IO & Ensurable Systems: Cardano Maintenance Initiative

System4mo ago1 post

239 DReps voted · 83 with a rationale · 6 changed their vote · 10 re-voted unchanged

Open a row to read the rationale.

Changed votes: 4 to yes, 2 to no, together voting with 237.8M ₳ of voting power.

  • Yes481.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes479.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes438.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes435.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes393.6K ₳No rationale
  • No379.5K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain379.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes366.6K ₳No rationale
  • No356.1K ₳Rationale

    The 62.1M ADA ask covers only Q3 2026 to Q1 2027 (approximately nine months) with no published FTE breakdown, no disclosed rate card, and no competitive process. That figure demands independent justification that has not been provided. Furthermore, the parallel Tweag proposal demonstrates that non-IO teams have the depth and transparency to deliver core Cardano infrastructure competitively. Voting "Yes" on an uncontested, financially opaque maintenance would be irresponsible in my opinion.

  • Yes330.6K ₳Rationale

    I support all IO projects.

  • Yes329.7K ₳No rationale
  • No321.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes318.6K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain318.1K ₳Rationale

    Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
    Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
    Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
    Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions.

  • AbstainRevoted314.4K ₳Rationale

    My Abstain vote is a demand for transparency. While Cardano needs this maintenance, the ₳45.9M Development budget is a black box. We preach “Don’t Trust, Verify”, yet are forced to blindly trust IOG. If IOG provides a structural breakdown off-chain, I will gladly switch my vote to Yes.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    I currently feel almost blackmailed into voting for this proposal. Not because of direct pressure, but because of the stark reality of our situation: I know we absolutely need this maintenance initiative to materialize, yet we are given close to nothing regarding how IOG actually arrived at the final number.

    The massive “Development” budget is a black box that we are expected to somehow just “trust”. Yet, as an ecosystem, we preach every single day: “Don’t Trust, Verify!”. How are we supposed to blindly trust this? Let’s be honest with ourselves: if this exact proposal had been submitted by any entity other than IOG, we would scrutinize every single item (best case!). In the worst case, we would have downvoted it the moment it went on-chain. This is a glaring double standard, and I feel guilty even entertaining it.

    I am deeply frustrated because it feels like I am being forced to choose the least damaging option: compromising my own governance integrity, or risking the network’s security, which is absolutely at stake if this isn’t approved.

    We have a right to know how IOG came to this figure. I am not looking to micromanage, challenge individual FTEs, or debate how well developers are compensated. I simply want to understand the big picture. Why do we need 45.9M for development and not 30M, or 100M? Right now, from a governance perspective, it is just an arbitrary number.

    Earlier votes

    Abstain3mo agoSuperseded

    I am voting Abstain under protest. While Cardano absolutely needs this maintenance, the ₳45.9M Development budget is a black box. We preach "Don't Trust, Verify," yet are forced to blindly trust IOG here. If IOG provides a structural capacity breakdown off-chain, I will switch my vote to Yes.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    I currently feel almost blackmailed into voting for this proposal. Not because of direct pressure, but because of the stark reality of our situation: I know we absolutely need this maintenance initiative to materialize, yet we are given close to nothing regarding how IOG actually arrived at the final number.

    The massive "Development" budget is a black box that we are expected to somehow just "trust". Yet, as an ecosystem, we preach every single day: "Don't Trust, Verify!". How are we supposed to blindly trust this? Let's be honest with ourselves: if this exact proposal had been submitted by any entity other than IOG, we would scrutinize every single item (best case!). In the worst case, we would have downvoted it the moment it went on-chain. This is a glaring double standard, and I feel guilty even entertaining it.

    I am deeply frustrated because it feels like I am being forced to choose the least damaging option: compromising my own governance integrity, or risking the network's security, which is absolutely at stake if this isn't approved.

    We have a right to know how IOG came to this figure. I am not looking to micromanage, challenge individual FTEs, or debate how well developers are compensated. I simply want to understand the big picture. Why do we need 45.9M for development and not 30M, or 100M? Right now, from a governance perspective, it is just an arbitrary number.

    My current "Abstain" vote is a deliberate expression of this frustration and discontent. However, I want to be entirely clear: there is a path to a "Yes" vote for me within this current action. I do not necessarily require a completely new proposal to be submitted. If IOG can publicly address these concerns and provide the structural breakdown of this budget before the voting period ends, I am willing to reconsider and switch my vote to support it. Conversely, if this opacity remains unaddressed, I cannot rule out switching my vote to a "No".

  • Abstain313.8K ₳No rationale
  • Yes308.2K ₳No rationale
  • YesChanged301.3K ₳Rationale

    I’m a big fan of IO and everything they’ve accomplished over these nearly 10 years regarding Cardano. I believe it’s a top-tier company in terms of research, implementation, and blockchain, and I don’t question their capabilities at all.
    However, as an observer—since I’m not deeply involved, but would still like to share my perspective. I feel that IO owes the community a clear, solid, and concise explanation of what has been achieved in previous governance actions. From my point of view, it’s very confusing; it feels like there are overlaps between this year’s proposals and last year’s, and it’s not clear at all.
    It creates a lot of confusion, raising questions like: “Didn’t we already pay for this last year?” or “Why are we paying again if this was supposed to have been implemented already?” This starts to generate distrust across the community.

    I would like to see clear, measurable frameworks and informative checkpoints for all these governance actions something like a “Messari-style” State of Cardano report. I understand that a report like that isn’t cheap, but considering that we are about to spend nearly $40 million, the minimum expectation would be a clear report outlining what is intended to be achieved and what was accomplished last year.

    This is a humongous amount of money, and it’s unreasonable for there to be so much confusion especially knowing that IO does very good work, yet their efforts start to be questioned. I wouldn’t like to see that happen. If producing such a report costs $50,000 or $100,000, then include it in the budget it doesn’t matter. There needs to be clarity and a formal way to track the return on what is being done. It’s simply too much money for this to remain so informal.

    This time, I will support the proposal. However, I want to express that if clarity fails again in future proposals if ambiguity and confusion persist regarding what was delivered versus what was supposed to be delivered—then unfortunately I won’t be able to support with my vote. Cardano is no longer what it was five years ago; now it’s up to us to ensure that what gets done is logical and properly scrutinized.

    Earlier votes

    Abstain4mo agoSuperseded

  • Yes297K ₳Rationale

    Voting YES on ALL IOG Withdrawals

    May 20th 2026

    Summery

    Nine treasury withdrawals from IOG totalling around 162M ada ($40M USD)

    Important Citation

    https://x.com/EdnStuff/status/2051321214728118360

    EdnStuff said the following on May 4th 2026

    I see the IO proposals as a package deal. But by all accounts I see most dreps only voting yes on a small selection of the 9. This is going to lead to some extremely lopsided, fragmented, and piecemeal results that will fall short of what we need on #Cardano 
    $ADA.
    

    Charles quote tweeted saying

    https://x.com/IOHK_Charles/status/2051376829949464792

    Sadly, this is the end result of a piecemeal roadmap. It's an iPhone by committee, with people deciding whether they prefer the fingerprint sensor to wireless charging. You end up with a bizarre, useless product.
    

    Statement

    There are a handful of people who, when they speak, I think it unwise not to listen to. Charles is one such person. His statement above makes this choice pretty easy.

    While we need to foster a wide ecosystem of R&D firms, we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationship with our biggest contributor. It is obvious and undeniable that the long-term success of Cardano remains dependent on the continued efforts of IO.

    I am voting for all of these IO proposals because Charles has made it clear that he does not believe Cardano can be successful without each of them, and it would be unwise to disregard his intuition.

    Signed,

    William Doyle

    Your friendly neighbourhood DRep!

    $computerman

    drep1yfpgzfymq...pzw3nt

    https://x.com/william00000010

  • No285.2K ₳No rationale
  • No280.5K ₳Rationale

    I recognize that Cardano maintenance is essential. Node maintenance, DevOps, monitoring, QA, release support, documentation, and component maintenance are foundational activities that the entire ecosystem depends on.

    However, this proposal requests ₳62,134,630, making it one of the largest single funding requests in this round. For a Treasury Withdrawal of this size, I believe the current level of budget disclosure is not sufficient. While the proposal provides high-level categories such as Development, Infrastructure, Engagement, Operations, Security & Audits, and others, it lacks a more detailed cost structure, including team size, role allocation, salary ranges, infrastructure cost breakdowns, audit and testing costs, outsourcing costs, delivery milestones, and specific budgets and acceptance criteria for each functional area.

    My concern is not that maintenance is unimportant. My concern is that voters currently do not have enough information to determine whether this ₳62M+ request is reasonable, efficient, and sufficiently accountable. Cardano Treasury funds are public funds. The larger the request, the higher the standard should be for transparency, cost breakdowns, milestones, monthly reporting, and measurable deliverables.

    Given the current level of disclosure, I cannot support this proposal in its present form. I would encourage the proposer to provide a more detailed budget breakdown and verifiable deliverables before seeking community approval again.


    我認同 Cardano 的維護工作是必要且重要的。節點維護、DevOps、監控、QA、release support、文件維護與各項元件維護,都是整個生態系持續運作所依賴的基礎工作。

    然而,本提案申請金額高達 ₳62,134,630,是本輪最大單筆資金申請案之一。對於這種規模的 Treasury Withdrawal,我認為目前的預算揭露程度仍然不足。雖然提案中列出了 Development、Infrastructure、Engagement、Operations、Security & Audits 等高階分類,但仍缺少更細部的成本結構,例如團隊人數、角色分工、薪資區間、基礎設施成本明細、審計與測試成本、外包成本、交付里程碑,以及各 functional area 對應的具體預算與驗收標準。

    我的疑慮並不是 maintenance 不重要,而是目前投票人沒有足夠資訊去判斷這筆 ₳62M+ 的支出是否合理、是否有效率,以及是否具備足夠的 accountability。Cardano Treasury 是公共資金,申請金額越大,對透明度、成本拆分、里程碑、月度報告與可衡量交付成果的要求就應該越高。

    在目前資訊揭露程度下,我無法支持本提案的現行版本。我建議提案方補充更詳細的預算拆分與可驗收成果後,再重新尋求社群授權。

  • No275.2K ₳Rationale

    I am voting NO on “IO & Ensurable Systems: Cardano Maintenance Initiative” at the requested 62,134,630 ADA. I fully agree that core maintenance is non‑discretionary and that IO’s expertise has been central to Cardano’s stability and upgradeability to date. The governance and custody setup via Intersect’s treasury contracts, Oversight Committee controls, auto‑abstain delegation, and refund conditions is also robust and aligned with constitutional best practice. My objection is not to funding essential maintenance itself, but to the way this proposal bundles many different activities into a single, very large “maintenance” envelope without sufficient cost transparency or scope discipline.

    In its current form, the proposal conflates true, safety‑critical maintenance (uptime, DR, incident response) with a broad set of improvements and support functions: Cardano Blueprint documentation, open‑source community support, code modernization and technical‑debt work, performance analysis, and QA/release work that should be scoped and costed as part of specific feature or node deliverables. Many of these are valuable, but they are not all non‑optional “keep the lights on” tasks, and the proposal does not provide the granular FTE rates, team sizing, or per‑component cost breakdown needed to judge whether 62M ADA is reasonable. For a single vendor, in a treasury that has already committed to other large initiatives, this size and level of bundling is not something I can support.

    For a future maintenance proposal, I would be prepared to reconsider a smaller, better‑structured request that:
    (1) clearly modularizes the scope into separate governance actions—for example, a narrowly defined core maintenance contract for node uptime/DR/incident response, and distinct, smaller proposals for documentation (Blueprint), performance improvements, open‑source support, and ecosystem engagement;
    (2) adopts a tighter definition of “maintenance”, reserving that label and budget for truly non‑discretionary operational work, while treating modernization, technical debt, and documentation as explicit upgrades or improvements with their own scope and evaluation criteria; and
    (3) provides a transparent, benchmarkable cost model (FTE bands, roles, and per‑workstream allocations), so DReps can compare core Haskell node maintenance costs against alternative node teams and industry norms, and see exactly how much is being requested for Blueprint, tooling, and other “extras”.

  • Yes272.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes268.9K ₳No rationale
  • YesRevoted254.2K ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes3mo agoSuperseded

  • Yes236.8K ₳No rationale
  • YesRevoted233.3K ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes4mo agoSuperseded

  • Yes222.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes216.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes202.8K ₳No rationale
  • No189.8K ₳No rationale
  • Yes185K ₳No rationale
  • Yes183.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes182.7K ₳No rationale
  • No169.1K ₳No rationale
  • Yes161.1K ₳No rationale
  • Yes157.8K ₳No rationale
  • No157.8K ₳No rationale
  • Yes155.7K ₳No rationale
  • No149.8K ₳Rationale

    I'm increasingly concerned about Cardano's overall treasury spend rate, especially following the recent approval of the Draper/Dragon Orion Fund. To provide a necessary counter-balance, I am defaulting to NO on treasury withdrawals at this time.
    This proposal (₳62 M) is important infrastructure work, but it does not meet my strict criteria for approval right now. It is not core/critical infrastructure such as IO Hydra L2 production hardening or deliverables directly required to advance the Midnight partnership.
    I will continue voting YES only on the highest-priority items that directly strengthen essential scaling and partnership infrastructure.

  • Yes142.9K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain138.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes128.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes127K ₳No rationale
  • Yes126.4K ₳No rationale
  • YesRevoted124.6K ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes3mo agoSuperseded

  • Yes122.8K ₳Rationale

    I am voting yes on this proposal because I view maintenance as foundational infrastructure rather than optional development work. Every upgrade, scaling initiative, security improvement, governance enhancement, and developer tool introduced into the ecosystem ultimately depends on continued maintenance, monitoring, testing, incident response, documentation, and release management to remain stable and trustworthy over time.

    I recognize the significant Treasury ask and believe proposals of this scale warrant heightened scrutiny, transparency, and accountability. The breadth of the work — spanning bug fixes, DevOps, quality assurance, performance optimization, security reviews, release management, monitoring, and component maintenance — also makes measuring impact more difficult than feature-based proposals. Success in maintenance is often invisible: stability, uptime, and resilience frequently appear as the absence of failure rather than the presence of a new capability.

    Despite these concerns, I believe the timing matters. Cardano is entering a phase defined by expanding capabilities, increasing complexity, and additional maintenance burdens introduced by scaling initiatives, governance evolution, and future protocol upgrades. As new systems are introduced, ensuring operational continuity and reliability becomes increasingly important.

    My support should not be interpreted as unconditional endorsement of rising operational costs. Rather, it reflects the belief that sustained infrastructure requires sustained stewardship, and that maintenance funding — when paired with oversight, transparent reporting, and measurable accountability — is necessary to support a production-grade ecosystem over the long term.

    I support continued scrutiny regarding efficiency, cost distribution, and decentralization of maintenance responsibilities across the ecosystem. However, at this stage, I believe maintaining the reliability, security, and operational resilience of Cardano is a necessary investment as the ecosystem enters its next cycle of growth and complexity.

  • Yes120.5K ₳No rationale