Update Constitutional Committee 2026
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 653 to 655.
186 DReps voted · 64 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 4 to yes, together voting with 875.6M ₳ of voting power.
Voting concentration
7 of 186 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 12.8%, top 5 combined 44.5% of 3.8B ₳ voted.
The 34 largest voters together held as much voting power as the 67.0% threshold required in yes votes.
- Yes944.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes930.8K ₳Rationale
We vote YES on this governance action.
This proposal is a necessary and procedural update to the Constitutional Committee. Four committee seats expire at the end of Epoch 653, and this action replaces those seats with the candidates elected through the 2026 Constitutional Committee election.
We support the proposal because it follows a transparent election process with candidate registration, DRep voting, stake-weighted results, independent audit, and publication of the audited outcome before submission. This gives the community a clear and verifiable basis for updating the committee.
Maintaining a functioning Constitutional Committee is essential for Cardano governance. The committee must remain operational, legitimate, and above the required minimum size as member terms expire. This action provides continuity without changing the quorum or altering the remaining committee seats.
For these reasons, we support the update of the Constitutional Committee according to the audited election results.
- Yes928.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes926.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes924.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes878K ₳No rationale
- Yes866.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes831.8K ₳Rationale
We support Intersect lead election process and its result.
- Yes811.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes793.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes772.5K ₳Rationale
I support the** Update Constitutional Committee 2026 **proposal.
For me, the most important consideration in this vote is respect for a governance process that has already been completed. The 2026 Constitutional Committee election has concluded, the results have been independently audited, and DReps have selected the four candidates through the established voting process.
Since the process has been duly completed, I prefer to see the election outcome formally recorded on-chain, and to allow the Constitutional Committee to maintain the continuity of its operations.
Looking at the backgrounds of the four candidates, I believe each brings a distinct form of value.
Philip DiSarro (Phil_uplc) has long been involved in Cardano smart contract security, formal verification, and developer tooling, and also carries practical experience in both the ecosystem and governance. Regarding certain controversies that remain under discussion in the community, I will continue to pay attention. At the same time, I do not wish to dismiss years of technical contribution and existing governance experience solely on the basis of information that has not yet been fully clarified.
Marek Mahut has a substantial track record in Cardano infrastructure, the open-source community, and the SPO ecosystem. His work on Blockfrost, together with his earlier involvement in community and open-source efforts, gives me a relatively high degree of confidence in his technical and ecosystem contributions.
Cardano Curia represents a different model of governance experience. Participating as a consortium, consistently publishing rationales for its votes, and placing emphasis on evidence and constitutional grounding is an approach that I believe deserves continued observation and recognition.
As for Leandros BSP, the publicly verifiable technical and governance record is currently more limited, consisting mainly of Catalyst proposals and community participation. For this reason, I look forward to seeing the concrete contributions he will make once he takes up the role on the Constitutional Committee.
I recognise that stepping forward to participate in Cardano governance already carries considerable responsibility, and that this itself warrants a basic level of respect.
For these reasons, I am casting a Yes vote.
I am supporting the completed election process and the continuity of the Constitutional Committee’s work, while remaining open to forming further judgements based on actual performance going forward. - Yes739.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes665K ₳Rationale
This proposal does not buy a product and requests no ADA. It converts the 2026 Constitutional Committee election into an on-chain committee update. Five current credentials are described as ending at epoch 653; two incumbents—Philip DiSarro and Cardano Curia—are renewed, three other expiring or retired credentials are removed, and Marek Mahut and Leandros BSP are added. The intended result is a seven-member committee with the existing two-thirds quorum unchanged.
The case for acting now is strong: the proposal's fixed epoch-799 end date and the 146-epoch maximum term mean enactment is valid only in epoch 653. Missing that window risks a committee below its required minimum and therefore weakens Cardano's constitutional check on governance actions. The election was open to candidate registration, allowed DReps to approve up to four of ten candidates, published final Hydra evidence, and was followed by a detailed audit workbook. The audit recomputed the same four winners and found no fourth/fifth-place tie.
The strongest objection is legitimacy rather than technical execution. Only 38 DReps cast valid ballots, representing 43.43% of registered DRep voting power in the audit's epoch-645 snapshot. Stake-weighted support also differed materially from raw voter counts. In addition, the published audit records a warning that its epoch-645 per-voter weights matched Ekklesia's published candidate weights exactly for only one of ten candidates. The audit still found the same winners, but the discrepancy should be explained publicly and retained in the governance record.
On balance, maintaining a valid constitutional-review body through a completed election is directionally valuable and the evidence is sufficient for YES. Medium rather than High confidence reflects the voting-power discrepancy, limited independent capability evidence for the two newly appointed candidates, low ballot participation, and the proposal's unusually narrow enactment timing.
- Yes622.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes605K ₳Rationale
I vote Yes, the selection process has already taken place powered by Ekklesia but run by Intersect MBO, the results have been audited. This is a simple procedural vote to ratify that outcome on-chain to ensure CC continuity is maintained without interruption.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I vote Yes, the selection process has already taken place powered by Ekklesia but run by Intersect MBO, the results have been audited. This is a simple procedural vote to ratify that outcome on-chain to ensure CC continuity is maintained without interruption.
The successful candidates will serve new terms ending at Epoch 799, in accordance with the current committeeMaxTermLength protocol parameter.
In accordance with the Cardano constitution, Article III, Section 3 (2), Intersect has facilitated a public “process… for [the] election of members of the CC consistent with the requirements of the Guardrails”, to update the positions due to expire at Epoch 653. The four candidates who received the most votes, by voting power, are elected. In this round, all four elected members are seated for the same term of 146 epochs (approximately two years), which is the current limit of the committeeMaxTermLength protocol parameter.
This governance action officially endorses the results of that electoral process and updates the Constitutional Committee accordingly. No changes are made to the quorum, which will remain ⅔.
Re-election and the term limit.
committeeMaxTermLength caps each individual term, measured from the epoch of enactment. It does not cap cumulative or continuous service across terms. Cardano Curia and Philip DiSarro (Phil_uplc) are being re-elected, but each receives a fresh maximum-length term measured from this action's enactment; the time already served on their current seats (which expire at Epoch 653) does not count toward the 146-epoch limit. Their new term begins where the current one ends, so this is a seamless renewal rather than an extension stacked on top of the existing term.Note. This action changes only the four expiring seats. The remaining three committee members - Eastern Cardano Council, Tingvard, and Ace Alliance, whose terms expire at epoch 726 - are unchanged and are not included in this action.
Committee after enactment:
Marek Mahut, Cardano Curia, Philip DiSarro, Leandros BSP, Eastern Cardano Council, Tingvard and Ace Alliance - Yes569.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes545K ₳No rationale
- Yes501.6K ₳Rationale
- Yes479.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes433.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes425.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes389.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain379.7K ₳Rationale
Abstaining on this one. I don't want and participate in off-chain elections. I very much think that they are the wrong way and show that we have an immature and incomplete on-chain governance system, should be ashamed of that, and fix that as soon as possible instead of working with these ridiculous Intersect shenanigans.
- Yes379.5K ₳No rationale
- No357K ₳Rationale
I'm noticing a trend of too many individuals from the same coordinated circle taking over the CC. I will vote no until there is more interest-diversity amongst the council.
- Yes347.9K ₳No rationale
- No338.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes332.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain318.3K ₳Rationale
Abstaining from voting as a DRep due to my role as a member of the Tingvard constitutional consortium, ensuring structural independence and avoiding conflicts of interest between governance delegation and constitutional interpretation.
Thank you for reading my rationale. You can follow my governance journey on X as user @kenerik
- Yes317.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes314.3K ₳Rationale
Voting yes on this critical governance action which aims to keep a Cardano's Constitutional Committee in place without interruption to on chain actions requiring CC assessment of constitutionality and approval. Four seats will expire at the turn of epoch 653 and therefore a new committee is needed in order to avoid delays. The members being put forward have already been voted four from a selection of 10 applications on the Hydra voting system and therefore DReps have already signalled approval.
- Yes297.1K ₳Rationale
This is fine
- Yes288.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain285.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes275.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes273.9K ₳Rationale
The 2026 Constitutional Committee election has concluded, its audited results identify Philip DiSarro, Leandros BSP, Marek Mahut, and Cardano Curia as the four elected candidates, and this action implements that result through the required on-chain committee-update mechanism. It replaces the seats expiring at Epoch 653, maintains the existing two-thirds threshold, and preserves a functioning Constitutional Committee. I therefore vote Yes.
- Yes272.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes261K ₳Rationale
Ratifying the clear, audited will of the community from the 2026 CC Election to replace expiring seats and maintain full Constitutional Committee functionality.
- Yes258.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes238.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes205.6K ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on the Update Constitutional Committee 2026 governance action.
This action implements the outcome of the 2026 Constitutional Committee election by updating committee membership to reflect the candidates selected through the established DRep voting process.
For me, this vote is not about whether I personally agree with every view, statement, or action of every individual elected. It is about respecting a legitimate governance process and honoring its verified outcome.
Decentralized governance only has meaning if the community is willing to accept the results of the processes it has agreed to use. Elections cannot become symbolic exercises where results are respected only when they align with our individual preferences.
The Constitutional Committee has a specific and important role within Cardano governance: determining whether governance actions comply with the Cardano Constitution. Its purpose is not to dictate policy or replace the judgment of DReps, SPOs, or ADA holders, but to serve as an independent constitutional safeguard within the broader governance system.
Updating the committee in accordance with the election results also supports continuity, accountability, and the orderly transfer of governance responsibility.
I have seen no compelling evidence that the election process or its outcome was invalid, nor any reason to reject the implementation of the results.
Decentralization does not happen simply because the protocol allows it. It happens because the community deliberately practices it. That includes participating in elections, respecting their outcomes, and allowing Cardano’s governance institutions to evolve through transparent community-driven processes.
For those reasons, I vote YES.
- Yes201.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes189.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes186K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes166.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes159.5K ₳No rationale
- No157.5K ₳Rationale unavailable
- Yes150.8K ₳Rationale
Supporting this as the routine on-chain ratification of the already-elected and audited 2026 Constitutional Committee candidates. No issues with the process or the proposed members.
- Yes143K ₳No rationale