Cardano Constitution to Replace the Interim Constitution
341 DReps voted · 57 with a rationale · 11 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes435.8M ₳Rationale
The new Constitution clarifies rules, prevents arbitrary interpretation, and strengthens financial protections. Rejecting it risks costly reconstitution, making approval reasonable.
新憲法は明確化により恣意的解釈を防ぎ、財務保護を強化します。承認しない場合、高コストの再制定が必要となるため、承認が妥当です。For details, including an analysis of differences between the Interim and Draft Constitutions, see:
暫定憲法とドラフト憲法の差異分析を含む詳細は以下を確認してください。https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Cn-z715DcgxrDfpm5Ipb8S_G2hj_BDPBj4NnUGz73S0/edit?usp=sharing
- Yes254.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes222.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain174.6M ₳Rationale
- Yes120.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes91.5M ₳Rationale
- Yes88.6M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted86M ₳Rationale
SIPO Votes in Favor of the New Constitution as a DRep!
Cardano stands at a historic turning point. This Constitution is the foundation for true decentralization and financial freedom.
SIPO supports this step toward involving 3 billion people and fostering a sustainable, resilient, and inclusive economy.
Governance must be safe, transparent, and adaptive. This living document ensures future growth, trust, and innovation.
Now is the time to shape Cardano’s future!
Earlier votes
Yes1y agoSuperseded
- Yes84.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes77.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes76.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes75.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes74.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes73.1M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted69.4M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, i have voted ✅YES on the current proposal to enact and ratify the DELEGATE ENDORSED CARDANO CONSTITUTION. We may not be 100% there, but this version of the constitution is pretty damn good imo. We can always debate on small tweaks and updates in the future to have a V2 constitution, and than a V3 consitution, etc. But i don't see a blocker in this one atm..
Earlier votes
Yes1y agoSuperseded
- Yes66M ₳No rationale
- Yes62.7M ₳Rationale
Now that we have moved into the era of on-chain governance and the Cardano blockchain is in the hands of the community, it's time to move forward with the constitution. I vote yes to removing the interim constitution and replacing it with the latest Cardano Constitution detailed in the Governance Action.
Some are unhappy with how it works and its details, but there is room for improvements, amendments and growth for the ecosystem and ADA holders.
Let's take the next step forward.
Regards
PB - Yes50.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting on the governance action “Cardano Constitution to Replace the Interim Constitution.” The proposed constitution in this governance action considers the security of the Cardano network and is expected to address many governance issues in the interim constitution. It is desirable for the current interim constitution to be revised into the new constitution proposed in this action. However, the new constitution in this proposal is not perfect. It is important to continue monitoring its implementation and engaging in discussions to explore and develop an even better constitution in the future.
- Yes50M ₳Rationale
Despite the fact that this Cardano Constitution is still far from perfect, it is definitely sufficient to move forward. So, I have decided to vote Yes
- Yes49.5M ₳No rationale
- No48.6M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Constitution, despite its forward-thinking intentions for decentralized governance, raises significant concerns about the safety and oversight of the Cardano Blockchain treasury. While the Constitution establishes a framework for on-chain governance, it does not include adequate guardrails to prevent misuse, mismanagement, or corruption of the treasury, which is a crucial concern in any blockchain ecosystem. Let’s take a closer look at the issues surrounding the Cardano Treasury and the lack of effective protections.
- Weak Oversight on Treasury Withdrawals (TREASURY-01 to TREASURY-04)
The most glaring issue in the Constitution lies in its handling of Treasury Withdrawal actions. The Constitution specifies that any net change limit on the treasury's balance must be agreed upon by DReps (Delegated Representatives) through a governance action (TREASURY-01a), but this is far from a safeguard. There are several issues with this approach:
Vague Governance Thresholds: The Constitution leaves the approval of treasury changes to an on-chain governance vote by DReps. While the threshold for approval is set at 50% of the active voting stake, this presents a potential for centralization. If the voting pool is manipulated or controlled by a few large stakeholders or entities, they could unilaterally decide how the treasury funds are allocated, leading to conflicts of interest or potential corruption. Without stricter rules to prevent the undue influence of a few powerful players, the treasury could easily become a tool for personal or factional gain.
Lack of Specificity on Treasury Spending: The Constitution allows for the possibility of treasury withdrawals to be denominated in Ada (TREASURY-03a), which is standard, but it lacks more specific guidelines on how funds are to be allocated. The absence of clear, transparent spending criteria opens the door to poorly justified or even fraudulent expenditures.
Insufficient Pre-Withdrawal Scrutiny: According to TREASURY-04a, treasury withdrawals are only permissible once there is an approved ecosystem budget, yet this "budget" could be as vague as the governance actions themselves. This creates an unnecessary layer of ambiguity, making it harder for stakeholders to track the movement of funds or to know if treasury withdrawals align with the Cardano blockchain’s long-term goals. The lack of stringent oversight means there is a potential for funds to be allocated to initiatives that serve the interests of the few, rather than the community at large. - No Mechanisms to Prevent Treasury Mismanagement or Corruption
The Cardano Treasury is essentially the lifeblood of the ecosystem’s development and growth. However, the Constitution falls short in providing sufficient safeguards to prevent corruption, fraud, or simple mismanagement. Here are a few critical concerns:
Potential for Conflict of Interest: Since treasury management can be influenced by DReps or other governing bodies, there is a risk of conflict of interest. DReps, especially those who are heavily invested in the ecosystem or who may have alliances with specific development projects, could prioritize personal or group interests over the interests of the broader Cardano community. Without a system of independent checks and balances—such as independent audits or decentralized oversight—there is little preventing these entities from using the treasury for their own benefit.
No Protection Against Fraudulent or Misleading Proposals: While the Constitution requires treasury withdrawals to be tied to an approved budget, it does not outline how fraudulent or misleading proposals are to be detected and prevented. There is no mention of auditing mechanisms, third-party reviews, or community accountability mechanisms that would ensure proposed projects have proper oversight before being funded. This leaves room for individuals or entities to create false narratives around certain initiatives, directing funds toward nonviable projects, or worse, diverting funds for personal gain.
Treasury Withdrawal Caps Are Too Lenient: The TREASURY-01a guideline, which mandates a net change limit agreed upon by the DReps, could be a source of great vulnerability. The Constitution's wording leaves this decision too open to the discretion of DReps, and the 50% voting threshold isn’t enough to deter the influence of large stakeholders who may push for excessive withdrawals or allocations. A stronger cap on how much can be withdrawn at any given time, with more robust accountability mechanisms in place, would create better safeguards against reckless spending. - Lack of Transparency in Treasury Actions
One of the key pillars of decentralized governance is transparency, especially when it comes to the handling of public funds. The Cardano Constitution falls short in this regard:
Opaque Treasury Management: While TREASURY-03a specifies that withdrawals must be denominated in Ada, it says little about how treasury management will be communicated to the broader community. How are the public to know that the funds are being allocated in an equitable and responsible manner? There is no clear roadmap for community members to review treasury decisions, track fund allocation, or participate in discussions about how the funds should be used. This lack of visibility invites suspicions of backroom deals or secretive funding decisions.
No Public Disclosure of Entities Receiving Treasury Funds: The Constitution fails to address the lack of public disclosure about which entities or individuals are receiving treasury funds. Without mandated public transparency for all recipients of treasury funding, it becomes far too easy for funds to flow to projects or organizations with close ties to decision-makers or even entities that do not fully represent the interests of the broader community. Public disclosure of who receives treasury funds is a basic form of accountability that is crucial in preventing favoritism, corruption, or misappropriation of resources. The absence of such a provision in the Constitution signals a major oversight in terms of safeguarding the treasury from potential misuse.
No Clear Roadmap for Transparency Mechanisms: The Constitution provides no detail on the process for tracking treasury withdrawals after approval, nor how public stakeholders can challenge or provide input on treasury spending. A transparent, community-driven platform for tracking the spending of treasury funds, perhaps akin to a public ledger or open-source project for Cardano treasury activities, would help to bolster confidence in the system and reduce fears of corruption. Without such mechanisms in place, the system risks creating an us-vs-them mentality, where community members feel left out of the decision-making process.
Conclusion: A Call for Stronger Treasury Protections
While the Cardano Constitution represents an ambitious attempt to create a decentralized governance framework for the blockchain ecosystem, it lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent mismanagement, corruption, and poor oversight of the treasury. In its current form, it opens the door for significant risks to the Cardano community’s financial resources, allowing for undue influence by powerful stakeholders, ambiguous withdrawal processes, and lack of transparency in treasury management.
While the Constitution sets forth a number of Guardrails to protect the Cardano Blockchain from technical failure, it fails to apply a similar level of protection to the treasury. Without clearly defined repercussions for those who misuse the treasury, there is little incentive to ensure that funds are used ethically and responsibly.
If the Cardano community is to truly thrive in a decentralized environment, it is essential that the Constitution be amended to include stronger guardrails and accountability measures around treasury management. Until such amendments are made, stakeholders should carefully reconsider supporting this Constitution in its present form, as it does not sufficiently protect the Cardano Blockchain Treasury from the risks of corruption and misallocation of funds. - Weak Oversight on Treasury Withdrawals (TREASURY-01 to TREASURY-04)
- Yes47.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes42.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes40.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes38.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes37.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes34.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes34.3M ₳Rationale
We believe the new Constitution is significantly better than the Interim Constitution in both content and process, which led to our "yes" vote. The discussion had 10 participants, resulting in 6 yes votes, 4 abstentions, and 0 no votes.
- Yes33.5M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES to approve the Cardano Constitution because it reflects the will of the delegates who participated at the Constitutional Convention in Argentina, representing a significant step forward in Cardano's governance. While there are aspects I personally disagree with, compromise is essential in any governance process. This constitution provides a strong foundation, and importantly, it allows for future amendments to refine and improve it over time. Moving forward with this document is the right decision to ensure progress while maintaining the ability to adapt as the ecosystem evolves.
- Yes31.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes30.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
After having participated in numerous Cardano Constitution discussions and reading various different drafts, as well as analyzing the current concerns about proposal & discussion availability on GovTools, I have decided to vote yes on the delegate-approved Constitution. I still think that the Constitution and the platforms/tools that inform delegators need some work, but this draft is still a major step up from the Interim Constitution that is in place. It is also worth noting that the Interim Constitution might REQUIRE this delegate-approved draft to be in place before other drafts can be proposed. For these reasons, I am voting yes.
- Yes27.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes25.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain23.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes22M ₳Rationale
I total agree and will vote Yes for this GA. The Cardano community has long awaited an official constitution. After more than two years of discussions, both online and offline, across various levels and countries, this constitution has been carefully considered and truly reflects the collective spirit of the community.
- Yes21.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes21.5M ₳Rationale
I have decided to vote YES in favour of replacing the Interim Constitution with the delegate-endorsed Cardano Constitution. However, I do so after much deliberation and with some reservations regarding the processes by which we have arrived here and considering the future.
Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the hard work and dedication of all Delegates, Alternates and Constitutional workshop attendees who have passionately fought to have their voices, and those of whom they represented, heard in this Constitution. Often in the face of some serious “shepherding” of the conversations.
Secondly, a thank you to community-built tools such as cgov.app by MadOrkestra who worked up to the eleventh hour in order to ensure that community members could be heard when they may have not been able to attend in-person events. The passion of the Cardano Community is one of its’ greatest strengths and will be a decisive factor in the success or failure of this ecosystem.
The delegate-endorsed Constitution is an improvement on the currently implemented Interim Constitution, both in terms of content and validity, given that no community-wide vote was held regarding the initial implementation of the Interim Constitution.
Given that the passing of this Constitution also opens the door to the potential ratification of future New Constitution, Update Constitutional Committee and Motion of No Confidence governance actions as per Interim Constitution Guardrail INTERIM-04, the current distribution of DRep delegation should be considered.
I feel that greater education efforts are required here. Simply telling ADA holders to “pick a DRep or Auto-Abstain” in order to withdraw their rewards without educating them on the impact of “Auto-Abstain” on the voting process has thus far been somewhat irresponsible. We now have almost 70% of all voting-registered stake addresses accounting for 50% of all DRep-delegated stake not participating in governance thanks to this current approach. At this moment in time, a minimum of 26 DReps could reach a 67% threshold and the fact that one of those DReps currently has a 12% thumb on the scale is a cause for concern. Thankfully, the tricameral model of Cardano governance means that SPOs should be able to mitigate any potential issues from outsized bad actors attempting to take advantage of the current levels of distribution.
- Yes21.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes19.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes18.2M ₳No rationale