Set 2025 Net Change Limit of 300M ADA, 2026 Net Change Limit of 250M ADA
224 DReps voted · 66 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote · 5 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 2 to yes, 2 to no, together voting with 51.6M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes297K ₳Rationale
I see this proposal as making two main points. The first is that we should set a minimal NCL early and optionally increase it later. The second is that we should set these values at 300M ₳ for 2025 and 250M ₳ for 2026.
I agree with both of these suggestions.
Setting the lowest NCL we can all agree on allows us to immediately unlock and deploy the portion of treasury funds that has broad support, rather than waiting for consensus on a higher number. This gives the ecosystem access to funding sooner, while still leaving room to debate and potentially raise the limit later.
The two proposed values—300M ₳ and 250M ₳ for 2025 and 2026, respectively—make sense as a minimal NCL starting point because they are approximately equal to the expected treasury revenue for each year.
Signed William Doyle
- No291.8K ₳Rationale
I'm voting "No" on this governance action since there is a newer similar GA ("2025 Net Change Limit") which does a better job of explaining what it's meant to achieve, why it's needed, and how the authors arrived at the proposed spending cap.
- No285.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes275.2K ₳Rationale
While I am willing to reluctantly agree to the Net Change Limit proposed for 2025, it is at the upper boundary of what I'd currently accept as a yearly spending cap.
Beyond the 2025 amount, I am opposed to the remainder of the proposal. In my view, it is short sighted and irresponsible to attempt to set an amount for 2026. None of us have any idea what is going to happen from one week to the next, so trying to anticipate the state of affairs in the blockchain ecosystem in general and Cardano's state of development and adoption specifically, 9 months from now and setting a 2026 NCL, is an exercise in futility.
I am willing to agree to this proposal for three specific reasons.
- The knowledge that I will oppose any budget that allocates more than 75% of the NCL to the 2025 budget with the final 25% remaining for unforeseen opportunities and emergency reserves.
- The ability to change the NCL once its minimum timeframe has elapsed, which will occur before a 2026 NCL is required.
- Lack of any other valid option.
With that being said, I am voting YES to this proposal based solely off of the amount proposed for 2025; however, if a more appropriate proposal is submitted before this proposal's end date, I will happily reevaluate my position and assign my support to the most feasible and fiscally responsible proposal.
- Yes272.2K ₳No rationale
- No236.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes217.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes216.4K ₳Rationale
After thorough analysis, I vote YES on both NCL proposals, with a strong preference for the community's 300M/250M approach. Here's why: While both proposals demonstrate fiscal responsibility, the community version better aligns with projected treasury inflows (~300M in 2025, ~265M in 2026) and proactively addresses the expected revenue decline. Its two-year scope provides clearer planning horizons for ecosystem projects. The higher 350M cap isn't reckless, but why push the limits when we can maintain growth within our means? That said, I'm voting yes on both because having any NCL is better than none - we can't risk constitutional gridlock. The beauty of decentralized governance is seeing grassroots proposals compete with institutional ones on merit. This is Cardano's governance maturing before our eyes.
- No202.8K ₳Rationale
The proposed NCL's were not adequately informed by an open community engagement process.
- Yes202.8K ₳No rationale
- No201.5K ₳Rationale
I vote NO on this because GA of lack of proposer identity.
From GA Metadata:
Just to clarify, we are not IOG, CF, EMURGO, PRAGMA, INTERSECT or their staff, we are just community members.
We won't give names right now because we don't want to get caught up in any drama. - Abstain189.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes175K ₳No rationale
- No161K ₳Rationale
Voting no due to the mutable anchor link which changed during the vote. Please use immutable anchors for important governance actions.
- Yes157.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes151.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes149.8K ₳No rationale
- No138.6K ₳Rationale
I agree with setting a limit on the amount of funds we can withdraw from the Cardano treasury. However, this amount should be based on market conditions and the specific period. The year 2025 looks promising for the price of ADA, so it’s logical to set an amount for that year.
What we don’t know—and can’t predict—is the situation in 2026. Setting a limit of 250 million ADA for that year raises questions, such as: what conditions were considered in deciding that amount without knowing the budget or market trends for the year? For this reason, I am unable to support this Governance Action (GA).
Another reason is the anonymity of the team submitting this GA. I stand for transparency in decision-making. My concern is: how can we reward or hold you accountable if this proposal passes? By “reward or punish,” I mean either supporting your future proposals if this one benefits the Cardano ecosystem, or holding you accountable if the outcome does not meet community expectations. If the latter happens, who takes responsibility?
- No136.8K ₳Rationale
Too high, it is not conservative enough for nascent governance
- Yes124.6K ₳No rationale
- No115.6K ₳No rationale
- YesChanged108.3K ₳History
Earlier votes
No1y agoSuperseded
- Yes107.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes106K ₳No rationale
- Yes99K ₳No rationale
- Yes83.9K ₳Rationale
I have decided to vote in support of this proposal. I believe that the spending limit set here is higher than what is required, but I am cognizant that this is only an upper limit and that all funding needs to be approved by the community regardless. There are also too many important priorities that require funding to not approve a limit at all or to wait for another NCL proposal. Although I am not in favor of choosing an NCL for 2026 at this time, this is not a decisive factor for me. If the community finds that the 2026 NCL listed here is not appropriate, then a new NCL can be proposed and would replace it. What we need to ensure does not happen is not approving an NCL in a timely manner, which would delay and create uncertainty around passing a budget. With this in mind and the fact that this proposal is not too far off from where I think we need to be on an upper spending limit, I choose to support it.
- Abstain83.4K ₳No rationale
- No82.1K ₳No rationale
- No77.2K ₳No rationale
- No74.5K ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I vote 'NO' because there is no transparency for this proposal. Metadata should be immutable and stored instead of using web2, as it can be easily altered at any time. I am more than willing to vote 'YES' when everything is transparent, especially for proposals that are positive and contribute to the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem.
- No63.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes58.7K ₳Rationale
The proposed limits mirror forecasted inflows, meaning spending doesn't exceed what’s coming in—this is fiscally responsible. It allows for significant investment (300M ADA is a lot) while maintaining a conservative cap that protects against over-draining the treasury. All in all, it's a safe, pragmatic, and necessary step forward.
- Yes58.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes56.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes56.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes54.1K ₳Rationale
Cardano needs to invest for growth and adoption. Now is the time to do it, now is the time to compete with other Blockchains to get real-world usecases and onboard millions of users and even more in transactions. The world is opening up to Crypto and is now that we need to invest to get adoption and success, or else we will fall behind. There is no point in having all this money stored, because if we don't attract value, it won't be worth much in the future. On the other hand, if we search to invest now we can bring value, bring transactions, bring crucial usecases for the world that solve big problems which bring value into our Ada economy and will increase the demand and price of ADA. \n\nLet's not be scared, let's be more bold and ambitious, and don't forget that the more transactions we get, the faster we can replenish the treasury. We're not spending money we are actually investing here, so it's more about choosing good high potential proposals, instead of refraining from using the treasury.
- Yes53.1K ₳Rationale
Let's pursue this so that the Cardano Treasury will be usable with an agreed upon Budget, to fund worthwhile projects this year.
- YesRevoted52.3K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes1y agoSuperseded
- No45.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes39.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes36.9K ₳No rationale
- No29.3K ₳No rationale
- No26.7K ₳Rationale
The net change limit is too high for each year defined in this governance action. I will be voting no.
- Yes24.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes15.7K ₳No rationale
- No14.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes14.3K ₳Rationale
Rationale for Voting Yes on the 2025-2026 NCL Info Action Proposal
Recognition of Effort
I want to recognize the efforts of those who prepared this Info-Action under tight time constraints and with minimal precedent to guide them.
This acknowledgment underpins my pragmatic support for the proposal, despite its shortcomings.Unclear Definition of NCL Withdrawal Amount
The Net Change Limit (NCL) is not clearly defined in either the Cardano constitution or the proposal, diverging from the community’s emerging understanding of a "net change limit".
While this lack of clarity is significant, it does not warrant rejecting the proposal.Constitutionality of Threshold
The proposal specifies a 67% threshold of the active voting stake to pass.
This raises a question of the constitution's guardrail TREASURY-01a intent for it leaves unclear whether the "threshold" value of 50% is an intrinsic part of the guardrail’s identity or merely part of a mechanism to establish if the NCL proposal is agreed.
Specifically, does 'TREASURY-01a' mean an NCL requires approval by more than 50% of the active voting stake, with the threshold as a core part of the guardrail? Or does it imply the NCL must exceed a standalone threshold of at least 50%, with the proposal’s support measured against it in a separate step to confirm agreement?"
If the constitution's 50% threshold is intrinsic to the guardrail, attempting to change the threshold to 67% could be deemed unconstitutional. However, if the guardrail is a standalone benchmark and its conditions are met the proposal is constitutional and the approval process continues. If the proposal does not garner approval exceeding the proposer's threshold of 67% the proposal cannot be agreed. I believe allowing a threshold above 50% enhances governance rigor and support proposers setting it, as they can set the voting period. However, enabling this functionality would require amending the constitution, updating ledger rules, and revising voting tools.
Thus, I accept that the vote must exceed only 50% to agree an NCL.Immutability of Supporting Documents
The ability to edit supporting documents after approval poses a significant risk, potentially undermining the proposal’s integrity. This issue requires attention from the Constitutional Committee to enforce immutability and maintain trust in the process.Multi-Year Scope Concern
Given the current maturity of Cardano’s governance, a single-year budget scope might be more appropriate, with a new NCL proposal potentially superseding this proposal before 2026. However, the delay in finalizing the 2025 budget makes the inclusion of 250 million ada as next year's NCL advantageous. It encourages discussions for the 2026 budget process earlier.
I would expect a new 2026 NCL limit proposal to supercede this info action but not before the end of 2025.Budget Period and Timeline Misalignment
With the 2025 first quarter past, the NCL’s full-year value of 300 million ADA raises concerns about potential back payments for prior work, which I oppose unless explicitly specified.
The NCL should proportionally reflect the remaining timeline being funded to ensure accuracy in resource allocation.Urgent Need for a 2025 Budget
A budget ceiling is urgently needed to cap treasury withdrawals for the 2025 roadmap and budget, including work on Ouroboros Leios and ZK technologies. This limit must balance treasury stability with the demand for improved performance to keep Cardano competitive.
While the proposed 300 million ada maximum is high, it’s acceptable given current budget discussions.NCL Value Alignment and Budget Prudence
The NCL values (300 million ada for 2025 and 250 million for 2026) align reasonably with projected treasury inflows over the two-year period. I prefer budgets that maintain a surplus, especially given the current volatile cryptocurrency climate. A lower NCL for 2025, around 200 million ada, would reflect the nascent state of the budget process, reinforce prudent monetary policy and mitigate the negative effect on ada price by treasury withdrawls.
However, the pressing need for a budget decision supersedes my preference for a reduced value.Percentage based limits
Adopting percentage-based limits based on treasury inflows could enhance predictability and serve as guardrails to streamline future budget processes.Conclusion
Despite irregularities in constitutional requirements, and other concerns, the urgent need for a 2025 budget justifies overlooking these issues. While I’d favor a lower NCL value out of fiscal caution, the priority of passing a budget compels me to vote YES. The Constitutional Committee can address the issues raised here to refine governance practices.
- Yes7.8K ₳No rationale