Medusa DRep

I am voting “No” for one reason only — the requirement for a single large withdrawal of funds. We have already been burned by this approach enough times. Please split your request into milestones and submit each of them separately.

While the proposal is clearly written and addresses legal and operational aspects of managing treasury funds, several concerns prevent support at this time.

Most of the requested funds (664,000 ADA) are allocated to establishing a Cayman Islands legal entity. This places the majority of the budget into legal and administrative overhead rather than technical infrastructure or ecosystem development. It is difficult to justify such spending before the practical details and expected impact of the liquidity program itself are clearly demonstrated.

Additionally, the proposal delegates significant operational authority to an interim committee. Although multisig controls and reporting are planned, the structure still concentrates meaningful control over treasury resources in a small group, which raises governance concerns for a fund that may eventually manage much larger allocations.

Finally, the proposal does not yet provide a sufficiently concrete framework for how the future liquidity deployment will generate measurable benefits for the Cardano ecosystem.

For these reasons, it would be preferable to revisit this initiative with a clearer implementation plan, stronger governance safeguards, and a more cost-efficient legal setup. Until then, this withdrawal cannot be supported.

No, no, no - once again, no. Monopolizing the budget is a terrible idea. It was a bad idea last time, and it is a bad idea now. No. We know where this leads - 90% of the funds will go to 9,000 promises from IOG (with a very low completion rate), and the remaining 10% will go to “Raid the Treasury”-style proposals, which are largely useless for the network. No.

I'm not sure that creating a roadmap should cost 750,000 ADA. I believe the requested amount is extremely high for the stated goals.

I'm not sure, but isn’t that what the Cardano Foundation is supposed to be for?

The proposal to pay for listings creates a dangerous precedent — one where tomorrow you might be charged ten times more, or face a delisting instead. It’s essentially extortion, which is illegal in most jurisdictions.

Even with all its usefulness, this is still a private company asking the treasury to pay for its commercial service. This sets a precedent for subsidizing a business rather than funding infrastructure development. What happens after 18 months? Will they ask again? And what if the funding doesn’t come through? What happens to the projects that have already integrated the service? Unfortunately, I see a risk of the ecosystem becoming dependent on a single centralized service.

I don’t consider this proposal important enough for the Cardano ecosystem to warrant funding from the treasury. It feels more like an investment pitch. Why should the ecosystem fund a closed, private project? Why does a project with such a large user base and revenue even need funding from the Cardano treasury in the first place?

Maybe you should consider submitting this proposal to Catalyst instead?

У нас уже есть Catalyst. У нас уже есть Withdrwal proposials. Я не думаю, что экосистеме нужен еще дополнительный "фонд" с непрозрачными правилами управления и распределения средств.

I don’t believe that rewriting the UI of a Ledger app is worth 300,000 ADA. With all due respect — no. It’s just not worth that much.

I'm not sure I’ll end up using this, but competition is always a good thing for the end user in the long run, as it drives progress.

This seems like a meaningful contribution to the ecosystem — if it’s made open. I’m not sure it should cost this much, but in the long term, it does appear to be valuable.

I'm not sure I’ll end up using this, but competition is always a good thing for the end user in the long run, as it drives progress.

This looks more like a Catalyst proposal. Moreover, it lacks details and a budget breakdown, even though the requested amount is not the largest compared to others.

I like the project. I support its development and understand its value, but I can’t vote “YES” on allocating the funds when the description doesn’t say a single word about where the specific amount of ADA comes from or how it will be used. Why 314k? Why not 214? 514? 321? 42?

This looks more like a Catalyst proposal. Moreover, it lacks details and a budget breakdown, even though the requested amount is not the largest compared to others.

Yes, IOG are the developers of Cardano, but questions arise regarding the rational use of funds and the pace of development. How many deadlines have been missed? How many initiatives have failed to reach completion within a reasonable timeframe? What about the Rust team? What about adhering to your own specifications during development? I support the continued growth of Cardano. I oppose monopolization. Abstain.

And why do you never mention the amounts earned by your private staking pools over the past 5 years? Seriously. Tens of millions of ADA. Isn’t that enough funding and motivation to continue developing the network?

I don’t consider this proposal important enough for the Cardano ecosystem to warrant funding from the treasury. It feels more like an investment pitch. Why should the ecosystem fund a closed, private project? On top of that, it uses vague phrasing like “expanding native asset support in wallets” — why be so abstract?

I'm not sure that “maintaining and governing the open-source Cardano node repositories, including the Haskell codebases,” and similar tasks require such a large budget — especially considering they’re handled by core developers or entire companies. Is this really a non-profit organization? From the outside, it looks more like an attempt to secure funding for a massive bureaucratic machine with zero efficiency, IMHO...

Adastat is an excellent explorer, but since I personally know the developer, there’s a potential conflict of interest here. That’s why I’ll abstain.

I abstained from voting on Adastat to avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest. In this case as well, I’m taking a neutral stance.

I’m also a wallet developer, so I fully understand the costs involved — and I’m genuinely surprised by the requested amount of 583,000 for “ongoing operations.” I’m equally surprised by the “€30,000 per month” figure. It seems like the budget shouldn’t be going toward maintaining the project, but rather toward hiring a cost optimization specialist.

If the funds aren’t granted, do you have a backup plan for survival? And if your survival doesn’t depend on treasury funding, then are these funds truly necessary? Could we see an alternative business plan?

Isn’t this a misuse of influence? Don’t you think that voting on your own proposal — especially one requesting a quarter of a billion ADA — is a clear conflict of interest?

This seems like a meaningful contribution to the ecosystem — if it’s made open. I’m not sure it should cost this much, but in the long term, it does appear to be valuable.

Not a fan of giant bulk withdrawals from treasury, prefer larger number of smaller withdrawals that would get approved based on their merit by the community governance.

I'm not sure I’ll end up using this, especially since we already have Aiken — but competition is always a good thing for the end user in the long run, as it drives progress.

I'm not sure I’ll end up using this, but competition is always a good thing for the end user in the long run, as it drives progress.

I strongly support initiatives like this, but unfortunately, I’m also a developer and maintainer of open-source projects in the Cardano ecosystem. That makes me a potential beneficiary — which presents a clear conflict of interest. Therefore, I abstain.

I believe that supporting such tools benefits the ecosystem by expanding the potential reach of developers and integration opportunities. Moreover, the requested budget appears very reasonable given the stated commitments and motivations.

Not a fan of giant bulk withdrawals from treasury, prefer larger number of smaller withdrawals that would get approved based on their merit by the community governance. Furthermore, don't see any mention of how existing Catalyst Treasury funds are utilized as a part of the next Catalyst Fund round, or whether there are any plans to return unused funds to Cardano treasury...

As a developer and DevOps specialist, I believe the requested amount is significantly overestimated and does not reflect the actual needs of a project of this type.

I also run an independent node and indexer. The Medusa cluster consists of 5 servers: one server running cardano-db-sync with 12 cores and 64 GB of RAM; three servers running cardano-node, providing redundancy and data to the db-sync, each with 8 cores and 24 GB of RAM; and a frontend server with 4 cores and 4 GB of RAM. Each server is connected to a reliable 2 Gbps channel.

The cluster operates stably and without interruption, serving around 600 unique users per day on average, with peaks reaching 1,000 at epoch boundaries. While that may not sound like a lot, wallet synchronization happens continuously, and in reality, the cluster processes tens or even hundreds of thousands of requests daily — even when users take no active actions after logging in.

I pay around $100 per month in total for this infrastructure.

You are requesting approximately $27,500 per month for infrastructure and maintenance(I’m not even considering the other items or amounts — only this one), based on the current exchange rate.

Even if all 948 DReps registered in the Cardano network — and we both know that’s objectively impossible — accessed your service and voted, it wouldn’t produce even 1% of the load my cluster handles. That’s assuming they all logged in and voted on the same day, which is also highly unrealistic. Voting events are infrequent and spread over time. Yes, nodes and db-sync do operate between voting periods as well — but so do mine, even when nobody is accessing them. Three nodes and one db-sync — all for $100 per month.

So my answer is “NO.”

As a developer and DevOps specialist, I believe the requested amount is significantly overestimated and does not reflect the actual needs of a project of this type.

I also run an independent node and indexer. The Medusa cluster consists of 5 servers: one server running cardano-db-sync with 12 cores and 64 GB of RAM; three servers running cardano-node, providing redundancy and data to the db-sync, each with 8 cores and 24 GB of RAM; and a frontend server with 4 cores and 4 GB of RAM. Each server is connected to a reliable 2 Gbps channel.

The cluster operates stably and without interruption, serving around 600 unique users per day on average, with peaks reaching 1,000 at epoch boundaries. While that may not sound like a lot, wallet synchronization happens continuously, and in reality, the cluster processes tens or even hundreds of thousands of requests daily — even when users take no active actions after logging in.

I pay around $100 per month in total for this infrastructure.

You are requesting approximately $20,000 per month for infrastructure, based on the current exchange rate.

Even if all 948 DReps registered in the Cardano network — and we both know that’s objectively impossible — accessed your service and voted, it wouldn’t produce even 1% of the load my cluster handles. That’s assuming they all logged in and voted on the same day, which is also highly unrealistic. Voting events are infrequent and spread over time. Yes, nodes and db-sync do operate between voting periods as well — but so do mine, even when nobody is accessing them. Three nodes and one db-sync — all for $100 per month.

So my answer is “NO.”

Please provide some research and math proving that it is necessary, effective, and healthy for the network and users.

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