CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4
189 DReps voted · 72 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote · 2 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 2 to no, 1 to abstain, together voting with 23.2M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes185K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes175K ₳No rationale
- Yes161.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes157.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes149.8K ₳Rationale
These changes represent sensible housekeeping and improvements that make the Constitution clearer, more consistent, and easier to interpret without altering its core principles or weakening protections. Removing redundant mechanisms like the Budget Info Action reduces complexity in governance workflows, while directly embedding audit and transparency requirements into treasury actions maintains (and arguably strengthens) accountability.
Reverting the three contested wordings to accommodate EMURGO's concerns is a pragmatic step toward unity. - Yes138.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes126.5K ₳No rationale
- No124.6K ₳No rationale
- No102.5K ₳No rationale
- No99K ₳No rationale
- No90.6K ₳Rationale
GOVERNANCE ACTION REPORT [EN]
1. Introduction
This proposal submits Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4 as a constitutional amendment. It removes non-binding “expectations” and “encouragement” clauses, eliminates the Budget Info Action mechanism, and removes the constitutional obligation to create a CC Code of Conduct, with the stated goal of simplifying governance and removing redundant mechanisms. It also unifies terminology and adds definitions (e.g., Active Voting Stake, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient) to reduce ambiguity.
In addition, it strengthens formal requirements for governance actions by requiring that any document hosted via URL be immutable, ensuring proposals cannot be altered after submission. After the removal of the Budget Info Action, accountability requirements are shifted into Treasury Withdrawals, including audit and oversight safeguards. In the transition from v2.3 to v2.4, three specific wording changes are reverted back to the v1.0 wording following formal objections raised by EMURGO.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
There is no principled objection to several substantive elements, including the removal of the Budget Info Action. The position here is pragmatic: if budgeting via Info Action is primarily meant for signaling and coordination, that can be handled more efficiently off-chain (e.g., via Ekklesia), while accountability requirements should be concentrated where execution actually occurs, namely in Treasury Withdrawals. On this specific point, the direction is acceptable and desirable.
Support is also given to the requirement that proposal documents hosted via URL must be immutable, as this protects proposal integrity, prevents post-submission tampering, and strengthens trust in the governance process.Negative aspects
For a constitutional amendment with high institutional impact, the minimum requirement is not “good intentions” or a well-written summary, but auditable comparability between versions. When attempting a manual verification of Constitution v1.0 against v2.4, a serious issue became evident in the supporting material: the v1.0 → v2.4 diff/check file is misaligned and confusing, with sections out of order and enough editorial noise to make identical passages appear as additions/removals. This defeats the primary purpose of a diff, which is to enable dReps to assess the real scope of changes quickly and accurately.
From Article 3 onward in the original text, the changes appear even more substantial: rewrites, deletions, and structural rearrangements, which would normally increase the need for a high-quality diff. However, the current materials do not support responsible due diligence.Risks and concerns
A clear institutional risk is created: erroneous decisions driven by poor auditability, and incentives for shortcuts (heuristics, reliance on third parties, voting by fatigue). This risk is amplified by a recurring accountability gap in the ecosystem, with many votes lacking rationale and rationales that are often superficial when present.
There is also a methodological problem: editorial changes (grammar/style/formatting) were bundled together with conceptual changes. In a constitutional text, this packaging dramatically increases review complexity, reduces scanability, and raises the likelihood that important changes slip through. The expected standard would be to clearly separate cosmetic edits from substantive amendments, with section-by-section documentation and explicit mapping of moved blocks.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO.
A constitutional amendment cannot be endorsed under a process where the core comparability artifact (the v1.0 → v2.4 diff) fails. The vote is NO on methodology and auditability grounds.Reconsideration (a potential YES) would be conditional on a re-submission that meets minimum verification standards, including: (1) canonical text versions with stable structure, (2) a section-by-section diff with anchors and moved-block detection, (3) explicit separation of editorial vs conceptual changes, and (4) a granular, verifiable changelog. Without this, transparency, adequate scrutiny, and responsible decision-making cannot be assured.
4. Conclusion
The vote is NO due to methodology and auditability failure: comparability between v1.0 and v2.4 is not verifiable with the provided materials. The substance includes acceptable directions, but there is no operational basis to endorse a constitutional amendment without a reliable, verifiable diff.
RELATÓRIO DE AÇÃO DE GOVERNANÇA [PT]
1. Introdução
A proposta submete a Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4 como emenda constitucional. O texto remove cláusulas não vinculantes de “expectations” e “encouragements”, elimina o mecanismo de Budget Info Action e remove a obrigação constitucional de criação de um CC Code of Conduct, com a justificativa de simplificação de governança e redução de mecanismos redundantes. Também consolida terminologia e adiciona definições (ex.: Active Voting Stake, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient), buscando reduzir ambiguidades.
Além disso, reforça requisitos formais para ações de governança ao exigir que o documento hospedado via URL seja imutável, garantindo que propostas não possam ser alteradas após submissão. Após a remoção do Budget Info Action, requisitos de accountability são deslocados para o contexto de Treasury Withdrawals, incluindo salvaguardas de auditoria e supervisão. Na transição de v2.3 para v2.4, três mudanças específicas de redação são revertidas para o wording da v1.0 após objeções formais da EMURGO.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
Não há objeção de princípio a aspectos relevantes do conteúdo, incluindo a remoção do Budget Info Action. A posição aqui é pragmática: se o objetivo do budgeting via Info Action é principalmente sinalização e coordenação, isso pode ser tratado com maior eficiência off-chain (por exemplo, via Ekklesia), enquanto requisitos de accountability devem ficar concentrados onde a execução ocorre, isto é, em Treasury Withdrawals. Nesse ponto específico, a direção é aceitável e desejável.
Há também apoio ao requisito de que documentos de proposta hospedados via URL sejam imutáveis, pois isso protege a integridade das propostas, previne alterações após a submissão e fortalece a confiança no processo de governança.Aspectos negativos
Para uma emenda constitucional com alto impacto institucional, o requisito mínimo não é “boa intenção” ou um resumo bem escrito, mas comparabilidade auditável entre versões. Ao tentar uma verificação manual da Constituição v1.0 contra a v2.4, tornou-se evidente um problema sério no material de apoio: o arquivo de diff/check v1.0 → v2.4 está desalinhado e confuso, com seções fora de ordem e ruído editorial suficiente para fazer passagens idênticas parecerem adições/remoções. Isso frustra a finalidade do diff, que é permitir avaliação rápida e acurada do escopo real das mudanças.
A partir do Artigo 3 em diante no texto original, mudanças parecem ainda mais substanciais (reescritas, deleções e rearranjos estruturais), o que aumenta a necessidade de um diff de alta qualidade. Porém, os materiais atuais não sustentam due diligence responsável.Riscos e preocupações
Há um risco institucional claro: decisões errôneas motivadas por baixa auditabilidade e incentivos a atalhos (heurísticas, dependência de terceiros, voto por fadiga). Esse risco é amplificado por uma lacuna recorrente de accountability no ecossistema, com muitos votos sem justificativa e justificativas frequentemente superficiais quando existem.
Há também um problema metodológico: mudanças editoriais (gramática/estilo/formatação) foram empacotadas junto com mudanças conceituais. Em texto constitucional, isso aumenta dramaticamente a complexidade de revisão, reduz a scanability e eleva a probabilidade de que mudanças importantes passem despercebidas. O padrão esperado seria separar claramente ajustes cosméticos de emendas substantivas, com documentação seção a seção e mapeamento explícito de blocos movidos.
3. Voto e Justificativa
Voto: NO.
Uma emenda constitucional não pode ser endossada sob um processo em que o artefato central de comparabilidade (o diff v1.0 → v2.4) falha. O voto é NO por metodologia e auditabilidade.
Uma reconsideração (potencial YES) fica condicionada a uma re-submissão que atenda padrões mínimos de verificação, incluindo: (1) versões canônicas do texto com estrutura estável, (2) diff seção a seção com âncoras e detecção de blocos movidos, (3) separação explícita de mudanças editoriais versus conceituais, e (4) changelog granular e verificável. Sem isso, transparência, escrutínio adequado e decisão responsável não podem ser assegurados.
4. Conclusão
O voto é NO por falha de metodologia e auditabilidade: a comparabilidade entre v1.0 e v2.4 não é verificável com o material fornecido. A substância inclui direções aceitáveis, mas não há base operacional para endossar uma emenda constitucional sem um diff confiável e verificável.
- Yes83.9K ₳Rationale
I am voting in favor of this proposal and have been in agreement with the proposed changes to the constitution since version 2.3. The changes from 2.3 to 2.4 are, in my opinion, an improvement to the language and clarity of our constitution, and therefore I maintain my support.
- No77.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes74.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes69.9K ₳No rationale
- No65.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes56.1K ₳Rationale
yes. incremental improvements are good.
- Yes51.8K ₳Rationale
Yes, Yuta and the team always working diligently driving for the new constitution.
Moreover, he updated frequently on the version of the constitution with the contribution of the community members.Across the DReps forums are also well updated.
- Yes48.7K ₳Rationale
Agreed
- Yes48K ₳No rationale
- Yes45.9K ₳Rationale
Wistkey Lab supports the adoption of Cardano Constitution v2.4 because it strengthens governance clarity, enforceability, and accountability in ways that directly align with our execution-focused DRep objectives. By removing non-binding expectations, clarifying definitions, and simplifying governance flows, the update reduces ambiguity and improves decision-making for DReps and the Constitutional Committee. The introduction of immutable proposal documentation and universal audit safeguards enhances transparency and responsible treasury usage, while the removal of redundant Budget Info Actions streamlines governance without weakening oversight or voter sovereignty.
- Yes45.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes41.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes29.3K ₳No rationale
- No26.7K ₳Rationale
This is horrible. This doesn't make any fucking sense. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of law would realize how bizarre and warped this is. This does nothing to build out the constitution. It makes things less clear, removes more power from the constitution as a document itself and thus the community. Yuta and the stupid fucks at Emurgo should go ask someone who understands legal concepts to build out and create guidance via the constitution. Not gut it and add in retarded shit that does not matter. What the God Damn fuck is this. Just stop wasting everyone's time and admit y'all are out of your league and need to step down. This is embarrassing.
- Abstain15.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain15.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes10.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes10.7K ₳Rationale
I'm like this proposal, so I'm voting yes
- No8.4K ₳No rationale
- No6.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes4.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes3.6K ₳No rationale
- No1.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain861.2 ₳No rationale
- Yes688.8 ₳No rationale
- Yes4 ₳No rationale
- Yes0 ₳No rationale