Rationale ID: RID24920185fi39ik2039fdhe4t2wdvs
Generated At: 2026-02-05T03:55:00+03:30
Generated By: govcircle.space

Action Information
Action Title: Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2)
Action ID: gov_action1cgdsp7g0rr7wgqp7maptpvx525fxuqwfgm5qe3f5r20ew5x2772s2z23tt

Follow DRep's Rationale: YUTA

Vote: YES

Executive Summary
The potential benefits of this proposal are already well described in the metadata and accompanying documentation.
With regard to potential downsides, I have made efforts to understand the risks by reviewing forum discussions, Intersect committee meeting minutes, and available analyses. Based on this review, I have not identified any indications of critical or fatal drawbacks at this time. That said, surveys indicate that there is a non-negligible number of developers who believe that this change should not be implemented.

Audit
Digest: 84ad0c7a781bdad8761ada4cf0fe175920247cf0292b6e995380bf8d6263ff40
Digest Algorithm: SHA-256

Rationale ID: RID24920185fi39ik2039fdhe4t2asdc
Generated At: 2026-02-05T03:55:00+03:30
Generated By: govcircle.space

Action Information
Action Title: Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1
Action ID: gov_action1fvgw27fjpr9c7g582mszzyez0jgkqgjgatzdnyngrg8wwc9kcn3qrgch3v

Follow DRep's Rationale: CardanoYoda

Vote: NO

RIP

Governance Rationale

Rationale ID: RID24920185fi39ik2039fdhe4t2wefd
Generated At:
2025-12-11T03:00:00+03:30
Generated By: govcircle.space

Action Information

Action Title: Add Constitutional Committee Member
Action ID: gov_action1fk4nx9zhkcdcyjaudwjtnkd7gagwyhqtth2zypawkc78gvdxkuzqzcfpwy

Follow DRep's Rationale:
Yoroi Wallet, YUTA, SIPO, CardanoYoda, Peter Bui

Vote: YES

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Executive Summary

Expanding the Constitutional Committee by adding a member enhances governance agility and improves quorum resilience. This change ensures broader expertise, reduces potential bottlenecks in rapid decision-making, and strengthens the system’s capacity to measure DRep responsiveness as a KPI.

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Risks & Mitigation

Risk: Equality of minimum CC member parameter with CC size can endanger governance status.
Mitigation: Reduce committeeMinSize parameter to committeeMinSize = currentCommitteeSize - 1.

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Signal

Description: If this action reaches the required votes within a single epoch, it demonstrates rapid governance response and sets a benchmark for DRep engagement.
Purpose: Create KPI

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Audit

• Digest:
  84ad0c7a781bdad8761ada4cf0fe175920247cf0292b6e995380bf8d6263ff40
• Digest Algorithm: SHA-256
• Signatures:
• IPFS Link: https://ipfs.io/ipns/k51qzi5uqu5dinemr19bcje6d8emg9r6gmbg1j23b43zrfrcc2qm3ic42l7nko

I vote YES on the Cardano Critical Integrations Budget (70M ADA) because this governance action represents a crucial, strategic investment that immediately addresses the highest priority missing infrastructure required for Cardano to achieve mass adoption, institutional relevance, and exponential DeFi growth.

1. Enabling Tier-One Stablecoin Adoption: The lack of a robust, high-trust stablecoin is a major impediment to large-scale DeFi and institutional capital flow. This budget specifically targets the foundational infrastructure—reliable oracles, institutional custody, and scalable analytics—needed to successfully onboard these tier-one stablecoins. Approving this budget is essentially voting to unlock predictable liquidity and provide the base currency required for a vibrant financial ecosystem.

2. Institutional & Technical Maturity: The planned integrations—especially institutional digital asset custody and professional wallet infrastructure—are non-negotiable requirements for onboarding institutional capital and catering to enterprise use cases (e.g., RWA). This moves Cardano beyond early adoption and into the competitive sphere of mature L1s. As a Software Architect, I recognize that these infrastructure components are dependencies for future high-value applications.

3. Unified Ecosystem Alignment: This proposal is unique due to the explicit collaboration between IOG, the Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, Midnight Foundation, and Intersect. This unified approach signals strategic maturity and a commitment to efficient execution, leveraging the combined expertise of all core entities to attract and manage world-class integration partners.

4. Risk Mitigation through Financial Structure: The use of a milestone-based funding structure, where budget drawdowns are administered by Intersect only upon submission of signed agreements and agreed-upon scope of work, provides a strong layer of fiscal responsibility and risk mitigation, ensuring funds are used effectively and tied directly to tangible progress.

Conclusion: Delaying this critical infrastructure implementation would severely hinder Cardano's immediate growth potential and compromise its competitiveness. The 70M ADA is a strategic expenditure on the core foundations necessary to capture a significant portion of the rising institutional and DeFi market share.

2. ترجمه فارسی (توجیه رأی «بله»)
توجیه: یک سرمایه‌گذاری ضروری و استراتژیک برای فاز بعدی رشد کاردانو
من به بودجه ادغام‌های حیاتی کاردانو (۷۰ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی) رأی «بله» می‌دهم، زیرا این اقدام حاکمیتی نشان‌دهنده یک سرمایه‌گذاری حیاتی و استراتژیک است که مستقیماً به زیرساخت‌های مفقود با بالاترین اولویت می‌پردازد؛ زیرساخت‌هایی که برای رسیدن کاردانو به پذیرش انبوه، ارتباط نهادی و رشد نمایی در امور مالی غیرمتمرکز (DeFi) ضروری هستند.

۱. فعال‌سازی پذیرش استیبل‌کوین‌های تراز اول: نبود یک استیبل‌کوین قوی و قابل اعتماد، یک مانع جدی برای جریان سرمایه سازمانی و دیفای در مقیاس بزرگ است. این بودجه به طور خاص، زیرساخت‌های بنیادین مورد نیاز (اوراکل‌های قابل اعتماد، نگهداری سازمانی دارایی، و ابزارهای تحلیلی مقیاس‌پذیر) را برای پذیرش موفق این استیبل‌کوین‌های تراز اول هدف قرار می‌دهد. تأیید این بودجه اساساً به معنای رأی دادن برای آزادسازی نقدینگی قابل پیش‌بینی و تأمین ارز پایه مورد نیاز برای یک اکوسیستم مالی پویا است.

۲. بلوغ فنی و نهادی: ادغام‌های برنامه‌ریزی‌شده – به ویژه نگهداری سازمانی دارایی‌های دیجیتال (Institutional Custody) و زیرساخت‌های حرفه‌ای کیف پول – الزامات غیرقابل مذاکره برای جذب سرمایه نهادی و پذیرش موارد استفاده سازمانی (مانند RWA) هستند. این اقدام، کاردانو را فراتر از مراحل اولیه پذیرش، به قلمرو رقابتی شبکه‌های لایه اول (L1) بالغ هدایت می‌کند. به عنوان یک معمار نرم‌افزار، تصدیق می‌کنم که این اجزای زیرساختی، پیش‌نیازهای (Dependencies) برنامه‌های کاربردی با ارزش آتی هستند.

۳. همسویی یکپارچه اکوسیستم: این پیشنهاد به دلیل همکاری صریح بین IOG، بنیاد کاردانو (Cardano Foundation)، اِمورگو (EMURGO)، بنیاد میدنایت (Midnight Foundation) و اینترسکت (Intersect) منحصر به فرد است. این رویکرد یکپارچه، بلوغ استراتژیک و تعهد به اجرای کارآمد را نشان می‌دهد و از تخصص ترکیبی تمامی نهادهای اصلی برای جذب و مدیریت شرکای ادغام در سطح جهانی استفاده می‌کند.

۴. کاهش ریسک از طریق ساختار مالی: استفاده از ساختار تأمین مالی مبتنی بر نقاط عطف (Milestone-based Funding)، که در آن برداشت از بودجه توسط Intersect تنها پس از ارائه توافق‌نامه‌های امضا شده و دامنه کار مورد توافق انجام می‌شود، یک لایه قوی از مسئولیت‌پذیری مالی و کاهش ریسک فراهم می‌کند و تضمین می‌دهد که بودجه به طور مؤثر و مستقیماً در جهت پیشرفت ملموس هزینه می‌شود.

نتیجه‌گیری: به تأخیر انداختن اجرای این زیرساخت حیاتی، به طور جدی پتانسیل رشد فوری کاردانو را مختل کرده و توان رقابتی آن را تضعیف می‌کند. ۷۰ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی یک هزینه استراتژیک برای بنیان‌های اصلی است که برای به دست آوردن سهم قابل توجهی از بازار رو به رشد دیفای و نهادی ضروری است.

I Follow YUTA Rationale

Conditional YES — Questions for Clarification
I would like to give a conditional YES to the “Cardano Critical Integrations Budget.”
Because this is a very large request, I kindly ask for clarification on the following points.
Given that this governance action places notable time pressure on both DReps and the CC, I would greatly appreciate it if these explanations can be provided before the Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action is submitted.

Justification for the 70M ADA amount
Please explain why 70M ADA is the appropriate figure.
Why would 65M ADA be insufficient, and why would 75M ADA be excessive?
High-level breakdown of the 70M ADA
Separate from (1), could you provide the most detailed breakdown possible for how the 70M ADA is expected to be allocated?
More robust success metrics (KPIs)
The current “live on mainnet” metrics seem insufficient.
Could you include numerical KPIs such as increases in TVL, user numbers, external capital inflows, or transaction volume?
These would help DReps evaluate success or failure more objectively.
Specific gaps in existing Cardano infrastructure
For each integration category (Custody/Wallet, Analytics, Bridge, Oracle),
could you specify what is currently missing on Cardano?
For example, regarding wallet infrastructure:
what exactly is lacking today in Lace or Eternl, and what needs to be developed?
Vendor lock-in risk
Is there a risk that this budget creates strategic dependency on a specific vendor?
Are there standardization or “exit” clauses to prevent lock-in?
Required SLA/security levels
What levels of SLA, availability, and security requirements are being set for Oracle, Bridge, Analytics, Custody, and Wallet integrations?
Conditions for stopping or scaling down the program
While unused funds will be returned after 24 months,
could you clarify under what conditions the program can be paused, reduced, or stopped midway?
Who has the authority to trigger such decisions?
Precedents on other L1s
Are there successful examples from other L1 ecosystems (e.g., Solana, Ethereum) that used a similar integration-budget model?
If so, what were the success and failure factors?
Timing and remaining NCL capacity
This proposal appears close to the end of the current NCL and uses most of its remaining capacity.
Could you clarify:
(a) Why this was kept until now, and
(b) Why it must be executed within this NCL, rather than splitting into phases across the next NCL?
Balancing confidentiality and constitutional transparency
While NDA-protected information is understandable, Cardano governance requires transparency.
Can you disclose, at minimum:
(a) Cost ranges per integration category
(b) Number of vendors involved
(c) Expected contract durations
so that DReps can reasonably judge the appropriateness of the plan?
Relationship with existing Cardano-native projects
How will this budget interact with existing Cardano-native infra teams (e.g., Charli3)?

Handling of underperformance (“failure rules”)
If, after 24 months, the KPI targets (TVL, Tx volume, capital inflow, etc.) fall significantly short:
(a) How will root-cause analysis be conducted?
(b) How will learnings affect future large-scale infrastructure proposals?
As DReps, we would like clarity not only on success criteria but also on how failure will be addressed.

موافقت مشروط (Conditional YES) — سؤالاتی برای شفاف‌سازی

من تمایل دارم به «بودجه ادغام‌های حیاتی کاردانو» موافقت مشروط (Conditional YES) بدهم. از آنجا که این یک درخواست بسیار بزرگ است، خواهشمندم در مورد نکات زیر شفاف‌سازی ارائه شود. با توجه به اینکه این اقدام حاکمیتی فشار زمانی قابل توجهی را بر روی هر دو گروه نمایندگان تفویض رأی (DReps) و کنسول کاردانو (CC) تحمیل می‌کند، بسیار سپاسگزار خواهم بود اگر این توضیحات پیش از ارسال اقدام حاکمیتی برداشت از خزانه‌داری (Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action) ارائه شوند.

۱. توجیه مبلغ ۷۰ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی (ADA)
لطفاً توضیح دهید که چرا ۷۰ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی رقم مناسبی است. چرا ۶۵ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی ناکافی خواهد بود، و چرا ۷۵ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی بیش از حد خواهد بود؟

۲. تفکیک سطح بالا از ۷۰ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی
جدا از مورد (۱)، لطفاً دقیق‌ترین تفکیک ممکن را در مورد چگونگی انتظار برای تخصیص ۷۰ میلیون اِی‌دی‌اِی ارائه دهید.

۳. معیارهای موفقیت قوی‌تر (شاخص‌های کلیدی عملکرد - KPIs)
به نظر می‌رسد معیارهای فعلی «اجرا بر روی شبکه‌ی اصلی (live on mainnet)» ناکافی هستند. آیا می‌توانید شاخص‌های کلیدی عملکرد (KPI) عددی مانند افزایش در ارزش کل قفل‌شده (TVL)، تعداد کاربران، جریان ورودی سرمایه خارجی، یا حجم تراکنش‌ها را لحاظ کنید؟ این موارد به نمایندگان تفویض رأی (DReps) کمک می‌کنند تا موفقیت یا شکست را به طور عینی‌تر ارزیابی کنند.

۴. شکاف‌های خاص در زیرساخت موجود کاردانو
برای هر دسته از ادغام‌ها (نگهداری/کیف پول، تجزیه و تحلیل، پل، اوراکل)، آیا می‌توانید مشخص کنید که در حال حاضر چه چیزی در کاردانو ناقص است؟ به عنوان مثال، در مورد زیرساخت کیف پول: دقیقاً چه کمبودی امروز در Lace یا Eternl وجود دارد، و چه چیزی نیاز به توسعه دارد؟

۵. ریسک وابستگی به یک تأمین‌کننده (Vendor Lock-in)
آیا این ریسک وجود دارد که این بودجه، وابستگی استراتژیک به یک تأمین‌کننده خاص ایجاد کند؟ آیا بندهای استانداردسازی یا «خروج» برای جلوگیری از این وابستگی وجود دارند؟

۶. سطوح مورد نیاز توافقنامه سطح خدمات/امنیتی (SLA/Security Levels)
چه سطوحی از SLA (توافقنامه سطح خدمات)، دسترس‌پذیری و الزامات امنیتی برای ادغام‌های اوراکل، پل، تجزیه و تحلیل، نگهداری و کیف پول تعیین شده است؟

۷. شرایط توقف یا کاهش مقیاس برنامه
در حالی که بودجه استفاده‌نشده پس از ۲۴ ماه بازگردانده می‌شود، آیا می‌توانید شفاف‌سازی کنید که تحت چه شرایطی می‌توان برنامه را در میانه راه متوقف، کاهش یا به حالت تعلیق درآورد؟ چه کسی اختیار تصمیم‌گیری برای چنین اقداماتی را دارد؟

۸. نمونه‌های مشابه در سایر شبکه‌های لایه اول (L1s)
آیا نمونه‌های موفقی از سایر اکوسیستم‌های لایه اول (مانند سولانا، اتریوم) وجود دارد که از مدل بودجه ادغام مشابهی استفاده کرده باشند؟ اگر چنین است، عوامل موفقیت و شکست آنها چه بودند؟

۹. زمان‌بندی و ظرفیت باقیمانده‌ی محدودیت اعتبار شبکه (NCL)
به نظر می‌رسد این پیشنهاد نزدیک به پایان محدودیت اعتبار شبکه (NCL) فعلی است و از بیشتر ظرفیت باقیمانده آن استفاده می‌کند. آیا می‌توانید شفاف‌سازی کنید: (الف) چرا این موضوع تا کنون حفظ شده است، و (ب) چرا باید حتماً در همین NCL اجرا شود، به جای اینکه به فازهایی در طول NCL بعدی تقسیم شود؟

۱۰. توازن میان محرمانگی و شفافیت قانون اساسی
در حالی که اطلاعات تحت حفاظت توافقنامه عدم افشا (NDA) قابل درک است، حاکمیت کاردانو به شفافیت نیاز دارد. آیا می‌توانید حداقل موارد زیر را افشا کنید: (الف) محدوده هزینه‌ها به ازای هر دسته ادغام (ب) تعداد تأمین‌کنندگان درگیر (ج) مدت زمان مورد انتظار قراردادها تا نمایندگان تفویض رأی (DReps) بتوانند به طور منطقی در مورد مناسب بودن طرح قضاوت کنند؟

۱۱. ارتباط با پروژه‌های بومی موجود کاردانو
این بودجه چگونه با تیم‌های زیرساخت بومی موجود کاردانو (مانند Charli3) تعامل خواهد داشت؟

۱۲. رسیدگی به عملکرد ضعیف («قوانین شکست»)
اگر پس از ۲۴ ماه، اهداف شاخص‌های کلیدی عملکرد (TVL، حجم تراکنش، جریان ورودی سرمایه و غیره) به طور قابل توجهی کمتر از حد انتظار باشد: (الف) چگونه تحلیل ریشه مشکل (root-cause analysis) انجام خواهد شد؟ (ب) چگونه درس‌های آموخته‌شده بر پیشنهادات زیرساختی بزرگ‌مقیاس آینده تأثیر خواهند گذاشت؟ ما به عنوان نمایندگان تفویض رأی (DReps)، خواستار شفافیت نه تنها در مورد معیارهای موفقیت، بلکه در مورد چگونگی رسیدگی به شکست نیز هستیم.

While I hold a reservation regarding the immediate capital allocation amount—preferring a more phased approach, potentially aligning with future ecosystem developments like Project Night—the overall strategic concept of this Treasury Loan is overwhelmingly positive and a necessary step for the ecosystem.

The Snek Foundation has clearly demonstrated its intent and commitment within the proposal and has actively engaged with the community. As the Foundation has earned the trust of the Cardano community and established a strong base, proceeding with them as the initiative driver is sound.

This action is crucial not only for the Foundation's primary asset but also because the successful listing of a major community token (like SNEK) serves as a vital blueprint and gateway for the listing of all other Cardano Native Tokens (CNTs) on major exchanges. Given the current competitive dynamics of the crypto market, accelerating the presence and liquidity of key Cardano dApps on exchanges is an urgent necessity. Failure to do so risks stalling the critical inflow of new developers into the Cardano ecosystem.

The "Loan" mechanism provides an intelligent and acceptable framework for initiating this essential market expansion through a trusted community partner. Therefore, despite the hesitation on the financial specifics, I vote FOR based on the compelling strategic necessity of this listing expansion.

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اگرچه در مورد میزان و زمان‌بندی پرداخت فعلی تحفظ دارم و ترجیح می‌دهم رویکردی مرحله‌ای‌تر، شاید همسو با معرفی پروژه‌های مهم آینده مانند Night، اتخاذ شود، اما مفهوم کلی این طرح به عنوان یک وام از خزانه‌داری، یک حرکت استراتژیک ضروری و بسیار مثبت برای اکوسیستم است.

بنیاد Snek نیت و تعهد خود را در پروپوزال به وضوح نشان داده و در زمینه تعامل با جامعه اقدامات موثری انجام داده است. این بنیاد مورد اعتماد جامعه کاردانو است و یک کامیونیتی قوی برای خود ساخته، بنابراین می‌توان به اجرای این طرح توسط آن‌ها اطمینان کرد.

این اقدام نه تنها به لیست شدن دارایی اصلی این بنیاد کمک می‌کند، بلکه به طور غیرمستقیم مسیر را برای لیست شدن تمام توکن‌های بومی کاردانو (CNTs) در صرافی‌های بزرگ هموار می‌سازد. در وضعیت رقابتی کنونی بازار کریپتو، تسریع در حضور و نقدینگی دپ‌های کاردانو در صرافی‌ها یک ضرورت فوری است. تأخیر در این امر می‌تواند باعث از دست رفتن جریان حیاتی ورود توسعه‌دهندگان جدید به کاردانو شود.

مکانیسم «وام» یک چارچوب هوشمندانه برای آغاز این گسترش ضروری بازار از طریق یک شریک مورد اعتماد جامعه فراهم می‌کند. بنابراین، علی‌رغم تردید در جزئیات مالی، به دلایل استراتژیک و اهمیت حیاتی گسترش لیستینگ، رأی آری می‌دهم.

I am voting YES on this proposal, as I fully agree with the requested amount and the overall approach to providing fair remuneration to the Constitution Committee (CC) members. Recognizing and compensating their time, responsibility, and contribution to Cardano’s governance structure is crucial for maintaining accountability and sustaining long-term participation.

However, I do have an open question that I’d like the community and my delegators to reflect on: the current structure excludes individual CC members—such as KtorZ and Phil_UPLC—from receiving payment simply because they serve independently rather than as part of a group. This could unintentionally discourage future candidates from running solo, incentivizing people to form artificial groups or organizational entities just to qualify for funding.

While I understand that multi-member or script-based CCs may spend more time coordinating and reaching consensus, both individual and collective CCs fulfill the same constitutional responsibilities. The mechanism for balancing these payments between individuals and groups deserves deeper discussion within the community to ensure fairness and maintain motivation for all future CC candidates.

After reviewing the GovTool source code and analyzing the proposal details, I have decided to vote NO on this proposal. The requested budget appears significantly disproportionate to the scope and technical complexity of the project. Based on my experience, a comparable application could be developed from scratch—more efficiently and with better architectural decisions—for a fraction of the requested funds, potentially around one-fifth of the cost.

Furthermore, existing explorers that already receive treasury support provide governance-related data in a more optimized and scalable manner. With minimal additional investment, they could easily extend their functionality to include voting and governance interaction features, achieving similar or even better results at a far lower cost.

While I appreciate the team’s work on GovTool and its contribution to the ecosystem so far, this particular proposal does not demonstrate a cost-effective or technically necessary path forward given the available infrastructure and funding priorities. Therefore, my vote is NO.

I believe the election process was conducted with integrity, fairness, and transparency, and I have full confidence in the elected members’ capabilities to serve the Cardano community effectively. Their diverse expertise and demonstrated commitment to our ecosystem provide a solid foundation for leadership during this pivotal time.
As someone who also represents a region that is often marginalized—like many Iranian voices—I value governance processes that welcome and empower all contributors, regardless of geography or background. That inclusivity is what builds robust, resilient systems, and I’m proud to vote YES to endorse these elected leaders.

من معتقدم فرآیند انتخابات با صداقت، انصاف و شفافیت انجام شده و به توانایی‌های اعضای منتخب برای خدمت مؤثر به جامعه کاردانو کاملاً اعتماد دارم. تخصص متنوع و تعهد اثبات‌شده آن‌ها به اکوسیستم ما، پایه‌ای محکم برای رهبری در این برهه حساس فراهم می‌کند.

به عنوان کسی که نماینده منطقه‌ای است که اغلب نادیده گرفته می‌شود — مانند بسیاری از ایرانی ها — ارزش فرایندهای حکمرانی را می‌دانم که به همه مشارکت‌کنندگان، فارغ از موقعیت جغرافیایی یا پیشینه، خوش‌آمد می‌گوید و قدرت می‌بخشد. این شمول‌گرایی همان چیزی است که سیستم‌های قوی و پایدار را می‌سازد و من با افتخار رأی آری خود را برای تأیید این رهبران منتخب ثبت می‌کنم.

I am voting **YES **on the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.0. While there is always room for improvement, this version introduces targeted changes that can support builders more effectively while maintaining and even strengthening the protection of Cardano’s financial soundness. The update primarily modifies the treasury withdrawal process by removing Budget Information Actions and replacing them with clearer disclosure requirements. These changes streamline governance without introducing excessive complexity for proposers. Additionally, by removing burdensome requirements such as mandatory audits for withdrawals under one million ADA within two years, the proposal helps smaller initiatives access funding more efficiently.

Although the text changes are relatively modest, their impact is meaningful in balancing oversight with agility. I believe constitutional updates should undergo more comprehensive off-chain community engagement before being formalized on-chain, ensuring they reflect the collective vision of the Cardano community. To address this, I am working on GovCircle, a project focused on enhancing the off-chain processes for constitutional updates and building the tools we need for better governance outcomes. This proposal, while not perfect, moves us toward a governance framework that is both practical and protective, and thus earns my support.

While I deeply appreciate the significant contributions the SNEK project has made to the Cardano ecosystem, I vote NO on this proposal. Beyond concerns over its procedural constitutionality, the proposal lacks key elements that are essential for responsible treasury governance, including a treasury repayment plan, clearly defined KPIs, target values, and relevant historical analyses to demonstrate impact.
Treasury funds must be allocated with transparency, accountability, and measurable outcomes in mind. Without these safeguards and clarity around how funds would be repaid or how success would be evaluated, support cannot be justified—even for projects with meaningful past contributions.

While building global visibility is valuable, allocating treasury funds to temporary event booths at exhibitions does not contribute to long-term infrastructure or technical advancement within the Cardano ecosystem. As a DRep, I believe our priorities must focus on lasting developer tools, infrastructure projects, and on-chain innovation—not ephemeral marketing placements with limited strategic impact.

Event booths do little to strengthen core protocol resilience, developer adoption, or decentralized growth. Without a clear path linking expense to lasting benefits, this proposal relies heavily on brand awareness that may not translate into real on-chain activity or measurable community growth. Therefore, I vote NO, believing that treasury resources are better spent on projects that deliver enduring value and technical substance.

I vote NO on this proposal. Treasury funds should not be used for covering exchange listing fees, as that effectively sets a dangerous precedent—it’s akin to paying for legitimacy rather than earning it through merit and product viability. If projects need to outbid one another with millions of ADA for exchange visibility, it signals deeper systemic issues that funding alone cannot resolve.

Furthermore, this proposal lacks the essential components of responsible fiscal governance: there's no repayment plan, no clearly defined KPIs, and no historical performance analysis that would justify the investment. As Charles Hoskinson rightly affirmed, the treasury should not be tapping into such funds for listing fees. Without structural accountability and transparent ROI metrics, this proposal does not meet the standards of stewardship expected for the Cardano Treasury.

While a coordinated event strategy could enhance Cardano's visibility, the proposal’s significant budget request makes it difficult to justify at this point. As a DRep, I believe resources should first be prioritized on delivering tangible, user-facing products and infrastructure that provide clear value for developers and end users. Once those foundational tools and dApps are mature and driving real adoption, marketing initiatives will naturally amplify proven success rather than abstract visibility.
Moreover, the proposal lacks well-defined performance metrics and measurable KPIs tied to developer engagement, ecosystem growth, or on-chain activity. Without these benchmarks, the effectiveness of such a campaign remains speculative, and the risk is that the investment yields limited long-term ecosystem benefit. For these reasons, I vote NO on this proposal.

While the concept of this project could bring meaningful benefits to the Cardano community, the requested budget of 12 million ADA for one year is disproportionate to the current user base, user experience quality, and design maturity of the existing product. Based on my own development experience, the same functionality could be built from scratch for around 10% of the requested amount, without compromising on quality or scope.

My voting criteria consider not only the idea and purpose of a proposal but also the cost-to-value ratio. In this case, the proposal does not demonstrate a budget aligned with the realistic cost of delivery, nor does it provide sufficient evidence of scalability and adoption to justify the expense. For these reasons, I vote NO on this proposal.

While a unified global events marketing strategy could improve Cardano’s brand recognition, the timing and scale of this proposal make it a difficult investment to justify. At the current stage of the ecosystem, our priority should be to direct significant resources toward building and refining products, tools, and infrastructure that will drive adoption organically. Once we have strong, widely-used solutions in place, marketing efforts will have a much stronger impact, as we will be showcasing proven successes rather than promoting a brand without clear flagship use cases.

Additionally, the proposal’s budget appears large in relation to measurable, on-chain returns, and it lacks clear performance metrics to evaluate success beyond brand exposure. Without concrete KPIs linked to developer engagement, dApp deployment, or ecosystem growth, there is a risk of spending heavily on visibility without tangible, lasting benefits for the Cardano network. For these reasons, I am voting NO on this proposal.

As the only Iranian DRep, I cannot support this proposal administered by Intersect due to fundamental issues with Intersect’s structure and representation. Because of U.S. sanctions, I am excluded from Intersect membership and decision-making, which means this organization does not truly represent the entire global Cardano community. Without full inclusion and equal participation, the legitimacy of Intersect-led initiatives is compromised.
Furthermore, while the goal of creating a community-driven 2030 vision and roadmap is important, the process led by Intersect lacks full transparency and inclusivity for all DReps, especially those from sanctioned regions like Iran. Until governance bodies are fully representative and enable equitable involvement of all community members, including myself, I cannot endorse significant treasury funding for such projects.

Although I acknowledge the importance of Input Output (IOG) as the core architect of Cardano’s governance system and its vital role in building the foundation of Voltaire, I must vote NO on this proposal. I believe that the governance framework should be designed, evolved, and owned primarily by the Cardano community itself, rather than being led predominantly by IOG. The responsibilities and initiatives mentioned in this proposal, which are currently attributed to IOG, should instead be facilitated and executed by community-led organizations such as Intersect, ensuring a more decentralized and inclusive governance evolution.

While the technical capabilities of NFTCDN are impressive, I vote NO on this proposal because I do not believe Cardano Treasury funds should be used to subsidize infrastructure that ultimately operates under a centralized, private service model. Making a paid service temporarily free does not align with the long-term sustainability and open-source values of the Cardano ecosystem. The proposal lacks a clear path toward decentralization or open governance, and funding it could set a precedent for subsidizing private SaaS offerings that do not return ownership or control to the community.

I vote NO on this proposal because the requested amount of funding is disproportionately high compared to the actual scope of work. The proposed functionality—implementing an extended quadratic funding mechanism—can be developed at less than one-tenth of the requested cost using modern development tools and infrastructure.

While the idea of complementing Catalyst with quadratic funding is valuable, the current proposal lacks cost-efficiency and raises concerns about responsible treasury allocation. A more lean and transparent budget would be necessary to justify support.

I vote YES on the OpShin proposal because it significantly lowers the barrier to entry for smart contract development on Cardano by allowing developers to write contracts in Python—one of the most widely used and beginner-friendly languages in the world. This accessibility will accelerate DApp development, especially for developers coming from Web2 backgrounds who may not be familiar with Haskell or Aiken.

Moreover, the project is already functional and used within the ecosystem, with an active and doxed lead developer, showing clear traction and credibility. Supporting OpShin aligns with Cardano’s strategic goal of expanding its developer base and fostering broader adoption. The continued maintenance and evolution of OpShin are vital as Cardano's smart contract standards progress. Funding this initiative ensures Cardano remains a competitive and developer-friendly blockchain platform.

This proposal for Scalus — a Scala 3 based DApps development platform — offers a significant step forward in simplifying Cardano smart contract and DApp development. By enabling developers to use a single, powerful language and ecosystem, it lowers the technical barriers and accelerates time-to-market. This is especially important for onboarding Web2 developers proficient in Scala, Java, and Kotlin, a large talent pool that can now more easily transition to Cardano development.

Importantly, Scalus aligns closely with existing efforts like the Bloxbean Java library, creating synergies that benefit both projects and the wider Java/Scala developer community in Cardano. This alignment fosters interoperability and shared growth of tooling that improves developer experience and ecosystem maturity.
Supporting Scalus means investing in a practical, scalable, and professional-grade toolset that will drive broader adoption, improve code quality, and reduce training costs for businesses. Given the vendor’s strong background and expertise in functional programming and Cardano’s core technologies, this project is well-positioned to deliver long-term value to the community.
For these reasons, I support this proposal as a critical enabler of Cardano’s developer ecosystem expansion and innovation.

Access to reliable, low-latency blockchain data is critical for the success of decentralized applications in Cardano. Dolos fills a key infrastructure gap by offering a lightweight, resource-efficient Cardano data node purpose-built for developers who need to query the ledger without running full-node infrastructure. By reducing cost and complexity, Dolos democratizes backend access for small teams and experimental projects — helping dApps scale without overloading core network resources.

The proposal shows strong technical maturity and ecosystem alignment. Dolos is already open-source, actively maintained, and used in production by projects that value both speed and data integrity. With hundreds of commits and a growing contributor base, it represents a high-leverage, low-cost investment. Continued funding ensures it remains compatible with future protocol changes, and supports the ecosystem's push toward modular, decentralized infrastructure. I vote YES to support the continued evolution of this essential tool for dApp developers in the Cardano ecosystem.

Lucid Evolution is a vital open-source library that simplifies off-chain smart contract interactions on Cardano. As dApp development continues to grow, maintaining and updating such foundational tools is critical to ensure developers can build efficiently and securely. Continuous improvements and compatibility updates directly enhance developer productivity and the robustness of applications running on Cardano.

Anastasia Labs’ extensive track record and deep involvement in the Cardano ecosystem give me confidence that this project will be maintained with high quality and transparency. Supporting this proposal means investing in a core building block that strengthens Cardano’s developer ecosystem and accelerates adoption. Therefore, I vote YES to sustain the evolution and long-term support of Lucid.

While global events like the Cardano Summit and regional tech gatherings can boost marketing and community engagement, as a DRep, I have significant concerns about the justification for treasury funding here.
Firstly, based on the commitments and transparency expected from Core Entities like the Cardano Foundation regarding their Member Based Organization model, I feel those obligations have not been fully met, which reduces my trust in the governance and management of these events.
Secondly, from my personal experience attending the Cardano Summit 2024, I fail to see why treasury funds should support an event where ticket sales generate revenue. Such funding priorities seem questionable, especially when community members can independently purchase access.
Finally, many countries and community members cannot attend such events due to geopolitical or financial restrictions. Therefore, treasury resources should prioritize projects that represent and benefit the entire Cardano community inclusively, rather than costly events with limited accessibility.
For these reasons, I will vote NO on this proposal.

As the only Iranian DRep, I cannot consider Intersect a true Member-Based Organization (MBO) because I am excluded from membership and voting rights due to U.S. sanctions against Iran. This exclusion means Intersect does not represent the entire Cardano community, undermining its claim to be a neutral and inclusive governance facilitator.

Since I, as an Iranian representative, am denied participation and voting power within Intersect’s committees, I am forced to vote NO on all proposals administered by Intersect. The governance structure must be truly representative and inclusive to serve the global Cardano community fairly and transparently. Until these barriers are resolved, I cannot support Intersect’s funding requests from the treasury.

Many Cardano dApps rely on Blockfrost for accessing on-chain data. While Blockfrost has served the ecosystem well, its centralized nature creates a potential bottleneck and single point of failure — something that contradicts the long-term vision of Cardano's decentralized infrastructure.
This proposal introduces an open-source, decentralized alternative built on top of Blockfrost. By enabling the community to access on-chain data without relying solely on a centralized service, it strengthens the ecosystem’s resilience and promotes healthy infrastructure pluralism.

While I believe the requested amount is relatively high — especially considering that Blockfrost has received prior investment from IOG and operates on a revenue model — I still vote YES because the strategic value of decentralizing access to on-chain data outweighs the cost concern. The proposal contributes directly to the robustness and sustainability of Cardano’s developer ecosystem.

While I fully support the value of open-source development as a public good in Cardano, I believe this proposal introduces a centralized funding structure for a decentralized ecosystem — which contradicts Cardano’s core principles. Instead of individual open-source projects applying directly through transparent, competitive processes like Catalyst or direct Treasury withdrawals, this model outsources discretionary power and fund allocation to a committee (OSC) in an off-chain and relatively opaque fashion. It creates a fund-of-funds structure, where the actual recipients of treasury ADA are not clearly named or governed by on-chain logic.

Furthermore, this proposal asks for nearly 6 million ADA to be managed under general categories like “maintainer retainers,” “bug bounties,” and “developer advocacy,” without concrete KPIs, milestone deliverables, or named teams responsible for each initiative. This opens up room for inefficient allocation, political bias, and lack of accountability — especially dangerous in a decentralized ecosystem still building trust around governance. Every open-source project can and should stand on its own, applying transparently and directly for treasury funding through Catalyst or other grant platforms. Consolidating treasury disbursement into a loosely defined structure with off-chain controls is not the right direction for decentralized governance.

Zero-knowledge (ZK) technology and rollups are indeed critical innovations for the future of Cardano — especially for scaling, identity, and interoperability use cases. However, I currently lack sufficient clarity on how zkFold’s implementation aligns with existing ZK research and infrastructure already being developed by IOG and other actors in the ecosystem.

Additionally, considering the technical complexity and the high funding amount, I believe a deeper understanding is needed to responsibly cast a definitive vote. Until more transparent technical documentation and alignment with Cardano’s broader ZK roadmap are provided, I choose to abstain from voting on this proposal.

A reliable UTXO RPC service is essential infrastructure for many current and upcoming projects in the Cardano ecosystem — including Amaru, Mesh, and Lace. Beyond its present utility, UTXO RPC plays a critical role in enabling interoperability with other chains and Layer 2 solutions in the near future.
The proposal comes from TxPipe, a team that has consistently delivered high-quality tools and has already proven its value to the community. Additionally, the requested funding amount is reasonable given the scope, impact, and the technical maturity of the team.

For these reasons, I cast a confident YES vote.

I believe robust, low-level tooling is the invisible backbone of any thriving ecosystem — and in Cardano, Pallas is exactly that. Built in Rust and widely adopted by crucial projects like Aiken, Lucid, Mithril, and Amaru, Pallas provides the cryptographic primitives and serialization layers that allow developers to focus on innovation rather than protocol details. Its open-source nature, wide contributor base, and modular architecture make it an essential public good for enabling both interoperability and scalable dApp development across Cardano.

In my view, TxPipe has consistently proven its reliability and alignment with Cardano’s long-term goals through its public work and transparent delivery. Funding this proposal ensures that Pallas remains updated, maintained, and secure as the protocol evolves. This is not just a maintenance request — it's an investment in the developer experience, ecosystem efficiency, and technical sovereignty of Cardano. I support this proposal with a strong YES, recognizing its foundational role in sustaining decentralized innovation.

I recognize that sustained innovation in decentralized systems requires more than just short-term engineering — it demands rigorous foundational research. The IOR Work Program 2025 represents a long-term commitment to scientific integrity, pushing the boundaries of what’s possible in blockchain scalability, interoperability, and security. Technologies like Ouroboros Omega, ZKPs, and quantum-resistant cryptography are not optional enhancements — they’re essential for Cardano’s resilience and competitive edge over the next decade. Funding this proposal supports a structured and transparent research pipeline that is already integrated with peer-reviewed academic standards and feeds directly into real-world protocol development via formal specifications and CIPs.

I acknowledge the high cost associated with this request, but the scope — 20 research streams and 6 validation paths annually — is equally ambitious and foundational. Input Output Research has a proven track record, with over 200 published papers and direct contributions to Cardano’s core architecture. As long as outputs are made accessible and aligned with the wider community's priorities, this proposal delivers significant long-term value. I vote YES, trusting in the strategic importance of deep research to secure Cardano’s technological and philosophical vision.

Hardware wallets like Ledger, Trezor, and Keystone are essential for secure and non-custodial interaction with the Cardano blockchain. They are used by both everyday users and governance actors like SPOs and DReps, making their reliability and compatibility mission-critical. This proposal ensures that as Cardano evolves — introducing new features or breaking changes — hardware wallets stay up-to-date and usable. Failing to maintain them would create serious accessibility risks, fragmenting user experience and potentially locking out participants from on-chain features, voting, or governance.

The work is led by Vacuumlabs, a deeply experienced team that has been maintaining hardware wallet integrations since 2018. Their consistent delivery and long-standing involvement in Cardano infrastructure give me confidence in the quality and execution of this proposal. Funding this maintenance isn’t just about patches — it’s about preserving trust, usability, and ecosystem inclusivity. That’s why I vote YES to ensure the long-term functionality and resilience of Cardano’s hardware wallet ecosystem.

While I recognize the importance of secure interoperability for Cardano, I believe this proposal introduces redundant infrastructure that does not align with the current strategic roadmap. The Cardano ecosystem has already invested significant research and development into solving cross-chain interoperability through initiatives like PartnerChains, Midnight, and the Partnerchain SDK. These are designed with native compatibility, privacy features, and governance in mind, offering a more integrated and long-term solution for bridging and cross-chain communication. I see little justification for funding a secondary zkBridge approach when core entities are already addressing the problem with scalable and secure infrastructure.

Moreover, deploying zkBridge tooling in isolation raises governance and security fragmentation risks. Without clear integration plans, formal audits, or demonstrated alignment with Intersect, IOG, or the Partnerchain roadmap, the result could be increased complexity and potential conflict with Cardano’s existing interoperability model. Given the high cost, the uncertain ecosystem alignment, and overlap with existing funded solutions, I vote NO on this proposal. In my view, treasury funds should prioritize complementary and non-duplicative efforts that enhance cohesion, not diverge from it.

Cardano.nix is not just a utility—it’s a core infrastructure component that enables developers and SPOs to reliably deploy and maintain Cardano nodes, wallets, and backend services with precision. In our own work, stable tooling like this minimizes deployment friction, accelerates onboarding, and increases long-term maintainability of production systems.

MLabs has already proven itself as one of the most technically proficient teams in the ecosystem, and maintaining Cardano.nix is crucial for the operational integrity of multiple stakeholders, including IOG, Daedalus, and emerging on-chain governance platforms like ours.

Supporting this proposal helps ensure that those building at the infrastructure layer are not left with stale or broken toolchains. As we try to attract more developers—especially from traditional Web2/DevOps backgrounds—Nix-based environments provide clarity and reproducibility that these engineers expect.

I see this proposal as an essential investment for reducing tech debt, improving developer experience, and enabling secure infrastructure at scale.

I support this proposal. BloxBean is essential for Java-based development on Cardano. Funding it enables wider adoption by Web2 developers, ensures ongoing maintenance, and supports projects like GovCircle that rely on it. The requested amount is modest for its impact.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

As a software engineer with over a decade of experience in the Java ecosystem—particularly in developing enterprise applications using Java and the Spring framework—I strongly recognize the strategic importance of BloxBean in the Cardano ecosystem.

In our GovCircle project, we actively use several of BloxBean's tools, especially Yaci and related libraries. Our hands-on experience has shown us that BloxBean has created one of the most practical, developer-friendly, and open-source SDKs available for building on Cardano. It significantly reduces the complexity for Java developers entering the ecosystem and covers many of the essential components needed to interact with Cardano infrastructure.

However, as it currently stands, BloxBean is being maintained by a small team. The tools need further development, improved documentation, and broader support to meet the growing needs of the community. The requested funding will allow the team to onboard another full-time developer, which is essential for scaling the tools, addressing developer feedback, and engaging the wider Java community.

Supporting this proposal is not just a matter of maintaining existing tools—it’s a strategic investment in onboarding Java developers from Web2 into Web3, especially into the Cardano ecosystem. Considering the massive Java developer base globally, enhancing BloxBean could play a critical role in Cardano adoption.

I also want to highlight that the requested amount (₳99,600) is modest when compared to similar SDK/library initiatives in other programming languages. It's a cost-effective proposal with a high impact-to-cost ratio.

Lastly, I encourage my fellow DReps to vote in favor of this proposal. Not supporting BloxBean risks breaking the development pipelines of projects that rely on it—including ours. Strengthening this foundation will benefit the entire Cardano ecosystem by enabling broader, enterprise-level developer engagement.

Let’s invest wisely in the tools that can bring more builders to Cardano.

I vote Yes because this Info Action promotes transparency, accountability, and better governance. Splitting the treasury request into 39 separate governance actions allows voters to assess each item on its own merit.

This modular approach ensures:

Informed decision-making by the community

Avoidance of bundled approval of unrelated or less-supported items

Simplified auditing and tracking of treasury spending

Improved alignment between community values and funding outcomes

Cardano governance should move toward more granular and democratic practices like this. I fully support this direction.

As a DRep in the Cardano ecosystem, I vote Yes for the Amaru proposal due to the following key reasons:

Node Diversity and Decentralization: The Amaru project addresses a critical need in the Cardano network by introducing a new block-producing node written in Rust. This increases resilience by reducing dependency on a single Haskell implementation, thereby enhancing the network's fault tolerance and decentralization.

Performance and Efficiency: Amaru prioritizes better resource usage, including lower memory consumption and enhanced observability through industry-standard monitoring. This improvement benefits Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) by lowering hardware requirements, ultimately reducing operational costs.

Enhanced Interoperability: The Rust-based approach not only attracts a wider pool of developers but also integrates seamlessly with existing blockchain solutions. This modular and flexible design expands the potential for future innovations and use cases within the Cardano ecosystem.

High Assurance and Robustness: The development process of Amaru includes thorough conformance testing and the identification of inconsistencies in existing implementations. This meticulous approach contributes to the network's overall security and stability.

Responsible Budget and Governance: The proposal demonstrates financial responsibility with a clear breakdown of Full-Time Employee (FTE) requirements and contingency planning. Moreover, the use of an on-chain smart contract for budget administration ensures transparency and accountability.

Community-Driven and Open-Source: Amaru's open-source model, managed by PRAGMA—a reputable multi-entity effort—ensures community engagement and long-term maintenance. Regular updates and demos foster transparency and maintain community trust.