Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget

System11mo ago1 post

220 DReps voted · 89 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote · 5 re-voted unchanged

Open a row to read the rationale.

Changed votes: 3 to yes, 1 to abstain, together voting with 115.7M ₳ of voting power.

  • Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.6M ₳Rationale

    Voting Yes. This proposal strengthens Cardano by increasing stablecoin liquidity, improving trading efficiency, and supporting DeFi growth while generating ongoing revenue for the treasury. DAO oversight, legal protections, and transparent management provide accountability and responsible stewardship.

  • Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
  • No1.5M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
  • No1.2M ₳Rationale

    Rationale for Voting No on Treasury Stablecoin Liquidity Fund
    Cardano treasury funds should be used for development, infrastructure, and public goods, not for converting ADA into fiat-backed stablecoins.
    I prefer peer-to-peer trade in ADA itself, this directs value away into USD-based assets alone.
    If the community wants experiments with stablecoin liquidity, they should be proposed through Catalyst or voluntary initiatives, not with 50 million ADA from the treasury.
    Cardano represents more than money alone: RWA, NFTs, smart and financial contracts, BOS integration, and scaling are all stronger reasons for treasury investment.

  • YesChanged1.2M ₳Rationale

    I reconsidered so I voted yes, I hope it is very successful.

    Earlier votes

    No11mo agoSuperseded

  • Yes1.2M ₳Rationale

    I’ve been following the push for ADA stablecoin growth via funding it from the treasury for quite some time now, and I genuinely believe this is exactly the kind of boost we need. Deep initial liquidity is necessary in the grand scheme of what ADA stands for — not paying centralized entities for insider relief, but funding revolutionary progress ourselves. I think with this push, stablecoin liquidity can reach a self-sustaining level, and that’s the whole point: building something that lasts without reliance on outside control.
    The 9-person committee is a great idea, and so is the system of checks and balances where dReps can veto members, or freeze and return funds to the treasury if fraud or corruption ever occurs. That kind of accountability is essential to avoid the same failures that have taken over traditional systems.
    What I don’t like is the idea of paying dReps or turning governance roles into something people pursue for profit. That’s exactly how old-world governments became corrupted — people running for power because it pays, not because it serves. If some compensation is truly necessary due to the burdens described in the proposal, then so be it — but I would strongly prefer it be done only after responsibilities are fulfilled, not promised upfront.
    I also appreciate that this proposal isn’t just about throwing liquidity at the problem, it’s building actual infrastructure with legal protections, transparency requirements, and a smart contract framework the community can reuse in the future. This proposal respects constitutional limits, keeps all assets trackable on-chain, and requires public reporting every month, showing that this isn’t reckless spending but rather a strategic investment with guardrails.
    This is how we attract serious builders and market makers: not through speculation, but through dependable liquidity and deep markets.
    In the end, this isn’t just funding, it’s an evolution of how Cardano governs itself. If we get this right, we prove that a decentralized treasury can act with the precision of an institution, but without becoming one. That’s the difference between repeating old systems and rebuilding them.

  • YesRevoted1.1M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes11mo agoSuperseded

  • Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
  • No1.1M ₳Rationale

    I support the strategic goal: deeper, resilient stablecoin liquidity on Cardano is essential. I buy into serious, well-governed use of treasury capital to bootstrap critical public goods. Yet this proposal, in its current form, is dangerously under-specified, legally exposed, and operationally risky. It asks for 50M ADA to build what should be a surgical, legally robust, and transparency-first intervention; yet it delivers vague governance mechanics, fragile custody design, and large execution risks without credible mitigation. I cannot, in good conscience, approve this.

    The idea is valid and has been bandied around for years. Stablecoin liquidity is a key missing piece for growth, on-/off-ramp stability, and deeper DeFi activity. However, a 9-person multisig with 5-of-9 signers plus a dRep tDAO oversight centralizes execution risk in a human committee with weak, undefined real-world legal safeguards and key-management procedures. The legal standing of dReps, committee members, and the smart contract’s “ownership” is not established. If something goes wrong — say, a breach, hack, or regulator inquiry — who is legally liable? The proposal punts this, again, to later “legal structure” discussion. That is unacceptable for deploying tens of millions of ADA.

    And speaking of legal: the proposal promises "legal entities and counsel later" but requires the full 49.5M withdrawal only after “legal structure in place.” That sequencing is ambiguous and insufficient, because the first 500k ADA withdrawal already contains a material legal budget but no binding terms. Ouch.

    Then there's the treasury accounting and peg risk. While the fund design allows assets to include fiat-backed stablecoins and liquidity tokens, we're left completely in the dark about how protocol insolvency, stablecoin issuer failure, or depeg events are handled. This is not defined at all.

    I'd deem the committee pay of $9k/month total as slightly overpriced, but the real kicker is that contingency legal/audit/KYC costs are baked into the fund with no spending caps or community-approval triggers. Double ouch.

    I am not opposed in principle to deploying treasury capital to bootstrap stablecoin liquidity. I also respect the ambition to build open-source governance and legal frameworks. But for the reasons outlined above,** I cannot support this proposal as written: it asks for a very large capital allocation without binding legal protections, executable counterparties, phased risk mitigation, or a hard contingency plan for stablecoin failure or market stress.**

  • Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
  • Yes969.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes966.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes951.2K ₳Rationale

    Liquidity is one of the biggest challenges facing our ecosystem right now. Despite the risks associated with voting YES on this proposal, I believe the potential benefits outweigh those risks.

    That said, I would like to see a clearer and more structured protocol for how these funds will be managed during the TW, as this is essentially a fund management operation above all else.

  • Yes929.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes927.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes888K ₳No rationale
  • Yes884.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes866.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes860.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes829.9K ₳Rationale

    Deep Stablecoin liquidity is a key driver for DeFi. Cardano is behind other ecosystems in this front. This proposal addresses this need in a well structured an sustainable way.

  • Yes823.4K ₳Rationale

    Cardano needs to grow, and one of the things that it has been missing for a long time was stablecoins in sufficient amounts. Over the time for a number of reasons Cardano was unable to onboard USDC or USDT, which left the ecosystem hungry for solutions.

    To the challenge rose Cardano native projects with innovative stablecoin solutions and with possibly better approach and technology. What is still lacking is accelerated growth and adoption of it.

    In this sense, I believe we as a community can use treasury to push this through the early stages and provide deeper liquidity on DEXes and thus enabling a more vibrant ecosystem. Stablecoins are not usable just for trading but for all sorts of lending protocols, DePIN projects and other utility focused projects.

    There are risks in properly executing movements of such a large amount, but the people in the committee are well known in the Cardano community as well as to be personally. Failure in execution will be visible and reputations will be tarnished forever.

    I vote YES, because Cardano needs stablecoins like any other L1 ecosystem in any future scenario so lets give it a flying start and boost it with our own war chest.

  • Yes796.1K ₳Rationale

    I believe this proposal is a positive investment in the Cardano DeFi ecosystem. It deepens liquidity, thereby reducing slippage and price impacts during trades. It strengthens visibility and user confidence in our native stables (e.g. USDM). And, the liquidity provisioning arrangement includes a flow back to our Treasury as yield. There are solid provisions for oversight, legal framework, and sustainability. Does this solve all of our issues with respect to stables? No. Is it a positive, community driven first step forward? Yes.

  • Yes765.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes760.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes742.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes678.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes636.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes604.7K ₳Rationale

    I'm voting yes because Cardano's DeFi ecosystem suffers from a fatal weakness: anemic stablecoin liquidity. This proposal deploys 50 million ADA to solve it, and not as a handout, but as infrastructure investment that generates 4% annual returns back to the treasury while cutting stablecoin slippage in half. The current 4-6% slippage on trades makes Cardano uncompetitive and chokes user onboarding. Deep stablecoin liquidity isn't optional; it's the difference between a viable financial layer and a ghost chain.
    The structure mitigates risk: a nine-person committee (including CF, EMURGO, IOHK reps) manages deployment through a 5-of-9 multisig, while a treasury DAO composed of DReps holds veto power to freeze spending or shut down the fund entirely. All liquidity tokens sit on-chain in the governing contract, that is publicly auditable, no black boxes. The proposal phases work intelligently: 500K ADA covers legal setup, smart contract development, and audits before the remaining 49.5M touches DeFi protocols. ADA liquidation uses OTC desks and gradual sales to avoid price shock, ADA is spread across exchanges with 30M+ daily volume, the impact is negligible.
    This isn't picking winners arbitrarily; protocols apply and demonstrate security, yield potential, and growth plans. The committee evaluates openly with tDAO oversight. Yes, there's centralization risk in a small committee, but the alternative is permanent liquidity stagnation, which guarantees failure. The legal framework and governance contracts become reusable public goods for future treasury initiatives. We learn, adapt, or shut it down if KPIs aren't met. Perfect is the enemy of good, and Cardano can't wait for flawless proposals while competitors eat our lunch. Let’s get it done.

  • Yes591.1K ₳Rationale

    Stablecoin liquidity is critical for DeFi growth, adoption, and building resilience. This proposal provides a way to bootstrap liquidity, attract market makers, and showcase the fact that Cardano Defi is up there with (and beyond) the best.

    Carpe diem

  • YesRevoted582.9K ₳Rationale

    This action targets Cardano’s most practical bottleneck—stablecoin depth—by time-boxing ADA to seed liquidity across key venues, reducing slippage and improving UX. Execution includes staged releases and public reporting, enabling clear KPIs and accountable course-correction.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    This action targets Cardano’s most practical bottleneck—stablecoin depth—by time-boxing ADA to seed liquidity across key venues, reducing slippage and improving UX. Execution includes staged releases and public reporting, enabling clear KPIs and accountable course-correction.

    Earlier votes

    Yes11mo agoSuperseded

  • No579.1K ₳Rationale

    📌 Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget: My Decision as a DRep


    🔎 Proposal Summary

    On September 16, 2025, a vote was initiated for a 50,000,000 ADA budget from the Cardano Treasury.
    The funds are planned to be used for:

    • converting ADA into fiat-backed stablecoins (USDC, USDT, USDM, USDA),
    • providing liquidity to DEXs and lending protocols,
    • creating a legal framework and a smart contract to manage the fund,
    • forming a pool managed by a 9-person committee with oversight from the tDAO (dReps).

    Goals:

    • reduce stablecoin slippage by at least 50%,
    • provide users with easier on/off-ramps into the ecosystem,
    • attract market makers and developers,
    • return part of the revenue (15%) back to the Treasury.

    ⚠️ The Problem

    The requested amount is 50M ADA.
    That is almost 3% of the entire Treasury. At the current ADA price (~$0.9), that equals roughly $45 million.

    Risks:

    • centralized control in the hands of 9 people,
    • vulnerabilities in smart contracts or DeFi protocols,
    • offshore legal structures where funds can easily “disappear,”
    • ADA in this fund will not be staked (constitutional restriction),
    • even partial loss of such an amount would be a serious blow to the Treasury.

    ✅ My Proposal

    The idea is right — deep stablecoin liquidity is necessary for Cardano DeFi growth. But the implementation must be gradual and safe.

    • Start with a pilot phase at 0.25–0.5% of the Treasury (≈4–8M ADA).
    • Define KPIs: reduced slippage, higher trading volume, revenue generation.
    • Require:
      • external audits,
      • transparent reporting,
      • storage of all LP tokens in the smart contract.
    • After 3–6 months of proven success — consider scaling up the budget.

    🗳️ My Vote

    I am voting AGAINST the current version (50M ADA).
    Reason: the amount is excessively large and dangerous for the Treasury in case of mismanagement or abuse.

    My position:

    • I support the idea, but the budget must be significantly smaller.
    • With a reasonable amount, this initiative can benefit the ecosystem without threatening the Treasury.

    📢 My Comment in the Vote

    “I support building stablecoin liquidity on Cardano, but 50M ADA is far too large and risky. I propose starting with a 4–8M ADA pilot and then scaling up if results are positive. Therefore, I vote AGAINST the current amount.”


    🖤 My DRep ID: ➡️ drep1y269ehxj3...2fg2jr
    You can also find me under the name MREDGARCROSS.

    I have registered as a DRep and I am ready to help shape the future of the ecosystem.

  • Yes568K ₳Rationale

    As a dRep, I will vote yes for this 50 million ADA proposal to boost stablecoin liquidity on Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem because enhancing liquidity is critical for creating robust alternatives to legacy financial systems. By seeding DEXs and lending protocols, the proposal fosters user growth and enables higher-yielding DeFi products, driving adoption. The gradual liquidation of ADA through OTC deals minimizes price impact, and I’m confident in the diverse 9-person committee’s ability to manage the fund transparently under tDAO oversight. The 50% stablecoin slippage reduction target is essential for ecosystem stability, and the public goods, like an open-source governance contract and legal framework, make this a valuable learning opportunity for Cardano, justifying the funding.

  • Yes550.1K ₳No rationale
  • No503.6K ₳Rationale

    Firstly, how badly do we need stablecoin liquidity? Very very badly. I must admit, it’s long overdue. Cardano needs this like yesterday… but this current proposal doesn’t do it for me.
    I appreciate what this team is trying to achieve. I think deeper stablecoin liquidity would genuinely help Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem. The people involved seem capable, and honestly I don’t know most of them well enough to have strong opinions either way, which probably helps keep this objective.
    But I’m voting no because this proposal feels like using a sledgehammer to crack a walnut.
    Fifty million ADA is an enormous amount of money… roughly 3% of our entire treasury. That’s a massive bet on experimental DeFi strategies when we haven’t even proven smaller-scale versions work effectively.

    The governance structure worries me too.
    A 9person committee which we have started referring to fondly as the NSWF committee, with reps from Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, IOG, and SNEK basically puts all the major players in charge of a fund larger than most venture capital rounds. The community oversight sounds good on paper, but the actual mechanisms feel theoretical when real decisions need to be made quickly.
    Then there’s the legal complexity of setting up entities across multiple countries, dealing with different regulatory frameworks, and hoping no government decides to freeze community assets because they don’t like crypto that week.
    Furthermore, 4% return target assumes DeFi protocols will consistently generate positive yields, which ignores how quickly things can go sideways in this space. We’ve seen billiondollar protocols collapse overnight.
    What I’d need to see for a YES vote:
    Start smaller. Maybe 10-15 million ADA to prove the concept works. Add real sunset clauses so this doesn’t become a permanent institution. Replace the institutional committee with community members who don’t have conflicts of interest. Include actual insurance or protection mechanisms for when things go wrong.
    Most importantly, show me how this helps regular Cardano users, not just DeFi yield farmers and institutional players.

    While I have serious concerns about the size, complexity, and execution risks of this proposal, I want to acknowledge its ambition. It’s clear the team is thinking long-term about Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem, and the focus on transparency, governance, and stablecoin liquidity is exactly the kind of forward-looking work our community needs.
    Even if I’m voting no for now, I hope the ideas here spark discussions and lead to solutions that strengthen Cardano for everyone.
    The treasury is there to experiment carefully, and with proper safeguards, initiatives like this could help us grow in meaningful ways.

  • Yes501.3K ₳Rationale

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  • Yes479.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes478.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes435.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes393.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes390.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes379.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes379.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes366.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes358.6K ₳Rationale

    I agree with the principals of this but more would be needed and I think this should be just a secondary measure to improve defi. The first and most important step should be to BRING USDC to Cardano!!!!!

  • No356.1K ₳Rationale

    While only 2,261,207 Ada of withdrawals remain in my personal 200m limit for the first year, I still tried my best to consider this budget. I'd like to break down my thought process so that it can be used as a constructive critique to improve the proposed execution of this concept in the future. I do believe liquidity is an issue in our ecosystem, but this proposal itself is not ready yet. I formed a strong argument for both sides, then carefully reasoned to the mode stance for each point and which side of the vote that stance leaned towards. Ultimately, the mode stances averaged out to leaning on the "no" side, so my budget limit wouldn't have mattered.

    Point-by-Point Middle (Mode) Ground Assessment:

    1. Sell Pressure Impact
      Mode Stance: The truth lies between "no impact" and "massive pressure". 32.5M Ada sold over 2-3 months will create some downward pressure, but professional OTC handling can minimize it. The proposal should commit to specific OTC partnerships and maximum daily sale limits. We need guarantees on this, not just best-effort.
      Leans: Slightly against - too vague on execution details for such a large amount.

    2. Revenue Projections
      Mode Stance: 4% is neither terrible nor impressive. It's realistic for risk-adjusted returns but underwhelming for treasury deployment. The 85% reinvestment makes sense for compounding but reduces near-term treasury benefit.
      Leans: Against - treasury funds should generate better returns.

    3. Perpetual Structure & Accountability
      Mode Stance: Perpetual funds can work with proper oversight. The tDAO mechanism is innovative, but the 25% quorum is concerning. A sunset clause (such as mandatory review/renewal every 3 years) would be better.
      Leans: Against - too much permanent control without enough safeguards.

    4. Liquidity Bootstrapping Logic
      Mode Stance: Cardano does have a liquidity problem, and protocol-owned liquidity is superior to mercenary capital. However, $50M might be overkill - $10-20M could test the thesis first.
      Leans: For - the problem is real, but the solution size is debatable.

    5. Committee Composition
      Mode Stance: Having experienced ecosystem players is valuable, but the concentration of founding entities is concerning. A mix of 50% ecosystem veterans and 50% independent members would be better.
      Leans: Slightly against - too much insider concentration for this fund size.

    6. Protocol Selection Process
      Mode Stance: Some discretion is necessary for efficiency, but the criteria should be more explicit. A scoring rubric and public comment period for selections would improve transparency.
      Leans: Against - needs clearer, more objective selection criteria.

    7. Legal Structure
      Mode Stance: Proper legal structure is essential, but $200k seems high and jurisdiction shopping is concerning. A clear legal opinion on the chosen structure should be required before any funds move.
      Leans: Slightly against - too much uncertainty for immediate approval.

    8. Timing
      Mode Stance: There's validity to acting during a potential bull market, but Cardano's DeFi has grown a lot without this intervention.
      Leans: Slightly against - organic growth suggests the urgency doesn't fully justify the risk.

    9. KPIs and Metrics
      Mode Stance: The KPIs exist but are weak. More aggressive targets with consequences for missing them (like fund winddown) would be appropriate.
      Leans: Against - KPIs need strength and consequences.

    Verdict Breakdown:
    Against: 4
    Slightly against: 4
    Slightly for: 0
    For: 1

    Recommended Modifications:
    Reduce to 15-20M Ada - Prove the concept first
    Add sunset clause - 3-year mandatory review/renewal
    Strengthen KPIs - 8% return target with winddown trigger at <4%
    Improve committee diversity - Maximum 1/3 from founding entities
    Create staged deployment - Release funds in 5M Ada tranches based on milestones
    Guarantee OTC execution - Binding commitments from named desks
    Implement lock-up periods - Committee can't withdraw more than 10% monthly for example

    Final Judgment:
    The core idea has merit, but the execution plan is too loose, the amount too large, and the oversight too weak for a maiden voyage of this type. Cardano would be better served by starting with a smaller pilot program (10-15M Ada), proving the model works, then scaling based on demonstrated success.

    Much credit to the proposal's authors for identifying the liquidity challenge and proposing an innovative solution. However, asking for 50M Ada with vague plans, weak oversight, and minimal returns is not responsible treasury management in my opinion. I hope my highly detailed analysis is helpful, I felt this one was deserving of it.