearly defined performance gates before committing the full amount. This would allow governance to evaluate real-world performance while limiting downside risk.
Finally, although the proposal demonstrates transparency through reporting commitments and independent multisig oversight, we are not convinced that these governance safeguards sufficiently compensate for the financial risks being transferred to the Treasury. We believe this proposal would establish an important precedent for future Treasury investment strategies, and such a precedent should be supported only after a more conservative risk framework, stronger downside protections, and a more favorable capital deployment strategy have been demonstrated.
- Abstain10.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain10.4M ₳Rationale
I like this proposal, and I really want to support it but because Strike currently doesn't have a VARA license (as strike is a Dubai based company) - I will be abstaining from this vote. VARA is needed, as more regulatory bodies are taking action against unregulated entities.
Polymarket, Hyperliquid are already being looked at by regulatory bodies. This provides a risk towards any funding that goes to these companies. If Strike were to add funding or have plans to get VARA license using this funding, my vote would be a YES. For now it's no