Withdraw 3,810,423 ada for Mithril Protocol

System1mo ago2 posts

162 DReps voted · 50 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote

Open a row to read the rationale.

  • Yes923.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes881.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes861.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes825.2K ₳Rationale

    We support Intersect's budget process. This proposal is part of it.

  • Yes798.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes794.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes747.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes705.1K ₳No rationale
  • Yes625.9K ₳Rationale

    Voting YES. Mithril is live, open-source infrastructure enabling light clients and trustless state verification. Proven team transitioning from IOG to Treasury. Budget opacity and vague scope are real — underlying value isn't in question.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Voting yes. With some real concerns about how this proposal was packaged, concerns that are proportionate to the ask. A ₳3.8M treasury withdrawal deserves more than two budget line items, a volatility policy, visible milestones, and a defined scope of work. Those gaps are genuine, and I expect them to close in future funding rounds.
    They don't change the underlying vote because Mithril's value is already demonstrable. This is working, open-source infrastructure. The repositories are public, the protocol is operational, and the decentralization benefits are already real: light clients can verify Cardano chain state without trusting centralized intermediaries, full nodes sync faster, and exchanges and wallets can operate with substantially lower infrastructure overhead. The proposal asks the Treasury to sustain and continue something that works and is integral to a competitive tech stack.
    Teragone has years of demonstrated Mithril delivery through IOG collaboration. As part of the IOG-to-Treasury transition this is something I want to support because it is structurally correct: as Cardano matures, core protocol infrastructure should sit under community governance rather than single-entity funding. This proposal moves it in that direction.
    The transparency gaps are failures of how the proposal was packaged, not failures of what the proposal is for. I vote yes with the expectation that future Teragone submissions include itemized budgets, a published milestone schedule, an ADA volatility policy, and a defined roadmap for the funded period.

  • Yes619.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes605.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes589.7K ₳Rationale

    Yes for mithril! Supporting withdrawal.

  • Yes587.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes533.9K ₳Rationale

    Light weight client to Cardano is critical. Part of what will put us in the lead for the entire industry.

  • Yes479.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes442.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes431.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes414.2K ₳No rationale
  • No381.1K ₳Rationale

    Even after years, Mithril still only provides snapshots for bootstrapping nodes. That is okayish, but not impressive enough to justify wasting that many ADA on it.

  • No365.7K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain320.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes298.9K ₳Rationale

    Mithril gud

  • Yes294.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
  • Yes270.1K ₳Rationale

    I am voting YES on “Withdraw 3,810,423 ada for Mithril Protocol” because Mithril addresses a real infrastructure gap for Cardano: fast, trustless access to verified chain state without relying on centralized indexers or slow full‑node sync. Stake-based threshold multi‑signatures and succinct state proofs are directly relevant to secure light clients, cross‑chain interoperability, and more practical node and wallet operation as Cardano scales.

    Teragone Factory is a credible delivery team for this work, with several years of direct involvement in Mithril development alongside IO, which reduces ramp‑up risk and provides continuity as funding transitions from IO‑backed to community‑governed via Intersect. The proposal is scoped as a 6‑month maintenance and improvement tranche focused on concrete technical objectives — faster node syncing and trustless verification, IPFS‑based artifact storage, recursive zk‑SNARK proofs to shrink certificate chains, and one‑command SPO onboarding — with measurable KPIs such as reducing onboarding time from 30–60 minutes to roughly 5 minutes and cutting certificate chain size from about 10MB to around 20KB.

    This request is therefore a focused, infrastructure‑oriented maintenance and evolution package for a protocol that is already live and strategically important to Cardano’s resilience and usability.

  • No261K ₳Rationale

    Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

    Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

    My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

    In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

    At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

    Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

    Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

    This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

    Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

    • Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
    • Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
    • Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
    • Lack of credible execution capacity;
    • Structural governance or transparency concerns;
    • Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

    Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

    This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

    Governance Action Review

    My vote is NO due to the insufficient granularity of the budget.

    The proposal requests 3,810,423 ADA, of which 3,699,440 ADA is allocated to the development of the Mithril protocol and 110,983 ADA to the Intersect administration fee. Although the funds are distributed across different deliverables, the proposal does not disclose the team size, roles, seniority levels, rates, working hours, FTE allocations, or the methodology used to calculate the cost of each item. It also does not provide sufficient detail regarding the 220,000 ADA infrastructure expense.

    Without this information, it is not possible to adequately assess the proportionality of the amounts, the cost-effectiveness of the request, or whether the funds are being allocated efficiently. Mithril’s strategic relevance and the team’s technical capability do not replace the obligation to present a verifiable budget for a Treasury withdrawal of this magnitude.

    This rejection is limited to the insufficient financial transparency of this request and does not represent opposition to the Mithril protocol or to the continuation of its development.


    Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

    Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

    Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

    Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

    Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

    Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

    Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

    Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

    Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

    • Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
    • Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
    • Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
    • Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
    • Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
    • Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

    Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

    Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

    Relatório de Ação de Governança

    Meu voto é NÃO devido à insuficiente granularidade do orçamento.

    A proposta solicita 3.810.423 ADA, dos quais 3.699.440 ADA são destinados ao desenvolvimento do protocolo Mithril e 110.983 ADA à taxa de administração da Intersect. Embora os recursos sejam distribuídos entre diferentes entregáveis, não são informados o tamanho da equipe, as funções, senioridades, taxas, cargas horárias, FTEs ou a metodologia utilizada para calcular os custos de cada item. Também não há detalhamento suficiente da despesa de 220.000 ADA com infraestrutura.

    Sem essas informações, não é possível avaliar adequadamente a proporcionalidade dos valores, o custo-benefício da solicitação ou se os recursos estão sendo alocados de maneira eficiente. A relevância estratégica do Mithril e a capacidade técnica da equipe não substituem a obrigação de apresentar um orçamento verificável para uma retirada dessa magnitude.

    A recusa está limitada à insuficiência de transparência financeira desta solicitação e não representa oposição ao protocolo Mithril ou à continuidade de seu desenvolvimento.

  • Yes260.2K ₳No rationale
  • No245.5K ₳Rationale

    Mithril's security depends on signers like me contributing stake weight for free, and if the infrastructure that produces the protocol's actual guarantee is expected to run on goodwill, the same standard should apply to the open-source code contribution. There's nothing wrong with goodwill, collaborative work that improves the developer experience across the ecosystem - a lot of Cardano runs on exactly that. But the standard has to be consistent for everyone. Paying one side of the effort while the other side (the side that makes the protocol function at all) is expected to volunteer their time and expensive infrastructure creates an asymmetry I can't endorse with treasury funds. This isn't a judgment on Mithril's value or the team's work, it's that the funding model singles out code maintenance for payment while treating the equally essential signer network as free.

  • No238.8K ₳Rationale
    • Treasury runway is shrinking rapidly and must be protected. The 350M ADA 2026-27 NCL already risks ~21% drawdown. Aggressive prior spending + ADA weakness demands selectivity to avoid depletion before real adoption.
    • Infrastructure is important, but it is not the primary bottleneck. Cardano's core tech is solid. The ecosystem stalls on adoption, liquidity, developer experience, and compelling use cases (DeFi, RWAs, revenue-generating apps). Broad infrastructure funding without adoption KPIs won't drive organic ADA demand.
    • Hoskinson's concerns deserve respect, but governance requires balance. Core maintenance matters for competitiveness. DRep duty is long-term sustainability: not unlimited spending. Past allocations often failed to yield proportional TVL/users/ADA utility. Prioritize evidence-based proposals.
    • Better capital allocation strategy: Favor high-leverage use-case initiatives, especially RWAs and revenue generating applications that commit to direct revenue or ADA return mechanisms back to the treasury, with clear milestones, private co-funding, and proven traction. Target specific tech unlocks only when tightly tied to measurable adoption impact. This builds real value without creating dependency.
  • Yes234.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes232.7K ₳No rationale
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  • Yes196.1K ₳No rationale
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  • No50.5K ₳No rationale