Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit." Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action constitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
"Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit." (d52a4917df4f91...7ab1#0) is a Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. The TWGA seeks to withdraw 103,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury to reimburse the 100,000 ada deposit lost by the submitter of the Info Governance Action "Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -" in September 2024, when a bug in the Cardano node permitted an unregistered stake key to be used as the deposit return address and the protocol could not return the deposit on the Action's expiration. The additional 3,000 ada compensates the submitter for staking rewards forgone over the intervening period at a stated rate of 2 percent per annum. The on-chain withdrawal destination is stake1uys93fhep4lc2u6lu0q09kcxayxzthasded35c0x0w60ugc9s0cm5, the original Ikigai Action's reward address.
Article II.6's procedural standards are satisfied. The proposal anchors to an off-chain document with the on-chain blake2b-256 hash abaf67cde8defc914712009094cd3805bcf8911d3fa79c6edfd6c975dcf9d471, a content-addressed form that is immutable once posted, and the metadata supplies the title, abstract, motivation, rationale, and constitutionality discussion that Article II.6.2 requires. Article II.7.1's terms-of-withdrawal requirement is met on its plain text by the proposal's specification of purpose (reimbursement of the lost deposit), delivery period (immediate, on enactment of the Governance Action), costs (none), and refund conditions (none, given the immediate and unconditional nature of the disbursement). Article II.7.2's prior-receipts disclosure is supplied directly: the proposer states that the recipient of this reimbursement has not previously received funds from the Cardano Treasury. Article II.7.3 is satisfied because the 103,000 ada requested here is well within the 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit currently in force for the period spanning epochs 613 through 713.
The remaining Article II.7 provisions, Article II.7.4 (Audit Allocation), Article II.7.5 (Administrator), and Article II.7.6 (Auditable Accounts and Delegation), require a different analysis because of the unique remedial character of this Action. This is, in substance, the return of the 100,000 ada deposit posted by the submitter of the original Ikigai Info Action, together with 3,000 ada of staking-reward compensation, to the same stake address (stake1uys93fhep4lc2u6lu0q09kcxayxzthasded35c0x0w60ugc9s0cm5) that the original submitter specified as the deposit return address when filing that Action in September 2024. The 100,000 ada Cardano Treasury deposit posted on the original Ikigai Action was retained by the Treasury when that Action expired in epoch 517 rather than being returned to the submitter, and the present Treasury Withdrawal restores it to the exact return address the original submission designated. It is a single, automated, unconditional transfer, completed in a single transaction upon enactment. There is no period during which any party holds the funds prior to disbursement to the recipient, no monitoring of fund use is possible or beneficial, and no oversight mechanism could meaningfully attach to a transfer that ends at the moment it begins. The protocol itself functions as administrator in this narrow case, overseeing the unique, unconditional, direct payment that this Action authorizes. Article II.7.4's allocation requirement is satisfied because no ada need be allocated for periodic independent financial audits or for the implementation of oversight metrics where the disbursement is complete in a single on-chain transaction publicly verifiable by any ada holder. Article II.7.5's administrator-designation requirement is satisfied because the protocol's automated disbursement is itself the administrator function, providing the monitoring of fund use and assurance of deliverable achievement that the Constitution requires, on a record that can be unilaterally verified by the Cardano Community. Article II.7.6's administrator-held custody requirement does not engage because there is no holding period; the funds move directly from the Treasury to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, and II.7.6's substantive obligations apply only "so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient."
We emphasize that the foregoing analysis represents a very narrow exception to the audit and oversight requirements that this Committee normally applies to Treasury Withdrawals. In the ordinary case, a Treasury Withdrawal funds a program of work over a delivery period and requires the accountability architecture that Article II.7's audit and administrator provisions contemplate. This proposal is not the ordinary case. It seeks the protocol's restoration of a deposit that the protocol itself failed to return, in a single automated transaction whose use is determined entirely by the on-chain action with no discretion exercised by any party after disbursement. The introduction of an intermediary administrator, an audit engagement, or an oversight committee would add no constitutional benefit over the protocol's own adjudication, and the absence of these mechanisms in the ordinary sense is not, on these facts, a constitutional defect.
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit." Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action constitutional.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Cardano Curia finds the “Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional. The action has a clear reimbursement purpose, a specified amount, immediate on-chain delivery, and a limited scope that does not create an ongoing program of work or continuing treasury administration.
What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal of ₳103,000 from the Cardano Treasury to reimburse the submitter of the earlier “Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -” Info Action.
The requested amount consists of ₳100,000 for the original governance action deposit and ₳3,000 intended to compensate for forgone staking rewards. The expected effect is a one-time direct reimbursement to the specified recipient upon enactment.
Constitutional and guardrails assessment
Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. It is properly framed as a Treasury Withdrawal and is therefore assessed under the constitutional requirements for governance action standards and treasury withdrawal standards.
The proposal identifies a specific purpose: reimbursement of a governance action deposit and associated forgone staking rewards. It also identifies the relevant amount, the immediate delivery mechanism, and the limited nature of the withdrawal. This is not a request to fund an ongoing program, service contract, development roadmap, or multi-stage delivery process. The constitutional delivery is the reimbursement itself.
The proposal is limited in scope and does not introduce new protocol behavior, alter monetary policy, change governance rights, or create continuing obligations for the Cardano Blockchain. The withdrawal is a single, direct transfer whose execution can be verified on-chain by any ada holder.
The action also appears consistent with treasury stewardship principles because the requested amount is specific, bounded, and tied to a concrete prior governance action. It does not request open-ended funding, discretionary spending authority, or administrator-held custody for later disbursement.
Treasury-specific assessment
For ordinary treasury withdrawals that fund work over time, strong requirements for milestones, reporting, audits, administration, and custody controls are essential. This action is materially different because the proposed use of funds is completed by a single direct reimbursement.
The withdrawal does not create a period during which funds are held by an administrator before further disbursement. It does not require a future delivery schedule, milestone approval process, vendor management structure, or ongoing expenditure monitoring. The relevant use of the funds is the direct reimbursement transaction itself.
For that reason, Cardano Curia finds that the auditability, oversight, administrator, and custody requirements are satisfied in substance on these specific facts. The transfer either occurs as authorized or it does not, and the result is publicly verifiable on-chain.
Determination
Cardano Curia determines that this Treasury Withdrawal is constitutionally aligned. It has a clear purpose, a specified amount, immediate delivery, limited scope, and no continuing discretionary treasury administration. The action is therefore suitable for a positive constitutional finding.
Cardano Curia finds the “Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
The action is clear, bounded, directly executable, and publicly verifiable. It requests a specified amount for a specific reimbursement purpose and does not create an ongoing spending program or administrator-held custody arrangement.
Cardano Curia therefore records 5 constitutional votes, 0 unconstitutional votes, 0 abstentions, 0 did-not-vote, and 0 against votes.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecYesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is constitutional.
The governance action with ID "gov_action1654...7qtkhq" and title "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit." is a Treasury Withdrawal, and is therefore subject to the following sections and guardrails in the Cardano Constitution.
ARTICLE II, Section 6 of the Cardano Constitution states that governance actions must follow a standardized and legible format, including a URL hosting an immutable document and a corresponding hash, and must provide sufficient rationale including a title, abstract, justification, and supporting materials.
This governance action includes a valid URL and hash, which matches the hash of the off-chain documentation referenced. The rationale also meets the minimum content specified in this section.
ARTICLE II, Section 7 specifies that Treasury Withdrawal governance actions must include the following:
1. Purpose, Delivery Period, Costs, and Refund Conditions
This governance action specifies:
- The purpose of the withdrawal as "To reimburse the lost deposit for an Info governance action."
- The period for delivery of proposed activities as "This will be instantly performed as part of the governance action’s enactment on-chain."
- "There are no costs or expenses associated with this treasury withdrawal."
- "There are no circumstances for refunding to the treasury."
These elements fulfil the requirements of Article II, Section 7(1).
2. Prior Treasury Funding Disclosure
ARTICLE II, Section 7(2) requires disclosure of whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months.
This governance action states that "The recipient of this reimbursement has not previously received funds from the treasury.". This fulfils the requirement of ARTICLE II, Section 7(2).
3. Net Change Limit (NCL)
ARTICLE II, Section 7(3) requires that Treasury Withdrawals must not exceed the Net Change Limit.
The Net Change Limit in effect at the time of submission of this vote on-chain is the governance action with ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q".
- A. Current NCL Amount: 350000000 ada
- B. Current NCL Time Period: Epoch 613 to Epoch 713 (Inclusive)
- C. Total of Treasury Withdrawals within the Current NCL Time Period: 291435336 ada
- D. Amount of this Treasury Withdrawal: 103000 ada
- E. "C" plus "D" = 291538336 ada
- F. "A" minus "E" = 58461664 ada
As the value of "F" is greater than or equal to zero, this governance action fulfils the NCL requirement.
4. Audit Allocation and Oversight Metrics
ARTICLE II, Section 7(4) states "Treasury Withdrawals actions shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada."
This governance action has identified the "cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics" as zero, due to the purpose of the TW being completed entirely on-chain with a single transaction. This technically fulfils the requirements of ARTICLE II, Section 7(4).
5. Designated Administrators
ARTICLE II, Section 7(5) requires that one or more administrators are designated to monitor fund usage and ensure deliverables are achieved.
This governance action states that "While funds administration is not required, as the funds are being immediately distributed, in order to comply with this requirement the DReps are nominated as the “Administrator”, as they will be responsible for executing the distribution.", which fulfils this requirement.
6. Fund Management Requirements
ARTICLE II, Section 7(6) states "Any ada received from a Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawal, so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, must be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, and such accounts shall not be delegated to an SPO but must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option."
This governance action specifies that "The funds will not be held by an Administrator, so no compliance regarding the wallet’s delegation is required.", which fulfils this requirement.
Finally, the guardrails that require consideration for this governance action are TREASURY-01a, TREASURY-02a, and TREASURY-03a. These are addressed as follows:
- TREASURY-01a - The net change limit with governance action ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q" is currently in effect, after being "agreed by the DReps via an on-chain governance action with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake".
- TREASURY-02a - As per the above assessment, this treasury withdrawal does not exceed the current Net Change Limit.
- TREASURY-03a - This treasury withdrawal is denominated in ada.
We therefore find this governance action Constitutional.
This governance action sufficiently fulfils the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed constitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Unconventional, but okay.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The proposal clearly specifies the withdrawal purpose, amount, delivery mechanism, refund conditions, and prior Treasury funding. As the withdrawal is executed directly on-chain upon enactment, there is no ongoing administration or programme delivery requiring the governance structures typically associated with larger Treasury withdrawals.
I note that the proposal's treatment of Articles II - Section 7.4 and Section 7.5 is somewhat unconventional. The on-chain transfer provides transparency of the reimbursement, but this should not generally be equated with the periodic independent financial audits required for operational Treasury programmes. Likewise, characterising DReps as the "Administrator" is not entirely accurate, as the transfer is effected directly by the ledger following ratification rather than administered by a third party. Given the nature of this one-off reimbursement, however, I do not consider these points sufficient to render the proposal unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I find the proposal constitutionally compliant.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799No rationale
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
This governance action requests ₳103,000 from the Cardano Treasury to reimburse the submitter of the earlier “Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -” Info Action.
The requested amount consists of the original ₳100,000 governance action deposit and an additional ₳3,000 intended to compensate for forgone staking rewards.
This action is properly framed as a Treasury Withdrawal governance action and must therefore be assessed under Article II, Section 6 and Article II, Section 7 of the Constitution, together with the applicable treasury guardrails in Appendix I.
The proposal satisfies Article II, Section 6. It provides a title, abstract, motivation, rationale, and constitutionality discussion in a standardized and legible format.
The proposal also satisfies Article II, Section 7, §1. It identifies the purpose of the withdrawal as reimbursement of a lost governance action deposit, states that delivery occurs immediately upon enactment, states that there are no associated costs or expenses beyond the requested reimbursement, and states that there are no refund conditions due to the immediate and unconditional nature of the transfer.
The proposal satisfies Article II, Section 7, §2 by stating that the recipient has not previously received funds from the Cardano Treasury.
The requested amount is ₳103,000 and does not exceed the current Net Change Limit. Tingvard therefore finds Article II, Section 7, §3 and the relevant treasury guardrails satisfied.
The remaining treasury requirements must be assessed in light of what this action actually does.
This is not a proposal for an ongoing program of work, a service contract, a development roadmap, or a staged delivery process. It is a direct reimbursement action. The constitutional “delivery” is the payment itself: a one-time transfer of the specified amount to the intended recipient.
Because the withdrawal is completed directly on-chain upon enactment, there is no period during which funds are held by an administrator before further disbursement, no ongoing use of funds to monitor, and no future deliverables requiring continuing administrative assessment.
For that reason, Tingvard finds that Article II, Section 7, §4 is satisfied in substance without requiring a separate allocation for periodic independent audits or oversight metrics. The relevant use of the funds is the direct on-chain reimbursement itself, which is publicly verifiable by any ada holder. Adding a separate audit or oversight process would not provide meaningful additional constitutional assurance in this specific case.
Tingvard also finds Article II, Section 7, §5 satisfied. Although the proposal names DReps as administrator, Tingvard does not rely on DReps as an administrative body for this purpose. DReps vote on whether the action should be approved; they do not administer the funds after enactment.
In this specific action, the administrator function is effectively performed by the protocol execution itself. The action authorizes a direct and unconditional transfer from the Treasury to the specified recipient. The monitoring of fund use and the assurance of delivery both begin and end with the same public on-chain transaction. The transaction either occurs as authorized or it does not, and the result is verifiable on-chain.
Article II, Section 7, §6 is not engaged in the ordinary sense because there is no administrator-held custody period. The funds are not held by an administrator prior to later disbursement to a Treasury Withdrawal recipient. They are transferred directly to the recipient through the governance action.
Tingvard therefore finds that the proposal satisfies the relevant constitutional requirements.
Tingvard finds the “Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.
The action has a clear purpose, a specified amount, prior funding disclosure, Net Change Limit compliance, and an immediate on-chain delivery mechanism.
Because the withdrawal consists of a single direct reimbursement whose execution is publicly verifiable on-chain, Tingvard finds that the constitutional audit, oversight, administrator, and custody requirements are satisfied in substance on these specific facts.
Tingvard therefore judges this governance action constitutional.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31AbstainExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We abstain from voting on this governance action.
This proposal, "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.", is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action intended to reimburse a Governance Action deposit that could not be recovered due to a bug in the Cardano node software, together with compensation for lost staking rewards. We understand and appreciate the rationale behind this proposal. In particular, we recognize that an early participant in Cardano governance suffered a significant loss due to a system defect rather than any fault of their own. From the perspective of fairness, it is reasonable for the community to consider an appropriate remedy. However, this proposal differs from a typical Treasury Withdrawal because it seeks to compensate for a past loss. We do not believe that the current Cardano Constitution provides sufficiently clear standards for assessing the constitutional compliance of such compensation-based requests. First, regarding Article II, Section 7, Paragraphs 4 and 5, the proposal states that no ADA allocation is required for audits and oversight metrics, and designates the DReps as the Administrator while simultaneously stating that the Administrator will not hold the funds. We find it difficult to determine from the constitutional text alone whether a zero-ADA allocation for audits is permissible, or how the responsibilities of an Administrator should be interpreted when the Administrator does not take custody of the funds. Regarding Article II, Section 7, Paragraph 6, the proposal explicitly states that the Administrator will not hold the funds. We consider it a reasonable interpretation that this provision applies only when an Administrator takes custody of Treasury Withdrawal funds prior to distribution. Accordingly, based on the information available, we do not consider this issue to be a clear constitutional violation. We also note that the proposal seeks to compensate a specific recipient. While the proposal explains the historical circumstances surrounding the lost deposit, we believe that the relationship between the designated recipient and the original loss is an important consideration in a compensation case. However, the Constitution does not currently establish clear requirements regarding the level of evidence or verification needed in such circumstances. Furthermore, the proposal includes not only reimbursement of the original 100,000 ADA deposit but also an additional 3,000 ADA as compensation for lost staking rewards. While reimbursement of the principal amount is understandable, compensation for hypothetical foregone rewards raises broader questions regarding the scope of Treasury-funded compensation. At present, neither the Constitution nor established governance practice provides clear guidance regarding where such compensation should begin or end. Taken together, we do not oppose the objective of providing relief in this case. Rather, we conclude that the Constitution does not currently provide sufficiently clear standards to determine whether this proposal should be considered constitutionally compliant or non-compliant. Several provisions remain open to reasonable interpretation, and the issues raised by this proposal extend beyond what the current constitutional framework was designed to address. We therefore believe that further community discussion and clearer governance standards would be beneficial, particularly regarding compensation for losses arising from system defects, verification of recipients, treatment of foregone benefits, and the constitutional requirements relating to audits and administrators.
For these reasons, we abstain from voting on this proposal.