Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5
180 DReps voted · 58 with a rationale · 10 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes584.2M ₳Rationale
Yoroi DRep votes YES on Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5. Yoroi supports this governance parameter adjustment as a pragmatic measure to improve the operational resilience of the Constitutional Committee.
- Operational Flexibility
Reducing the committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 allows the Constitutional Committee to function effectively even in scenarios where member availability is limited, without compromising governance integrity. Yoroi therefore votes Yes on this proposal.
- Operational Flexibility
- Yes435.8M ₳Rationale
For the same reasons as last time, I will vote YES to [Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5].
The following is the same reasoning as last time, but I would like to add one point: the fact that only four candidates have run for the four CC seats, despite a candidacy period of more than one month and repeated appeals, strengthens my argument.
Current Risk
At present, the actual number of Constitutional Committee (CC) members is equal to the minimum required size. In this situation, if even one CC member resigns, the committee would fall below the minimum threshold and become non-functional. This would prevent not only ordinary governance actions but also critical actions such as urgent security updates. This represents a serious structural risk that must be addressed urgently.Available Options
In principle, there are only two ways to mitigate this risk (or a combination of both): (1) Increase the actual number of CC members (2) Reduce the minimum CC size
I support option (2) reducing the minimum CC size.Addressing Concerns About Reducing the Minimum CC Size
I acknowledge concerns that lowering the minimum CC size could lead to future concentration of power. However, this change affects only the minimum threshold. As long as the actual CC size remains at seven members, there is no change from the current situation. Even if the number temporarily drops to six or five, an election can be held to restore the CC to seven members. In addition, as stated in the metadata, the original rationale for setting the minimum CC size to seven no longer applies under current conditions. Therefore, the argument that lowering the minimum CC size would immediately lead to centralization is an oversimplification.Why Increasing the Actual CC Size Is Not Supported Increasing the actual CC size requires a highly costly and complex process. In practice, a previous attempt to increase the CC from seven to eight members failed to obtain DRep support, and some DReps called for even more costly procedures. In most cases, an election would be required, and consensus would first need to be reached on whether such costs are justified. This issue is not something that can be addressed “eventually”; it is an urgent risk. However, in reality, there are no individuals or entities willing to commit the necessary resources to actively pursue an increase in the actual CC size.
Alignment With CC Compensation (TENET 4) Increasing the actual CC size would further complicate the implementation of TENET 4 regarding CC compensation. Last year, a CC member resigned and the CC fell below the minimum size because DReps did not approve compensation even for five CC members. In simple terms, many DReps judged compensation for five CC members to be too high. Given this voting behavior, it is likely to be even more difficult to support compensation for eight or more CC members, making this approach politically and practically unviable.
Conclusion The current situation allows a single resignation to potentially halt the entire governance process. Increasing the actual CC size is not a realistic or timely solution. From the perspective of immediacy, feasibility, and risk mitigation, reducing the minimum CC size is the most practical option. For these reasons, I will vote YES on [Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5].
前回同様の理由で[Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。
以下、前回の投票理由と同文ですが、１つ追加すると、１ヶ月以上の立候補期間と再三の呼びかけにも関わらず、４席を巡るCC選挙に４名しか立候補していない事実は私の主張を強化しています。
現在のリスク認識 現在、実際の憲法委員会（CC）人数が最小CC人数と一致しています。この状態では、CCメンバーが1人でも退任すると最小CC数を下回り、CCが機能不全に陥ります。その結果、通常のガバナンス行為だけでなく、セキュリティ上の緊急アップデート等も実行できなくなる可能性があり、これは早急に対処すべき深刻な構造的リスクです。
解決手段の選択肢 このリスクを解消する方法は、原理的に次の2つ（またはその組み合わせ）しかありません。 (1) 実際CC人数を増やす (2) 最小CC人数を減らす
私は、このうち (2) 最小CC人数の減少 を支持します。最小CC人数減少に対する懸念への整理 最小CC人数の減少が、将来的な権力集中につながる可能性があるという懸念は理解します。ただし、これはあくまで「最小値」の変更に過ぎません。実際のCC人数が7名のままであれば、現状と何も変わりません。仮に6名または5名まで減少した場合でも、選挙を実施することで7名へ回復させることは可能です。また、メタデータに記載されている通り、当初「最小CC数＝7」とした理由は、現在の状況には当てはまりません。したがって、「最小CC数を下げる＝直ちに権力集中」という主張は、過度に単純化された議論だと考えます。
実際CC人数の増加を支持しない理由 実際CC人数の増加は、非常に高コストかつ複雑なプロセスを伴います。実際に、7名から8名への増加は一度DRepの支持を得られず失敗しており、その際には、より高コストな手続きを求める意見もありました。多くの場合、選挙の実施が必要となり、そのコストを正当化するための合意形成自体が困難です。本件は「できれば改善したい」話ではなく、今すぐ対処すべきリスクですが、現実として、実際CC人数の増加に積極的にリソースを投下しようとする個人やエンティティは存在していません。
CC報酬（TENET 4）との整合性 実際CC人数の増加は、TENET 4 に基づくCC報酬設計の実現をさらに困難にします。昨年、CCが1名退任し最小CC数を下回った背景には、5名分のCC報酬に対してDRepの賛同が得られなかったという事実があります。多くのDRepは、5名分の報酬ですら「高すぎる」と判断しました。この投票傾向を踏まえると、実際CC人数を8名以上に増やし、それに見合う報酬を支えることは、政治的・実務的に成立しにくいと考えられます。
結論 現状は、CCメンバー1人の退任によってガバナンス全体が停止し得る危険な状態です。実際CC人数の増加は現実的な選択肢とは言い難く、即効性と実行可能性を考慮すると、最小CC人数の減少が最も現実的なリスク対処策です。以上の理由から、[Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5] に YES を投票します。
- Abstain332.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes293M ₳Rationale
EMURGO as a DRep votes YES on Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5, with rationale outlined below.
This governance parameter change has been reviewed and EMURGO supports the proposed adjustment to the committeeMinSize parameter. Reducing the minimum committee size from 7 to 5 provides greater operational flexibility for the Constitutional Committee while maintaining the integrity of the governance process. For these reasons, EMURGO votes yes.
- Yes254.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes222.9M ₳Rationale
This is a bit of a tricky one. We don't want single CC members to have more weight on their vote if the total number goes down to 5. On the other hand there are currently not many volunteers for this currently unpaid job. We vote YES to keep governance going, even if we drop below 7 CC members.
- Yes174.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes165.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes120.2M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. We support lowering the `committeeMinSize` parameter from 7 to 5 as a necessary measure to reduce the risk of governance inoperability.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We recognize the work of Intersect’s Civics Committee, Technical Steering Committee, and Parameter Committee in advancing a narrowly scoped parameter change to address an operational risk in Cardano governance.
The Cardano Foundation’s decision to vote YES is based on the following factors:
- Operational Resilience: The current Constitutional Committee has 7 members, matching the current `committeeMinSize`. This creates a fragile configuration: if one member retires, reducing the on-chain committee size below the minimum, governance actions requiring Constitutional Committee approval become ineligible for ratification. This includes Parameter Changes, Constitution Updates, Treasury Withdrawals, and Hard Forks. We view this as an avoidable risk to the continuity of Cardano governance.
- Reduction of Individual Blocking Risk: With the minimum set at the same level as the current committee size, any single committee member can, in practice, create a condition where the Constitutional Committee is no longer able to support actions that require its approval. We believe that lowering the minimum to 5 reduces the risk of indirect blocking while preserving the Constitutional Committee's role as a constitutional safeguard.
- Minimum, Not Target Size: This governance action changes the minimum required committee size. It does not directly reduce the current number of Constitutional Committee members, nor does it set 5 as the desired long-term committee size. We support the proposal and encourage the ecosystem to continue to maintain a Constitutional Committee composition above the minimum size, so that there is sufficient operational buffer.
We acknowledge that reducing the minimum committee size changes the dynamics if the committee were actually to fall to 5 members. At that size, and assuming the current 2/3 Constitutional Committee approval threshold, 4 constitutional votes would be required, while 2 non-votes could prevent the threshold from being met. This is a real consideration. However, in our view, the greater and more immediate risk is the current absence of any buffer between the active committee size and the minimum required for governance to operate fully.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. We view this as a measured, reversible change in parameters that improves governance resilience without altering the current Constitutional Committee composition. We encourage continued attention to maintaining a robust, active, and sufficiently broad committee while ensuring that Cardano’s governance system can function through normal transitions.
---> **_NOTE on 'Internal Voting':_**> The fields _constitutional_ and _unconstitutional_ below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are _for_ or _against_ the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes91.5M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote YES on the proposal to reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5.
My rationale:
My main reason is operational resilience. The current Constitutional Committee (CC) has 7 members, which is equal to the current minimum size. This makes governance fragile because a single resignation, expired term, or failure to maintain active membership can prevent the CC from satisfying the minimum-size requirement. As a result, governance actions that require CC approval may be blocked from progressing.
The purpose of this change is to create a safety buffer, not to concentrate governance power.
I recognize that this change comes with a trade-off. The parameter itself defines the minimum required number of CC members, not the desired operating size. However, if the CC were to operate with only 5 members, individual members would have more influence. With the current 2/3 approval threshold, 4 constitutional votes would be required, while 2 unconstitutional votes could prevent approval. This is a real governance risk.
However, the current situation is that the minimum is equal to the actual number of CC members. In my view, this creates unnecessary fragility. The risk of governance inoperability under the current setting is greater than the risk created by this limited reduction.
The proposal does not directly reduce the current number of CC members, and it does not imply that a 5-member CC should become the normal target. Ideally, Cardano should continue to maintain a 7-member committee. In the future, I would even support discussing a larger committee, for example, 9 members with a minimum of 7. That would provide both resilience and broader decentralization.
However, a larger committee only makes sense if the Constitution and governance process evolve to address the real problems that governance faces. For example, conflicts of interest should be handled explicitly. Today, CC approval of many governance actions may appear almost formal because most actions are not controversial from a constitutional perspective. If we expect a larger CC to add real value, the constitutional review process must be meaningful, independent, and relevant to the actual risks in governance.
An important aspect of my decision is incentives. Serving in governance is demanding work, especially during periods when treasury withdrawals are being reviewed. In my observation, there is not enough interest in the CC role relative to how important and demanding the work is.
Governance needs people with the right competence, independence, and willingness to devote sufficient time to the role. If this work remains difficult to fill, setting the minimum equal to the target number of members creates avoidable systemic risk.
We should also be honest about the recent context. Cardano has already experienced a situation where the retirement of a single CC member brought the committee below the required minimum. This exposed a mismatch between governance needs and the current incentive structure. I believe that once incentives are introduced for governance bodies, the number of qualified applicants will increase. We can reconsider a higher minimum later.
It is also important to note that the CC does not approve governance actions alone. Other governance bodies, especially DReps and, depending on the action type, SPOs, are also part of the ratification process. A smaller CC cannot approve governance actions by itself.
However, a smaller CC can make blocking easier. This is why the change should be treated as an operational safeguard, not as a governance-design ideal.
The proposed value of 5 complies with the relevant constitutional guardrails, has gone through the Parameter Committee process, and is reversible if needed. For these reasons, I support the change while expecting future CC elections to continue targeting 7 active members.
If you would like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqp - Yes86M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes YES, with expectations, on the parameter change to reduce committeeMinSize from 7 to 5.
This governance action, submitted by Intersect on behalf of the Civics Committee and the Technical Steering Committee and with the recommendation of the Parameter Committee, reduces the committeeMinSize protocol parameter from 7 to 5. committeeMinSize is the minimum number of on-chain-registered Constitutional Committee members required for Cardano governance to operate: if the number of active committee members falls below it, all governance actions that require Constitutional Committee approval — Parameter Changes, Constitution updates, Treasury Withdrawals, and Hard Forks — become ineligible for ratification. The change does not alter the current number of committee seats, does not change the maximum committee size, and is reversible provided at least seven members are in place.
Why it matters now. The Constitutional Committee currently comprises seven active members while committeeMinSize is set to seven — a buffer of zero. A single resignation or term expiration would drop the active count below the minimum and halt the majority of Cardano's governance. This is not hypothetical: one seat has already been vacated, and a number of members' terms expire at Epoch 653. Reducing the minimum to five creates a two-member operational buffer that lets governance keep functioning while vacancies are filled, without lowering the committee's actual size.
Why SIPO votes Yes. SIPO's support follows directly from its record and its objective. SIPO's stated objective is to build sustainable decentralized governance for Cardano; governance that can be brought to a halt by a single departure does not serve decentralization. SIPO has consistently supported governance-process and institutional-resilience measures that arrive through the proper committee route — voting Yes on the Cardano Budget Process Framework, on the Cardano Foundation as Project Catalyst's managing entity, and on the Update Plutus Cost Models parameter change. This action arrives through exactly that route: approved by the Civics Committee on 2026-03-13 and by the Technical Steering Committee on 2026-06-03, recommended by the Parameter Committee under PCP-005, with the ninety-day off-chain notice for governance-critical parameters satisfied (the off-chain proposal was published on 2025-11-11), and with all three committeeMinSize guardrails — not negative, not below three, not above ten — satisfied at a value of five. It is a clean resubmission of an earlier action that was invalidated only by a technical collision with a concurrent parameter change. Its ratification depends on the enactment of the Update Plutus Cost Models change, which SIPO has already voted Yes on and which has been enacted, so the dependency runs in the same direction as SIPO's own votes. This is SIPO's fourth Yes on a parameter change, consistent with its votes on Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units, on the Net Change Limit, and on the Plutus Cost Models.
SIPO states the trade-off plainly. The proposal itself discloses, and SIPO records, the one real cost of this change: if the actual committee were ever to shrink to five members under a two-thirds threshold, four constitutional votes would be needed to pass an action and only two to block it — so at a committee of five, the inactivity of one member would let another single member veto governance. SIPO does not treat this as a reason to vote No, because committeeMinSize is a floor for continued operation, not a target for committee size: the election process is explicitly intended to maintain seven seats, the change does not reduce actual seats, and the alternative — leaving a zero-buffer committee one departure away from paralysis — is the greater risk to decentralized governance. But SIPO holds the proposer to its stated intent.
SIPO therefore votes Yes with the following expectations: (1) that Intersect continues to run Constitutional Committee elections to maintain a full seven seats — filling the vacated seat and the seats expiring at Epoch 653 — so that a minimum of five functions as a safety buffer and not as a normalization of a smaller committee; and (2) that when the number of active committee members approaches the new floor of five, this is reported transparently, given the concentration of veto power the proposal itself acknowledges at that size. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep として、committeeMinSize を 7 から 5 に引き下げるパラメータ変更に、期待事項付きで賛成（YES）を投じます。
本ガバナンスアクションは、Intersect が Civics Committee および Technical Steering Committee を代表し、Parameter Committee の勧告のもとで提出したもので、プロトコルパラメータ committeeMinSize を 7 から 5 に引き下げます。committeeMinSize は、Cardano ガバナンスが機能するためにオンチェーン登録が必要な Constitutional Committee メンバーの最小数です。アクティブなメンバー数がこれを下回ると、Constitutional Committee の承認を要する全てのガバナンスアクション — Parameter Change・憲法改定・Treasury Withdrawal・Hard Fork — が ratify 不能になります。本変更は現在の委員会の席数を変えず、最大席数も変えず、7 名以上が在籍していれば元に戻せる可逆的な変更です。
なぜ今重要か。Constitutional Committee は現在アクティブ 7 名で、committeeMinSize は 7 — バッファはゼロです。1 名の辞任または任期満了でアクティブ数が下限を割り、Cardano ガバナンスの大半が停止します。これは仮定ではありません。すでに 1 席が空席となり、複数メンバーの任期が Epoch 653 に満了します。下限を 5 に引き下げれば、空席を補充する間もガバナンスを機能させ続ける 2 名分の運用バッファが生まれます。委員会の実際の規模を下げることなく、です。
なぜ SIPO は賛成するか。SIPO の支持は、その投票記録と目標から直接導かれます。SIPO の掲げる目標は Cardano の持続可能な分散型ガバナンスの構築であり、1 名の離脱で停止しうるガバナンスは分散に資しません。SIPO は、正規の委員会ルートを通じたガバナンスプロセス・制度レジリエンスの施策を一貫して支持してきました — Cardano Budget Process Framework、Project Catalyst の管理主体としての Cardano Foundation、そして Update Plutus Cost Models パラメータ変更にいずれも賛成しています。本アクションはまさにそのルートを通っています。Civics Committee が 2026-03-13 に、Technical Steering Committee が 2026-06-03 に承認し、Parameter Committee が PCP-005 として勧告、ガバナンス上重要なパラメータに求められる 90 日のオフチェーン事前告知も充足（オフチェーン提案は 2025-11-11 に公開）、committeeMinSize の 3 つの guardrail — 負でない・3 未満でない・10 超でない — も 5 という値で全て満たしています。本件は、同時期の別のパラメータ変更との技術的衝突のみで無効化された先行アクションのクリーンな再提出です。その ratify は Update Plutus Cost Models の発効に依存しますが、SIPO は同案にすでに賛成済で、同案は発効済であるため、依存は SIPO 自身の投票と同じ方向に働きます。これは SIPO にとって 4 例目のパラメータ変更への賛成であり、Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units・Net Change Limit・Plutus Cost Models への賛成と一貫します。
SIPO はトレードオフを率直に記します。提案自身が開示し、SIPO も記録するとおり、本変更には一つの現実的なコストがあります。仮に実際の委員会が 5 名まで縮小した場合、2/3 閾値のもとでは、アクションの可決に 4 票、阻止に 2 票が必要となり — 委員会が 5 名なら、1 名の不活性で他の 1 名がガバナンスを veto できてしまいます。SIPO はこれを反対の理由とはしません。committeeMinSize は継続運用のための下限であって委員会規模の目標ではなく、選挙プロセスは 7 席の維持を明確に意図しており、本変更は実席を減らさず、そして代替案 — バッファゼロの委員会を、離脱 1 つで麻痺する状態に放置すること — こそが分散型ガバナンスにとってより大きなリスクだからです。ただし SIPO は、提案者をその表明した意図に対して拘束します。
したがって SIPO は、以下の期待事項とともに賛成します。(1) Intersect が表明どおり Constitutional Committee 選挙を運用して 7 席を完全に維持し — 空席および Epoch 653 満了席を補充し — 下限 5 が「小規模化の常態化」ではなく安全バッファとして機能するようにすること。(2) アクティブメンバー数が新下限 5 に接近した場合、提案自身がその規模で認めている veto 権の集中に鑑み、透明に報告すること。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- Yes84.3M ₳Rationale
This makes sense to help mitigate the need for emergency CC elections in the future. Also, relying on the judgment of the Civics Committee and the Technical Steering Committee here.
- Yes77.7M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted76.8M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes1mo agoSuperseded
- Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes74.5M ₳Rationale
I support this proposal.
In my view, the root issue is not the committeeMinSize parameter itself, but the lack of sustainable incentives and compensation for Constitutional Committee (CC) members. Creating an environment where qualified individuals are willing to serve on the CC should be a priority for Cardano governance.
At present, however, the pool of available CC candidates remains limited. With committeeMinSize set equal to the current committee size of seven, even a single resignation or expired term could disrupt governance operations.
While a smaller committee may increase concerns around centralization, I believe this proposal is a pragmatic and necessary measure to reduce the risk of governance paralysis under current conditions.
That said, I view this as a temporary solution. If the number of qualified CC candidates increases and appropriate incentive structures are established in the future, the community should revisit committeeMinSize and reassess what is appropriate for a healthy governance system.
Given the current circumstances, I believe this is a reasonable adjustment and therefore vote Yes.
本提案を支持します。
現在の課題の根本原因は committeeMinSize の値そのものではなく、Constitutional Committee（CC）の報酬体系やインセンティブ設計が十分に整備されておらず、なり手が限られていることにあると考えています。そのため、優秀な人材が継続的にCCへ参加できる環境を整備することは、Cardanoガバナンスにおける重要な課題の一つです。
一方で、現状ではCC候補者が十分に確保できているとは言えず、committeeMinSize が現員数と同じ7に設定されていることで、1名の欠員だけでもガバナンスが停止するリスクがあります。
CCの人数が少ない状態は中央集権化リスクを高める側面がありますが、現在の状況を考慮すると、本提案はガバナンス停止を回避するための現実的かつ必要な対応であると考えます。
ただし、本提案はあくまで暫定的な対応であり、将来的にCC候補者の増加や適切な報酬体系の整備が進んだ場合には、committeeMinSizeについて改めて見直しを行うべきだと考えます。
現時点では合理的な判断であると考え、Yesとします。
- Yes73.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES. Currently, both the Constitutional Committee and the minimum size parameter are set at 7. This creates unacceptable fragility where a single member's resignation halts the entire governance system, blocking hard forks and treasury withdrawals. Reducing the committeeMinSize to 5 provides a necessary operational buffer to prevent catastrophic gridlock during member transitions. This does not change our goal of electing a 7-member body, but simply ensures Cardano governance remains resilient during the temporary loss of one or two members.
- Yes69.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes62.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain53.8M ₳Rationale
I'm voting Abstain on the proposal to change committeeMinSize from 7 to 5.
I acknowledge the problem this proposal is trying to solve. The current committeeMinSize (7) equals the actual size of the Constitutional Committee, leaving no buffer, and creating a single point of failure where the departure of even one member could halt governance. I don't oppose the attempt to address this.
That said, this solution lowers the floor of the oversight layer. The Constitutional Committee is the check that verifies the constitutionality of all governance actions, including those passed by DReps, and lowering its minimum threshold weakens the robustness of that oversight. In particular, at a committee size of 5, the votes needed to block fall to 2, or effectively 1 if one member is inactive, so the blocking power that should be distributed instead becomes concentrated in a small minority.
The same problem could be solved by increasing the actual committee size so that 7 becomes a buffer rather than the floor, or by strengthening rapid replacement procedures when a seat falls vacant, instead of lowering the minimum. Since less oversight-weakening alternatives haven't been sufficiently explored, I choose to Abstain: I won't block the resolution of a legitimate operational problem, but I won't vote in favor of lowering the oversight threshold either.
- Abstain50.5M ₳Rationale
I am abstaining because this proposal falls outside my area of expertise. I do not feel I have enough technical knowledge to make a fully informed decision for or against it.
- No50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on this proposal. Reducing the minimum Constitutional Committee size from 7 to 5 moves governance in the wrong direction: the goal should be to grow participation in this core function, not to shrink it. I would readily support a budget to attract and retain more qualified CC candidates — strengthening the Constitutional Committee is far more valuable to the ecosystem than much of what current treasury proposals fund. This year's approved budget already totals roughly 240M ADA; if we can spend tens of millions on "nodes" and "VC" but cannot spare even 1M ADA to strengthen the Committee, our priorities are broken. A substantively identical proposal was rejected last year, yet nothing was done since then to secure spare seats or otherwise mitigate the underlying risk, nor was a discussion opened on compensation for members — lowering the minimum size does not address that root cause, it only lowers the bar. Serving as a CC member is a genuine honour, but for volunteers it is a heavy personal burden; speaking from my own experience as a former interim orchestrator for the Japan team, I do not believe the candidate pool will grow until the role is made more sustainable and attractive. For these reasons I am voting No. Reference: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/ [Japanese version follows] 本提案に反対票を投じます。Constitutional Committee（憲法委員会）の最小サイズを7から5へ縮小することは、ガバナンスを誤った方向へ進めるものです。この中核的な機能は、縮小ではなく参加を拡大すべきです。私は、より多くの適格なCC候補者を集め維持するための予算であれば、むしろ賛成します。憲法委員会の強化は、現在のトレジャリー提案の多くが資金提供する対象よりも、エコシステムにとってはるかに価値があります。今年の通過予算は既に約2.4億ADAに達しています。「ノード」や「VC」に数千万ADAを使える一方で、委員会の強化に1M ADAすら割けないのであれば、優先順位が壊れています。実質的に同一の提案は昨年も否決されましたが、それ以降、予備の議席を確保してリスクを軽減する取り組みも、委員への報酬に関する議論も行われていません。最小サイズの引き下げは、この根本原因に対処するものではなく、単に基準を下げるだけです。CC委員を務めることは真に名誉なことですが、ボランティアで担うには大きな個人的負担を伴います。日本チームの暫定オーケストレーターを務めた自身の経験から言っても、役割をより持続可能で魅力的なものにしない限り、候補者層が育つとは思えません。以上の理由から、私は反対票を投じます。参照: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem-jp/
- Yes50M ₳Rationale
Reducing the committeeMinSize parameter does not necessarily imply that the committee will be reduced. However, if that were to happen unexpectedly, a lower committeeMinSize would help ensure governance is not blocked.
- Yes49.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes40.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes37.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes36.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain34.6M ₳Rationale
予算執行には滞りなく行くのが良いですが、前回反対してるので棄権。
- Yes33.5M ₳Rationale
Yes. Lowers committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 so a single empty Constitutional Committee seat cannot halt all ratification, as happened in epoch 597 when the Atlantic Council resigned. Seats stay at 7 and elections still target 7; the 5 is a contingency buffer, not a reduction.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Vote: Yes
This lowers
committeeMinSizefrom 7 to 5 to give Cardano governance an operational buffer against a single empty Constitutional Committee seat halting the entire ratification pipeline. It does not shrink the committee, it does not change the elected seat count, and it leaves elections targeting 7. The Cardano First framework reads as a Yes led by Governance Transparency, with the Decentralization trade-off named and judged acceptable.The case is not hypothetical. When the Cardano Atlantic Council resigned from the Constitutional Committee in epoch 597, active membership fell to six against a minimum of seven, and ratification of governance actions stalled until a snap election restored the seat. This parameter change is the structural fix for exactly that failure mode.
Pillar Analysis
Governance Transparency (lead pillar)
The pillar engaged here is the resilience and continuity of the governance system itself. Under the current setting, the minimum and the actual membership are the same number, so the system has zero slack: one departure and every CC-gated action freezes. That is a single point of failure sitting on top of the most consequential parts of governance, treasury spend, parameter changes, constitution updates, and hard forks. Moving the minimum to 5 while keeping 7 seated converts a zero-slack configuration into a two-seat buffer, so a resignation or term expiry no longer takes the whole pipeline offline while a replacement is elected. The proposal is explicit that this is a floor, not a target, and the Intersect-run election process continues to maintain 7 seats. That is the right separation: keep the working committee full, but stop a transient vacancy from becoming a governance outage.
Decentralization (contested)
The honest trade-off is that a lower minimum changes the math on rejection. At 5 seated members, the inactivity of one leaves room for another to veto an action, and 2 unconstitutional votes block ratification versus 3 at a 7-member body. A smaller committee is, at the margin, easier to deadlock. I am treating this as contested-but-acceptable rather than disqualifying for three reasons: the change is a minimum, not a mandate, so the committee is not actually being reduced; the floor of 5 still sits comfortably above the guardrail hard floor of 3; and the realistic alternative, leaving a zero-slack minimum in place, is the more centralizing outcome in practice, because a stalled committee hands disproportionate power to whoever can delay refilling a seat. A buffer that keeps the system running is more decentralizing than a brittle threshold that periodically shuts it down.
Risks I'm Accepting With This Yes
Easier to block at the floor
If membership ever did fall to 5, the threshold to reject an action drops to 2 votes, so a single absent member plus one objector could stall ratification. I am accepting this because 5 is a contingency floor the system passes through briefly during a vacancy, not a steady state, and elections are structured to return the body to 7.
Standing minimum reduction
Lowering the constitutional minimum is a real reduction in a safeguard, and it would matter at the moment of any future reversion: reverting to 7 only bites if the committee then has fewer than 7 members. I am accepting this because the proposal keeps 7 as the operating target, the change is reversible, and the buffer's upside (no repeat of the epoch-597 stall) outweighs the narrow downside.
Bottom Line
A two-seat buffer that stops a single Constitutional Committee vacancy from freezing treasury, parameter, constitution, and hard-fork ratification, with the committee still seated and elected at 7. The reduced rejection threshold is the cost, and on balance keeping governance operational wins. Yes.
- Yes31.4M ₳Rationale
I vote YES.
This parameter change improves the operational resilience of Cardano governance by preventing governance halts due to temporary Constitutional Committee inactivity.
It introduces no financial burden, maintains decentralization, and strengthens the reliability of the governance system. - Yes30.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
There is a clear need to lower the MINIMUM committee size simply for the sake of redundancy and governance continuity. I would prefer going as low as 3 for the minimum, but going from 7 to 5 is a big step in the right direction. This is a YES from me.
- Yes27.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.5M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged26.1M ₳History
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
This in my mind is a knee jerk reaction to the fact that not all CC members have resubmitted for voting this cycle, its unnecessary in my mind and if we don't get enough we can have a snap vote to manage the out come within a very short period of time. Why do we insist on working thru everything in such isolated and knee jerk ways? Don't most of you have a college degree and understand the need to get work done early to stay ahead of the work load demand. Preparation and time management are key to getting things done in a very complete and through manner making your life actually easier not harder.
Its either sheer procrastination or the unhealthy fear of proposals not going thru due to a lack of CC members confirmed to make sure each decision can actually count onchain, relax its going to be OK and we will get thru this, writing a proposal to hedge on what you think is a inevitable failure is not a plan its a reaction to rhetoric from reading to many x posts on the failure of Voltaire even though were literally not even in toddler phase when it comes to the time since the Constitution was enacted by the people of Cardano
- Yes25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES to Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5. Requiring a min committee size of 7 given the current lack of interest and compensation creates significant additional risk for governance stall. 5 is a better number and leaves the community with room to operate in the face of one or two resignations.
- Abstain23.5M ₳Rationale
I don't think it's matters. The root cause of the issue is why doesn't anyone want to run for the CC?
- Yes21.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes21.5M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on the protocol parameter update action “Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5” (c75bb221606687aa858ec89c7a15c88e9c17054f2e045ae31ecc8a9687cd206e#0).
I reluctantly vote in favour of this action having witnessed the ecosystem reject an attempt to increase the number of Constitutional Committee (CC) members to 8 last year. Preference would have been to increase the number, while keeping the minimum at 7. However, no system can sustainably operate at the limit continuously. Operating with 7 members while the protocol minimum is 7 has left the Cardano governance system exposed to a level of fragility that it should never have been placed in in the first place. With an increasing number of individual member seats, as opposed to consortiums, the risk of one or more being unable to fulfil their duties at any point in time risks stalling the governance system. As we have seen play out following the retirement of a CC member in late 2025.
Voting as a DRep, who is also a Civics Committee member, the timing of this (re)submission to Mainnet has been unfortunate. As the metadata highlights, this was approved by the Civics Committee on 2026-03-13. 84 days passed before reaching Mainnet submission.
Yes, careful coordination was required to prevent a repeat collision with another parameter update, as happened following the submission by a community member, and hindsight is a wonderful thing but over-cautiousness regarding the Plutus Cost Model update and the hard fork has resulted in some unfortunate timing. It was submitted during the CC election registration phase and made it appear as though this submission was a knee jerk reaction to low turnout numbers at the time. This was absolutely not the case. It was months in the making. Another impact of timing was that, had this been submitted sooner, it would have better informed the Intersect CC election process. Had the proposal failed, the process could have pivoted early enough to electing more than the minimum members. Not having this answer ahead of time hand tied the process into committing to the 4 minimum and now hoping that this proposal passes.
Additionally, the metadata put forth by the Civics Committee was largely changed by the Technical Steering Committee. The educational content and context as to why this was being resubmitted again was largely removed and focussed on the technicalities. Leading me to publish an explanation article on X here: https://x.com/HephyPool/status/2063399716084183367?s=20. Which at least one DRep has admitted actually helped inform their voting decision. Metadata should seek to educate and inform the community, not just focus on the technical. It would have cleared up many of the misconceptions and allowed DReps to vote more clearly.
All in all, I am voting YES. The idea has been discussed for long enough, received Civics and Technical Steering support, contains a reversion plan and uses the correct parameter name throughout. With that said, let’s increase the size of the CC in the future.
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes19.9M ₳Rationale
Yes, I support increasing resiliency of the CC by introducing a buffer of 2.
- Yes17.4M ₳No rationale
- No17.3M ₳Rationale
Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5
- Yes16.7M ₳Rationale
The current minimum equals the current number of CC members, which makes governance fragile. A single resignation, expired term, or inactive seat can bring the CC below the required minimum and block actions that require CC approval.
This change should not be seen as making 5 members the ideal committee size. Cardano should still aim to maintain 7 active CC members, and a larger committee can be discussed in the future once incentives and candidate availability improve.
We recognize that a smaller minimum increases the influence of individual CC members and can make blocking easier. However, the risk of governance inoperability under the current setting is greater than the risk of this limited reduction.
The parameter is within guardrails, has gone through the Parameter Committee process, and can be changed again later if needed.
- Yes16.4M ₳Rationale
Vote: YES
This governance action is a protocol-parameter change that reduces committeeMinSize from 7 to 5. Submitted by Intersect on June 5, 2026 on behalf of the Civics Committee and the Technical Steering Committee, with the recommendation of the Parameter Committee, it lowers the minimum number of active Constitutional Committee members required for the committee to ratify governance actions. It does not shrink the Constitutional Committee itself and does not change the committee's vote threshold: the intent is to continue seating a full seven-member committee through regular elections while creating an operational buffer against vacancies. No ADA is requested and no treasury funds are involved.
Vampyre Fund votes YES.
This is foundational governance infrastructure, and the risk it addresses is not hypothetical. When the Cardano Atlantic Council retired effective November 25, 2025, the Constitutional Committee fell below its required membership and Cardano experienced its first governance shutdown: CC-dependent actions — including treasury withdrawals and protocol-parameter changes that require concurrent majorities from DReps and the committee — could not be ratified until the committee was replenished, even where DReps approved them. A governance system that can be paralyzed by a single resignation, term expiration, or vacancy is structurally fragile. Reducing the functional quorum to five while continuing to target a full seven seats is a conservative, sensible hardening of the mechanism. Vampyre Fund takes an ultra long-term view of Cardano's institutions, and resilience of the ratification process is exactly the kind of durable, non-tactical improvement that view favors.
The honest trade-off is that a lower floor allows governance to proceed on a smaller active base, which modestly reduces the redundancy of the constitutional safeguard: five members rather than seven would suffice to keep CC-dependent actions moving. This deserves acknowledgment rather than dismissal. It is materially mitigated by three facts — the committee's vote threshold is unchanged, the standing intention remains a fully seated seven-member committee, and the alternative on display in late 2025 was not a stronger safeguard but a complete stall. A committee that cannot act is not a safer committee; it is an absent one. Five active members remains a substantial and credible quorum.
Vampyre Fund supports this change as a matter of operational resilience, not as a step toward a smaller committee. We would oppose any subsequent action that used this lower floor as cover to leave seats unfilled or to erode the committee's vote threshold, and we will continue to weight the full and prompt seating of the Constitutional Committee as a governance priority.
- No14.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA votes ABSTAIN on Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5.
RCADA recognises the genuine operational issue this proposal addresses. With both the current Constitutional Committee and
committeeMinSizeset at 7, the system has no buffer. A single resignation, term expiry, registration issue, or temporary inactivity can immediately affect the committee’s ability to ratify governance actions that require Constitutional Committee approval, including parameter changes, Treasury withdrawals, Constitution updates, and hard forks.This is a real governance resilience concern. RCADA agrees that Cardano governance should not be fragile enough that one or two committee availability issues can create system-wide disruption.
RCADA also recognises that this resubmission gives the community a proper opportunity to review the proposal after the previous action was affected by parameter-action coordination issues. RCADA’s prior abstain was largely procedural and should not be read as opposition to improving Constitutional Committee resilience.
However, RCADA is not fully convinced that lowering the minimum from 7 to 5 is the strongest long-term governance design.
While the proposal addresses an immediate pain point, it does so by reducing the floor of one of Cardano’s key constitutional safeguards. Even if the current intention is to keep operating with a seven-member committee, protocol parameters can shape future behaviour. A lower minimum may make it easier over time to normalise operating with fewer committee members.
RCADA believes a stronger long-term structure may be to expand the target Constitutional Committee size while maintaining a higher minimum. For example, electing 9 members with a minimum of 7 could provide a similar operational buffer while better preserving representation, legitimacy, and resilience.
RCADA also remains cautious about voting dynamics at a smaller committee size. Under the current two-thirds threshold, a seven-member committee requires 5 constitutional votes to approve, while a five-member committee requires 4. At five members, inactivity or opposition from a small number of members can have a larger effect on whether governance actions progress.
This abstain is not opposition to improving governance resilience. RCADA supports fixing the current brittleness. However, we prefer solving it through a broader discussion on Constitutional Committee design rather than only lowering the minimum parameter.
The preferred steady state should remain a healthy, full-sized Constitutional Committee, not one operating near the bare minimum.
For these reasons, RCADA votes ABSTAIN. We support preventing governance inoperability, but do not fully endorse reducing
committeeMinSizeto 5 as the best long-term path forward.RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here: "https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/."
- Yes12.1M ₳Rationale
We support reducing the Constitutional Committee minimum size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5.
Recent governance experience has demonstrated that the current threshold creates unnecessary operational risk. In late 2025, a governance action to add a Constitutional Committee member explicitly stated that restoring the committee to the minimum required size would "enable on-chain governance to resume in full." This, having followed the resignation of a CC member, provided real-world evidence that governance continuity can be affected when committee membership falls below the operational threshold.
This proposal does not reduce the intended size of the Constitutional Committee. Rather, it introduces resilience against temporary vacancies, resignations, or delays in replacement elections, ensuring that governance can continue functioning while the community restores full committee membership.
While a smaller active committee slightly increases the influence of individual members, we believe the benefit of maintaining governance continuity outweighs this risk. Cardano's constitutional safeguards remain intact, and the proposal remains fully within constitutional guardrails.