Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1
186 DReps voted · 74 with a rationale · 5 changed their vote · 4 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 4 to yes, 1 to abstain, together voting with 28M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes182.7K ₳No rationale
- No169.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes161.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes157.8K ₳No rationale
- No157.8K ₳Rationale
Sorry, can't see the Legal Structure cost justified
- No149.8K ₳Rationale
I largely agree with the thoughtful concerns raised by ArmyofSpies in his earlier vote rationale (https://x.com/ArmyofSpies/status/1977565495302996409). Additionally, the IOG-led Pentad is already executing a more coordinated and promising set of initiatives to boost liquidity and DeFi infrastructure on Cardano, most notably through the Critical Integrations Budget, which has successfully delivered USDCx and related stablecoin infrastructure. We should focus our limited resources on supporting and scaling these existing efforts rather than creating parallel structures with extra overhead.
- Yes142.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes138.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes124.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes115.6K ₳No rationale
- No112.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain109.8K ₳No rationale
- No90.6K ₳Rationale
Governance Action Review
Governance Action:
Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1I am voting NO on this Treasury Withdrawal at this stage.
This vote should not be interpreted as a rejection of the proposal itself or of treasury funding in principle. My concern relates primarily to the timing and coordination of treasury allocations under the current governance environment.
At present, the ecosystem still lacks a sufficiently clear view of the full pipeline of proposals that may seek funding within the current NCL window.
Approving Treasury Withdrawals before proposers have had a meaningful opportunity to participate in a broader coordination process risks reinforcing an uncoordinated funding dynamic, where requests are assessed in isolation rather than in relation to the wider ecosystem’s needs, trade-offs, and budget constraints. My concern is not with individual submissions as such, but with the absence of a more collaborative and comparative process through which scope, budget, and priority can be better optimized across the current funding cycle.
Given the expectation that Intersect’s budgeting process may surface a broader set of requests in the coming weeks, I believe a short delay would likely improve decision quality and reduce the risk of inefficient allocation.
Approving withdrawals too early may also create downstream pressure to expand the NCL in order to accommodate proposals that emerge later but may prove strategically more relevant.
This should not be read as an attempt to block funding or paralyze governance. The ecosystem has already had roughly a full year to learn from the weaknesses of the previous cycle and to build a more credible coordination layer for the next one. That response has progressed more slowly than it should have.
I was willing to accept greater urgency last year because continuity of development mattered and the system was still in an early transition phase. But if we never reach the point where dReps are willing to demand greater accountability, coordination, and rigor, then the ecosystem simply carries the same loose standards into yet another funding cycle.
I do not consider that acceptable after the time already available to improve the process.
For these reasons, I believe it is preferable to delay approvals temporarily rather than normalize allocation decisions under incomplete and uncoordinated information.
This vote reflects a preference for better coordination and prioritization of treasury spending, not opposition to the goals of
Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1.
Revisão de Ação de Governança
Ação de Governança:
Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1Estou votando NÃO nesta Treasury Withdrawal neste momento.
Este voto não deve ser interpretado como uma rejeição da proposta em si ou do financiamento via tesouro em princípio. Minha preocupação está principalmente relacionada ao timing e à coordenação das alocações do tesouro no atual ambiente de governança.
No momento, o ecossistema ainda não possui uma visão suficientemente clara do conjunto completo de propostas que podem buscar financiamento dentro da janela atual de NCL.
Aprovar Treasury Withdrawals antes que os proponentes tenham tido uma oportunidade real de participar de algum processo mais amplo de coordenação corre o risco de reforçar uma dinâmica de financiamento descoordenada, na qual pedidos são avaliados isoladamente, em vez de serem analisados em relação às necessidades mais amplas do ecossistema, aos trade-offs existentes e às restrições orçamentárias.
Minha preocupação não é com submissões individuais em si, mas com a ausência de um processo mais colaborativo e comparativo por meio do qual escopo, orçamento e prioridade possam ser melhor otimizados ao longo deste ciclo de financiamento.
Considerando que o processo de orçamento conduzido pela Intersect pode trazer à tona um conjunto mais amplo de solicitações nas próximas semanas, acredito que um pequeno atraso provavelmente melhoraria a qualidade das decisões e reduziria o risco de alocações ineficientes.
Aprovar retiradas muito cedo também pode gerar pressão posterior para expandir o NCL, a fim de acomodar propostas que venham a surgir depois e que eventualmente se revelem mais relevantes do ponto de vista estratégico.
Isso não deve ser interpretado como uma tentativa de bloquear financiamento ou paralisar a governança. O ecossistema já teve aproximadamente um ano inteiro para aprender com as fragilidades do ciclo anterior e desenvolver uma camada de coordenação mais sólida para o próximo ciclo. Essa resposta avançou mais lentamente do que deveria.
No ano passado eu aceitei um maior senso de urgência porque a continuidade do desenvolvimento era importante e o sistema ainda estava em uma fase inicial de transição. No entanto, se nunca chegarmos ao ponto em que os dReps estejam dispostos a exigir maior accountability, coordenação e rigor, o ecossistema simplesmente carregará os mesmos padrões frouxos para mais um ciclo inteiro de financiamento.
Depois do tempo que já tivemos para melhorar o processo, não considero isso aceitável.
Por essas razões, acredito ser preferível adiar temporariamente as aprovações em vez de normalizar decisões de alocação baseadas em informações incompletas e descoordenadas.
Este voto reflete uma preferência por maior coordenação e melhor priorização do gasto do tesouro, e não uma oposição aos objetivos da
Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1. - Yes83.9K ₳Rationale
I am in favor of this treasury withdrawal request. I have already voted in favor of the budget info action and gave my rationale for that on the info action vote metadata. This action is about ensuring that the team is handling the funds in a responsible way, and I believe that they are. I am satisfied with the proposed process that this well known and respected team is putting forward to handle the funds. There is some risk involved but I am also satisfied that the plan proposed mitigates the risk as much as is reasonable to expect.
- Yes56.4K ₳Rationale
I vote Yes to pass the Defi Liquidity Budget
- Yes56.1K ₳Rationale
first withdrawal: yes. LOADS of good effort in here for valuable things.
second withdrawal: lets see. I think i even prefer three withdrawals.. slow ramp up. - Abstain51.8K ₳Rationale
a slight abstain without clear information updates from previous year defi liquidity progress
- Yes48.7K ₳Rationale
cool
- Yes48K ₳No rationale
- Abstain45.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes30.9K ₳No rationale
- No29.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes28.8K ₳No rationale
- No26.7K ₳Rationale
No author, no vote. IDK who the fuck 'WE' is.
- No19.4K ₳No rationale
- Abstain15.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes10.7K ₳Rationale
i'm like proposal so i vote yes
- No6.8K ₳No rationale
- No4.1K ₳No rationale
- Abstain3.4K ₳Rationale
I actually like the direction here. Trying to bring more liquidity into Cardano DeFi makes sense, and I appreciate that this proposal is focused on setting up the foundation first instead of rushing to deploy a huge amount of ADA.
That said, I’m not fully comfortable voting YES yet.
Most of this request (800k ADA) goes into legal setup especially the Cayman foundation and while I understand why that’s being done, it still feels like a big upfront cost for something that doesn’t directly create value yet. We’re basically funding the structure before we’ve fully agreed on how the full 50M ADA liquidity plan will play out.
There’s also a bit of a “point of no return” feeling here. Once the legal entity is created and the structure is in place, it becomes much harder for the community to rethink or adjust the overall approach later.
I don’t think this is a bad proposal far from it. The team clearly thought about legal risks, accountability, and transparency, which is good to see. I just feel like we’re moving into a fairly complex setup with real costs and long-term implications, and I’m not 100% convinced we’ve aligned on the bigger picture yet.
- Yes688.8 ₳No rationale
- Yes619.5 ₳No rationale
- Abstain167.1 ₳No rationale
- No99.5 ₳No rationale
- YesChanged0 ₳History
Earlier votes
No5mo agoSuperseded
recasting vote to yes. while true the protocols should be doing more and reinvesting in their own growth. maybe treasury needs to step in since they have not been doing so.
No5mo agoSuperseded
no. vague.
- Yes0 ₳No rationale