Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5

Rationale highlights

Why some of the largest DReps voted for and against, in their own words.

• Yoroi W₳llet

  Yes584.2M ₳

  Yoroi DRep votes YES on Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5. Yoroi supports this governance parameter adjustment as a pragmatic measure to improve the operational resilience of the Constitutional Committee. Operational Flexibility Reducing the...

  Yoroi DRep votes YES on Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5. Yoroi supports this governance parameter adjustment as a pragmatic measure to improve the operational resilience of the Constitutional Committee.

  • Operational Flexibility
    Reducing the committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 allows the Constitutional Committee to function effectively even in scenarios where member availability is limited, without compromising governance integrity. Yoroi therefore votes Yes on this proposal.
• YUTA

  Yes435.8M ₳

  For the same reasons as last time, I will vote YES to [Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5]. The following is the same reasoning as last time, but I would like to add one point: the fact that only four candidates have run for the four CC seats,...

  For the same reasons as last time, I will vote YES to [Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5].

  The following is the same reasoning as last time, but I would like to add one point: the fact that only four candidates have run for the four CC seats, despite a candidacy period of more than one month and repeated appeals, strengthens my argument.

  Current Risk

  At present, the actual number of Constitutional Committee (CC) members is equal to the minimum required size. In this situation, if even one CC member resigns, the committee would fall below the minimum threshold and become non-functional. This would prevent not only ordinary governance actions but also critical actions such as urgent security updates. This represents a serious structural risk that must be addressed urgently.

  Available Options

  In principle, there are only two ways to mitigate this risk (or a combination of both):
(1) Increase the actual number of CC members
(2) Reduce the minimum CC size
  I support option (2) reducing the minimum CC size.

  1. Addressing Concerns About Reducing the Minimum CC Size

     I acknowledge concerns that lowering the minimum CC size could lead to future concentration of power. However, this change affects only the minimum threshold. As long as the actual CC size remains at seven members, there is no change from the current situation. Even if the number temporarily drops to six or five, an election can be held to restore the CC to seven members. In addition, as stated in the metadata, the original rationale for setting the minimum CC size to seven no longer applies under current conditions. Therefore, the argument that lowering the minimum CC size would immediately lead to centralization is an oversimplification.

  2. Why Increasing the Actual CC Size Is Not Supported
Increasing the actual CC size requires a highly costly and complex process. In practice, a previous attempt to increase the CC from seven to eight members failed to obtain DRep support, and some DReps called for even more costly procedures. In most cases, an election would be required, and consensus would first need to be reached on whether such costs are justified. This issue is not something that can be addressed “eventually”; it is an urgent risk. However, in reality, there are no individuals or entities willing to commit the necessary resources to actively pursue an increase in the actual CC size.

  3. Alignment With CC Compensation (TENET 4)
Increasing the actual CC size would further complicate the implementation of TENET 4 regarding CC compensation. Last year, a CC member resigned and the CC fell below the minimum size because DReps did not approve compensation even for five CC members. In simple terms, many DReps judged compensation for five CC members to be too high. Given this voting behavior, it is likely to be even more difficult to support compensation for eight or more CC members, making this approach politically and practically unviable.

  Conclusion
The current situation allows a single resignation to potentially halt the entire governance process. Increasing the actual CC size is not a realistic or timely solution. From the perspective of immediacy, feasibility, and risk mitigation, reducing the minimum CC size is the most practical option. For these reasons, I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5].

  ---

  前回同様の理由で[Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。

  以下、前回の投票理由と同文ですが、１つ追加すると、１ヶ月以上の立候補期間と再三の呼びかけにも関わらず、４席を巡るCC選挙に４名しか立候補していない事実は私の主張を強化しています。

  現在のリスク認識
現在、実際の憲法委員会（CC）人数が最小CC人数と一致しています。この状態では、CCメンバーが1人でも退任すると最小CC数を下回り、CCが機能不全に陥ります。その結果、通常のガバナンス行為だけでなく、セキュリティ上の緊急アップデート等も実行できなくなる可能性があり、これは早急に対処すべき深刻な構造的リスクです。

  解決手段の選択肢
このリスクを解消する方法は、原理的に次の2つ（またはその組み合わせ）しかありません。
(1) 実際CC人数を増やす
(2) 最小CC人数を減らす
  私は、このうち (2) 最小CC人数の減少 を支持します。

  1. 最小CC人数減少に対する懸念への整理
最小CC人数の減少が、将来的な権力集中につながる可能性があるという懸念は理解します。ただし、これはあくまで「最小値」の変更に過ぎません。実際のCC人数が7名のままであれば、現状と何も変わりません。仮に6名または5名まで減少した場合でも、選挙を実施することで7名へ回復させることは可能です。また、メタデータに記載されている通り、当初「最小CC数＝7」とした理由は、現在の状況には当てはまりません。したがって、「最小CC数を下げる＝直ちに権力集中」という主張は、過度に単純化された議論だと考えます。

  2. 実際CC人数の増加を支持しない理由
実際CC人数の増加は、非常に高コストかつ複雑なプロセスを伴います。実際に、7名から8名への増加は一度DRepの支持を得られず失敗しており、その際には、より高コストな手続きを求める意見もありました。多くの場合、選挙の実施が必要となり、そのコストを正当化するための合意形成自体が困難です。本件は「できれば改善したい」話ではなく、今すぐ対処すべきリスクですが、現実として、実際CC人数の増加に積極的にリソースを投下しようとする個人やエンティティは存在していません。

  3. CC報酬（TENET 4）との整合性
実際CC人数の増加は、TENET 4 に基づくCC報酬設計の実現をさらに困難にします。昨年、CCが1名退任し最小CC数を下回った背景には、5名分のCC報酬に対してDRepの賛同が得られなかったという事実があります。多くのDRepは、5名分の報酬ですら「高すぎる」と判断しました。この投票傾向を踏まえると、実際CC人数を8名以上に増やし、それに見合う報酬を支えることは、政治的・実務的に成立しにくいと考えられます。

  結論
現状は、CCメンバー1人の退任によってガバナンス全体が停止し得る危険な状態です。実際CC人数の増加は現実的な選択肢とは言い難く、即効性と実行可能性を考慮すると、最小CC人数の減少が最も現実的なリスク対処策です。以上の理由から、[Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。

• hix_coffeepool

  No50.4M ₳

  I am voting No on this proposal. Reducing the minimum Constitutional Committee size from 7 to 5 moves governance in the wrong direction: the goal should be to grow participation in this core function, not to shrink it. I would readily support a budget to...

  I am voting No on this proposal. Reducing the minimum Constitutional Committee size from 7 to 5 moves governance in the wrong direction: the goal should be to grow participation in this core function, not to shrink it. I would readily support a budget to attract and retain more qualified CC candidates — strengthening the Constitutional Committee is far more valuable to the ecosystem than much of what current treasury proposals fund. This year's approved budget already totals roughly 240M ADA; if we can spend tens of millions on "nodes" and "VC" but cannot spare even 1M ADA to strengthen the Committee, our priorities are broken. A substantively identical proposal was rejected last year, yet nothing was done since then to secure spare seats or otherwise mitigate the underlying risk, nor was a discussion opened on compensation for members — lowering the minimum size does not address that root cause, it only lowers the bar. Serving as a CC member is a genuine honour, but for volunteers it is a heavy personal burden; speaking from my own experience as a former interim orchestrator for the Japan team, I do not believe the candidate pool will grow until the role is made more sustainable and attractive. For these reasons I am voting No. Reference: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/ [Japanese version follows] 本提案に反対票を投じます。Constitutional Committee（憲法委員会）の最小サイズを7から5へ縮小することは、ガバナンスを誤った方向へ進めるものです。この中核的な機能は、縮小ではなく参加を拡大すべきです。私は、より多くの適格なCC候補者を集め維持するための予算であれば、むしろ賛成します。憲法委員会の強化は、現在のトレジャリー提案の多くが資金提供する対象よりも、エコシステムにとってはるかに価値があります。今年の通過予算は既に約2.4億ADAに達しています。「ノード」や「VC」に数千万ADAを使える一方で、委員会の強化に1M ADAすら割けないのであれば、優先順位が壊れています。実質的に同一の提案は昨年も否決されましたが、それ以降、予備の議席を確保してリスクを軽減する取り組みも、委員への報酬に関する議論も行われていません。最小サイズの引き下げは、この根本原因に対処するものではなく、単に基準を下げるだけです。CC委員を務めることは真に名誉なことですが、ボランティアで担うには大きな個人的負担を伴います。日本チームの暫定オーケストレーターを務めた自身の経験から言っても、役割をより持続可能で魅力的なものにしない限り、候補者層が育つとは思えません。以上の理由から、私は反対票を投じます。参照: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem-jp/

• Rodrigo-[CHIL]

  No17.3M ₳

  Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5