Thanks for asking this question. There are three different things we should not mix up:
- committeeMinSize (the parameter being changed here from 7 to 5): the floor of active members below which the CC cannot act at all.
- CC threshold (2/3): the fraction of sitting members that must vote "Yes".
- Number of seats (currently 7): explicitly not changed by this action
The action only changes the floor. The 2/3 threshold and the 7 seats stay as they are. The percentage does not change based on the committee size, but the absolute vote count does. (in the governance action text there is a table provided that addresses this)
A drop-off affects the running tally, because ratification is checked at each epoch boundary against the committee state as it stands then. After a resignation, that member's existing votes no longer count for actions that have not yet been ratified, and expired members can no longer vote on gvernance actions.
On the tie question: At 6 members with 2/3, you need 4 "Yes", a 3:3 split would mean 50%, so below 67%. The action is simply not approved by the CC. (There is no tiebreaker and none is needed: threshold not met means the action fails on the CC component, that's it)
Thank you for the detailed response. My current apprehension is the possibility of a split vote that would lead to a ratification impasse, due to a 6 member CC body. This could potentially be very likely if the minimum threshold is reduced to 5. I believe q member would be more likely to resign if they knew governance wouldn't stall upon their departure, even thought the increased risk of impasse was introduced. I'm a big big fan of "can't do harm" rather than relying on the best intentions of others "won't do harm". With the CC minimum size set to 7 the expectations is clear and the risk to inaction is also clearly defined without the need to rely on the best intentions of others or hope we don't end up in a 50% impasse.
By reducing the requirement to 5 we introduce additional states of non ratification from one to two, making inaction (non ratification) a more likely outcome.
My key point was: lowering minSize doesn't add a failure state, it removes one. Today at minSize 7, a single resignation (6 active) means the CC can ratify nothing at all (governance would be stalled, we had that before), and that's the more severe form of inaction.
At minSize 5 the CC keeps working, and only a genuine 3:3 split fails, which is just the 2/3 threshold doing its job at any committee size. So the change makes the CC moreable to act, and not less.
It's also worth remembering what a CC vote actually is: it's not an opinion or preference vote, it's an assessment of whether an action is constitutional. That's a much narrower, more objective question, so a clean 3:3 split is quite unlikely in practice. Members are reading the same Constitution against the same action, not weighing personal preferences. (even though we've seen that before, but not from three CC members at the same time)