I am voting YES again on this resubmitted proposal for the exact same reasons as before. The core arguments from my previous detailed rationale regarding critical infrastructure, accountability, and the path to self-sustainability still fully apply.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES again on this resubmitted proposal for the exact same reasons as before. The core arguments from my previous detailed rationale regarding critical infrastructure, accountability, and the path to self-sustainability still fully apply.

Read the previous rationale here: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmQuKgWzypZYaVeyaf9suvha9cwuPmtJxbUqN24pYz41iU

Although already passed, I am voting YES to signal support for this massive smart contract improvement. I lack deep technical expertise but fully trust the rigorous diligence and testing conducted by Intersect's committees.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Although this governance action has already passed, I am voting YES to officially signal my support for what is a massive improvement to Cardano's smart contract capabilities. While I lack the deep technical expertise to independently evaluate the updated parameters, I fully trust the rigorous diligence and testing conducted by Intersect's Parameter and Technical Steering Committees.

I am voting YES to fund Eternl. I look at treasury spending very strictly, but Eternl is critical infrastructure we can't afford to lose. This works like a loan, pushing them toward a self-sustainable model instead of making them rely on the treasury forever.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

As a DRep, I always look at treasury spending very strictly. However, evaluating this proposal means balancing fiscal discipline against the reality of what Cardano users actually need on a daily basis. Here is why I am deciding to support this request:

1. Critical Infrastructure and the User Experience

Let's be completely honest: Eternl is a great wallet and I use it daily. Compared to any other Cardano wallet I’ve seen, it’s leaps ahead and we need to make sure we still enjoy a great user experience.

I can't imagine using Lace or falling back to Yoroi (sorry, but this is the hard truth!).

I hear the comments from users who complain that Eternl is complex and not easy for beginners, but for a seasoned user, I think it is by far the best. It currently handles between 10% and 18% of all mainnet transactions. Cardano without Eternl would be a way worse experience for me, and we shouldn't let our main wallets scale down.

2. A Necessary Shift to Self-Sustainability

I would love Eternl to stay completely free and become sustainable based just on transaction fees without a premium subscription.

But the hard truth is that right now, overall Cardano sentiment and usage are at very low levels. This isn't Eternl's fault. If people don't use the network, that's an ecosystem problem, not a wallet problem.

Because of these market conditions, I understand why they need to introduce paid subscriptions. It is not what I had hoped for, but I get it. As a user, I see myself as a paid subscriber to ensure I can keep using this great wallet. I appreciate their plan to stand on their own feet, so I consider this treasury withdrawal to be their last one.

3. Accountability Through a Repayment "Loan" Model

I greatly value that this proposal is basically a "loan" and not a typical grant handout.

The team intends to fully repay the original USD value of the withdrawal ($420,000) back into the treasury from their future surpluses. They are also adding a very generous 50% "interest" (up to $210,000) if they succeed. It won't be an easy task, but they have laid down a good plan.

4. My Concerns About the Runway

Despite my support, I do have some reservations. The assumption that exactly 4.2% of their users will convert to paid subscribers is a bit arbitrary.

All in all, I don't think this target is unachievable or crazy optimistic over the long run, but I am mostly concerned about the time it will take to get there. I am worried about whether the team will have enough runway funds to survive until they actually reach that 4.2% level. The community will need to keep a close eye on their progress reports and on-chain logs.

Closing Thoughts

Voting "YES" to fund Eternl protects our user experience while supporting their transition into a fully self-sustaining business. It keeps an excellent piece of infrastructure alive without creating permanent dependency on the treasury.

I have decided to abstain. This proposal is too technical for me to objectively evaluate. While an enterprise JVM platform is promising, real market demand isn't guaranteed. Also, funding another node isn't a treasury priority right now. I'd reconsider in a future budget cycle.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I have decided to abstain on this proposal. Because it is highly technical, it is very difficult for me to objectively evaluate it.

There are certainly good things here. The enterprise-grade JVM platform seems very promising and could serve as a bridge for institutional adoption. Still, building it does not automatically guarantee that there will be real market demand or real-world usage.

Also, a big part of this proposal is funding another node. Since the treasury has already funded alternative nodes like Dingo and Amuru, financing another one does not seem like a top ecosystem priority at this current stage.

Taking our current treasury spending into consideration, I would be much more willing to vote "yes" on a proposal like this under more favorable market conditions and in a future budget cycle - specifically, a cycle where we don't already have two or more other nodes under development.

I am voting NO on the Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program. While I strongly support the mission of open-source sustainability, an upfront 36-month commitment of ₳12,000,000 is too large an ask for our treasury at this time.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I deeply respect the intent behind this proposal; sustaining our open-source maintainers is undeniably critical for Cardano's long-term resilience. However, my guiding principle as a DRep is responsible and justifiable treasury spending.

The way we currently operate relies on an annual budget cycle. We cannot responsibly commit future years' funds within the current fiscal period, because doing so locks up liquidity and restricts those funds from being allocated to other projects and pressing needs in our ecosystem.

I encourage the proposers to return with a revised approach: a leaner proposal split into 12-month funding rounds. This would fit our annual budget structure and significantly reduce the upfront ask. Additionally, this approach allows the community to appropriately evaluate the program's effectiveness before renewing funding in subsequent cycles.

I am voting YES on Cardano Vision 2026. Cardano = Science. Without our scientific foundation, we are no better than a random meme coin. Dedicating less than 10% of our protocol's annual revenue to critical, existential R&D is a sound and absolutely essential investment in our future.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Science is our fundamental identity. One must look through this prism to understand why funding of this proposal is essential and why voting "YES" is so obvious.

Cardano’s entire Unique Selling Proposition (USP) is built on rigorous, peer-reviewed science. If we strip away that scientific foundation, Cardano becomes less useful than a random shitcoin. Our narrative, our security, and our future rely on the application of groundbreaking technologies, just like the Ouroboros protocol, which would never have existed without this exact type of foundational research.

We cannot risk defunding our research arm and watching our brightest scientists migrate to competing ecosystems. The work packages outlined in this proposal, particularly post-quantum resistance and advanced scalability, are NOT optional "nice-to-haves". They are critical, existential imperatives. We must move forward.

I understand that a ₳32.9M ask might seem big when viewed in isolation. However, as a DRep committed to responsible treasury spending, I look at the macroeconomics: The Cardano protocol generates roughly ₳350M annually through its monetary engine and fees. This means CV26 represents an R&D allocation of less than 10%. In the high-tech sector, it's typical for companies to spend 15% to 30% of their annual revenue on R&D just to stay relevant. By that metric, spending under 10% on research for a protocol that literally defines itself by science is not just rational - it is highly conservative.

Finally, I want to acknowledge that this proposal provides a much higher level of granularity and budget transparency compared to previous IO requests, which I have criticized in the past.

Science is the foundation of our home. Without it, we break apart. I am voting YES to keep Cardano at the forefront of innovation.

In line with my past vote, I'm voting YES for Gerolamo. This in-browser light node gives Cardano trustless on-device validation for dApps/wallets.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

In line with my previous vote, I am voting YES for Gerolamo. Cardano uniquely benefits from an in-browser, fully-validating light node that allows wallets and dApps to verify data directly on-device without trusting centralized servers. While this phase focuses on client-side validation to contain costs, I strongly entertain the idea of this project evolving into a full block-producing client node during a secondary funding phase in 2027.

In line with my previous vote on the combined Pebble and Gerolamo proposal, I am voting YES to support this streamlined, critical infrastructure project.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Following my previous vote on the combined proposal, I am voting YES again to support Pebble. This proposal focuses strictly on essential infrastructure, providing an easier entry point for millions of JavaScript and TypeScript developers to build on Cardano while keeping our core network tooling updated and stable.

I am voting NO. While I respect EMURGO’s marketing efforts, upgrading to a 'Title' sponsorship has a poor ROI and feels like corporate vanity spending.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

After careful review, I am voting NO on the TOKEN2049 Singapore 2026 ‘Title’ Sponsorship Upgrade. While I supported the baseline ‘Platinum’ sponsorship to ensure Cardano has a solid presence and a stage for our community builders, this expensive top-up brings diminishing returns.

As a DRep committed to responsible and justifiable treasury spending, I share several key concerns raised by the community:

• Poor Onboarding ROI: Spending large amounts of treasury funds for premium branding at investor-heavy events usually results in low retail adoption and a weak return on investment.
• Corporate Vanity & Opportunity Cost: This upgrade risks becoming vanity spending. These funds would be much more productive if deployed toward core infrastructure, developer tools, or protocol scaling.
• Missing Co-funding: The treasury should not completely subsidize commercial marketing. Entities that gain direct commercial upside from these events should co-fund the costs.

A Path to a "YES" Vote:
Charles Hoskinson’s public mention that he is willing to fund a portion of this upgrade is a very positive step toward financial accountability.

However, because we do not know the exact details or how much he will commit, the current proposal puts an unnecessary burden on the treasury. If a significant, specific portion of the cost is subsidized (by Charles or even perhaps Emurgo), I will gladly switch my vote to YES before the voting window closes.

I support these vital infrastructure upgrades (Peras, Leios, History Expiry) but am abstaining to provide feedback for the anticipated revision. I encourage the team to return with a leaner, unbundled, one-year proposal so we can fund this work and get started ASAP.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Since this treasury withdrawal has already failed to pass, my "Abstain" vote serves to place my governance rationale on the record and provide constructive feedback for the team's anticipated revision.

I want to be clear: I fully support the necessity of these deliverables. Leios is only half of the picture; the rest is Peras, and we absolutely need both for our scalability and to realize our Cardano 2030 strategy. The accompanying work packages are also critical (for example, History Expiry, without which smaller SPOs would soon struggle to keep up with upcoming hardware requirements of Leios, posing a direct threat to our decentralization). I also greatly value the team's transparency and the highly detailed breakdown of salaries, development costs, and overhead.

I understand the community’s concerns regarding the bundled nature of the proposals and the massive two-year funding request. While I see valid logistical reasons for the team's approach, as these work packages are closely interconnected and guaranteed funding ensures zero development disruption, we must balance efficiency with responsible, step-by-step treasury management.

What I am looking for in a revised proposal:

I would like to see the team return with a revised, leaner approach that addresses the community's structural concerns:

1. Shorter Time Horizons: Split the funding request into a one-year timeframe (if feasible), rather than asking for two years upfront.

2. Strategic Unbundling: Separate the work packages into tighter, more modular proposals. Group together only the deliverables that are absolutely interconnected by technical dependencies or strict timelines.

3. Optimized Budget: Review the budget to cut any non-essential spending. We should strive for the leanest possible execution without compromising on the high standards of quality and security the Cardano network demands.

I look forward to seeing a modular revision of this vital infrastructure work and having the team start working on delivering those work packages ASAP.

I'm voting YES on TOKEN2049 Singapore. EMURGO listened to community feedback, reducing the budget request. Cardano requires active global marketing, and the world’s largest Web3 event provides a vital opportunity for exposure and builder support.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I decided to support this proposal based on these three points:

• Community Feedback Addressed: EMURGO listened to initial DRep and community feedback regarding the budget scale, separating this from the Cardano Summit proposal and lowering the tier to a more responsible 'Platinum' request.
• Essential Marketing Presence: Cardano needs active global marketing. As the world's largest crypto and Web3 event, TOKEN2049 Singapore provides a necessary platform to put our ecosystem in front of over 25,000 decision-makers and investors.
• Direct Value for Builders: This sponsorship directly supports our ecosystem projects by providing them with free tickets, dedicated presentation stage time, and global exposure that they otherwise could not access individually.

I support the L2 Scalability projects but vote NO due to unfulfilled Midgard deliverables, restrictive bundling, and a lack of budget granularity beyond top-level workstream figures. Meaningful progress on these fronts provides a clear path to a YES vote.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Introduction

I want to explicitly state my strong support for the technological goals of this initiative. Data Availability, Hydra, and Midgard are critical for Cardano's future, and I want to see all of these projects materialize. However, specific reservations force me to vote NO on this current proposal.

My Reservations

• Outstanding Deliverables: Midgard has previously received significant funding but has failed to formally deliver several key commitments (e.g., the Statement of Milestones and the 2025 end-of-year mainnet readiness). While I hear that the actual work may be largely completed, formal reports have not been submitted. In governance, my principle is "Don't Trust! Verify". The community needs to see the concrete deliverables before releasing further funds.
• Proposal Bundling: Packaging three distinct workstreams into a single proposal forces a "take it or leave it" dynamic. I fundamentally disagree with this approach. The community should have the right to vote on these projects individually and potentially fund them across different budget periods.
• Budget Opacity: Consistent with other IO proposals, this request suffers from a "black box" budget. While the proposal does explicitly break down the costs into three distinct areas (Workstream 1 L2 Agnostic: ₳1,895,613; Workstream 2 Hydra Production: ₳7,582,452; Workstream 3 Midgard Optimisation: ₳947,806), these massive sums simply fall under a vague "Development" line without any further granularity. I am not looking to micromanage developer salaries, but I need to understand how those numbers were actually calculated (for example, how we ended up with a number like 7.58M ADA for Hydra and why not 3M or 10M?).

A Clear Path to YES

I am eager to support this initiative. Meaningful progress on the following points would prompt me to re-evaluate and switch my vote to YES:

1. Unbundling: Separate the proposal so the community can evaluate and vote on the three distinct projects individually.
2. Submit Past Deliverables: Midgard must submit their pending reports and formal deliverables from previous funding. Basic accountability cannot be compromised.
3. Provide High-Level Granularity: Provide a deeper breakdown of the workstream budgets. To reiterate a core principle from my past rationales: if the Treasury is funding for-profit businesses, then we should have some stake in them. Alternatively, if we are funding public good infrastructure, those organizations should not be scooping fat profit margins at the Treasury's expense. We need enough high-level detail to ensure the requested money is directly compensating specialized builders, rather than quietly covering management bonuses and corporate padding.

I am voting YES. While I have serious concerns about IOG's budget opacity and the lack of a long-term maintenance plan, lowering the barrier to entry for developers is an absolute must-have. Tools like cardano-init and a battle-tested smart contract library are critical for ecosystem growth.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

My initial inclination was to vote "NO" on this proposal, but after deeper reflection and past conversations with developers building on Cardano, I have decided to vote YES.

Cardano cannot thrive solely on theoretical capabilities; without an ecosystem of amazing DApps, having smart contract capability means very little. Right now, our main issue is a lack of users and real-world demand, and DApps are the vehicle to drive that demand. However, to get those DApps, we must attract more developers, and our current builders suffer from fragmented, outdated documentation.
Lowering the barrier to entry is no longer a "nice-to-have" - it is an absolute "must-have". Features like the cardano-init CLI, which allows developers to spin up a project in minutes (similar to a React app), alongside a battle-tested smart contract library, will vastly reduce the time from a developer's start to their MVP.

However, my support comes with significant reservations that haven't been addressed so far:

1. Budget Opacity: I am highly disappointed by how IOG presents its budget details, just like the rest of their proposals. A staggering 81% of the total requested amount is hidden behind a black box labeled "Development & Engineering teams", providing us with zero granular visibility.
2. Entity Responsibilities: Ideally, an initiative focused on foundational developer experience and documentation should be spearheaded and funded by the Cardano Foundation (CF), as I believe this falls under their mandate. Since they haven't initiated this, I am glad IOG stepped in, but we need better alignment on responsibilities moving forward.
3. Future Maintenance: The proposal lacks a clear post-completion maintenance plan. Who will maintain this code and documentation once this is finished and these funds are depleted? Without a dedicated strategy, we risk falling right back to where we are today with outdated resources.

Despite these serious concerns, the sheer utility of improving the developer experience outweighs the negatives. I am voting YES because we must equip our builders with the tools they desperately need to succeed.

I am voting ABSTAIN. While I strongly support reinforcing Cardano’s high-assurance identity, I am deeply concerned that we risk spending over 13 million ADA on developer tools that may ultimately lack real-world adoption.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I have decided to vote ABSTAIN on the "IO: Cardano High Assurance Technical Collaboration" Treasury Withdrawal proposal.

Cardano's reputation for security and correctness is its primary differentiator. In the minds of users, the security of the underlying protocol and the DApps built on top of it are deeply interlinked. A vulnerability in a major DApp damages the reputation of the entire ecosystem. Therefore, delivering automated formal verification tools to ensure our DeFi landscape is as secure as possible is an objective I fundamentally agree with.

In fact, I consider ecosystem security so critical that I would normally be willing to overlook my usual strict requirements for budget transparency to protect the network's reputation. Once again, this proposal presents a financial "black box", with 86% of the requested ₳13,078,578 budget (amounting to ₳11,247,577) allocated broadly to "Development" without granular details. I have repeatedly expressed my frustration with this opacity in past IO proposals.

However, the budget structure is not my primary reason for abstaining this time.

My definitive reservation is the risk of non-adoption. The proposal aims to build a Container-Based Developer Environment (CBDE) and open automated formal verification tools (Blaster). Yet, the proposal itself explicitly acknowledges the risk that, without dedicated promotion and developer outreach, these tools might see low adoption despite on-time delivery.

We cannot afford to fund a 13-million ADA public good if it ends up being underutilised or ignored by the developer community. Until there is a clearer, guaranteed pathway to ensure active developer onboarding and the integration of these tools into everyday workflows, I cannot confidently commit treasury funds to this endeavor.

I vote YES. The revised proposal uncouples the event, reduces costs, and increases CF’s contribution. A Tier-1 event in Singapore before Token2049 is vital for marketing. However, future summits should aim for 100% self-sustainability, transparent business ROI, and higher CF financial backing.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES on the revised Cardano Summit 2026 proposal. I highly appreciate that the Cardano Foundation listened to community feedback by decoupling this request from EMURGO's proposal, significantly reducing the overall requested treasury amount, and increasing their own internal contributions.

As a top-tier blockchain, Cardano boasts unmatched technology but has historically lacked the marketing presence to match. We absolutely need a high-end, Tier-1 event to showcase our ecosystem to the world. Strategically positioning this Summit in Singapore immediately preceding Token2049 is an ideal move to capture institutional and enterprise attention.

However, while I support this iteration, I'd like to see the following improvements in future event proposals:

• Greater Skin in the Game: I believe that the Cardano Foundation should cover at least 50% of the total event costs from their own allocated funds, rather than relying heavily on the treasury.

• Path to Sustainability: I highly advocate for a definitive roadmap demonstrating how the Summit can transition into a 100% self-sustained event, funded entirely by event revenues or the Foundation's own backing.

• Verifiable ROI: Event outcomes must move beyond general "brand awareness" and translate directly into specific, measurable new business for our ecosystem. We need transparent tracking of how generated leads actively convert into tangible opportunities and partnerships.

I appreciate the responsiveness shown in this revised proposal, which has my support today. Moving forward, we must continue pushing for fully sustainable events that deliver clearly measurable business value.

I am voting NO on this bundled proposal. While Project Cayley is a 'must-have', I cannot support public subsidization of a private, for-profit business without clear revenue-sharing, strict transparency between free and premium tiers, or a neutral infrastructure fund.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

To be absolutely clear, I fully support Project Cayley. It is critical infrastructure. Without sliced indexing, the upcoming Leios upgrade will make data access far too expensive, which would inadvertently force network centralization. Furthermore, I have mixed feelings regarding Blockfrost because I highly value the services they have historically provided to our community. I have used their free tier myself, and I fundamentally agree with the logic that "if we use it, we should fund it".

However, as a DRep committed to responsible and justifiable treasury spending, I must vote NO on this specific implementation due to the following critical concerns:

• The Bundling Problem: This proposal tangles together public infrastructure (Project Cayley, which is absolutely needed for our decentralization) with the operational funding of a private business. These should be separate conversations.
• Privatizing Profits, Socializing Costs: We must examine Blockfrost’s revenue model and cost structure to validate their needs. Blockfrost is a private, for-profit company, and while generating profit is entirely welcomed, asking for treasury subsidies changes the dynamic. To use an analogy from the "legacy" world: when banks collapse, governments (the taxpayers) often step in to bail them out. The absolute minimum expectation in those scenarios is that the public receives a stake or share in the institution. If we expect those standards in the legacy world, we should demand even higher standards of transparency and co-ownership in Web3. If we share the costs, we should share the revenues.
• Market Distortion & Centralization: By funding a specific commercial business, we are essentially picking winners and losers at the protocol level. What happens to competitors like Koios? We risk distorting the free market, which leaves other companies struggling to survive unless they also ask for funding. Both outcomes are detrimental: we either end up funding every commercial indexing business out there, or we drive competitors to extinction, resulting in a centralized monopoly.
• Lack of Financial Segregation: We must separate the "free tier" (the service to our community) from their profit-generating side. Without detailed reports, we cannot evaluate if our subsidy solely covers the infrastructure costs of the free tier, or if it is inadvertently subsidizing the premium tier, corporate profit margins, or executive bonuses.

A Clear Path to "YES"
I understand that Blockfrost is critical infrastructure, and I am highly motivated to see our indexing capabilities scale. I would gladly change my vote to YES if any of the following conditions are met in a revised proposal:

1. Share Costs = Share Revenues: Implement a business model where the community sees a return on its investment. For example, allocating a percentage of premium tier revenues back to the treasury is a highly viable path forward.
2. Strict Business Unit Separation: Provide full transparency into the free path. Blockfrost must provide detailed reports allowing us to evaluate the exact costs of the free tier. There should be zero profit margin applied to the public subsidy of the free tier, while the premium side rightly remains a distinct, for-profit endeavor.
3. A Neutral Treasury Fund for Indexing: After conducting a comprehensive assessment of our blockchain's indexing needs, we establish a neutral fund from the Treasury. This fund would be exclusively dedicated to supporting the baseline indexing needs (e.g., covering basic infrastructure costs) of all similar businesses in the ecosystem. This way, all companies gain the exact same foundational advantages without the protocol causing market distortion.

I am voting Yes on Pogun. While we have other Bitcoin solutions, this proposal shifts our Treasury from a charity to a venture fund with its EBITDA repayment and perpetual return model. Its non-margin lending and highly efficient BABE protocol are excellent, though we must monitor finances closely.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Long story short: I would have voted "No" on this proposal had it not been for the repayment and perpetual return structure.

Typically, I prefer to allocate my votes toward protocol updates and core upgrades rather than commercial DApps. For a commercial venture to earn my support, it needs to offer a full repayment, provide yield to replenish the treasury, or be an absolute "must-have" killer product. Since we already have a few alternative Bitcoin solutions in the pipeline, this isn't necessarily a unique "must-have", but it strongly satisfies the first two criteria.

Here is why I am supporting this withdrawal:

• Venture Fund Model: This proposal has the potential to transform our Treasury from a "charity" granting free capital into a "venture fund". Pogun commits to returning 20% of its EBITDA until the initial funding is repaid. This is followed by an ongoing 5% perpetual return to the Cardano Treasury. This is the exact kind of financial stewardship we need to sustain the ecosystem.

• Institutional Appeal via Non-Margin Lending: The credit market introduces a non-margin, peer-to-peer lending model. Because collateral is only at risk upon definitive default—and not due to intra-day price fluctuations—there are no oracle-driven liquidations. Furthermore, borrowers recover the exact identical Bitcoin UTxO they locked, which avoids triggering a taxable disposal event. This makes it significantly more enticing to institutional capital.

• Massive Technical Efficiency: The custom bridge utilizes the BABE witness encryption protocol. Compared to current heavy-weight ZK implementations, BABE is a massive operational improvement, boasting a ~2,000x faster setup time and ~1,868x lower off-chain storage requirement.

A Note of Caution to the Community:
While the financial model is excellent on paper, I recognize the valid fear of "creative accounting". There is always a risk that a project could artificially inflate operational costs or salaries to remain "EBITDA negative" indefinitely, thus indefinitely delaying Treasury repayment. I am optimistic the team will act in good faith, but we as DReps must pay close attention to their quarterly financial transparency reports should this proposal pass.

I am voting YES. While not a strict “keep the lights on” need, enhancing Plutus is essential for Cardano's DeFi competitiveness. Making smart contracts cheaper and faster is vital. I also applaud the improved budget transparency in this proposal compared to recent requests.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES on this proposal for the following key reasons:

• Crucial for Competitiveness & DeFi: To remain relevant, we need cheaper on-chain execution costs that open up application designs that were previously uneconomical. Targeted expansions, such as removing the redundant scope check (which currently adds roughly 25% to script preparation time) and adding new primitives, will significantly reduce execution budgets. This is fundamental for our DeFi ecosystem to flourish and attract deeper liquidity.

• Supporting Node Diversity: I have consistently voted to strengthen Cardano’s resilience through technical diversity, such as funding alternative node clients like Amaru and Dingo. This proposal directly supports those initiatives. By delivering a property-based conformance testing framework and authoritative Agda formalisations, alternative full node builders gain the tools needed to verify their evaluators against the canonical implementation.

• A Step Forward in Budget Transparency: In my previous rationales, I strongly criticised the "black box" nature of IO’s funding requests and the lack of full-time equivalent (FTE) granularity. I am pleased to see that this proposal provides a clear breakdown of the required engineering resources (e.g., specific allocations for compiler, cryptography, and formal methods engineers). While there is always room for improvement, this allows us to make rough FTE estimates and represents a much-needed shift toward the responsible and justifiable treasury spending I advocate for.

Closing Thoughts

We must continue to equip developers with the best possible tools to build without friction. Furthermore, by distributing the stewardship of Plutus alongside VacuumLabs - a specialist firm with deep expertise - we are moving away from a single point of failure. This distributed ownership model is exactly the kind of ecosystem sustainability and resilience our digital nation needs.

My Abstain vote is a demand for transparency. While Cardano needs this maintenance, the ₳45.9M Development budget is a black box. We preach “Don’t Trust, Verify”, yet are forced to blindly trust IOG. If IOG provides a structural breakdown off-chain, I will gladly switch my vote to Yes.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I currently feel almost blackmailed into voting for this proposal. Not because of direct pressure, but because of the stark reality of our situation: I know we absolutely need this maintenance initiative to materialize, yet we are given close to nothing regarding how IOG actually arrived at the final number.

The massive “Development” budget is a black box that we are expected to somehow just “trust”. Yet, as an ecosystem, we preach every single day: “Don’t Trust, Verify!”. How are we supposed to blindly trust this? Let’s be honest with ourselves: if this exact proposal had been submitted by any entity other than IOG, we would scrutinize every single item (best case!). In the worst case, we would have downvoted it the moment it went on-chain. This is a glaring double standard, and I feel guilty even entertaining it.

I am deeply frustrated because it feels like I am being forced to choose the least damaging option: compromising my own governance integrity, or risking the network’s security, which is absolutely at stake if this isn’t approved.

We have a right to know how IOG came to this figure. I am not looking to micromanage, challenge individual FTEs, or debate how well developers are compensated. I simply want to understand the big picture. Why do we need 45.9M for development and not 30M, or 100M? Right now, from a governance perspective, it is just an arbitrary number.

I'm voting YES on the IO: Cardano Upgrades proposal. Implementing Babel fees, Account Addresses, and a Multi-Asset Treasury are crucial for DeFi, L2 scaling, and treasury resilience. However, I continue to urge IO to provide greater budget granularity in future funding requests.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES to fund the IO: Cardano Upgrades initiative. This proposal encompasses three highly anticipated and fundamentally important technical upgrades that I am eager to see implemented.

First, Babel fees have been a promised feature for years - in fact, it was one of the core technologies that initially drew my excitement to Cardano. While it has been a long time coming, I am optimistic that we will finally see this materialize, at the very least as a production-ready MVP, through this funding.

Second, the account address enhancement is critical. It unlocks the ability to implement micro-fees and significantly reduces operational costs for DeFi applications, which are currently relatively high. Leveling up our DeFi ecosystem is an absolute necessity right now. Furthermore, this upgrade provides the amount-based patterns essential for robust Layer 2 scaling solutions.

Third, implementing a Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury is a profound strategic enhancement. Had the Treasury been able to hold a portion of its funds in stablecoins, its current fiat value would be substantially larger. Beyond stablecoins, this feature will allow the Treasury to hold Cardano Native Tokens (CNTs). This effectively transforms the Treasury into a stakeholder in promising ecosystem projects - a powerful mechanism for ensuring our ecosystem remains strong, resilient, and mutually invested.

However, despite my strong support for these technologies, I remain concerned by the lack of cost granularity provided by IO. The budget is once again presented as a financial "black box" divided into three broad workstream buckets. While this lack of detail might be acceptable for a private corporation operating on its own capital, it is not an acceptable standard when requesting external public funding from the Treasury. As I have stated in previous rationales, I strongly urge IO - and all proposers - to adopt greater transparency in their funding requests.

Nevertheless, the technological merit of these three upgrades is undeniable, and I am highly motivated to see all of them implemented. The long-term benefits to the ecosystem far outweigh my reservations regarding the budget presentation.

I am voting YES on the IO Consensus Initiative. While the development budget lacks granular FTE details, delivering Ouroboros Leios is absolutely essential for Cardano's survival and 2030 scalability targets. I have full confidence in IO to execute this critical network upgrade.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES to fund the IO: Consensus Initiative. After careful consideration, I view Ouroboros Leios not merely as a highly desirable upgrade, but as an absolute necessity for Cardano's long-term survival and ecosystem growth.

To achieve our 2030 roadmap targets (specifically the ambitious goal of 27 million monthly transactions), this consensus upgrade is mathematically necessary. Without Leios, scaling to meet that level of global demand is simply impossible.

However, I do not take the requested treasury amount lightly. My primary reservation lies with the "Development" portion of the budget. Requesting ₳23.8M (86% of the total budget) without providing granular details, such as the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs), the split between senior and junior engineers, or estimated hourly rates, creates a financial "black box". As an advocate for responsible and justifiable treasury spending, I strongly urge IO and others to provide greater transparency in future proposals of this magnitude.

Despite this reservation, I am fully committed to funding this initiative. Even after intentionally playing devil's advocate, I simply could not find any convincing reasons where the costs outweigh the immense benefits. My confidence in IO's proven ability to deliver complex, high-assurance engineering ultimately outweighs my budgetary critiques. I look forward to seeing Leios implemented, ensuring our network is fully equipped for sustainable, long-term expansion.

I am voting NO on this joint proposal because the total budget ask is simply too high, and bundling these two initiatives into an "all-or-nothing" vote limits our options as DReps.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting NO on this joint proposal because the total budget ask is simply too high, and bundling these two initiatives into an "all-or-nothing" vote limits our options as DReps.

While I see the value in the synergies of co-locating the Summit with TOKEN2049, and I absolutely want Cardano represented at both events, we need to focus on leaner spending. I strongly prefer having separate proposals so we can evaluate them individually.

I acknowledge that the proposers have already listened to community feedback and submitted separate, revised actions. I will evaluate those new proposals based on their individual merits and updated funding requests.

I’m voting YES on HLabs. Despite initial budget concerns, Gerolamo’s browser-native resilience and Pebble’s imperative syntax offer unique strategic value. These tools enable true decentralization and lower entry barriers for devs, justifying this vital treasury investment.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Summary

After deep reflection and additional research, I have decided to vote YES on the Harmonic Laboratories proposal. While I initially had reservations regarding the budget, my further research into the unique "serverless" resilience of the Gerolamo node and the onboarding potential of the Pebble language has convinced me of its strategic value for Cardano.

Transparency & Due Diligence Disclosure

I want to be as transparent as possible with my delegators: I am not a technical expert. Recognizing this, I have spent additional time researching this proposal and weighing the rationales of respected DReps whose technical judgment I value. Specifically, the views of Input Endorsers, Cardano Yoda, Cerkoryn, Varavas, Yuta, Dave, and Chris Cata were instrumental in helping me navigate the complexities of this action.
Furthermore, I was approached by the Harmonic Labs team to discuss my initial concerns. Our dialogue was productive and allowed me to gain a much deeper understanding of the project’s scope.

Rationale

1. True "Don’t Trust, Verify" for Users: Gerolamo is a different "beast" because it is a TypeScript implementation capable of running directly in a browser. This allows users and dApp developers to verify the ledger on their own devices rather than relying on 3rd-party APIs. This provides a level of censorship resistance and "serverless" resilience that is currently a missing piece in our ecosystem and more aligned with my self-sovereignty / “power to the edges” philosophy.
2. Lowering the Developer Barrier: I am now convinced that Pebble is a vital "on-ramp”. By offering an imperative programming style familiar to the 17 million JS/TS and Solidity developers, we can onboard talent more effectively than through functional programming alone.
3. Clarification on Costs: My main concern was the high cost of FTEs. The team successfully explained that these figures represent the total revenue distribution required to support a high-level operation - including taxes, benefits, and overhead - rather than just base salaries. To attract and retain the tier of engineering talent required for a node implementation, these rates are a necessary investment.

Conclusion

Cardano needs more than just core infrastructure; it needs tools that make it easy for users to be self-sovereign and for developers to build. This proposal delivers both. While the budget remains a significant ask, I believe the long-term benefits to our decentralization and adoption metrics justify the investment.

I am voting YES to approve the transition of Project Catalyst management from IOG to the Cardano Foundation (CF).

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES to approve the transition of Project Catalyst management from IOG to the Cardano Foundation (CF). My primary motivation is to ensure business continuity for our ecosystem’s builders and to uphold our commitment to those already delivering value through Funds 10–14.

I am voting YES on this Withdrawal Action, which is in accordance with my previous votes on both the broader treasury budget and the original DeFi Liquidity Info Action.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES on this Withdrawal Action, which is in accordance with my previous votes on both the broader treasury budget and the original DeFi Liquidity Info Action.

While I consistently advocate for conservative and highly scrutinized treasury spending, I view this 800,000 ADA withdrawal not as a sunk expense, but as a mandatory security investment. Establishing a formal legal entity (Cayman Islands Foundation) to protect the community and committee members from liability, alongside funding rigorous, independent smart contract audits, are non-negotiable prerequisites before we deploy larger liquidity pools into the ecosystem.

Ultimately, this ensures we have the necessary legal accountability and technical guardrails in place, providing a secure, resilient, and professionally managed foundation to responsibly scale Cardano's DeFi landscape.

I have decided to vote "YES" on the funding request for the Dingo Go node, although I initially considered voting "NO."

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I have decided to vote "YES" on the funding request for the Dingo Go node, although I initially considered voting "NO".

As someone who maintains a conservative approach to treasury spending, I was reluctant to fund a third node implementation. Since we already have the Amaru (Rust) node being developed alongside our foundational Haskell node, I felt that our need for network resilience and node diversity was already met.

However, I deeply respect the Blink Labs team and value their ongoing work for our ecosystem. Because I am not a developer myself, I wanted to be certain I wasn't missing any important technical details. Therefore, I relied on AI-driven research to better understand the proposal.

Through this research, I realized that the Go implementation (Dingo) brings several important new characteristics to Cardano that go beyond just network resilience:

• Cheaper and Easier dApp Deployment: Dingo includes built-in APIs and indexing. This lowers the infrastructure overhead, making it much more cost-effective and easier for developers to build and launch dApps.

• Bridging the Gap to Enterprise Adoption: Go is the industry standard for modern tech and cloud computing. Dingo makes it much easier for traditional businesses to adopt Cardano and connect it to the systems they already use.

• Accelerating the Leios Hard Fork: Dingo's architecture provides a valuable testing ground for the upcoming Leios upgrade, helping us prepare to scale the network safely and efficiently.

Closing Thoughts:

While the requested budget is substantial, I now view this not just as funding for an extra node, but as a strategic investment to grow our ecosystem, make it easier for developers to build, and attract larger enterprises to Cardano.

I have decided to vote NO.

While I recognize the immense effort that went into designing this framework, and I genuinely appreciate several of its components, my concerns regarding centralization, bureaucracy, and exclusivity ultimately outweigh the benefits of this specific implementation.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

After reviewing the proposed Cardano Budget Process Framework for 2026, I have decided to vote NO.

While I recognize the substantial effort that went into designing this framework, and I genuinely appreciate several of its components, my concerns regarding centralization, bureaucracy, and exclusivity ultimately outweigh the benefits of this specific implementation.

What I Support in This Proposal

To be clear, I am not opposed to structured coordination. In fact, there are several aspects of this framework that I find highly commendable:

Structured Stages & Strategic Alignment: I appreciate the logical progression of stages and the requirement for proposals to align with the Vision 2030 strategy and specific KPIs. This mirrors my own principle of demanding a clear ROI for treasury spending.

Anti-Spam Measures: The requirement of a 1,000 ADA deposit is a sensible guardrail to protect our treasury from spam and low-effort submissions.

Why I Am Voting NO

Despite the positive elements, I cannot support the framework in its current iteration due to the following critical concerns:

The "Brussels" Effect and Centralization Risks: I am deeply concerned that this process positions Intersect as the "Brussels" of Cardano: a centralized, bureaucratic hub that operates at a distance from the everyday citizens of our digital nation. As a DRep, my core mandate is to champion greater decentralization. Introducing heavy bureaucratic layers risks hindering grassroots innovation and alienating the wider community.

Insufficient Time for Review in Ekklesia: Drawing from our experience in the previous funding round, I am worried that the Ekklesia process will not provide DReps with adequate time to conduct proper due diligence. If we are forced to review complex, high-budget work packages under strict deadlines, we cannot responsibly safeguard the treasury.

The Risk of an Oligarchy: The reliance on "participating stake" within Ekklesia, especially when combined with tight voting windows, creates a significant vulnerability. It risks concentrating decision-making power in the hands of a few large DReps who have the resources to move quickly, inadvertently forming an oligarchy. This contradicts my guiding principle of making decisions that benefit the many rather than a select few.

Increasing Barriers to Entry: By making the governance and funding process highly demanding and corporate in its structure, we are making participation more exclusive. Instead of empowering average ADA holders to engage with the ecosystem, we are building a system that only seasoned professionals or well-funded entities can navigate.

Closing Thoughts

We have built the first digital country, and its governance should be accessible, decentralized, and transparent. While we definitely need a budget framework, it must not come at the cost of creating a centralized bureaucracy. I welcome a revised framework that ensures sufficient review time, mitigates the power of large stakeholders in off-chain polling, and keeps governance accessible to all Cardano citizens.

I have decided to vote YES on the Amaru 2026 Treasury Withdrawal proposal. My decision is based on my core principles of strengthening Cardano's resilience through technical diversity, while maintaining high expectations for transparency and accountability.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I have decided to vote YES on the Amaru 2026 Treasury Withdrawal proposal. My decision is based on my core principles of strengthening Cardano's resilience through technical diversity, while maintaining high expectations for transparency and accountability.

1. Critical Need for Node Diversity

A second, independent node implementation is not a luxury; it is a necessity for a mature digital nation. By developing a full block-producing node in Rust, the Amaru team is providing an essential safeguard against "single point of failure" risks that come from relying on only one codebase (Haskell). This directly aligns with my commitment to Greater Decentralization and Long-Term Vision, ensuring that the Cardano network remains secure and robust as it scales.

2. Transparency and Proven Track Record

I appreciate the honesty presented in the 2025 Retrospective. The team has documented where they succeeded and where they faced delays (such as in the networking stack and mempool development). This level of openness, combined with their use of on-chain smart contracts for budget administration and a public financial journal, sets a high standard for treasury-funded projects. I am voting in favor because I believe this team has the technical skill and the integrity to deliver on their 2026 roadmap.

3. Budgetary Concerns & "Conservative" Scrutiny

I must be honest: the costs associated with this proposal are significant. The Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) rate and the fixed costs for testing platforms are, in my view, very high. As a DRep who advocates for Sustainable & Justifiable Treasury Spending, I did not look at these figures lightly.

However, I recognize that:

• Attracting and keeping high-quality blockchain engineers requires competitive pay.
• Cutting costs on security audits or testing infrastructure would be a mistake for a project of this importance.
• The proposal includes a clear way to return unused funds (especially from the market volatility buffer) back to the treasury.

Closing Thoughts

Supporting Amaru is an investment in the future of our digital nation. While the cost is high, the value of having a more resilient and diverse ecosystem is far greater. I am excited to see how this project strengthens Cardano's already solid decentralized foundations and helps us build an even more unstoppable ecosystem together.

I'm voting YES to maintain budget continuity.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting YES on this Info Action to establish a Net Change Limit (NCL) of 300 million ADA for Epochs 613–713.

I previously voted in favor of the "2025 Net Change Limit Extension" which did not pass. While this current proposal is for a smaller amount, I am supporting it because it is critical that we do not stall the budget process by operating without an NCL in place. Going forward, 300 million ADA represents my floor; I would most likely vote NO on any future limits proposed below this threshold, but would remain open to supporting a subsequent Info Action for a higher limit, such as 350 million ADA, to ensure adequate funding for ecosystem growth.

I am voting 'yes' in accordance with my previous vote on the related Info Action.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am voting 'yes' in accordance with my previous vote on the related Info Action.

I'm voting Yes

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This parameter change will allow greater flexibility for DApp developers. It has been extensively evaluated by Intersect’s Parameter Committee and Technical Steering Committee, with no specific security concerns identified and no negative impact on overall performance. Therefore, I am voting YES.

I'm voting Yes

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

As per our tradition of naming hard forks after prominent Cardano contributors, I'm voting YES.

I'm voting YES on this Net Change Limit Info Action.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I decided to vote yes based on the following thoughts:

• Yearly inflow is ~300M. This Net Change Limit extends beyond a year (roughly 1.5 years) so overall we're not spending more than what we earn.

• 50 million of the 350M are already voted by DReps before this Info Action submission but not withdrawn by the proposers.

• We're still in an early critical period where we need to ship fast and stay competitive to remain relevant. Although I'm more inclined to be conservative with spending, some extraordinary spending might indeed be needed to advance our protocol—not just must-have items like security, but also highly desired ones like integrations. It's better to have that extra room.

• Although experience tells me we tend to utilize 100% of budgets, it's not a mandate to use the whole amount of ADA. As far as I'm concerned, I'll vote based on items I think we absolutely need, without feeling we must hit 100% of that NCL.

I'm voting NO on this Budget Info Action for DeltaDeFi.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I love what DeltaDeFi is building—a Hydra-based, low-latency order-book exchange is exactly what Cardano needs, hands down! I'm 100% behind this team and their vision. But here's why I'm voting no:

• This feels like a Catalyst proposal, not a Budget Info Action. The budget process should fund neutral, generic infrastructure—not commercial projects from specific companies.

• For 2025, we've already hit what I'd consider the max reasonable spend. I'm reluctant for more spending right now (though not an absolute red line—if something's truly critical, I'd support it).

• Most importantly: Funding one DEX distorts competition. We're essentially picking winners at the protocol level. What about other DEXes? DeltaDeFi gets an unfair advantage over competitors, and this isn't VC funding—it's treasury money.

I'd love to see DeltaDeFi succeed and get properly funded. But doing it through a governance Info Action at this time isn't the right way. Let's keep the budget for truly neutral infrastructure.

I’m voting YES in this info action. Without any vision, mission or strategy we cannot navigate the web3 world and we cannot even measure what success means.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I haven’t been very actively involved with the preparation of this framework, so I cannot know how we ended up with those exact KPIs, Strategic Pillars or the specific Mission & Vision. One can identify potential gaps in the strategy or misalignment with their particular desires. We can also keep debating for the refinement of those documents forever without ever reaching consensus. Or we can accept that this is a very good strategy to begin with, a clear vision that’s easy to articulate and always keep in our mind, and a mission that can unite all of our ecosystem participants. Down the line, we can refine or improve our strategy based on user demand and market conditions.

As a DRep, having such a framework in place, makes my life a lot easier because I can clearly recognise if a particular proposal aligns with our strategy, and I can evaluate if a treasury withdrawal will contribute to the realization of our Vision. I can also identify those of the businesses, builders, organisations, communities, and individuals that are amplifying Cardano’s capabilities to become the financial operating system of the world and create digital economies as mandated by our common mission.

Moreover, all of those strategic pillars included in this framework align greatly with what I have always supported consistently.

Therefore, I support this Info Action and I’m voting “YES”.

I'm voting YES on the updated Cardano Constitution v2.4.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

The Cardano Constitution is a living document (unlike State Constitutions that are set in stone and almost certainly never change)! With that in mind, improvements are welcome, but only when they have real substance. This last iteration with version (2.4) has a lot of substance, and hopefully has all of the stakeholders' feedback incorporated; thus it can keep us going for a good amount of time if it passes (this time).

Here's my take on the proposed changes:

• Removing the unnecessary Budget Info Action and consolidating its condition with the Treasury Withdrawal Action makes sense.
• Also, the code of conduct, although highly encouraged, is not enforceable, so removing it is good practice.
• The immutability requirement is an absolute necessity for a strong governance model so it's very well welcomed!
• With the changed definitions, terms, and wording, I am ok. The only thing I'd like to keep is the definition of the ada owner (changed from Ada Holder). I cannot understand the reasoning for this removal, but since I don't believe there would be ambiguity in this term, I'm ok with that.

Therefore, I vote YES.

I'm voting YES, in accordance with the respective Info Action. We need those integrations ASAP!

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

In accordance with the Info Action “gov_action13a2dqgwxum7d6kjfprcs57cf9733ek2dkt5qnuhqd4ll5ntcwu7sqluwkxd”, I am voting YES. These integrations are critical for our ecosystem, and the Pentad is the best structure to deliver them. As with the previous Info Action, I understand that there is a high level of confidentiality which does not allow the disclosure of specific amounts or the naming of partners. Nevertheless, Pentad has already started working intensively to deliver these integrations, and some of them have already been announced.

This proposal ensures governance continuity even if another CC member resigns.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I vote yes because this proposal increases operational resilience by ensuring that even if another Constitutional Committee member resigns in the future, it will not disrupt governance and the ratification of governance actions. Christina is a fine addition to CC Members as well.

I vote yes for the addition of Cardano Curia to the Constitutional Committee, as ratified by the off-chain (Ekklesia) voting process.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I vote yes for the addition of Cardano Curia to the Constitutional Committee, as ratified by the off-chain (Ekklesia) voting process.

This Info Action does not increase spending; it simply ensures business continuity and compliance with the Cardano Constitution. Therefore, I vote yes!

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This Info Action does not increase spending; it simply ensures business continuity and compliance with the Cardano Constitution. Therefore, I vote yes!

I'm voting YES! We need these integrations ASAP, and the founding entities working together is the most efficient way to deliver them.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

At this stage, it's more of a "trust me bro" Info Action, but here's why I'm all in:

• Founding entities collaborating is the most efficient path forward. Yes, they've let us down before, but unlike working on their own, peer pressure (from the other entities), strict KPIs, and community oversight will hold them accountable this time.
• All items are high-priority and super urgent. Every day without tier-1 stablecoins, critical infrastructure for institutional adoption, and cross-chain bridges & oracles is a day lost forever. Smaller ecosystems solved this long ago - if we want a Cardano breakthrough, this is the way.
• I understand that confidentiality is necessary at this stage. Companies sign NDAs, and revealing costs/pricing weakens negotiating power - this is standard business practice.
• I look forward to a more detailed outline during the Treasury Withdrawal phase.

In accordance with my previous YES vote on the Info Action and after thoroughly reviewing this proposal, I have decided to vote YES again. Please see my detailed rationale below.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

There is not much more to add as my approval was already explained during the Info Action process, which can be read in the following links:

• Automatically generated PDF

• Anchor URL (json file)

I wish there were more specifics about their action plan, but I fully understand that this is proprietary confidential information that must remain as “trade secrets”. This is common and reasonable in any business context.

This does not mean that this loan comes without risk, but having a respectable Board of Advisors combined with transparent disclosure of revenue-generating sources gives me confidence that the Snek team will deliver on their promises.

I'm voting yes on this proposal. It benefits Cardano, and I see no real drawback.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes on this proposal. It benefits Cardano, and I see no real drawback.

On the objections raised by others:

• Funding: The Cardano Foundation is paying for this. You might prefer they spend those funds elsewhere — I hear it — but these are not treasury funds under DRep control. It's better to see CF spend to advance Cardano (even if you consider it suboptimal) than spend nothing at all.

• CF governance: The same arguments again and again—CF doesn't elect board members from the community, it isn’t representative, etc. I'm tired of this debate. Yes, I’d prefer community-elected board members, but let's face it: this isn't happening right now. One of my core philosophies is to accept what we cannot change (outside our control) and focus on what we can. CF's board is not in our control. Let's stop pushing against a wall. Whether CF elects board members from the community or not is irrelevant to this proposal. I'm assessing this proposal on its own merits.

• ROI and opportunity cost: This might not be profitable, even long-term. Since these are CF's funds that they likely wouldn't redirect to other activities we control, I don't mind. Even with opportunity cost considered, I'd still say yes: our ecosystem is too big not to secure these domain names. It's good for branding and marketing, and the potential integration with AdaHandles is promising. Honestly, I can't wait to get my own domain.

To sum up, I see clear reasons for CF to apply for these domains and no compelling reason not to—so I’m voting YES.

I’m voting YES!

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I’m voting YES.

This reimbursement should have happened long ago. The submitter of this Info Action lost their deposit due to a code bug; what should have been a milestone for Cardano governance became a personal loss, and it’s only fair to make them whole. Compensation should include the original deposit plus a reasonable 3k ADA allowance for lost opportunities (missed staking rewards and the Midnight airdrop).

This is the right thing to do ethically, practically, and for trust in our governance.

I'm voting yes in this governance proposal!

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I am comfortable supporting this version of the Constitution because my most important concerns in version 2 — specifically the identity and location disclosure — have been addressed.

It is also positive that there is now a provision for auditing not only treasury withdrawals above 1,000,000 ada but for all Treasury Withdrawals actions, with independent auditors and annual reporting to the community.

Additionally, I value the overall editorial improvements: clearer wording, standardized terminology, and grammar/punctuation fixes, as well as the consolidation of role-disclosure into a general rule (removing duplication from the SPO section).

I recognize there is no "perfect" constitution; this is an iterative process, unlike national constitutions that are often set in stone. I also accept that no constitution will match my preferences 100%. A very good, sufficiently robust version is enough — and this version meets that requirement. Therefore, I am voting yes!

I want better governance tools for Cardano, but Gov Tools’ user experience is still poor and their funding ask feels too high. They should cut costs before I can support this proposal. I regret to vote no in this proposal.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

During the budget process, when we were discussing which projects needed funding, I hadn’t included Gov Tools in my shortlist. This was because, as a user, my experience with Gov Tools was (and still is) very, very poor — and I believe their funding request doesn’t make sense.

I still can’t believe that the governance system of an ecosystem this large ($24B!) was built around a platform like this. It almost feels as though we wanted to discourage governance participation altogether.

This poor experience becomes even more apparent when compared to tools like Tempo, which make DRep registration simple and convenient, or CF’s newly introduced voting tool, which makes the voting process much easier.

At some point, we need to stop playing the nice guys and start demanding more — more accountability and more value for what we pay.

This is why it’s very difficult for me to vote in favor of this proposal, even though I understand that this funding would improve the platform in many aspects. In fact, anything that helps build governance infrastructure is more than welcome in our current state of governance. I also recognize the need to pay for maintenance and to support open-source, community-owned governance platforms (rather than privately maintained or entity-owned ones).

Nevertheless, I can’t make sense of the numbers behind this request. For example, $5K per month for hosting? With the current level of governance participation, I believe even a simple WordPress blog might attract more daily traffic and cost less than 1% of that amount.

DRep voting history on the DRep page and Governance Actions? These features have been implemented by Cardano explorers for a long time — why don’t we already have them in Gov Tools, and why are we only now being asked to pay for them?

I truly want to support governance, and having an open-source, community-owned tool is very important to me. For that reason, supporting Gov Tools initially feels like the right thing to do. On the other hand, we have a precedent of a poorly designed tool and a very large funding request that I simply can’t justify.

Right now, one part of me wants to support it, while another part wants to give a resounding “NO WAY!”

I believe the team should re-evaluate their funding request, significantly reduce their costs, and resubmit a proposal that does not exceed 60–70% of the current amount.

For the reasons above, I regret to vote “NO” at this time. I hope we get a leaner proposal — one that I’d gladly and wholeheartedly vote “YES” for.

I’m voting YES on the Cardano 2030 Vision & Strategy because it is a solid, usable guide that serves as a practical compass for prioritising proposals and funding against the seven strategic imperatives.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Having a good (but not perfect) strategy is better than having no strategy at all; this Vision & Strategy is good enough to implement now, and if a better version emerges later, it can be adopted. It aligns with how the community thinks about Cardano (e.g., abstraction of blockchain complexity, academic engagement, vibrant communities, etc).

With the vision as a North Star and our strategy as our compass, it helps assess whether governance actions -especially treasury withdrawals- advance the seven strategic imperatives and contribute to KPI progress, which can also ease DRep fatigue by making alignment checks faster and more consistent.

It also sets shared expectations for builders, institutions (including founding entities), the community, and governance actors about what matters most and where effort should be focused.

A major omission, in my view, is the limited treatment of governance as a strategic pillar. The strategy should explicitly recognise on‑chain institutions (DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee) and set decentralisation and participation goals, not just operational decentralisation via SPO incentives or multi‑client efforts. Without this, the ecosystem risks overlooking improvements to governance processes and tooling, including the need for broader DRep participation and decentralisation (we currently have a serious issue with DRep decentralisation!) and better decision‑making support.

I would also like this document to include a more condensed, one‑sentence message that’s easy to remember. For example, a mission statement such as: “We aspire to become the world’s financial operating system”. This message would stick in mind and be easy to recall in everyday decisions and in all the interactions we have (both inside and outside our ecosystem).

Some DReps have expressed concerns that this Strategic Plan is rather abstract and vague. However, specific actions and tasks are not supposed to be included in the Strategy; these belong in tactical or action plans. Vision is the destination—where we want to go (e.g., place “A”); strategy is the direction/route we would take (e.g., we will arrive by car via the national highway); and action plans are how exactly we will get there, that is, the step‑by‑step schedule (e.g., take the car from A to Z, then Z to Y, etc.). Therefore, for the purposes of defining our Vision and Strategy, this document perfectly articulates the routes we need to take to realise our Vision.

On KPIs: some are specific and well defined (e.g., annual L1 revenue, daily meaningful transactions), while others feel vague. Preferably, either fully specify all KPIs with data sources and review cycles, or keep them uniformly generic until we are in a position to articulate them in detail. It would also be very helpful to disclose how Intersect’s Product Committee arrived at those specific KPIs (for example, why a $200 million target and not $150 or $250).

I've decided to vote yes on the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget Proposal.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This proposal doesn't come without concerns, but nonetheless I've decided to upvote it based on the below rationale:

• Cardano undeniably faces big challenges in the DeFi ecosystem. Our TVL is very low compared to major competitors such as Ethereum and Solana. Especially stablecoins lack liquidity depth. This proposal directly addresses this issue.

• This proposal has strategic alignment with institutions inside Cardano. More specifically, the Cardano Foundation's 2025 roadmap explicitly commits to providing an eight-figure ada amount in liquidity to key Cardano stablecoin projects.

• Black Swan incidents like the one which happened on 10th of October 2025, provided us with concrete evidence of the liquidity constraints of our ecosystem (Liqwid Finance protocol).

• I interpret this proposal more like an investment than an expense. As I have already stated I have a more conservative approach to treasury spending and we have already reached my personal threshold for this year, but since this amount will not be spent but invested with an expected return and the possibility to have it returned back, I am ok.

• Shallow liquidity in our ecosystem causes us serious problems with user and institutional adoption: high slippage 4%-6% which makes us totally uncompetitive (worse than banks in the legacy world!) and more difficult for user on/off ramps, limited institutional participation due to liquidity constraints, etc.

• Alignment with Cardano Vision & Strategy: Based on Cardano's long-term strategy and leadership statements: Cardano aims to become the financial operating system of the world. How can we express those claims without liquidity in DeFi & stablecoins?

Concerns & Reservations

This proposal carries with it some concerns which I have tried to evaluate and address:

• Centralization risk of a small committee: This can be addressed by introducing more community members to the committee

• No committee member has demonstrated treasury management of that scale: This is not active portfolio management but a conversion under specific terms & conditions that are predetermined. Also community oversight and help, including the tDAO will help mitigate those risks.

• Price impact: Based on the proposed methodology (including OTC, gradual liquidation, volume distribution, etc), I really don't think the impact will be noticeable.

• Picking winners / losers: This is my biggest concern so far. Hopefully tDAO will have strong oversight over committee selection. Also I strongly encourage gradual rotation of funds to other stablecoins: The initial incoming liquidity would have a positive effect on Cardano's DeFi, attracting more capital inflows and allowing the fund to rotate some of the allocated funds to other stablecoins over time. If we fail to attract new inflows though, there's a real threat to the remaining stablecoins if no rotation takes place. I expect CF's pledge to also help in this area (with their commitment to provide liquidity).

I am voting yes in this Governance Info Action. Please read my full rationale below

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

The Snek community has already proven their strong commitment to the Cardano ecosystem. They have persevered through both easy and tough times to advance Cardano and have developed additional products, showing their dedication beyond just being a memecoin.

After listening to community feedback from the initial submission, they made amendments to their proposal. The biggest improvement, in my view, is transforming this request into a loan instead of a grant. This clearly demonstrates a high level of accountability from the Snek team and their belief that their venture will generate sufficient value to repay the 5M ADA requested from the treasury. While repayment is not guaranteed - especially considering market turbulence like the upcoming bear market - I recognise that every venture carries some risk.

Given that this is a novel and experimental way to deploy treasury funds, coupled with the involvement of highly respected Board Members and the team’s strong commitment and work ethic, I am inclined to vote YES on this Governance Info Action.
Ultimately, this decision boils down to this:

• Either the Snek team succeeds in their vision to list Cardano on many major Tier 1 platforms, leading to token price appreciation and an orderly repayment of the loan in ADA.
• Or they fail to complete the promised listings, highlighting the challenges Cardano and its ecosystem face in gaining influence in the broader cryptocurrency space. This failure would make loan repayment difficult and could have ripple effects damaging to other Cardano native tokens (CNTs) as well.

Although memecoins tend to feel more like a casino business to me, they have undeniably become a cultural phenomenon. Taking into consideration the effect they exert on the adoption of other blockchains, I acknowledge the need for Snek to carry Cardano’s flag forward.

Therefore, for me, this 5M ADA loan represents both an interesting educational experiment (mostly regarding the loan structure) and a kind of "all-in" strategic move - a blitzkrieg - to secure Cardano’s rightful place among the leading cryptocurrencies.

I have decided to vote "NO" in this governance action based on the following rationale.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I have decided to vote No based on the following rationale:

Firstly, I would like to express my great respect for the team behind this proposal and my confidence in their skills and well-meaning intentions.

Having said that, in line with earlier budget decisions and my explicitly stated opinions on budget spending, I want to reiterate that I take a conservative approach to fiscal policy, guided by spending no more than the yearly income from transaction fees. For this year, my votes during the budget process have almost reached that threshold, so I am more inclined to support only must-have proposals (not nice-to-have ones), such as urgent security improvements, critical tooling, or maybe even an extraordinary marketing campaign that would undeniably offer massive benefits in terms of user adoption.

Moreover, since this is the first year of governance and we are still testing the waters with the budget process, it is critical that we remain frugal and skeptical about all spending activities.

I would have preferred to see this proposal submitted during the budget process so I could weigh it against other marketing proposals or within Project Catalyst, where many marketing proposals are submitted.

In conclusion, I would love to see this proposal resubmitted in the 2026 budget process or in future rounds of Catalyst, but for now, I must say no.

I have decided to vote "NO" on this governance action after much thought and going back and forth between “Yes,” “No,” and “Abstain.” Detailed rationale is below.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I have decided to vote No on this governance action.

Firstly, this was one of my toughest governance decisions to date. I found myself swinging between “yes”, “no”, and “abstain” multiple times.

Secondly, I want to express my admiration for Yuta’s effort in drafting this new version of the Constitution. I understand this is a huge undertaking, and his commitment is truly remarkable and inspiring.

I appreciate the addition of much-needed definitions (which were missing in the first version), the correction of typos and errors, and the overall improvement in wording.

I also welcome the effort to streamline the budget process by removing the extra step of the budget info action prior to treasury withdrawals.

However, there is one point I strongly oppose: the requirement to disclose the location and identity of treasury withdrawal recipients. While I understand concerns about accountability, my experience shows that fraud or mismanagement can still occur even when real identities are exposed. On the contrary, forcing disclosure of real location and identity - beyond raising privacy concerns and being antithetical to Blockchain ethos - could expose individuals to serious, even life-threatening risks in some parts of the world. I encourage voluntary disclosure but oppose making it mandatory, as this could exclude pseudonymous participants or put some at grave risk.

I strongly encourage a further iteration based on version 2.0, incorporating more community input and a more thorough review. I envision the discussion proceeding in three parts:

• Typos and errors: The quickest to confirm
• Removal of the budget Info Action: A relatively fast decision with a simple yes/no option
• Examination of the new simplified wording and text changes: A slower process requiring careful review to avoid important omissions, ambiguity, and to ensure that all changes are thoroughly examined and well understood.

I’m voting NO on this proposal because it is unconstitutional and also raises fairness & sustainability concerns as described in my Rationale below.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I’m voting NO on this proposal based on the following rationale:

A Treasury withdrawal is only permitted if it is authorised and made according to an approved budget. Since there is no budget item / Info Action for this specific proposal, it is unconstitutional under the current Constitution.

I acknowledge the valuable work of the Snek team and recognize their need for support as they work toward getting their token listed on exchanges. Snek is indeed one of the most actively traded tokens on Cardano, with consistent performance and strong trading volumes within our ecosystem. That said, using Treasury funds directly for exchange listings raises serious fairness and sustainability concerns. If we choose to subsidize Snek’s listing, then logically we would need to extend the same support to other tokens in the Cardano ecosystem. This is something that would be neither feasible nor financially sustainable for the Treasury.

In my view, the better path is for Snek to pursue listings gradually, driven by community support, organic demand, and natural market growth.

As a final point, I’d like to add that I would be far more open to supporting a similar proposal if it included a sustainable element, for example by replenishing the Treasury gradually through a share of future profits. That kind of mechanism could then be replicated across other CNTs in the ecosystem, making such proposals more balanced and responsible.

I'm voting NO because this proposal is unconstitutional, wrongly submitted (wrong requested amount) and due to fairness & sustainability concerns that I analyse in my rationale below.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting No on this proposal based on the following rationale:

A Treasury withdrawal without a preceding Info Action is unconstitutional under the current Constitution. This means the submission isn't valid right from the start.

In addition, this proposal seeks to withdraw 5 million ADA from the Cardano Treasury. However, it has been submitted incorrectly, making it appear as though only 5 ADA is being requested. This discrepancy seems to come from confusion between Lovelace and ADA units.

I acknowledge the valuable work of the Snek team and recognise their need for support as they work toward getting their token listed on exchanges. Snek is indeed one of the most actively traded tokens on Cardano, with consistent performance and strong trading volumes within our ecosystem. That said, using Treasury funds directly for exchange listings raises serious fairness and sustainability concerns. If we choose to subsidise Snek's listing, then logically we would need to extend the same support to other tokens in the Cardano ecosystem. This is something that would be neither feasible nor financially sustainable for the Treasury.

In my view, the better path is for Snek to pursue listings gradually, driven by community support, organic demand, and natural market growth.

As a final point, I’d like to add that I would be far more open to supporting a similar proposal if it included a sustainable element, for example by replenishing the Treasury gradually through a share of future profits. That kind of mechanism could then be replicated across other CNTs in the ecosystem, making such proposals more balanced and responsible.

I vote yes to replace the current Interim Constitutional Committee with the elected members of the recent elections held by Intersect.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Summary

I vote yes to replace the current Interim Constitutional Committee with the elected members of the recent elections held by Intersect.

Additional Context

Intersect MBO recently held elections for the replacement of the Interim Constitutional Committees. DReps voted 7 very competent members/groups to whom I perfectly align with my own vote. I therefore fully support the replacement of the current interim CC with the elected one.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I don't support this withdrawal and therefore vote NO.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting during the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process on the Ekklesia platform, I abstain from this vote.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform, I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform (https://adastat.net/dreps/drep1ygc29nv90qqtf7qwlp5eqwnscdmvk5utnul9arfm9eklw9cphfhhu#budget_votes), I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

In alignment with my voting on the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation process through Ekklesia platform (https://adastat.net/dreps/drep1ygc29nv90qqtf7qwlp5eqwnscdmvk5utnul9arfm9eklw9cphfhhu#budget_votes), I support this withdrawal and therefore vote YES.

I support the treasury withdrawal for the Amaru Project, in continuation of my previous “Yes” vote on the “Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025” info action (read the rationale here: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kostaspanagias/drep/refs/heads/main/voting/2025/08/Amaru.jsonld). Moreover, the info action is well-written and fully documented, so it has my full support.

Rationale for Voting YES on the "Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 275M ada Administered by Intersect" Info Action

I am voting YES on this Budget Info Action.

First, the total amount requested (275 million ADA) is within the range I have consistently supported in all of my previous Net Change Limit Info Action rationales (300M ADA). This ensures that treasury spending remains responsible and sustainable.

Second, the proposals included in this budget were approved by the majority of voting power of DReps who participated in the Ekklesia process. While some may argue that bundling many proposals together means not every proposal will have universal support, the overall collection clearly reflects the will of the active governance participants.

Finally, this budget closely matches my own voting record as a DRep. Out of the 39 proposals, I have voted YES on the vast majority, with only 4 NO votes and 4 ABSTAINS. This strong alignment gives me confidence that this budget represents both my own judgment and the broader community’s priorities.

For these reasons, I am supporting this Info Action and voting YES.

Rationale for Voting ABSTAIN on 2025 Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 7.5M ₳ for community builders

I have decided to vote ABSTAIN on this Info Action.

While I support funding the individual proposals included in this Budget Info Action, I believe the way this Governance Action is structured is unconstitutional. Each budget proposal must have a named administrator responsible for managing disbursement, oversight, and reporting of funds. This is a key requirement of the Cardano Constitution.

Additionally, these proposals are already part of the 275M ADA budget Info Action, which is submitted and administered by Intersect. If both Info Actions are approved, it could create confusion and overlap in fund management.

I also understand the motivation behind submitting this budget Info Action - ensuring that only proposals with clear majority support (over 50% + 1 Lovelace of the 5.38B active voting stake) are included. However, I do not fully agree with the claim that the 275M Budget Info Action contains proposals lacking majority consensus. It is the responsibility of DReps to participate in Cardano governance and for delegators to choose their representatives. If some DReps did not vote on Ekklesia, I consider their non-participation as a form of abstention. Therefore, the 3.92B ADA voting participation in Ekklesia should be regarded as the effective active voting stake for this process.

For these reasons (support of proposals, but unconstitutionality and duplication of the Info Action), I have chosen ABSTAIN.

I am voting NO on this proposal because of the invalid metadata. We cannot rely on a governance info action where the data is altered after submission. I expect the proposal to be resubmitted so that I can evaluate it again on its merits (not data integrity).

Rationale for Voting YES on the 300M ADA Net Change Limit (Epochs 563–635)

I am voting YES on this Net Change Limit (NCL) proposal, as it aligns perfectly with the position I have consistently advocated for in my previous rationales.

Setting the NCL at 300 million ADA matches the expected annual treasury inflow, ensuring that we maintain fiscal responsibility while still enabling meaningful investment in Cardano’s continued growth. This figure strikes the right balance between prudent spending and supporting the ecosystem’s development needs.

I also appreciate the thoughtful structuring of this NCL to cover not only the remainder of 2025 but also a significant portion of 2026. This approach provides continuity for ongoing and upcoming budget proposals, many of which are designed around 12-month cycles, and ensures that essential development can continue without unnecessary interruptions while we debate future budgets.

For these reasons, I am in strong support of this Info Action and I am voting YES.

Rationale for Voting on “Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025” Info Action

I am voting YES on the Amaru Node Development 2025 proposal.

The Amaru node will significantly increase Cardano’s resilience and improve network security. As Cardano continues to onboard thousands of new users, transactions, and greater value, it is essential to ensure the system has no single point of failure. Amaru directly addresses this by introducing node diversity, thereby strengthening the network against potential disruptions.

Additionally, Amaru is expected to lower hardware requirements for stake pool operators, which will further promote decentralisation of the network. The choice to develop Amaru in Rust - a widely adopted programming language - will also broaden our developer base and attract new contributors to the Cardano ecosystem.

In my view, the requested funding is fully justified by the value Amaru brings in terms of security, decentralisation, and network robustness. For these reasons, I am supporting this proposal.

2025 Cardano NCL

After careful consideration, I have decided to vote NO on the proposed Net Change Limit (NCL) of 200 million ADA for the remainder of 2025.

Github Link of this file: https://github.com/kostaspanagias/drep/blob/main/voting/2025/07/NCL25_200M.md – You can visit this link to view the formatted version of these contents. The GitHub page provides a more user-friendly and human-readable format compared to the on-chain or Cardano Explorer metadata.

Below, I outline the reasoning behind my decision:

Rationale

• Consistency with Previous Positions:
  I have already reluctantly supported a 350M ADA NCL, having previously expressed a preference for a more conservative limit around 300M ADA, which aligns with the projected inflow for 2025. However, a 200M ADA NCL is, in my view, excessively restrictive for the current stage of Cardano’s development.

• Need for Strategic Investment:
  While I generally favor prudent treasury management, we remain in an early and critical phase of ecosystem growth. Cardano’s roadmap includes essential development initiatives-such as scalability upgrades (e.g., Leios), enhancements to programmability, and further work on interoperability and security-that require substantial investment. Setting the NCL too low could impede our ability to fund these priorities and maintain our competitive edge against other blockchain platforms.

• Alignment with Treasury Inflows:
  The annual inflow to the treasury is approximately 300M ADA. It is both reasonable and sustainable to set the NCL in line with this figure, ensuring that we do not spend more than we accrue, while also allowing for meaningful ecosystem investment. A 200M ADA limit, while justifiable if our ecosystem were fully developed or if we were in a more resource-constrained phase, risks underfunding critical initiatives at a time when Cardano needs to accelerate its development.

• Budget Process and Parallel Execution:
  Although only eight months remain in 2025, the logic of scaling the NCL down proportionally for the rest of the year is not compelling. Many budget proposals and ecosystem initiatives can be executed in parallel, regardless of the elapsed months. Restricting the NCL to a lower “remaining months” calculation could unnecessarily limit our ability to fund multiple concurrent projects, especially as the budget process matures and teams become more efficient at proposal execution.

• Consistency with My Previous Votes:
  I have already voted in favor of 51 budget proposals totaling roughly 285M ADA via the “Ekklesia” (2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation) process. Supporting a 200M ADA NCL would be inconsistent with my prior votes on these individual proposals and would undermine the intent to see these initiatives funded and executed.

Summary

While I appreciate the caution behind the proposed 200M ADA NCL, I believe it is too restrictive for the current needs and ambitions of the Cardano ecosystem. A limit closer to the actual annual inflow-around 300M ADA-strikes a better balance between sustainability and the imperative to invest in Cardano’s future. For these reasons, I have decided to vote NO on this proposal.

Rationale on: "2025 Net Change Limit" Voting

The Net Change Limit proposal appears well-considered and justified based on last year’s inflows. This sets a rational precedent for formulating fiscal policies within our ecosystem. However, I would prefer the proposed amount to be grounded in actual figures rather than projections. The actual 2024 inflow was approximately 336M, while the October 2024 projection stood at 351M. Given that we are now in April 2025, it seems reasonable to revise the number based on these actuals.

I’m deeply uncomfortable with a Net Change Limit of 350M ADA, and I would much prefer the community-led proposal of 300M ADA that unfortunately didn’t pass. The 2024 inflow was lower than 350M, and the projected 2025 figure is also below this mark. This means we risk spending more funds annually than we accrue, which seems unsustainable.

I acknowledge that without a Net Change Limit in place, our ecosystem remains in a stagnant phase, unable to fund pressing budget proposals. As we operate in a competitive industry, delaying decisions might jeopardise our position and competitiveness relative to other blockchains.

Moreover, I view the NCL as a spending ceiling rather than a target. In my experience, businesses often aim to exhaust their budgets due to concerns about future cuts if not fully utilised. I hope this isn’t true for us, since every ADA holder has a direct interest in our treasury’s sensible management. As such, while I am inclined to support the NCL proposal, I’ll be vigilant when evaluating individual budget proposals and will scrutinise them diligently. Each budget request should have a clear return on investment (ROI) - not necessarily monetary, but demonstrating the value and utility it brings to our ecosystem.

I’d really hoped for another, lower NCL proposal to appear before this one expired. Since this doesn’t seem likely, I would reluctantly vote “YES” in order to start building and avoid further disruptions.

Additional remarks:

• I welcome any other lower NCL that might appear in the future, and I would most likely vote in favour of it (my ideal NCL would be set at 300 million ADA).
• If I had 100k ADA available, I would submit a new NCL proposal at 300M ADA (only for 2025).
• It’s imperative that we do not lose even a single day more; it’s mid-April, and starting a new GA cycle would lead us into the second half of the year before we begin investing funds.
• Withdrawals from the treasury are investments, and as such, I would evaluate them carefully. If a proposal is not linked to clear results, I would be very hesitant to support it.

Decrease Treasury Tax from 20% to 10%

My vote for the proposal to decrease the treasury tax from 20% to 10% is NO. Below is my rationale.

Github Link of this file: https://github.com/kostaspanagias/drep/blob/main/voting/2025/2/taxratecut.md – You can visit this link to view the formatted version of these contents. The GitHub page provides a more user-friendly and human-readable format compared to the on-chain or Cardano Explorer metadata.

Rationale

• It's easier to reduce the tax rate than to increase it. If we reduce the tax rate now to the lowest permissible amount and later find that the treasury is depleting faster than anticipated, it would be more challenging to increase it again.

• The proposed decrease is too rapid. I would prefer a more conservative approach, where we gradually lower the tax rate (e.g., from 20% to 18%, then to 15%, etc.), evaluate the results at each step, and proceed cautiously with further adjustments.

• The impact on staking rewards is minimal. Current staking rewards are below 4%, with a more realistic range of 2.5%–3.5%. A 12% increase in rewards would bring them to approximately 2.8%–3.9% (a net increase of just 0.3%–0.4%). I fail to see how such a small increase would attract users from other blockchains to join Cardano solely for staking rewards.

• There is insufficient research supporting this move. To my knowledge, no research, paper, or detailed analysis has been presented to demonstrate the potential impact of this tax reduction or simulate how it might deplete treasury reserves over time. Without proper data, it's difficult to assess whether this change would have a minor or significant impact on the treasury.

• We need substantial funds for development and marketing. Blockchain technology is still in its early stages, and I anticipate that we will require significant resources for development (e.g., scaling solutions, quantum resistance technologies) and marketing (e.g., driving adoption, improving communication, educating users). A higher treasury tax ensures a steady flow of funds to support these critical needs.

• This is our first year managing community funds. As a community, we are in the early stages of learning how to govern ourselves and allocate resources effectively. Inefficiencies, errors, and potential misallocations are inevitable as we refine our processes through trial and error. This is not about wastefulness or bad actors – it’s simply part of the learning curve.

• Startups reinvest profits; so should we. Drawing a parallel with startups: In their early stages, startups typically reinvest profits rather than distributing dividends until they establish themselves within their markets and industry lifecycle. Similarly, Cardano should prioritize reinvesting transaction-generated funds into growth rather than increasing "dividends" (i.e., staking rewards). These investments will position us as a leading blockchain in the future, where an increased number of transactions and price appreciation will more than compensate for our early investments.

• Increased staking rewards do not encourage network usage. Even a small percentage increase in rewards at this stage promotes inertia rather than active participation in the ecosystem. Cardano offers exciting opportunities for participants to engage meaningfully: earning yield in decentralized finance (DeFi), participating in DAOs, trading NFTs, engaging with memecoin communities, using decentralized exchanges, and exploring real-world assets and decentralized applications (dApps). Active participation helps users understand blockchain's potential, educates the community, attracts new users, and drives adoption. This increased engagement will boost network utility and ensure sustainability – both in terms of transactions generating tax revenue and actual usage.

The renaming of Chang 2 Hard Fork to Plomin Hard Fork is in accordance with the tradition of naming hard forks in memory of notable Cardano contributors. Plomin was a significant contributor and a loved member of the community. This renaming will honor his contributions.

I believe "Chang" has already been widely spread as the name of this hard fork, so it's not "new" or confusing anymore. This name was chosen to honor Chang Feng, a Chinese astronomer & mathematician. So it was chosen to reflect Cardano's commitment to innovation and continuous progress as Chang Feng was a pioneer in his field. By honoring such significant figures, we not only acknowledge their contributions but also provide an opportunity for others to learn about their remarkable achievements.