Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 647 to 649.
172 DReps voted · 72 with a rationale · 8 changed their vote · 4 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 7 to yes, 1 to no, together voting with 222.2M ₳ of voting power.
Voting concentration
8 of 172 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 12.5%, top 5 combined 40.0% of 4.6B ₳ voted.
- Yes107.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes95.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes95.5K ₳No rationale
- No90.6K ₳Rationale
Governance Action Review Report - Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)
1. Introduction
This Info Action seeks DRep agreement on a new Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada for the Cardano Treasury, covering the period from the beginning of Epoch 613, on February 13, 2026, through the end of Epoch 713, on or about July 3, 2027. It supersedes the previously agreed limit of 350,000,000 ada for the same period.
The limit caps the cumulative amount removed from the Treasury through enacted Treasury Withdrawals recorded on the Cardano ledger. Withdrawals already debited since Epoch 613 count toward the new limit, while Treasury inflows, refunds, returns of Treasury-funded amounts, and proposed or unratified withdrawals do not affect the calculation.
As an Info Action, it has no direct on-chain effect and does not authorize any Treasury Withdrawal. It records DRep agreement on the fiscal limit applicable to the period if Yes votes exceed 50% of active voting stake. Individual Treasury Withdrawals would continue to require separate approval.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Negative aspects
The existence of a Net Change Limit as a fiscal control mechanism is not, by itself, the problem. The objection remains directed at how the NCL has been defined in isolation, without a strategic budget capable of guiding the use of Treasury resources. To date, no minimally clear framework has been established for priorities, indicative allocations by category, investment diversification, or containment of resource concentration and bundling. These deficiencies already supported the opposing position on previous NCL actions and remain unanswered.
The new Governance Action aggravates this concern. The current NCL of 350 million ada was established to cover a period of 100 epochs, between Epochs 613 and 713. However, well before the end of that horizon, its expansion to 500 million ada is already being proposed, an increase of approximately 42.9%. The justification presented is that the available room under the current limit is becoming constrained, but that constraint should produce greater prioritization, discipline, and selection among Treasury Withdrawals.
The expansion also occurs without a coherent strategy having been presented for distributing the additional resources. There is no indication of how much should be allocated to infrastructure, adoption, research, development, liquidity, education, governance, or other priorities. Nor is there an evaluation of the concentration already observed in certain categories and organizations. Fiscal space is therefore increased without correcting the fragmented process through which withdrawals are assessed individually, frequently without a consolidated view of the ecosystem’s needs.
The action does not present a clear fiscal position on the desired relationship between Treasury inflows and outflows, preservation of the balance, runway, or a sustainable drawdown rate. By significantly increasing the NCL before the end of the original period, without a strategic budget or broader fiscal justification, the use of the Treasury becomes progressively more distant from the replenishment of ada into it.
Risks and concerns
When a limit is expanded as soon as it begins restricting new withdrawals, its function as a fiscal guardrail is weakened. The problem lies not only in the value of 500 million ada, but also in the precedent of treating the NCL as an adjustable parameter whenever the remaining room becomes insufficient to accommodate new demands. This reduces planning predictability and weakens confidence that agreed limits will actually be respected throughout the period for which they were established.
The fact that the proposer is associated with the submission of a 120 million ada Treasury Withdrawal for AlphaGrowth also weighs negatively. That withdrawal would not fit within the available room under the current NCL. The presentation of a higher NCL by an actor directly interested in a large withdrawal creates a problematic structural incentive. It is not necessary to attribute bad faith or prove improper intent to recognize that this practice compromises the perception of the guardrail’s independence and establishes an inappropriate institutional precedent.
Large withdrawals should not generate pressure for the fiscal limit to be increased until they can be accommodated. The process should operate in the opposite direction: proposals should compete within a previously defined fiscal horizon, requiring DReps to establish priorities and reject less essential or less competitive initiatives.
Otherwise, a cycle is formed in which new proposals increase pressure on the ceiling, the ceiling is expanded to accommodate them, and the additional room is consumed again without the planning deficiencies being corrected. This increases the risk that Treasury use will follow a trajectory determined primarily by the immediate pressure of available proposals.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The central question is not how the 500 million ada will be accounted for, but why the ecosystem should expand an existing limit before establishing a coherent allocation strategy and without demonstrating the capacity to respect the previously agreed fiscal horizon.
The position therefore remains NO. As long as the NCL continues to be proposed in isolation, without a strategic budget containing at least minimally defined priorities and allocations, there will be insufficient basis to support it.
In this specific action, the early expansion of the ceiling makes the objection stronger than in previous proposals. The current limit was established for 100 epochs but is already being increased by approximately 42.9% because its remaining room is becoming constrained. That constraint should instead require prioritization and competition among withdrawals.
The direct relationship between the proposer and a 120 million ada withdrawal that depends on greater fiscal space further strengthens the objection. A fiscal guardrail should constrain proposals rather than be adjusted to accommodate them. Support would require the NCL to be accompanied by a strategic budget with priorities and allocations at least minimally delineated.
4. Conclusion
The NCL is being expanded before the end of its agreed horizon, without a strategic allocation framework or a broader fiscal position on Treasury sustainability. Combined with the proposer’s relationship to a 120 million ada withdrawal requiring additional fiscal space, this weakens the guardrail and supports a NO vote.
Relatório de Revisçao de Ação de Governança [PT]
1. Introdução
Esta Info Action busca o acordo dos DReps sobre um novo Net Change Limit de 500.000.000 de ada para o Tesouro da Cardano, abrangendo o período entre o início da Epoch 613, em 13 de fevereiro de 2026, e o encerramento da Epoch 713, por volta de 3 de julho de 2027. O novo limite substitui o valor de 350.000.000 de ada anteriormente acordado para o mesmo período.
O limite restringe o valor acumulado removido do Tesouro por meio de Treasury Withdrawals aprovadas e registradas no ledger da Cardano. As retiradas já debitadas desde a Epoch 613 são contabilizadas no novo limite, enquanto entradas no Tesouro, reembolsos, devoluções de recursos financiados pelo Tesouro e retiradas propostas ou ainda não ratificadas não afetam o cálculo.
Por ser uma Info Action, não produz efeito on-chain direto nem autoriza qualquer Treasury Withdrawal. Registra o acordo dos DReps sobre o limite fiscal aplicável ao período caso os votos favoráveis ultrapassem 50% do stake de votação ativo. Cada Treasury Withdrawal continuaria dependendo de aprovação separada.
2. Análise da Governance Action
Aspectos negativos
A existência de um Net Change Limit como mecanismo de controle fiscal não é, por si só, o problema. A objeção permanece direcionada à forma como o NCL vem sendo definido isoladamente, sem um budget estratégico capaz de orientar o uso dos recursos do Tesouro. Até o momento, não foi estabelecido um framework minimamente claro de prioridades, alocações indicativas por categorias, diversificação dos investimentos ou contenção da concentração de recursos e do bundling. Essas deficiências já fundamentavam a posição contrária às ações anteriores de NCL e continuam sem resposta.
A nova Governance Action agrava essa preocupação. O NCL vigente de 350 milhões de ada foi estabelecido para cobrir um período de 100 epochs, entre as Epochs 613 e 713. No entanto, muito antes do encerramento desse horizonte, já se propõe sua ampliação para 500 milhões de ada, um aumento de aproximadamente 42,9%. A justificativa apresentada é que o espaço disponível sob o limite atual está ficando restrito, mas essa restrição deveria justamente produzir maior priorização, disciplina e seleção entre as Treasury Withdrawals.
A ampliação também ocorre sem que tenha sido apresentada uma estratégia coerente sobre como os recursos adicionais seriam distribuídos. Não há indicação de quanto deveria ser destinado a infraestrutura, adoção, pesquisa, desenvolvimento, liquidez, educação, governança ou outras prioridades. Tampouco há uma avaliação sobre a concentração já observada em determinadas categorias e organizações. Assim, aumenta-se o espaço fiscal sem corrigir o processo fragmentado pelo qual as retiradas são avaliadas individualmente, frequentemente sem uma visão consolidada das necessidades do ecossistema.
A ação não apresenta uma postura fiscal clara sobre a relação desejada entre entradas e saídas do Tesouro, preservação do saldo, runway ou ritmo sustentável de drawdown. Ao elevar o NCL de forma significativa antes do encerramento do período original, sem um budget estratégico ou uma justificativa fiscal mais ampla, o uso do Tesouro distancia-se progressivamente da reposição de ada.
Riscos e preocupações
Quando um limite é ampliado assim que começa a restringir novas retiradas, sua função como guardrail fiscal é enfraquecida. O problema não está apenas no valor de 500 milhões de ada, mas no precedente de tratar o NCL como um parâmetro ajustável sempre que o espaço restante se torna insuficiente para acomodar novas demandas. Isso reduz a previsibilidade do planejamento e enfraquece a confiança de que os limites acordados serão efetivamente respeitados durante o período para o qual foram definidos.
Também pesa negativamente o fato de o próprio proposer estar associado à submissão de uma Treasury Withdrawal de 120 milhões de ada para a AlphaGrowth. Essa retirada não caberia no espaço disponível sob o NCL vigente. A apresentação de um NCL maior por um ator diretamente interessado em uma retirada de grande porte cria um incentivo estrutural problemático. Não é necessário atribuir má-fé ou provar uma intenção imprópria para reconhecer que essa prática compromete a percepção de independência do guardrail e estabelece um precedente institucional inadequado.
Grandes retiradas não deveriam gerar pressão para que o limite fiscal seja ampliado até que possam ser acomodadas. O processo deveria funcionar no sentido inverso: as propostas deveriam competir dentro de um horizonte fiscal previamente definido, obrigando os DReps a estabelecer prioridades e rejeitar iniciativas menos essenciais ou menos competitivas.
Caso contrário, forma-se um ciclo no qual novas propostas aumentam a pressão sobre o teto, o teto é ampliado para acomodá-las e o espaço adicional é novamente consumido sem que as deficiências de planejamento sejam corrigidas. Isso aumenta o risco de que o uso do Tesouro siga uma trajetória determinada principalmente pela pressão imediata das propostas disponíveis.
3. Voto e Fundamentação
Voto: NÃO
A questão central não é como os 500 milhões de ada serão contabilizados, mas por que o ecossistema deveria ampliar um limite vigente sem antes estabelecer uma estratégia coerente de alocação e sem demonstrar capacidade de respeitar o horizonte fiscal previamente acordado.
Por essas razões, a posição permanece NÃO. Enquanto o NCL continuar sendo proposto isoladamente, sem um budget estratégico com prioridades e alocações minimamente delineadas, não haverá base suficiente para apoiá-lo.
Nesta ação específica, a expansão antecipada do teto torna a objeção ainda mais forte do que nas propostas anteriores. O limite vigente foi estabelecido para 100 epochs, mas já está sendo ampliado em aproximadamente 42,9% porque o espaço restante está ficando restrito. Essa restrição deveria, em vez disso, exigir priorização e competição entre as retiradas.
A relação direta entre o proposer e uma retirada de 120 milhões de ada que depende de maior espaço fiscal reforça ainda mais a objeção. Um guardrail fiscal deveria restringir as propostas, e não ser ajustado para acomodá-las. O apoio exigiria que o NCL fosse acompanhado de um budget estratégico com prioridades e alocações minimamente delineadas.
4. Conclusão
O NCL está sendo ampliado antes do encerramento do horizonte acordado, sem um framework estratégico de alocação ou uma postura fiscal mais ampla sobre a sustentabilidade do Tesouro. Combinado à relação do proposer com uma retirada de 120 milhões de ada que exige espaço fiscal adicional, isso enfraquece o guardrail e fundamenta o voto NÃO.
- No74.5K ₳Rationale
NO. I do not support increasing the Net Change Limit from 350M ADA to 500M ADA. The proposal does not provide sufficient evidence that the current limit has become a genuine constraint or that such a significant increase is necessary. Any adjustment to this fiscal guardrail should be supported by transparent data, demonstrated funding demand, and a clear impact assessment rather than assumptions or market conditions.
- No65.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes63.1K ₳No rationale
- No62.7K ₳Rationale
Hell no.
- YesRevoted56.4K ₳Rationale
We have come to an impasse where the line between necessity / needs and overspending on wants is now coming into light. Not to denigrate the magnificent and diligent work done by all the great TEAMS and developers within CARDANO but It is now more apparent than ever that a spending problem exists within the ecosystem. Each project has a viable reason to request funds but some are more visibly required than others Ie: Infrastructure to maintain NODE production over a marketing booth for a single crypto friendly event , while some teams threaten to shutdown and or leave the ecosystem with a known history of creating useable products for the community. I cannot in my right conscious vote to add an additional 150 M $ADA to the NCL without voicing this observation of the current treasury hemorrhage we are experiencing from multiple projects that are deeming themselves as more integral to the Protocol operation as the next. We must find a suitable way to control the treasury drain before we doom the Ecosystem to the same fates as Polkadot, Tezos, and other Blockchains that enacted governance and failed to grow. The treasury must be used at this time to facilitate growth and stability but the amount of projects requesting funding is too great, a treasury proposal withdrawal amount limit maximum per request may be an option but it is not my place to demand action upon this idea. I find value in growth and see the additional 150M $ADA at current pricing allowable but future NCL limit increase proposals shall receive a negative Vote from me until a positive inflow to the treasury is established. The NCL narrative has come nearly full circle from original NCL proposal to set the limit to 275M $ADA, we are slowly creeping closer to that too large a sum of NCL conversation and we have now witnessed the need for a sustainable treasury. I hereby publicly and reluctantly vote YES for this proposal for the sake of growth in my ecosystem of choice and community ~Lourde Ouroborus Imperator Aeternalis ~ (Amended due to Orig. NCL amount error)
Earlier votes
Yes1mo agoSuperseded
We have come to an impasse where the line between necessity / needs and overspending on wants is now coming into light. Not to denigrate the magnificent and diligent work done by all the great TEAMS and developers within CARDANO but It is now more apparent than ever that a spending problem exists within the ecosystem. Each project has a viable reason to request funds but some are more visibly required than others Ie: Infrastructure to maintain NODE production over a marketing booth for a single crypto friendly event , while some teams threaten to shutdown and or leave the ecosystem with a known history of creating useable products for the community. I cannot in my right conscious vote to add an additional 150 M $ADA to the NCL without voicing this observation of the current treasury hemorrhage we are experiencing from multiple projects that are deeming themselves as more integral to the Protocol operation as the next. We must find a suitable way to control the treasury drain before we doom the Ecosystem to the same fates as Polkadot, Tezos, and other Blockchains that enacted governance and failed to grow. The treasury must be used at this time to facilitate growth and stability but the amount of projects requesting funding is too great, a treasury proposal withdrawal amount limit maximum per request may be an option but it is not my place to demand action upon this idea. I find value in growth and see the additional 150M $ADA at current pricing allowable but future NCL limit increase proposals shall receive a negative Vote from me until a positive inflow to the treasury is established. The NCL narrative has come nearly full circle from original NCL proposal to set the limit to 550M $ADA , we are slowly creeping closer to that NCL and we have now witnessed the need for a sustainable treasury. I hereby publicly and reluctantly vote YES for this proposal for the sake of growth in my ecosystem of choice and community ~Lourde Ouroborus Imperator Aeternalis ~
- No56.1K ₳No rationale
- No48K ₳No rationale
- No45.3K ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted31.8K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes2mo agoSuperseded
- No19.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes15.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes9.2K ₳No rationale
- No6.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes4.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes3.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes688.8 ₳No rationale
- Abstain293.8 ₳No rationale
- Yes0 ₳No rationale