Rationale highlights

Why some of the largest DReps voted for and against, in their own words.

• Yoroi W₳llet

  Yes584.2M ₳

  Summary Yoroi DRep votes YES on "Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027" as a well-scoped and timely investment in the protocol infrastructure that Cardano's next phase of growth depends on. Rationale • Peras mainnet deployment is...

  Summary
  Yoroi DRep votes YES on "Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027" as a well-scoped and timely investment in the protocol infrastructure that Cardano's next phase of growth depends on.

  Rationale
  • Peras mainnet deployment is overdue.
  Peras has been in development and the research is sound, but it remains undeployed on mainnet. Reducing finality from roughly 12 minutes to around 2 minutes is not a marginal improvement; it is a prerequisite for the kind of DApp experiences that compete with other L1s. This proposal funds the production cryptography, KillSwitch mechanism, and hard fork readiness work needed to get it there.
  • Keeping node operation economically viable.
  At the throughput levels Leios targets, full-history storage requirements will become economically prohibitive for many SPOs. History Expiry is the structural fix for that problem, and funding it now, ahead of Leios activation, is the right sequencing. Delaying it means the problem arrives faster than the solution.
  • Tweag's track record warrants confidence.
  The team has been contributing to Cardano's consensus and ledger layers since 2018, with prior treasury funding delivered against open-source, publicly tracked milestones. The conformance testing framework being extended here for both Peras and Leios further demonstrates a long-term investment in ecosystem correctness, not just point deliverables.

  Conclusion
  Yoroi supports this proposal as a necessary and well-governed continuation of core infrastructure work that the ecosystem has already committed to. The scope is coherent, the team is credible, and the timing is right. Yoroi votes YES.

• YUTA

  Yes435.8M ₳

  I vote YES on "Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027." Peras + Leios are necessary pieces for Cardano to compete with other L1s. Given Cardano's current transaction volume, the benefits of Peras may be more immediately tangible...

  I vote YES on "Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027."
  Peras + Leios are necessary pieces for Cardano to compete with other L1s. Given Cardano's current transaction volume, the benefits of Peras may be more immediately tangible than those of the currently more popular Leios: Peras shortens finality from roughly 12 minutes to about 2 minutes under certain conditions, so it delivers value whether transaction volume is high or low. Tweag's track record can be verified through its activity in repositories such as cardano-ledger (346 commits — the #2 contributor, after iohk.io's 985), cardano-node, and ouroboros-consensus.
  Furthermore, in response to community feedback, the scope has been narrowed to the necessary minimum compared with the previous proposal.

  ーーー

  私は「Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027」にYESを投票します。

  Peras＋Leiosは他のL1との競争において必要なピースです。現在のCardanoのTxの利用量を考慮すると、現味人気のあるLeiosよりも、Perasはそのスケーラビリティ向上の効果を実感しやすいかもしれません。これはファイナリティを12分から2分へ一定の条件下で早めるものですから、Tx量が高くても低くても、効果があります。cardano-ledger（346 commits = #2 contributor (985 iohk.io に次ぐ)）、cardano-node、ouroboros-consensus githubレポジトリなどでのTweagの活動を確認することがチームの実績を確認できます。

  さらに、コミュニティのフィードバックを受けて、前回の提案書からスコープは必要最小限に絞り込まれました。

• hix_coffeepool

  No50.4M ₳

  I am voting No on this proposal. This year's Net Change Limit (NCL) has been set well above the level I consider sustainable. Under my published voting framework, an appropriate NCL is roughly 15% of the previous year's staking rewards (on the order of...

  I am voting No on this proposal. This year's Net Change Limit (NCL) has been set well above the level I consider sustainable. Under my published voting framework, an appropriate NCL is roughly 15% of the previous year's staking rewards (on the order of ₳82M), whereas the NCL currently in force is several times that amount. Because the treasury is already authorized to disburse far beyond my personal NCL threshold, I am voting No on all treasury withdrawal proposals until aggregate withdrawals are brought back within a sustainable limit — regardless of the individual merits of any single proposal. This vote reflects a position on total treasury spend, not a judgment on the value of your specific project. Reference: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/ [Japanese version follows] 本提案に反対票を投じます。今年のNet Change Limit（NCL）は、私が持続可能と考える水準を大幅に上回って設定されています。公開済みの投票フレームワークでは、適正なNCLは前年のステーキング報酬の約15%（₳82M程度）ですが、現行のNCLはその数倍に達しています。トレジャリーは既に私のpersonal NCL（個人として許容する上限）を大きく超える出金が認められている状態にあるため、出金総額が持続可能な範囲に戻るまで、個別提案の良し悪しに関わらず、すべてのトレジャリー出金提案に反対票を投じます。本投票はトレジャリー支出全体に対する立場の表明であり、貴提案の価値そのものを否定するものではありません。参照: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem-jp/

• Agora | Cardano (by Rodrigo Pacini)

  No261K ₳

  Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN] Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis...

  Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

  Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

  My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

  In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

  At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

  Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

  Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

  This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

  Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

  • Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
  • Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
  • Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
  • Lack of credible execution capacity;
  • Structural governance or transparency concerns;
  • Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

  Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

  This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

  Governance Action Report — Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027 [EN]

  This is a quick-check vote. I am not taking a position here on the technical merit, strategic relevance, or necessity of the proposed work.

  My vote is NO due to insufficient budget granularity.

  The proposal requests a large treasury withdrawal but does not provide enough detail to allow an independent assessment of whether the requested amount is proportionate. It references an average rate of USD 176/hour and uses FTE-based costing, but it does not clearly disclose how many people will work on the project, what roles they will perform, how hours are allocated across milestones, what seniority mix is assumed, or how the estimated workload was derived.

  For a treasury withdrawal of this scale, this level of budget detail is not sufficient. DReps should not be required to infer the actual staffing model or rely primarily on trust in the proposer and later contracting arrangements. Without a clear breakdown of personnel, responsibilities, hours, and milestone-level costs, the budget cannot be adequately verified before voting.

  For this reason, I vote NO.

  Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

  Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

  Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

  Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

  Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

  Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

  Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

  Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

  Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

  • Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
  • Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
  • Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
  • Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
  • Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
  • Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

  Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

  Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

  Relatório de Ação de Governança — Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027 [PT]

  Voto: NÃO

  Este é um voto de quick check. Não será tomada posição, aqui, sobre o mérito técnico, a relevância estratégica ou a necessidade do trabalho proposto.

  O voto é NÃO devido à granularidade insuficiente do orçamento.

  A proposta solicita uma retirada relevante do Tesouro, mas não fornece detalhes suficientes para permitir uma avaliação independente sobre a proporcionalidade do valor solicitado. A proposta menciona uma taxa média de USD 176 por hora e utiliza uma estimativa baseada em FTE, mas não informa com clareza quantas pessoas trabalharão no projeto, quais funções serão exercidas, como as horas serão distribuídas entre milestones, qual composição de senioridade foi assumida ou como o volume de trabalho estimado foi calculado.

  Para uma retirada do Tesouro dessa escala, esse nível de detalhamento orçamentário não é suficiente. DReps não deveriam precisar inferir o modelo real de alocação de equipe nem depender primariamente da confiança no proponente e em arranjos contratuais posteriores. Sem uma decomposição clara de pessoas, responsabilidades, horas e custos por milestone, o orçamento não pode ser adequadamente verificado antes do voto.

  Por esse motivo, o voto é NÃO.