MyCNFT DRep

Voting No due to the size of the 120M ADA request from the Treasury. While liquidity growth is important, a withdrawal of this magnitude poses a risk to treasury reserves and potential market pressure without guaranteed long-term TVL retention.

This action is purely symbolic and does not affect protocol operations. It is a tribute and a well-deserved recognition of an individual's contribution to the community.

Rationale: NO

High Opportunity Cost and Risk Profile: Converting 9,000,000 treasury ADA into USDM for a 12-month liquidity deployment exposes the Treasury to significant opportunity cost if ADA appreciates during the deployment period. The proposal also expands the Treasury's role beyond funding public ecosystem development into deploying capital in a derivatives liquidity strategy, introducing smart contract, stablecoin, custody, operational, and market risks. While the proposal presents modeled returns, these are not guaranteed and may underperform a simple hold-ADA strategy. Given the scale of the requested deployment and its risk profile, the proposal does not provide a sufficiently compelling risk-adjusted case for the use of Treasury assets.

Rationale: ABSTAIN

Commercial Vendor Funding Review. While introducing real-world Visa payment rails and open-source payment primitives is highly beneficial for adoption, Wirex is an established commercial entity with substantial revenue. Treasury funding should prioritize critical open-source Layer-1 infrastructure over subsidizing multi-million dollar corporate integrations during conservative fiscal cycles.

Non-Critical Infrastructure Spend.
While the AI-agent integration design via MCP is innovative, it represents an ecosystem luxury rather than critical, life-sustaining Layer-1 node infrastructure during major protocol upgrade cycles.

Rationale (NO):

High Capital Concentration. Allocating 20M ₳ to a single intermediary entity dilutes direct governance oversight and creates unnecessary centralization of treasury funds.
Large-scale commercial funding should be restricted under current market conditions to prioritize vital core network infrastructure.

Rationale (NO):

Excessive Capital Concentration: Allocating 20M ₳ to a single intermediary sub-DAO creates significant capital concentration and dilutes direct DRep oversight over ultimate fund positioning.

While the DAO’s track record is notable, delegating large-scale funding decisions to an internal builder network introduces evaluation bias and complicates granular milestone auditing for DReps.

Given the current intensive protocol upgrades phase, massive capital outlays should remain strictly restricted to vital network-wide consensus and node infrastructure layers.

Rationale: ABSTAIN
Infrastructure Over Commercial Verticals: During intensive protocol upgrades (Leios, Peras), Treasury funding must prioritize critical public infrastructure (e.g., Blockfrost, Daedalus) over non-essential commercial dApps.

Unenforceable Revenue-Share Risks: The Cardano Treasury is not a venture capital fund and lacks cross-border legal mechanisms to recover ~5M ₳ if private operations or anchor events (e.g., Yellowstone Club) fail.

Geographic Disproportion: Allocating substantial global Treasury funds to scale a private business targeting a localized, niche US market is economically unbalanced under current conditions.

A 300M ADA Net Change Limit aligned with prior treasury inflows reinforces fiscal discipline and constitutional governance. It sets a responsible spending boundary while supporting long-term ecosystem sustainability.

Node diversity is critical for the long-term resilience and decentralization of Cardano. Funding Amaru strengthens infrastructure by introducing an alternative Rust-based node implementation, reducing single-client dependency risk.

The roadmap is clearly defined, includes security audits and transparency measures, and contributes directly to core protocol robustness.

Support — honours Max van Rossem’s lasting contributions to Cardano governance, community, and ecosystem.

Abstain. The limit is reasonable, but the 16-month period is too long and the projections remain uncertain. I may support future proposals that include stronger fiscal safeguards.

While the proposal is strategically aligned with Vision 2030 and addresses a real infrastructure gap, there remain material execution risks around liquidity attraction, Hydra production readiness, and the sustainability of measured KPIs. I therefore abstain at this stage, with conditional support for a future proposal that demonstrates proven market demand, external validation of metrics, and reduced delivery risk.

I support Constitution v2.4 as it streamlines governance by removing non-enforceable provisions, strengthens treasury accountability, and protects proposal integrity through immutability. These changes improve clarity, trust, and operational efficiency while preserving decentralization and broad community legitimacy.

I support this Info Action as a step toward Cardano’s strategic maturity as a fully community-governed network. It provides DReps with a shared, non-binding framework to assess treasury spending and long-term priorities. Clear strategic positioning and measurable KPIs improve capital efficiency, credibility, and sustainable real-world adoption without compromising decentralization.

funds critical infrastructure (stablecoins, oracles, bridges) needed for DeFi and institutional growth, with strict oversight and audits.

Extending the 2025 Net Change Limit (₳350M) for 8 more epochs ensures smooth Treasury operations.
Administrative measure, no extra spending, fully aligned with Cardano Constitution.

A necessary step for liquidity: stablecoins, bridges, $1–3B TVL. Neutral project, all major institutions working together.

⚖️ Backing comes with expectation of strict milestone oversight, audits & return of unused funds.

I vote AGAINST the ₳5M Snek Treasury Loan.

1. Limited Transparency: The detailed budget for ₳5M is not fully disclosed. Using community funds for a private commercial asset (SNEK) requires clear, verifiable allocation. The proposal prioritizes the Foundation’s “strategic flexibility” over the Treasury’s fiscal transparency, limiting the community’s ability to independently assess the risk and reasonableness of this allocation.

2. High Risk: The loan lacks enforceable on-chain guarantees (collateral, smart contracts), and repayment relies on speculative Snek revenue projections, creating significant risk for the Treasury.

3. Concentration of Benefit and Precedent: Funding should target ecosystem-wide public goods, not primarily the commercial success of a single, private token. This sets a problematic precedent for resource allocation.

I support the concept of treasury loans as an experiment, but this proposal requires a transparent risk structure, enforceable guarantees, and fair distribution of benefits across the network before it can be approved.

This is about correcting a system error and honoring the early contributors who tested and strengthened Cardano's new governance. Fairness and recognizing our pioneers is paramount.

A smart move to strengthen Cardano’s digital identity and Web2↔Web3 presence.

I support the idea of compensating Constitutional Committee (CC) members as an important step toward sustainable and fair governance in Cardano. The CC’s work requires time, expertise, and independence, and establishing a transparent, smart contract–based compensation mechanism aligns well with the Constitution.

However, the requested budget of 1,000,000 ADA — up to 200,000 ADA per member — seems relatively high for an initial funding round. At this stage, a phased or partial approach might be more appropriate, allowing the community to evaluate the model’s effectiveness before scaling further.

Therefore, I generally support the concept but abstain from endorsing this specific budget to encourage more detailed justification of the compensation level and ensure a stronger balance between cost and outcome.

The document becomes cleaner, more coherent, and legally solid. Treasury accountability is strengthened, and governance simplified.

Community values can live in off-chain charters, not in the Constitution.

GovTool is a critical open-source infrastructure for Cardano governance. Halting its development would risk fragmentation and reliance on closed tools during the crucial Voltaire era. While the requested budget is significant, it is transparently structured, subject to smart contract oversight, and with unspent funds returning to the Treasury. Potential concerns (cost levels, role overlap) should be addressed through audits and future optimizations, but they are not strong enough to block funding at this stage.

Agree with discussion, but waiting for clearer execution plans before full support.

Clear governance, transparency, and public good focus — boosting stablecoin liquidity benefits the entire ecosystem while returning revenue to the treasury.

As a DRep, I reviewed the SNEK loan proposal.

Compared to earlier treasury asks (where funds were requested with no repayment plan — I voted Against those), this proposal is much stronger. It introduces a loan model, staged milestones, and accountability.

Still, as this is the first of its kind, key safeguards are not yet fully defined. For that reason, I chose to Abstain — not to block innovation, but to signal the need for clearer protections before I can fully support such initiatives.

As a DRep, I voted FOR the Cardano in Oceania proposal.
This is not just spending — it’s a strategic investment in sustainable ecosystem growth.

Key strengths:

Expands Cardano’s decentralization and global reach.

Creates a scalable model other regions can adopt.

Strong transparency: milestones, reports, audit.

Risks exist, but phased funding and DRep appeal mechanisms reduce them.
I believe this initiative will deliver real impact and strengthen the network.