Cardano Builder DAO
141 DReps voted · 56 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes480.2K ₳No rationale
- No443.8K ₳No rationale
- No414.7K ₳No rationale
- No383K ₳No rationale
- No379.3K ₳Rationale
My strong opinion is that treasury ADA should be exclusively used to fund basic technical infrastructure that is available to all people in the Cardano ecosystem.
The Cardano Builder DAO focuses too much on “numbers go up” for my taste. That should be the purpose of for-profit businesses that build on the basic community-funded infrastructure. But those businesses should not be community-funded themselves, but rather be funded by people who want to risk their venture capital in them.
- No365.8K ₳No rationale
- No362.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain309.5K ₳Rationale
EN - I have a relevant conflict of interest exists regarding this proposal; consequently, I will abstain.
PT - Eu tenho um conflito de interesse relevante em relação a esta proposta; consequentemente, irei me abster.
- No299.1K ₳Rationale
I'm not enthusiastic about indirect treasury funding schemes. Let's use the DAO we already have.
- No294.5K ₳No rationale
- No270.2K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on “Cardano Builder DAO.” When this DAO was first funded, the intent was to decentralize funding structures and enable a specialized, builder-led mechanism that could allocate capital against clear Cardano 2030 KPIs, complementing rather than concentrating existing processes. The DAO has since operated two funding rounds, distributing around 11.1M ADA to 34 projects and publishing dashboards that track MAU, TVL, and transaction metrics for funded teams.
After reviewing the available public material, however, I do not see enough transparency, structural safeguards, or demonstrated ecosystem-wide impact to justify an additional 20M ADA at this time. The public-facing reporting focuses heavily on internal governance evolution, high-level KPI charts, and membership activity, but does not provide clear, accessible detail on individual funding decisions, project contracts, deliverables, or independent performance reviews for the prior 12M ADA. KPI tracking relies largely on a narrow set of self-described metrics (MAU, TVL, transactions) that are often weak proxies for durable value and can be difficult to interpret without richer context on quality, retention, and real user benefit.
Structurally, this proposal would expand a secondary allocator that already controls a significant pool of Treasury-derived capital, without clear sunset conditions, scale limits, or external guardrails to prevent the DAO from effectively becoming a semi-permanent funding gatekeeper for a relatively small circle of existing ecosystem providers. In a cycle where remaining NCL headroom is tightening, I do not believe it is prudent to allocate a further 20M ADA to a structure that has not yet demonstrated the level of openness, accountability, and independently verifiable results that should accompany large, recurring Treasury commitments to secondary allocators. For these reasons, I am voting NO.
- No260.3K ₳Rationale
Rationale (NO):
Excessive Capital Concentration: Allocating 20M ₳ to a single intermediary sub-DAO creates significant capital concentration and dilutes direct DRep oversight over ultimate fund positioning.
While the DAO’s track record is notable, delegating large-scale funding decisions to an internal builder network introduces evaluation bias and complicates granular milestone auditing for DReps.
Given the current intensive protocol upgrades phase, massive capital outlays should remain strictly restricted to vital network-wide consensus and node infrastructure layers.
- Abstain245.9K ₳Rationale
An employer of mine is still listed as a member on the Cardano Builder DAO website, and while I'm not aware of them requesting funds this round, I prefer to play it safe and avoid any possibility of conflict of interest.
- No238.9K ₳Rationale
Based on my criteria filter below I do like the proposal, however the scale is too big for the current ADA price and treasury conditions. If there was a revenue sharing mechanism I could be convinced. For now my vote is No.
- Treasury runway is shrinking rapidly and must be protected. The 350M ADA 2026-27 NCL already risks ~21% drawdown. Aggressive prior spending + ADA weakness demands selectivity to avoid depletion before real adoption.
- Infrastructure is important, but it is not the primary bottleneck. Cardano's core tech is solid. The ecosystem stalls on adoption, liquidity, developer experience, and compelling use cases (DeFi, RWAs, revenue-generating apps). Broad infrastructure funding without adoption KPIs won't drive organic ADA demand.
- Hoskinson's concerns deserve respect, but governance requires balance. Core maintenance matters for competitiveness. DRep duty is long-term sustainability: not unlimited spending. Past allocations often failed to yield proportional TVL/users/ADA utility. Prioritize evidence-based proposals.
- Better capital allocation strategy: Favor high-leverage use-case initiatives, especially RWAs and revenue generating applications that commit to direct revenue or ADA return mechanisms back to the treasury, with clear milestones, private co-funding, and proven traction. Target specific tech unlocks only when tightly tied to measurable adoption impact. This builds real value without creating dependency.
- Yes229.8K ₳No rationale
- No215.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes196.1K ₳No rationale
- No194.3K ₳No rationale
- No191.2K ₳No rationale
- No182.3K ₳No rationale
- No180K ₳No rationale
- Yes142.5K ₳Rationale
Not a single cent of the budget has been allocated to DAO builders, including Cardano's native oracle Orcfax, while huge amounts are paid for integrations of non-native oracles that do not publish on-chain and sign with a single server.
- No137.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes131.9K ₳No rationale
- No119.1K ₳Rationale
I am voting no because, while I support funding builders and recognize the work the Cardano Builder DAO has done to organize community-driven grant allocation, I am not convinced that delegating ₳20 million in Treasury funds to a specialized sub-DAO is the right governance model for Cardano at this stage.
My primary concern is one of governance and accountability. DReps were elected to evaluate Treasury proposals on behalf of the community. Creating another body responsible for selecting recipients and distributing significant Treasury resources introduces an additional layer of decision-making that is not directly accountable to the broader Cardano ecosystem. While the Builder DAO is composed of experienced builders, it does not necessarily represent the diversity of stakeholders who collectively make up Cardano's governance.
I also believe the proposal places greater emphasis on the process of allocating funds than on demonstrating long-term ecosystem outcomes. While previous funding rounds, KPI dashboards, and governance participation are positive developments, I would have preferred clearer evidence that prior allocations produced sustained improvements in ecosystem-wide adoption, usage, and resilience before substantially expanding this funding model. Previous ecosystem grants, including projects that later changed their business models or reduced public accessibility, reinforce my belief that Treasury should carefully evaluate demonstrated public benefit before increasing delegated funding authority.
Ultimately, I support funding builders, but I believe those decisions should remain as directly accountable to the Cardano governance process as possible. Until I am convinced that a specialized funding DAO provides measurably better outcomes than direct Treasury governance, I am not prepared to support transferring this level of discretionary authority.
- No110.9K ₳No rationale
- Abstain107.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes92.6K ₳No rationale
- No64.4K ₳No rationale
- No56K ₳No rationale
- No50.5K ₳No rationale
- Abstain47.3K ₳No rationale
- No45.2K ₳No rationale
- Abstain26.7K ₳Rationale
Not going to pass, abstain.
- No11.5K ₳No rationale
- No10.8K ₳No rationale
- No8.1K ₳No rationale
- No6.7K ₳No rationale
- No6.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes684 ₳No rationale
- No0 ₳No rationale