IO & Midgard Labs: L2 Scalability Initiative
239 DReps voted · 88 with a rationale · 12 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No479.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes478.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes442.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes438.7K ₳No rationale
- No414.2K ₳No rationale
- Abstain385.2K ₳Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - Yes383K ₳No rationale
- No381.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes365.7K ₳No rationale
- No360.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes332.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes328.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes323.2K ₳No rationale
- No320.4K ₳No rationale
- No314.4K ₳Rationale
I support the L2 Scalability projects but vote NO due to unfulfilled Midgard deliverables, restrictive bundling, and a lack of budget granularity beyond top-level workstream figures. Meaningful progress on these fronts provides a clear path to a YES vote.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Introduction
I want to explicitly state my strong support for the technological goals of this initiative. Data Availability, Hydra, and Midgard are critical for Cardano's future, and I want to see all of these projects materialize. However, specific reservations force me to vote NO on this current proposal.
My Reservations
- Outstanding Deliverables: Midgard has previously received significant funding but has failed to formally deliver several key commitments (e.g., the Statement of Milestones and the 2025 end-of-year mainnet readiness). While I hear that the actual work may be largely completed, formal reports have not been submitted. In governance, my principle is "Don't Trust! Verify". The community needs to see the concrete deliverables before releasing further funds.
- Proposal Bundling: Packaging three distinct workstreams into a single proposal forces a "take it or leave it" dynamic. I fundamentally disagree with this approach. The community should have the right to vote on these projects individually and potentially fund them across different budget periods.
- Budget Opacity: Consistent with other IO proposals, this request suffers from a "black box" budget. While the proposal does explicitly break down the costs into three distinct areas (Workstream 1 L2 Agnostic: ₳1,895,613; Workstream 2 Hydra Production: ₳7,582,452; Workstream 3 Midgard Optimisation: ₳947,806), these massive sums simply fall under a vague "Development" line without any further granularity. I am not looking to micromanage developer salaries, but I need to understand how those numbers were actually calculated (for example, how we ended up with a number like 7.58M ADA for Hydra and why not 3M or 10M?).
A Clear Path to YES
I am eager to support this initiative. Meaningful progress on the following points would prompt me to re-evaluate and switch my vote to YES:
- Unbundling: Separate the proposal so the community can evaluate and vote on the three distinct projects individually.
- Submit Past Deliverables: Midgard must submit their pending reports and formal deliverables from previous funding. Basic accountability cannot be compromised.
- Provide High-Level Granularity: Provide a deeper breakdown of the workstream budgets. To reiterate a core principle from my past rationales: if the Treasury is funding for-profit businesses, then we should have some stake in them. Alternatively, if we are funding public good infrastructure, those organizations should not be scooping fat profit margins at the Treasury's expense. We need enough high-level detail to ensure the requested money is directly compensating specialized builders, rather than quietly covering management bonuses and corporate padding.
- No313.4K ₳No rationale
- NoChanged300.6K ₳Rationale
Even though I know the team behind this proposal and I’m aware that they are doing hard and phenomenal work, I honestly can’t give them my vote. With $ADA at 0.25, talking about L2 solutions when we barely fill blocks except during specific spikes of activity makes me feel that all efforts should be focused on Ouroboros Leios instead of being so fragmented into L2 initiatives. In the end, from a personal perspective and considering how blockchains are currently being used, I don’t think L2 solutions are necessary at this moment.
Earlier votes
Abstain3mo agoSuperseded
- YesRevoted298.9K ₳Rationale
Voting YES on ALL IOG Withdrawals
May 20th 2026
Summery
Nine treasury withdrawals from IOG totalling around 162M ada ($40M USD)
Important Citation
https://x.com/EdnStuff/status/2051321214728118360
EdnStuff said the following on May 4th 2026
I see the IO proposals as a package deal. But by all accounts I see most dreps only voting yes on a small selection of the 9. This is going to lead to some extremely lopsided, fragmented, and piecemeal results that will fall short of what we need on #Cardano $ADA.Charles quote tweeted saying
https://x.com/IOHK_Charles/status/2051376829949464792
Sadly, this is the end result of a piecemeal roadmap. It's an iPhone by committee, with people deciding whether they prefer the fingerprint sensor to wireless charging. You end up with a bizarre, useless product.Statement
There are a handful of people who, when they speak, I think it unwise not to listen to. Charles is one such person. His statement above makes this choice pretty easy.
While we need to foster a wide ecosystem of R&D firms, we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationship with our biggest contributor. It is obvious and undeniable that the long-term success of Cardano remains dependent on the continued efforts of IO.
I am voting for all of these IO proposals because Charles has made it clear that he does not believe Cardano can be successful without each of them, and it would be unwise to disregard his intuition.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq6tt9c684e7vzata8r5pl4w84fmrjqeztdqw0sgpzw3nt
https://x.com/william00000010Earlier votes
Yes2mo agoSuperseded
Voting YES on ALL IOG Withdrawals
May 20th 2026
Summery
Nine treasury withdrawals from IOG totalling around 162M ada ($40M USD)
Important Citation
https://x.com/EdnStuff/status/2051321214728118360
EdnStuff said the following on May 4th 2026
I see the IO proposals as a package deal. But by all accounts I see most dreps only voting yes on a small selection of the 9. This is going to lead to some extremely lopsided, fragmented, and piecemeal results that will fall short of what we need on #Cardano $ADA.Charles quote tweeted saying
https://x.com/IOHK_Charles/status/2051376829949464792
Sadly, this is the end result of a piecemeal roadmap. It's an iPhone by committee, with people deciding whether they prefer the fingerprint sensor to wireless charging. You end up with a bizarre, useless product.Statement
There are a handful of people who, when they speak, I think it unwise not to listen to. Charles is one such person. His statement above makes this choice pretty easy.
While we need to foster a wide ecosystem of R&D firms, we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationship with our biggest contributor. It is obvious and undeniable that the long-term success of Cardano remains dependent on the continued efforts of IO.
I am voting for all of these IO proposals because Charles has made it clear that he does not believe Cardano can be successful without each of them, and it would be unwise to disregard his intuition.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq6tt9c684e7vzata8r5pl4w84fmrjqeztdqw0sgpzw3nt
https://x.com/william00000010 - No294.4K ₳No rationale
- No279.8K ₳Rationale
I recognize that Layer 2 scaling can provide long-term value for Cardano. The Midgard Labs proposal aims to build Layer 2 scaling capabilities for Cardano, allowing certain high-frequency, low-cost, and low-latency applications to operate outside the main chain while still settling back to Cardano. If successful, this type of infrastructure could help expand Cardano’s future application capacity.
However, this proposal requests ₳10,425,871, which represents a significant Treasury Withdrawal. At Cardano’s current stage, I believe the more fundamental and survival-level priorities remain mainnet maintenance, core infrastructure stability, and the advancement of main-chain scaling efforts such as Leios.
My concern is not that Layer 2 is unimportant. Rather, Cardano first needs to strengthen the performance, stability, developer experience, and reliability of the main chain and its core infrastructure. If the base layer is not sufficiently reinforced, allocating a large amount of Treasury funding to Layer 2 scaling at this stage may dilute both Treasury resources and governance attention.
Therefore, I see this proposal as technically valuable, but not the highest priority at the current stage. Once mainnet maintenance, Leios-based main-chain scaling, and core infrastructure have made clearer progress, Layer 2 solutions would be more appropriate for renewed evaluation and potential support.
我認同 Layer 2 擴容對 Cardano 的長期發展具有潛在價值。Midgard Labs 提案希望為 Cardano 建設二層擴容能力，讓部分高頻、低費用、低延遲的應用可以在主鏈之外運行，同時仍與 Cardano 主鏈進行結算。這類基礎設施若能成功，未來可能有助於提升 Cardano 的應用承載能力。
然而，本提案申請金額為 ₳10,425,871，屬於相當大額的 Treasury Withdrawal。以目前 Cardano 的發展階段來看，我認為更核心、更接近生存級需求的優先事項，仍然是主網維護、核心基礎設施穩定性，以及 Leios 等主鏈擴容路線的推進。
我的疑慮並不是 Layer 2 不重要，而是 Cardano 目前更需要先確保主鏈本身的性能、穩定性、開發者體驗與基礎設施可靠度。若主鏈基礎尚未充分強化，過早投入大額資金於二層擴容，可能會分散 Treasury 資源與治理注意力。
因此，我認為本提案具有技術探索價值，但在目前階段並非最高優先級。若未來主網維護、Leios 主鏈擴容與核心基礎設施已有更明確進展，Layer 2 方案會更適合被重新評估與支持。
- Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes270.1K ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on “IO & Midgard Labs: L2 Scalability Initiative” at 10,425,871 ADA, but it is a conditional YES that comes with clear expectations and consequences for future proposals in this area.
This initiative sits at a critical point in Cardano’s throughput expansion strategy. Today’s L1 profile—multi‑minute to ~2‑hour finality, ~7–10 TPS, and fees around 0.17 USD—excludes Cardano from serious consideration for high‑frequency DeFi, AI‑agent micropayments, gaming, and consumer payments, even before technical merits like security or eUTxO are evaluated. Leios and Peras will materially improve base‑layer capacity and finality, but they will not deliver sub‑second UX and sub‑cent fees across the board; in this budget cycle, only L2s can credibly close that gap. This proposal funds three linked workstreams that together address that problem in a way that builds on, rather than discards, prior investments: (1) a shared, L2‑agnostic data availability strategy and prototype for all Cardano L2s; (2) production hardening and turnkey solutions for Hydra, now in its adoption phase with real users like Delta DeFi and Masumi; and (3) the path from testnet to mainnet‑readiness for Midgard, Cardano’s first permissionless optimistic rollup. Strategically, this is not a nice‑to‑have; it is the L2 side of the Basho story, and without it Cardano’s scaling roadmap remains incomplete.
At the same time, the concerns raised by NO‑voting DReps are serious and justified, and my YES explicitly incorporates them. First, several DReps argue that Hydra has already received substantial investment and still has an unclear path to ecosystem‑wide impact, and that 80% of this budget going to Hydra‑related work risks good money chasing uncertain adoption. Second, Midgard has previous funding via Catalyst and a 2025 treasury withdrawal, with missed or delayed milestone communication and a shifted mainnet target; this undermines trust even if technical work has progressed. Third, this proposal bundles three conceptually distinct categories—shared public‑good infra (DA layer), IO’s own L2 research/maintenance (Hydra hardening), and acceleration of a specific rollup product (Midgard)—into one treasury narrative, making it harder to judge each on its own merits. I agree with these critiques. However, I also see a substantial body of prior Hydra and Midgard work, live or near‑live adopters (Delta DeFi, Masumi), and a clear, ecosystem‑level need for L2 capacity. On that basis, I judge a controlled continuation to be more prudent than halting the initiative mid‑stream, provided we tighten expectations around how this work is executed and reported.
My YES vote is therefore conditional on three expectations, which will heavily influence how I evaluate any future L2‑related asks:- Clear separation and reporting per workstream. I expect IO and Midgard Labs to report progress and milestones separately for: (a) the L2‑agnostic DA strategy/prototype (Q3–Q4 2026 → Q1 2027 spec and prototype), (b) Hydra production hardening and turnkey solutions (performance SLOs, operator tooling, and reference DeFi/state‑machine deployments for projects like Delta and Masumi), and (c) Midgard’s multi‑operator coordination and pen‑testing towards mainnet readiness. Any future proposals must show what was actually delivered here against these three tracks, not re‑bundle them into another large, undifferentiated narrative.
- L2‑agnostic infra and ecosystem‑first design. The data‑availability workstream must remain genuinely L2‑agnostic, with transparent evaluation of candidate architectures and visible community input before locking in choices that could impose ecosystem‑wide technical debt. Likewise, Hydra hardening and Midgard mainnet work should be positioned as platform‑level infrastructure with open standards and clear documentation, not as bespoke support for a small set of projects. Treasury is not a bailout mechanism for individual business models; if Delta, Masumi, or Midgard succeed, it should be because they provide competitive products on top of shared infrastructure, not because that infrastructure is effectively subsidised only for them.
- Significantly improved communication and milestone discipline. For Midgard in particular, previous Catalyst and treasury funding cycles have suffered from weak outward communication and slow milestone reporting, even where technical progress has been real. Going forward, I expect timely, transparent milestone submissions under this proposal, with public artefacts that non‑specialist DReps can verify: specs, testnet releases, pen‑test reports, and clear criteria for mainnet readiness. If those expectations are ignored or minimised—if, in another year, we are again asked to fund “the final push” for Midgard or further Hydra platformisation without clear, verifiable delivery against this program—my default stance on subsequent L2 scalability withdrawals will shift toward NO, regardless of how strategically important the category is in the abstract.
In summary, I see this proposal as a necessary next step in Cardano’s throughput expansion path, tying together shared L2 infrastructure, Hydra’s adoption‑phase hardening, and Midgard’s move toward production in a way that can materially improve competitiveness and tie L2 activity back to L1 fees and treasury revenue. I support it because I believe the downside of not funding it—stalled Hydra adoption, a Midgard testnet that never crosses the finish line, and a lack of credible L2 options for builders—is greater than the controlled risk of funding it under tightened expectations. But that support is not open‑ended: future votes in this area will be decided based on how well IO and Midgard Labs meet these expectations on delivery, separation of concerns, and communication over the life of this initiative.
- Yes261.6K ₳No rationale
- No261K ₳Rationale
Vote: NO
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Review
While recognizing the strategic importance of scalability for Cardano’s future and considering it legitimate for multiple teams to work on complementary infrastructure solutions, this proposal raises significant concerns related to execution, operational capacity, treasury discipline, and proposal structure.
This position should not be interpreted as opposition to scalability development within Cardano. Scalability remains one of the most important areas of Cardano’s roadmap and one of the major technical domains still under active development, alongside governance. There is a valid case for continued investment in scalability, and some degree of redundancy among different teams and approaches can be beneficial for ecosystem resilience. However, redundancy must remain disciplined, especially under current market conditions and treasury constraints.
The existence of other scalability initiatives already funded and currently under development within the ecosystem, including Treasury Withdrawals that have already received strong community support such as the “IO: Consensus Initiative” [1], which focuses on Leios development, reduces the urgency of immediately expanding treasury exposure through another major funding allocation tied to Midgard.
The primary concern is not necessarily the technical direction of the proposal, but rather the Midgard team’s execution track record. After reviewing previously funded Midgard-related proposals, including both Catalyst [2] and Treasury Withdrawals [3][4], a pattern of substantial delays, timeline extensions, and long-running incomplete milestones becomes evident. The explanations provided for these delays appear to stem primarily from internal capacity and management limitations rather than exceptional external circumstances.
It is also concerning that key members of the Midgard team are simultaneously involved in multiple initiatives across the Cardano ecosystem, raising reasonable questions regarding focus, execution capacity, and operational dispersion. It does not appear prudent to continue expanding treasury-funded parallel initiatives while previously funded deliverables remain delayed or incomplete.
Having open proposals is not, by itself, sufficient reason for rejection. However, when there is a consistent history of significant delays across multiple previously funded initiatives, this becomes a material risk factor for additional treasury exposure.
Another factor contributing to this rejection is the proposal structure itself. Previous Hydra- and Midgard-related funding proposals/initiatives were submitted separately, allowing DReps and the broader community to evaluate each workstream independently according to its own execution history, maturity level, risks, and strategic relevance. In this case, however, multiple distinct scalability initiatives were grouped together into a single Treasury Withdrawal proposal without sufficiently clear justification for why they must be inseparable from a governance and funding perspective.
This approach raises concerns regarding proposal bundling practices within Cardano governance. Combining loosely related or independently viable initiatives into a single budget proposal or Treasury Withdrawal, when there is no strong and unavoidable interdependence between them, reduces decision granularity. It makes it impossible for DReps to support one component while opposing another based on execution history, delivery confidence, or treasury prioritization concerns.
In this proposal specifically, Hydra and Midgard represent materially different execution profiles, maturity levels, and operational histories. Bundling both together effectively forces an all-or-nothing governance decision despite the fact that reasonable concerns may apply unevenly across the workstreams.
Even if the broader scalability direction is strategically important for Cardano, the use of bundled proposals in situations where components could reasonably be evaluated independently is not considered a healthy governance practice, particularly in situations where the bundled workstreams carry materially different execution histories, risk profiles, and funding backgrounds.
Nota sobre a metodologia e escopo da análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
Revisão de Ação de Governança
Embora seja reconhecida a importância estratégica da escalabilidade para o futuro da Cardano e seja considerado legítimo que múltiplos times trabalhem em soluções complementares de infraestrutura, esta proposta levanta preocupações significativas relacionadas à execução, capacidade operacional, disciplina do treasury e estrutura da proposta.
Este posicionamento não deve ser interpretado como oposição ao desenvolvimento de soluções de escalabilidade na Cardano. A escalabilidade permanece como uma das áreas mais importantes do roadmap da Cardano e como um dos principais domínios técnicos ainda em desenvolvimento ativo, junto com a governança. Há um argumento válido para a continuidade de investimentos em escalabilidade, e algum grau de redundância entre diferentes times e abordagens pode ser benéfico para a resiliência do ecossistema. No entanto, essa redundância deve permanecer disciplinada, especialmente sob as atuais condições de mercado e restrições do treasury.
A existência de outras iniciativas de escalabilidade já financiadas e atualmente em desenvolvimento no ecossistema, incluindo Treasury Withdrawals que já receberam forte apoio da comunidade, como a “IO: Consensus Initiative” [1], focada no desenvolvimento de Leios, reduz a urgência de expandir imediatamente a exposição do treasury por meio de uma nova alocação significativa de recursos vinculada à Midgard.
A principal preocupação não está necessariamente na direção técnica da proposta, mas sim no histórico de execução do time da Midgard. Após revisar propostas relacionadas à Midgard previamente financiadas, incluindo tanto Catalyst [2] quanto Treasury Withdrawals [3][4], torna-se evidente um padrão de atrasos substanciais, extensões de cronograma e milestones incompletos por longos períodos. As explicações fornecidas para esses atrasos parecem decorrer principalmente de limitações internas de capacidade e gestão, e não de circunstâncias externas excepcionais.
Também é preocupante que membros-chave do time da Midgard estejam simultaneamente envolvidos em múltiplas iniciativas no ecossistema Cardano, levantando dúvidas razoáveis sobre foco, capacidade de execução e dispersão operacional. Não parece prudente continuar expandindo iniciativas paralelas financiadas pelo treasury enquanto entregas previamente financiadas permanecem atrasadas ou incompletas.
Ter propostas em aberto não é, por si só, razão suficiente para rejeição. No entanto, quando existe um histórico consistente de atrasos significativos em múltiplas iniciativas previamente financiadas, isso se torna um fator material de risco para uma exposição adicional do treasury.
Outro fator que contribui para esta rejeição é a própria estrutura da proposta. Iniciativas/propostas de financiamento relacionadas à Hydra e à Midgard foram anteriormente submetidas separadamente, permitindo que dReps e a comunidade mais ampla avaliassem cada workstream de forma independente, de acordo com seu próprio histórico de execução, nível de maturidade, riscos e relevância estratégica. Neste caso, porém, múltiplas iniciativas distintas de escalabilidade foram agrupadas em uma única proposta de Treasury Withdrawal sem uma justificativa suficientemente clara sobre por que elas devem ser inseparáveis sob uma perspectiva de governança e financiamento.
Essa abordagem levanta preocupações quanto à prática de bundling de propostas dentro da governança da Cardano. Combinar iniciativas vagamente relacionadas ou viáveis de forma independente em uma única budget proposal ou Treasury Withdrawal, quando não há uma interdependência forte e inevitável entre elas, reduz a granularidade da decisão. Isso torna impossível que dReps apoiem um componente enquanto se opõem a outro com base em histórico de execução, confiança na entrega ou preocupações de priorização do treasury.
Nesta proposta especificamente, Hydra e Midgard representam perfis de execução, níveis de maturidade e históricos operacionais materialmente diferentes. Agrupar ambas em uma mesma proposta força, na prática, uma decisão de governança do tipo tudo-ou-nada, apesar de preocupações razoáveis poderem se aplicar de forma desigual entre os workstreams.
Mesmo que a direção mais ampla de escalabilidade seja estrategicamente importante para a Cardano, o uso de propostas agrupadas em situações nas quais os componentes poderiam razoavelmente ser avaliados de forma independente não é considerado uma prática saudável de governança, especialmente em casos nos quais os workstreams agrupados possuem históricos de execução, perfis de risco e antecedentes de financiamento materialmente diferentes.
References/Referências
[1] IO: Consensus Initiative
https://adastat.net/governances/73e171a4c0730b4b59ecae271ab89f12a9d56360b02920e1f95107dbdc1d676202[2] Catalyst Midgard proposal
https://milestones.projectcatalyst.io/projects/1200027[3] Treasury Withdrawal EC-0008-25
https://treasury.sundae.fi/budgets/9e65e4ed7d6fd86fc4827d2b45da6d2c601fb920e8bfd794b8ecc619/project/EC-0008-25[4] Treasury Withdrawal EC-0001-25
https://treasury.sundae.fi/budgets/9e65e4ed7d6fd86fc4827d2b45da6d2c601fb920e8bfd794b8ecc619/project/EC-0001-25 - Yes253.6K ₳No rationale
- No245.5K ₳Rationale
This should have been completed with the 2.1M ADA of funding it received last year at a high ADA-USD value. The L2 entity structure remains "under active exploration", Midgard's mainnet target depends on incomplete penetration testing, and the data availability layer is prototype-only. Given market conditions, I'm prioritizing the funding of L1 scaling initiatives before L2 developments this year.
- Yes238.8K ₳Rationale
I'm increasingly concerned about Cardano's overall treasury spend rate, especially following the recent approval of the Draper/Dragon Orion Fund. To provide a necessary counter-balance, I am defaulting to NO on most treasury withdrawals at this time.
This proposal (₳10.4M) is a clear exception. It directly funds production hardening of Hydra, the mainnet launch of Midgard, and shared L2 infrastructure which is exactly the type of high-priority critical scaling work I support.
I will continue voting YES only on the highest-priority items that directly strengthen essential infrastructure like IO Hydra L2 or deliverables required to advance key partnerships such as Midnight. - Yes235.2K ₳No rationale
- No234.2K ₳No rationale
- No233.2K ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted232.7K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes2mo agoSuperseded
- Yes228.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain215.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes208.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes207.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes200.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes191.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes181.9K ₳No rationale
- Abstain178.9K ₳No rationale
- No171.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes142.5K ₳No rationale
- Abstain138.4K ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted137.4K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes2mo agoSuperseded
- Yes131.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes129.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes128K ₳No rationale
- Yes120.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain118.7K ₳Rationale
I am voting abstain. I recognize the strategic importance of Layer 2 infrastructure and acknowledge the argument that Hydra, optimistic rollups, and shared L2 primitives may eventually play an important role in supporting high-throughput applications, lower-cost transactions, AI-agent economies, gaming, DeFi, and other performance-sensitive use cases. I also recognize that many mature ecosystems have adopted multi-layer scaling approaches, and that experimentation with complementary architectures can contribute to long-term resilience and ecosystem diversity.
However, I remain unconvinced regarding the urgency and sequencing of this investment relative to other scaling initiatives already underway. Cardano is entering a period in which major Layer 1 improvements — including proposals intended to significantly improve throughput and finality — have been prioritized and funded. At this stage, I would prefer to observe how these foundational L1 scaling efforts perform in practice before supporting additional Treasury investment aimed at solving similar constraints through Layer 2 infrastructure.
My hesitation should not be interpreted as opposition to L2s in principle. Rather, it reflects uncertainty around whether current ecosystem demand, builder adoption, and user activity justify the immediacy of this investment, or whether further evidence is needed to demonstrate that Layer 1 improvements alone will be insufficient to support near- to medium-term growth.
I also note that several projected benefits rely on future adoption assumptions, production uptake from early ecosystem participants, and anticipated growth in sectors such as AI agent payments and high-frequency applications. While these possibilities are compelling, I am not yet persuaded that they warrant urgent Treasury allocation at this stage relative to other priorities.
My abstention reflects a preference for measured sequencing rather than rejection: continue strengthening Cardano’s base layer, evaluate real-world outcomes, and reassess the necessity and scope of additional L2 investment as ecosystem demand evolves.