Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)

System4mo ago5 posts

172 DReps voted · 72 with a rationale · 8 changed their vote · 4 re-voted unchanged

Open a row to read the rationale.

Changed votes: 7 to yes, 1 to no, together voting with 222.2M ₳ of voting power.

Voting concentration

8 of 172 DReps cast half of the voted power.

Largest voter 12.5%, top 5 combined 40.0% of 4.6B ₳ voted.

  • Yes3.9M ₳Rationale

    [Portuguese]
    Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança "Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613–713)" (gov_action15at...hakceq), pois entendemos que a atualização do Net Change Limit para 500 milhões de ADA estabelece um limite de movimentação do Tesouro compatível com as necessidades atuais da governança, preservando a capacidade de financiar iniciativas estratégicas para o ecossistema sem representar uma autorização automática de gastos. Também avaliamos positivamente a relação entre custo e benefício da proposta, uma vez que ela apenas amplia o teto máximo disponível para movimentação, mantendo cada retirada do Tesouro sujeita à análise, deliberação e aprovação individual dos DReps por meio de ações de governança específicas. Além disso, a metodologia de contabilização apresentada é clara e objetiva, considerando apenas valores efetivamente registrados on-chain e incluindo as retiradas já realizadas no período de vigência, o que fortalece a previsibilidade orçamentária, a transparência, a rastreabilidade e o controle sobre a utilização dos recursos comunitários.
    [English]
    We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action "Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613–713)" (gov_action15at...hakceq), because we believe updating the Net Change Limit to 500 million ADA establishes a Treasury spending ceiling that is appropriate for the current needs of Cardano’s governance while preserving the ecosystem’s ability to fund strategic initiatives without constituting automatic authorization for Treasury expenditures. We also believe the proposal presents a sound cost-benefit profile because it only increases the maximum amount that may be withdrawn, while preserving the requirement that every individual Treasury withdrawal must still be reviewed and approved separately by DReps through dedicated governance actions. Furthermore, the proposed accounting methodology is clear and transparent, considering only amounts actually recorded on-chain and including withdrawals already executed during the applicable period. This approach strengthens budget predictability, accountability, transparency, and the traceability of community funds.

  • Abstain215.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes343K ₳No rationale
  • Yes35.1M ₳Rationale

    Vote: Yes. This Info Action replaces the existing 350 million ADA Net Change Limit with a 500 million ADA limit for Epochs 613 through 713. It does not authorize any treasury withdrawal.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    The Net Change Limit is a fiscal guardrail, not a budget and not an instruction to spend. Raising it does not approve AlphaGrowth or any other treasury proposal. Every withdrawal must still receive its own DRep support and satisfy the constitutional requirements for administration, oversight, custody, and reporting.
    The existing limit is becoming a barrier to considering serious commercial investments through July 2027. An NCL should protect the treasury from uncontrolled spending, but it should not reject future proposals before DReps can examine their merits.
    The risk is that additional capacity may encourage weaker proposals or create political pressure to use the full allowance. I accept that risk because DReps retain full authority to reject every withdrawal. The 500 million ADA limit remains a fixed ceiling, and withdrawals already made during the period count toward it.
    The treasury exists to protect and advance Cardano. A full treasury attached to a commercially irrelevant network would not be a successful outcome. Cardano must retain the ability to fund credible growth while there is still time for that funding to matter.
    I vote Yes.

  • Yes5.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes993.4K ₳No rationale
  • Yes228.7M ₳Rationale

    A few months ago the Cardano community set the NCL to 350m ADA. A lot got funded.

    Increasing the NCL to unsustainable amounts must not be the norm and can't be done every year, but we don't want to block AG through not voting YES in the increased NCL.

    We will look into the AG proposal next week.

  • Yes213K ₳No rationale
  • Yes4.3M ₳No rationale
  • No474.2K ₳Rationale

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  • Yes72.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes927.9K ₳Rationale

    We need additional flexibility regarding how the budget will be used, reviewed the video posted by Crypto Dossier on Aug 2, 2026 and I agree with him that we need to invest in Cardano more.

  • Yes13K ₳No rationale
  • YesChanged30.8M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    No3mo agoSuperseded

  • No142.7K ₳Rationale

    Net Change Limit Increase (350M → 500M ada) — Voting Rationale

    Governance Voting Rationale
    GAID gov_action15at...hakceq
    Title Agreement of a New Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada for Epochs 613–713
    Type of GA Info action (Net Change Limit agreement, TREASURY-01a)
    Date submitted Epoch 640 (Jul 2, 2026)
    Expiration Date Epoch 647 (Aug 2, 2026)

    Contents

    1.0 Introduction {#1.0-introduction}

    1.1 Summary {#1.1-summary}

    We are voting NO on this governance action to raise the Net Change Limit from 350,000,000 to 500,000,000 ada for the period covering Epochs 613 through 713.

    The reasoning is not a complaint about the number. A per-period ceiling on treasury outflows is meant to be adjustable, and there is nothing objectionable in adjusting it. The objection is about sequence and about what this particular adjustment is being asked to do. A specific treasury withdrawal — Cardano PRIME, 120,000,000 ada, to be executed by AlphaGrowth — is before DReps in the very same window, and this ceiling increase is sized and timed to make room for it. That places the spend ahead of the constraint, which inverts the one relationship a spending ceiling exists to hold: the constraint is supposed to be set first, and the spending fitted underneath it, not the other way around.

    Two independent lines of reasoning arrive at the same place. The first is the sequence itself. The second is a question of even-handedness about a shared resource: a ceiling redrawn specifically to accommodate a withdrawal that carries a private profit is the shared constraint bending to fit a private claim — and a rule that lets the ceiling rise whenever a withdrawal needs room is not really a ceiling at all. That these two lines of reasoning, which start from quite different places, meet at the same conclusion is what gives this DRep confidence in the vote.

    1.2 Description of Governance Action {#1.2-description-of-governance-action}

    This is an Info action under TREASURY-01a, drafted under Constitution v2.4, agreeing a Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada for the period beginning at the start of Epoch 613 and ending at the close of Epoch 713. It states that it supersedes the existing 350,000,000 ada limit for that same period, and that withdrawals already debited count toward the new cap.

    Its operative clause is the one that matters here: it directs that a Treasury Withdrawals action which has not yet been ratified or enacted when this new limit is agreed is to be assessed under this new limit, rather than under any prior limit. Its counterpart action, the Cardano PRIME withdrawal, carries the mirror of that clause — it is written to be conditional on a Net Change Limit having been agreed with enough remaining capacity to cover the 120,000,000 ada withdrawal in full at the moment of enactment. Each action, in other words, is drafted to point at the other. This rationale addresses the ceiling; a companion rationale addresses the Cardano PRIME withdrawal directly.

    2.0 Discussion {#2.0-discussion}

    2.1 Why these two actions have to be read together {#2.1-why-these-two-actions-have-to-be-read-together}

    Read entirely on its own, a change to a net-change limit is an unremarkable piece of fiscal tuning, and this DRep would treat it as such. But this limit is not being set on its own, and four features make that plain. The two actions share a proposer. The ceiling increase is sized to accommodate a specific 120,000,000 ada withdrawal within the period's remaining capacity. Approval of that withdrawal is being sought before the ceiling that is supposed to authorize it exists. And each action's text reaches for the other to complete itself. Taken together, these are not two separate decisions that happen to fall in the same window; they are one arrangement presented as two votes.

    Once the pairing is in view, the durable problem comes into focus, and it is not the number. A number in a limit is easy to change back — a later vote can lower it again. The precedent is not so easily undone. Once a ceiling has been fitted to a specific spend, and that spend enacted beneath it, the demonstration that the ceiling will yield when a large withdrawal needs the room is on the public record. That demonstration is the thing that does not reverse, and it is the reason the pair, rather than the ceiling alone, has to be the unit of judgment.

    The way the two actions are drafted is also the mechanism of the problem. Cardano PRIME's conditionality reads as prudence, and at the point of enactment it genuinely is prudence — it is sensible for a withdrawal to check that the capacity it needs actually exists. But that same conditionality splits the approval of the spend from its enactment, with the effect that each of the two votes can be presented as the one that is not yet binding: the withdrawal because it is "conditional," the ceiling because it is "only headroom." Between two votes each framed as not-yet-binding, 120,000,000 ada is committed. The moment at which the commitment actually lands has been arranged to sit nowhere in particular.

    2.2 A shared resource, and a ceiling fitted to a private claim {#2.2-a-shared-resource-and-a-ceiling-fitted-to-a-private-claim}

    The treasury is not the governing body's money. It is a shared resource belonging to the whole ecosystem, and governance holds it in trust. One consequence of holding something in trust is a kind of even-handedness: when governance sets a spending limit, it is imposing a discipline on everyone who wishes to draw from the commons. The fair test to apply is whether governance is willing to hold itself to that same discipline — or whether it will quietly relax the shared constraint whenever a particular withdrawal happens to need the room.

    Here the limit is being redrawn for the express purpose of accommodating a single withdrawal that carries a private profit: Cardano PRIME includes a performance fee, a surplus that flows to its executor rather than back to the commons. Adjusting the shared constraint to fit a private-surplus taking is precisely the asymmetry that a resource held in trust is supposed to guard against. This DRep frames that as a fitness gap in the arrangement, not as an accusation against anyone in it — but it is a real gap, and it bears directly on the vote.

    There is a further problem, and it is about scope. A rule that lets the ceiling rise whenever a withdrawal needs the room is not a bounded rule; it is an open-ended discretion that any future spend could trigger. "We may raise the limit when a withdrawal needs the space" has no natural stopping point — it can be reached for in any case at all. A ceiling that yields on demand is not, in any meaningful sense, a ceiling. This is why the objection resolves to a NO rather than to a shrug: the discretion the arrangement establishes is unscoped, and an unscoped discretion over the last hard limit on treasury outflows is not a small thing to wave through.

    The fix follows directly from the diagnosis. Scope the discretion. Set the net-change limit prospectively, sized to modeled need for the period as a whole, so that any increase answers a forecast of what the period will require rather than a particular consumer already waiting on the other side of the vote.

    2.3 Why NO rather than abstain {#2.3-why-no-rather-than-abstain}

    A finding about a two-action sequence, arriving on a ballot that is only one of the two actions, would ordinarily point toward abstention — the honest observation that the ballot in front of this DRep does not cleanly fit the finding, which is really about the pair. This DRep takes that consideration seriously, and in most such cases abstention is the correct and disciplined answer.

    It is not the correct answer here, for a mechanical reason. For a registered DRep, an abstaining vote is not neutral in effect: abstained stake returns to inertness and lowers the bar the action must clear to pass. Abstaining on this ceiling would therefore, in plain mechanical fact, help the very sequence the finding objects to. When withholding your vote assists the thing you are objecting to, withholding is not neutrality; it is quiet assent. The honest token is the one that actually resists. So the vote is NO, cast against the sequence, with the reasoning carried in this rationale because a bare ballot has no way to say "not this, in this order."

    2.4 What the vote does not reach {#2.4-what-the-vote-does-not-reach}

    A few observations belong in this DRep's longer-run record rather than in the vote itself, because they are about trajectory rather than about this single action, and the ballot cannot carry them.

    The "headroom, not a mandate to spend" framing is worth noting. It describes a decision that is, in practice, largely settled — many of the DReps weighing this ceiling have already cast their Cardano PRIME approval — in the vocabulary of a decision still fully open. That is not offered as an accusation; it is a signal worth tracking, because of what it points to. What it points to is a slow shift in how the ecosystem's last hard fiscal constraint is treated: from a thing that binds toward a thing that yields, with the inversion disclosed plainly and expected to proceed rather than to be rebalanced. If that pattern holds across future periods, the right response is not a vote but a proposal — a standing constraint on relaxing a net-change limit within the same period it governs, so that the ordering (constraint first, spend second) is protected structurally rather than case by case.

    This is also a concrete instance of a concern this DRep raised when evaluating the 2.4 constitutional amendment: that the net-change limit, like the budget Info action before it, could travel a path from genuine mandate, to redundant formality, to eventual quiet removal. This pairing is the sharpest test of that trajectory to appear so far, and this DRep will be watching how it resolves.

    3.0 Conclusion {#3.0-conclusion}

    We vote NO. A ceiling redrawn to fit a spend that is already being decided is a ceiling that has conceded it does not bind, and this arrangement redraws exactly such a ceiling — placing the spend before the constraint, and doing so through an open-ended discretion that any future withdrawal could invoke. The two lines of reasoning in this rationale, one about sequence and one about even-handed treatment of a shared resource, meet at the same conclusion and name the same remedy.

    The resubmission that answers both is straightforward to describe: set the net-change limit prospectively, size it to modeled need for the period, and scope it so that any future increase answers a forecast rather than a particular withdrawal waiting on the other side of the vote. Done that way, a ceiling increase is ordinary fiscal stewardship, and this DRep would treat it as such.

    Thank you for reading this rationale and for supporting it with your delegation. And the work continues...

    References / Sources {#references-sources}

    The following background may help a reader new to this DRep's approach. Each is linked once, at first relevance:

    • The evaluation framework — this DRep's standing method of judging governance actions by their long-run trajectory rather than by a single snapshot, first set out in the rationale on the Cardano Constitution. Coordination Commons
    • The 2.4 amendment rationale — where this DRep first flagged the risk that the net-change limit could drift from mandate toward formality. Rationale
    • Companion rationale — the Cardano PRIME Treasury Withdrawal, the other half of this pair. Cardano PRIME

    DRep ID: drep1yfaq8dsam...3nq50q

    Stay in touch!
    X: https://x.com/styg50

  • Yes164.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes0 ₳No rationale
  • Yes10.7M ₳Rationale

    RCADA votes YES on Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613–713).

    This is a cautious YES.

    RCADA recognises that this is an Info Action, not a Treasury Withdrawal. It does not directly authorize any spending from the Cardano Treasury. Instead, it records DRep agreement to set a new Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ADA for the period beginning at the start of Epoch 613 and ending at the close of Epoch 713.

    RCADA supports the principle that the Cardano Treasury should be governed with discipline, restraint, and long-term sustainability in mind. The Net Change Limit is an important fiscal guardrail because it places a fixed cap on how much ADA can leave the Treasury through enacted Treasury Withdrawals during the defined period. Raising that limit should not be treated as routine, and RCADA does not view this proposal as a simple housekeeping action.

    RCADA has previously been cautious about Treasury spending that exceeds estimated Treasury inflows. That caution remains. A Treasury that is drawn down faster than it replenishes cannot support the ecosystem indefinitely. The Cardano Treasury should not become a general-purpose spending pool, and DReps should not approve withdrawals simply because headroom exists under the limit.

    At the same time, RCADA recognises that the proposed 500 million ADA limit is not an automatic spending plan. It is a ceiling. Each Treasury Withdrawal would still need to be assessed and approved separately. RCADA’s YES vote should therefore not be interpreted as support for spending the full amount, nor as approval of any particular future Treasury Withdrawal.

    RCADA also notes that while 500 million ADA is higher than the previously agreed 350 million ADA limit, the relevant comparison is not only the headline increase of 150 million ADA. The period runs for roughly 1.38 years, and when compared against estimated Treasury replenishment over that period, the proposed limit appears to be moderately above expected inflows rather than an extreme expansion. This still matters, because full use of the limit would likely reduce the Treasury balance. However, RCADA does not view the proposed level as excessive if it is used carefully and only for high-quality proposals.

    RCADA also believes there is a reasonable argument that weaker market conditions can be an important time to build. Cardano should not stop investing in critical infrastructure, developer tooling, security, governance capability, decentralisation, resilience, and adoption simply because the market is down. In some cases, carefully selected public-good investment during quieter market periods may strengthen the ecosystem for the next growth cycle.

    However, this argument only works if spending remains selective. A higher Net Change Limit must not become an excuse for loose funding standards, weak accountability, duplicated work, poor value-for-money, or repeated funding of familiar recipients without clear ecosystem benefit. Any Treasury Withdrawal that relies on this expanded headroom should face strong scrutiny.

    RCADA is also concerned that the ecosystem does not yet appear to have a simple, coordinated, and comprehensive way for DReps and the community to assess how Treasury-funded grants and proposals have actually spent funds, what has been delivered, what impact has been achieved, what funds have been returned, and whether the spending represented value for money. Individual proposals may publish reports, dashboards, audits, milestone updates, or transaction records, and there are useful tools for tracking governance actions and Treasury movements. But RCADA is not currently aware of a single ecosystem-level reporting layer that allows DReps to easily evaluate the full Treasury-funded portfolio.

    RCADA recognises that such reporting would be difficult. Treasury-funded work varies widely across infrastructure, tooling, governance, adoption, liquidity, education, operations, and community initiatives. Not every valuable outcome is easy to measure, and not every project can be judged by the same metric. Even so, better portfolio-level reporting would materially improve DRep decision-making and public accountability.

    For that reason, RCADA supports this higher Net Change Limit with a clear expectation that Cardano Treasury governance continues to mature. The ecosystem needs stronger post-funding reporting, clearer portfolio-level visibility, better tracking of unused or returned funds, more consistent delivery evidence, and improved value-for-money assessment across funded work.

    RCADA’s support is therefore conditional in spirit, even though the vote itself is a YES. The higher ceiling should preserve flexibility for DReps to consider credible proposals on their merits, but it should not weaken the discipline applied to individual withdrawals. Proposals should continue to be judged on constitutional compliance, public-good value, delivery credibility, transparency, accountability, sustainability, risk, and long-term benefit to Cardano.

    On balance, RCADA supports this Info Action because it preserves governance flexibility during an important development period, while still leaving every future Treasury Withdrawal subject to separate DRep approval. RCADA votes YES with the clear expectation that the 500 million ADA Net Change Limit is treated as a maximum ceiling, not a spending target, and that any use of the additional headroom is reserved for high-conviction proposals that provide measurable and durable value to the Cardano ecosystem.

    RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here:
    https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/

  • Abstain12.5M ₳No rationale
  • Yes29M ₳Rationale

    After much deliberation, I've decided to vote YES to increase the NCL to 500M ADA until epoch 713. After adjusting to the sticker shock from many different treasury withdrawal proposals, I've concluded that Cardano is currently in a make-it-or-break-it situation. It is vital that we see the growth and usage necessary to keep our chain sustainable, else we risk the treasury valuation going even lower in terms of USD even without spending the ADA in it.

  • Yes817.5K ₳No rationale
  • No16.4M ₳Rationale

    Vote: NO

    This is a non-binding Info Action, "Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)" (gov_action15at...hakceq), submitted July 2, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. It proposes replacing the existing 350,000,000 ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 613-713 (February 13, 2026 through July 3, 2027) with a 500,000,000 ADA limit — a 43% increase in the ceiling on treasury withdrawals for a period already more than a third elapsed. The NCL caps total lovelace removed from the treasury by enacted Treasury Withdrawals; treasury inflows are not netted against it.

    The proposal is correct on one point of framing: an NCL is a ceiling, not a mandate, and DReps retain full discretion to reject every individual withdrawal beneath it. It is also legitimate to revisit a limit mid-period if the limit is demonstrably binding — that is, if worthy, well-structured proposals are being turned away for want of headroom rather than for want of merit. Dracula DAO would consider that case seriously if it were made.

    That case has not been made. Roughly 68M ADA has actually been withdrawn against the existing 350M ceiling; the current limit is not the constraint on ecosystem funding, and there is no evidence that a single qualifying proposal has failed because the cap was reached. The 2026 cycle's approximately 331.6M ADA of requests failed on their merits and on DRep judgment, not on headroom. Raising a ceiling that has been utilized at under 20% does not unlock funding — it removes a discipline, and it does so at a moment when the treasury's purchasing power is depressed and every ADA spent today is sold into weakness. Dracula DAO's position has been consistent since the 2025 NCL votes: ADA not spent today is ADA available tomorrow, when priorities and conditions have clarified. A lower NCL is the better long-term posture, and 350M is already generous relative to demonstrated, accountable demand. The stake-weighted signal so far reflects this — SPOs have voted against by a margin exceeding forty to one, and DReps remain net negative.

    Dracula DAO votes NO. The problem the 2026 cycle exposed is not an insufficient spending ceiling; it is the absence of a credible allocation mechanism beneath it. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — the ecosystem specifies what it wants built and pays once it exists and has been verified. It should not fund team operating budgets, roadmaps, or projected work, however that funding is scheduled or subdivided. A ceiling governs how much can leave the treasury; it says nothing about whether anything of value comes back. Until the community is paying for delivered features rather than financing intentions, a larger ceiling raises the cost of governance failure without improving the quality of what gets funded. Fix what the treasury buys before raising what it may spend; Dracula DAO will revisit the limit when there is evidence the limit — and not the process — is what binds.

  • YesChanged2.5M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Abstain4mo agoSuperseded

  • Yes9.2K ₳Rationale unavailable
  • Yes73.3M ₳Rationale

    I'm voting Yes on the Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713) proposal.

    Timing matters in this market right now. The institutional adoption wave is open, and this is the moment to convert that opportunity into real users and liquidity on top of the infrastructure the Pentad has built.

    Proposals that matter for ecosystem expansion, like AlphaGrowth's PRIME, shouldn't be blocked because there's no headroom left rather than because of their own merits. That's a situation we should avoid.

    In the sense of securing the room we need at a moment when Cardano should be making its leap, I'm voting Yes.

  • YesRevoted31.9K ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes4mo agoSuperseded

  • No78.9M ₳Rationale

    I am voting NO on the Info Action to increase the Net Change Limit to 500 million ADA for Epochs 613 through 713. This decision ultimately rests on a fundamental question of fiscal reality: can we truly justify expanding our spending ceiling during a period of sustained market weakness.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    I am voting NO on the Info Action to increase the Net Change Limit to 500 million ADA for Epochs 613 through 713. This decision ultimately rests on a fundamental question of fiscal reality: can we truly justify expanding our spending ceiling during a period of sustained market weakness? Cardano has slipped from the top 10 and continues to struggle within the top 20, reflecting some of our weakest relative market performance to date.

    As a DRep, I cannot in good conscience signal approval for an expanded spending cap. We have already exhausted the majority of our original 350 million ADA limit, and simply raising the ceiling to accommodate further drawdown is an unsustainable path forward. At current market rates of roughly $0.17 per ADA, a 500 million ADA limit represents approximately $85 million USD. We are consistently spending far more than the treasury accumulates, maintaining a pattern of deficit spending that cannot continue while broader market conditions remain challenging.

    Furthermore, treasury deployment to date has suffered from a lack of broad ecosystem distribution. Capital remains tightly concentrated within a small, isolated circle of familiar entities. While certain voices continue to cheer for unchecked treasury deployment, everyday ADA holders are the ones who bear the tangible cost through persistent sell pressure and suppressed price action.

    Voting NO sends a clear, necessary message to both DReps and the broader community that our spending power requires firm boundaries and strategic discipline. Future budget frameworks must be built around a far more thoughtful, equitable allocation process rather than repeatedly lifting guardrails to satisfy the same recipient groups. Ultimately, enforcing a strict cap instills vital investor confidence by proving that Cardano governance is grounded in fiscal responsibility and genuine treasury stewardship.

  • Abstain150.5M ₳Rationale

    The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. The room remaining under the current 350,000,000 ada NCL is close to exhausted, but a new limit set without an accompanying spending strategy is not one we can endorse.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    We recognize the practical problem this action addresses. The Net Change Limit agreed for Epochs 613–713 no longer leaves meaningful room for the treasury withdrawals now before DReps. Our reservations concerning the increase are the following:

    • No basis is given for the amount. The motivation explains why more room would be useful but does not show how 500,000,000 ada was derived. There is no projection of expected demand over the remaining period, no assessment of treasury sustainability under the higher cap, and no comparison against other values within the range.
    • A limit without a strategy is a weaker guardrail. We would support an increase framed strategically: room allocated across defined spending categories with designated allocations and accountable recipients, anchored to a shared long-term direction such as the Cardano 2030. The ecosystem should set those categories deliberately, weighing trade-offs and understanding what it costs to build and maintain Cardano.
    • Raising the cap to accommodate pending requests inverts its purpose. A limit that moves whenever demand approaches it functions as a spending target rather than a fiscal constraint. We would rather see the ceiling derived from agreed priorities than from the size of the requests in front of us.

    The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. Our abstention should be read as a reservation about method, not as opposition to ever adjusting the Net Change Limit. We encourage future proposers to derive the figure from budgeted categories and stated priorities rather than from pending requests, and we are committed to participating in the work of defining those categories with the community.

  • Yes0 ₳Rationale

    私は、現時点の暗号資産市場の状況も考慮すると、この新しいNet Change Limitは妥当であると考えます。そのため、私は本提案に賛成します。一方で、来年以降は、どのような分野にどの程度のTreasury予算を配分するのかを、より計画的かつ透明性をもって示していくことが重要だと考えます。さらに、想定外の状況にも対応できるよう、予備費のような枠を設けることも有益だと考えます。\n\nI believe this new Net Change Limit is appropriate, taking into account the current state of the cryptocurrency market. Therefore, I vote Yes on this proposal. At the same time, beginning next year, I believe it will be important to present, in a more planned and transparent manner, how much Treasury funding will be allocated to each area. Furthermore, I believe it would be beneficial to establish a contingency reserve to help address unforeseen circumstances.

  • Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain389.2M ₳Rationale

    Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713). Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.

    • Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision.
  • Abstain210.7M ₳Rationale

    EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713), with rationale outlined below.

    Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved.

  • Yes614.1K ₳Rationale

    Vote Yes on raising NCL from 350M to 500M ADA. Original limit set at 30 cents per ADA. At 16 cents today it equals only 56M US dollars a 47 percent drop never intended by DReps. 500M partially restores lost capacity. Every withdrawal still requires 67 percent DRep approval.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    I am voting Yes on raising the Net Change Limit from 350 million ADA to 500 million ADA for Epochs 613 through 713. This is not a vote to spend more. It is a vote to prevent an accidental fiscal tightening that was never intended by the DReps when originally setting this limit.
    When the 350 million ADA NCL was agreed around Epoch 613 ADA traded at approximately 30 cents representing roughly 105 million US dollars in fiscal capacity. At todays approximately 16 cents that same limit equals roughly 56 million US dollars. This is a 47 percent drop in real Treasury capacity caused by price action not by DRep intent.
    Projects budget in US dollars while the NCL caps ADA outflows. When ADA drops the same deliverable requires more ADA. The constraint has tightened by accident not by design. This was never the intent and it should not bind us now.
    I acknowledge that 500 million is a round number without detailed purchasing power methodology. My preference would be for a formula based NCL that auto adjusts for price changes. Since that does not exist I evaluate what is before me. 500 million ADA at 16 cents equals roughly 80 million US dollars. This partially restores lost capacity without fully compensating for the price decline. A fully adjusted NCL would require approximately 650 million ADA to match the original 105 million US dollar intent. Therefore 500 million represents a partial restoration not an expansion.
    I respect the view that a cap should be upheld not raised when restrictive. I share the concern about slippery slopes. However a cap that tightens automatically due to external price action is not a constraint. It is a random variable. If ADA had risen to 60 cents no one would argue the NCL should stay at 350 million and we should spend less. We should not accept the reverse either.
    The NCL remains a maximum not a target. Every individual Treasury Withdrawal still requires a separate DRep vote with 67 percent approval. Raising the ceiling does not lower the bar for any proposal. DReps retain full discretion to approve or reject each withdrawal on its merits.
    I am a conservative steward of the Treasury. I believe in constraints accountability and evidence. But I also believe constraints should be intentional not accidental. The 350 million ADA limit was set at a different price level with different purchasing power in a different market. Preserving it without adjustment is not fiscal discipline. It is fiscal drift.
    Going forward I will push for future NCL proposals to include price adjustment methodology rather than round numbers. I will also advocate that if ADA recovers significantly future ceilings should be evaluated for downward adjustment. Constraints must work in both directions to maintain credibility.

  • Yes81.8K ₳No rationale
  • No83.3M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain347.8M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes29.1M ₳Rationale

    I believe AlphaGrowth is a must-win proposal for the ecosystem. Therefore, I have no choice but to support an increase in the Net Change Limit to ensure it can be funded.

  • Yes39.8M ₳Rationale

    I am voting YES on two governance actions, one with the hash a75645e0871f3d...7fbf#0 and one with the hash 529dccaadaa000...96d7#0.

    First, there is some unavoidable conflict of interest inherent in the AlphaGrowth proposal: every DeFi protocol (and IMO, the whole ecosystem) stands to benefit from more capital being deployed into DeFi on Cardano. That being said, the funds allocated in the proposal to an independent eligibility audit to avoid favoritism are, to me, sufficient protections against my own conflict of interest.

    In response, I am voting yes on both the increased NCL, and the use of that increase in support of the AlphaGrowth proposal.

    In orbital dynamics, there is a concept called delta-V. This represents the change in velocity available to you by your current fuel reserves. Spend a certain amount of fuel, change your velocity by a set amount, and this determines how you change the shape of your orbit.

    If, however, you're in a decaying orbit, this Delta-V becomes time sensitive. As the orbit decays from drag from the atmosphere, the Delta-V required to correct and sustain the orbit long term increases. Conserving fuel and expending it slowly over time to try to maintain your current orbit is a losing game, because you have finite resources. The longer you wait, the more your orbit decays, and the more Delta-V is required to repair your orbit at all, until you hit a point of no return and your crash to earth is inevitable.

    I believe this is the position Cardano finds itself in. It has a fairly large reserve of ADA. Through unbelievable feats of human engineering it finds itself in a low, somewhat stable orbit. But it is decaying slowly over time.

    In my view, conserving that budget to spend it judiciously over a long period of time while the value of that treasury shrinks is consigning Cardano to a painful crash into the Atlantic ocean. Perhaps conserving that treasury will delay that crash by a few years, or allow us some leniency to steer that crash into safer, gentler waters, but nonetheless, we will crash.

    The solution, then, is to figure out how to stabilize the orbit. The Delta-V available in a stable orbit becomes a moot point. If we are stable, and self sustaining, we will have time to secure a resupply, and from that stable orbit our launch into the stars becomes far easier.

    More concretely, the Cardano treasury will not replenish or grow its expenditures through transaction fees alone. It will grow it's holdings by fostering billion dollar businesses that have no choice but to invest in the continued success of Cardano.

    I believe the AlphaGrowth proposal is our best use of what fuel we have to change the trajectory of Cardano for the better. They have a proven track record, a concrete plan, and the right mindset to attract those businesses.

    You can find a larger writeup justifying my vote here.

  • No3.4M ₳Rationale

    There is no way in hell I am voting to raise the Net Change Limit so that we can blow even more of the treasury on useless spending.

    You all got what you wanted by spending what you did, now you have to live with that for a year as the price of ADA tanks.

    All I can hope for is that there is actually a lower NCL in the future and that spending will finally be curtailed, and that builders delivering on chain transaction volume will finally get some treasury funding instead of Charles and IOG draining us for the foreseeable future.

    The madness has to end eventually.

  • Yes960.2K ₳No rationale
  • No202.9K ₳No rationale
  • YesChanged170.3M ₳Rationale

    I'm changing my vote to "YES" because I've gotten a guarantee from the Cardano Node and Plutus Team that they will take serious any feature request from AlphaGrowth for the onboarding efforts they push for. This is the comprehensive push that I think is both necessary and required for the success of that effort

    Earlier votes

    No4mo agoSuperseded

  • No249.9K ₳No rationale
  • No1M ₳Rationale

    Let us ask for information, set goals, set an NCL for those goals, ask for all proposals, vote and then stick to it. Setting an NCL which is "only a guide" and "won't all be spent" and then having to increase the already bloated allocation to address the communities failure to push back on "first in best dressed" non-transparent omnibus requests is not working.

  • Yes57.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes146.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes120.1M ₳Rationale

    SIPO DRep votes YES on the Info action agreeing a Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada for the Cardano Treasury for Epochs 613-713.

    SIPO reads this as a price adjustment, not an expansion of spending.

    When this period opened at the start of Epoch 613 on 13 February 2026, ada traded at about $0.2832, and the 350,000,000 ada limit then in force represented roughly $99.1 million of real spending capacity. Ada trades at about $0.1646 today. The same 350,000,000 ada limit now represents roughly $57.6 million - a contraction of about 42% in real terms that no governance decision authorised and no DRep voted for. A limit denominated in ada silently tightens whenever ada falls. At today's price, 500,000,000 ada is worth about $82.3 million, which restores roughly 83% of the capacity the limit carried when the period began; a full restoration would require about 602,000,000 ada. On the measure that matters - what the treasury can actually fund - this proposal does not expand the envelope. It partially repairs it.

    SIPO anticipated exactly this. In February 2026, voting Yes to the 300,000,000 ada limit for this same period, SIPO recorded that a static Net Change Limit does not respond to significant ada price fluctuations, and argued that Cardano should evolve toward an adaptive fiscal model indexed to treasury balance, annual inflows, and market conditions. That limitation has now materialised, and this action is the consequence of not having built the adaptive mechanism.

    The constraint is also real in practice. Treasury withdrawals debited since the start of Epoch 613 total approximately 302.7 million ada, about 86.5% of the 350,000,000 ada limit, leaving roughly 47.3 million ada for the remaining eleven months to the close of Epoch 713. Fiscal capacity is not the binding concern at this level: treasury inflows are running at roughly 323 million ada per year, and 500,000,000 ada across this 100-epoch period is equivalent to about 365 million ada per year - a net draw of roughly 42 million ada per year against a treasury balance of about 1.47 billion ada.

    SIPO's Yes is not an endorsement of raising the cap whenever it binds. A guardrail that moves each time it becomes uncomfortable stops being a guardrail. SIPO supports this adjustment because it is grounded in a measurable price change, and repeats the position it took in February: Cardano should replace ad hoc renegotiation with a rule-based, adaptive Net Change Limit, transparent and constitutionally grounded, so that future adjustments follow a published formula rather than a vote taken under pressure. This action agrees a limit; it authorises no withdrawal, and SIPO will continue to judge each withdrawal on its own merits. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.


    SIPO DRep は、Cardano トレジャリーの Epoch 613-713 における Net Change Limit を 500,000,000 ADA と合意する Info アクションに賛成(YES)を投じます。

    SIPO は本件を、支出の拡張ではなく価格調整と読みます。

    本期間が開始した 2026 年 2 月 13 日(Epoch 613 開始時点)、ADA は約 $0.2832 で取引されており、当時の 350,000,000 ADA という上限は実質で約 9,910 万ドルの支出能力を意味していました。現在 ADA は約 $0.1646 です。同じ 350,000,000 ADA という上限は、いま約 5,760 万ドルしか意味しません。ガバナンス上の決定を一切経ず、どの DRep も投票していないまま、実質で約 42% 縮小したことになります。ADA 建ての上限は、ADA が下落するたびに自動的に引き締まります。現在価格では 500,000,000 ADA は約 8,230 万ドルであり、期間開始時に上限が持っていた能力の約 83% を回復するにとどまります。完全に回復させるには約 602,000,000 ADA が必要です。実際に国庫が何を賄えるかという尺度で見れば、本提案は枠を拡張していません。部分的に修復しているだけです。

    SIPO はこの事態を予期していました。2026 年 2 月、同じ期間の 300,000,000 ADA 案に賛成した際、SIPO は固定型の Net Change Limit について「ADA 価格が大きく変動した場合に自動調整が働かない」と記録し、トレジャリー残高・年間流入額・市場環境を反映する動的な財政モデルへ進化すべきだと論じました。その限界がいま現実化したのであり、本アクションは適応的な仕組みを作らなかったことの帰結です。

    制約は実務上も現実です。Epoch 613 開始以降に確定したトレジャリー引き出しは合計 約 3 億 273 万 ADA で、350,000,000 ADA の上限の約 86.5% に達し、Epoch 713 終了までの残り約 11 ヶ月に対して残枠は約 4,730 万 ADA です。この水準では財政容量は制約要因になりません。トレジャリーへの流入は年率 約 3 億 2,300 万 ADA で推移しており、100 エポックの本期間における 500,000,000 ADA は年率換算で約 3 億 6,500 万 ADA、約 14 億 7,000 万 ADA の残高に対して年 約 4,200 万 ADA の純減にあたります。

    SIPO の賛成は、上限が窮屈になるたびに引き上げることへの承認ではありません。不都合になるたびに動くガードレールは、もはやガードレールではありません。SIPO が本調整を支持するのは、測定可能な価格変動に根拠があるためであり、2 月に取った立場をここで繰り返します。Cardano は場当たり的な再交渉を、透明で憲法的整合性を持つルールベースの動的 Net Change Limit に置き換えるべきです。そうすれば将来の調整は、圧力下の投票ではなく公開された算式に従います。本アクションは上限を合意するものであり、いかなる引き出しも承認しません。SIPO は引き続き各引き出しをそれ自体の是非で判断します。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。

  • No102.1K ₳Rationale

    Governance Action Review Report - Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)

    1. Introduction

    This Info Action seeks DRep agreement on a new Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada for the Cardano Treasury, covering the period from the beginning of Epoch 613, on February 13, 2026, through the end of Epoch 713, on or about July 3, 2027. It supersedes the previously agreed limit of 350,000,000 ada for the same period.

    The limit caps the cumulative amount removed from the Treasury through enacted Treasury Withdrawals recorded on the Cardano ledger. Withdrawals already debited since Epoch 613 count toward the new limit, while Treasury inflows, refunds, returns of Treasury-funded amounts, and proposed or unratified withdrawals do not affect the calculation.

    As an Info Action, it has no direct on-chain effect and does not authorize any Treasury Withdrawal. It records DRep agreement on the fiscal limit applicable to the period if Yes votes exceed 50% of active voting stake. Individual Treasury Withdrawals would continue to require separate approval.

    2. Governance Action Analysis

    Negative aspects

    The existence of a Net Change Limit as a fiscal control mechanism is not, by itself, the problem. The objection remains directed at how the NCL has been defined in isolation, without a strategic budget capable of guiding the use of Treasury resources. To date, no minimally clear framework has been established for priorities, indicative allocations by category, investment diversification, or containment of resource concentration and bundling. These deficiencies already supported the opposing position on previous NCL actions and remain unanswered.

    The new Governance Action aggravates this concern. The current NCL of 350 million ada was established to cover a period of 100 epochs, between Epochs 613 and 713. However, well before the end of that horizon, its expansion to 500 million ada is already being proposed, an increase of approximately 42.9%. The justification presented is that the available room under the current limit is becoming constrained, but that constraint should produce greater prioritization, discipline, and selection among Treasury Withdrawals.

    The expansion also occurs without a coherent strategy having been presented for distributing the additional resources. There is no indication of how much should be allocated to infrastructure, adoption, research, development, liquidity, education, governance, or other priorities. Nor is there an evaluation of the concentration already observed in certain categories and organizations. Fiscal space is therefore increased without correcting the fragmented process through which withdrawals are assessed individually, frequently without a consolidated view of the ecosystem’s needs.

    The action does not present a clear fiscal position on the desired relationship between Treasury inflows and outflows, preservation of the balance, runway, or a sustainable drawdown rate. By significantly increasing the NCL before the end of the original period, without a strategic budget or broader fiscal justification, the use of the Treasury becomes progressively more distant from the replenishment of ada into it.

    Risks and concerns

    When a limit is expanded as soon as it begins restricting new withdrawals, its function as a fiscal guardrail is weakened. The problem lies not only in the value of 500 million ada, but also in the precedent of treating the NCL as an adjustable parameter whenever the remaining room becomes insufficient to accommodate new demands. This reduces planning predictability and weakens confidence that agreed limits will actually be respected throughout the period for which they were established.

    The fact that the proposer is associated with the submission of a 120 million ada Treasury Withdrawal for AlphaGrowth also weighs negatively. That withdrawal would not fit within the available room under the current NCL. The presentation of a higher NCL by an actor directly interested in a large withdrawal creates a problematic structural incentive. It is not necessary to attribute bad faith or prove improper intent to recognize that this practice compromises the perception of the guardrail’s independence and establishes an inappropriate institutional precedent.

    Large withdrawals should not generate pressure for the fiscal limit to be increased until they can be accommodated. The process should operate in the opposite direction: proposals should compete within a previously defined fiscal horizon, requiring DReps to establish priorities and reject less essential or less competitive initiatives.

    Otherwise, a cycle is formed in which new proposals increase pressure on the ceiling, the ceiling is expanded to accommodate them, and the additional room is consumed again without the planning deficiencies being corrected. This increases the risk that Treasury use will follow a trajectory determined primarily by the immediate pressure of available proposals.

    3. Vote and Rationale

    Vote: NO

    The central question is not how the 500 million ada will be accounted for, but why the ecosystem should expand an existing limit before establishing a coherent allocation strategy and without demonstrating the capacity to respect the previously agreed fiscal horizon.

    The position therefore remains NO. As long as the NCL continues to be proposed in isolation, without a strategic budget containing at least minimally defined priorities and allocations, there will be insufficient basis to support it.

    In this specific action, the early expansion of the ceiling makes the objection stronger than in previous proposals. The current limit was established for 100 epochs but is already being increased by approximately 42.9% because its remaining room is becoming constrained. That constraint should instead require prioritization and competition among withdrawals.

    The direct relationship between the proposer and a 120 million ada withdrawal that depends on greater fiscal space further strengthens the objection. A fiscal guardrail should constrain proposals rather than be adjusted to accommodate them. Support would require the NCL to be accompanied by a strategic budget with priorities and allocations at least minimally delineated.

    4. Conclusion

    The NCL is being expanded before the end of its agreed horizon, without a strategic allocation framework or a broader fiscal position on Treasury sustainability. Combined with the proposer’s relationship to a 120 million ada withdrawal requiring additional fiscal space, this weakens the guardrail and supports a NO vote.

    Relatório de Revisçao de Ação de Governança [PT]

    1. Introdução

    Esta Info Action busca o acordo dos DReps sobre um novo Net Change Limit de 500.000.000 de ada para o Tesouro da Cardano, abrangendo o período entre o início da Epoch 613, em 13 de fevereiro de 2026, e o encerramento da Epoch 713, por volta de 3 de julho de 2027. O novo limite substitui o valor de 350.000.000 de ada anteriormente acordado para o mesmo período.

    O limite restringe o valor acumulado removido do Tesouro por meio de Treasury Withdrawals aprovadas e registradas no ledger da Cardano. As retiradas já debitadas desde a Epoch 613 são contabilizadas no novo limite, enquanto entradas no Tesouro, reembolsos, devoluções de recursos financiados pelo Tesouro e retiradas propostas ou ainda não ratificadas não afetam o cálculo.

    Por ser uma Info Action, não produz efeito on-chain direto nem autoriza qualquer Treasury Withdrawal. Registra o acordo dos DReps sobre o limite fiscal aplicável ao período caso os votos favoráveis ultrapassem 50% do stake de votação ativo. Cada Treasury Withdrawal continuaria dependendo de aprovação separada.

    2. Análise da Governance Action

    Aspectos negativos

    A existência de um Net Change Limit como mecanismo de controle fiscal não é, por si só, o problema. A objeção permanece direcionada à forma como o NCL vem sendo definido isoladamente, sem um budget estratégico capaz de orientar o uso dos recursos do Tesouro. Até o momento, não foi estabelecido um framework minimamente claro de prioridades, alocações indicativas por categorias, diversificação dos investimentos ou contenção da concentração de recursos e do bundling. Essas deficiências já fundamentavam a posição contrária às ações anteriores de NCL e continuam sem resposta.

    A nova Governance Action agrava essa preocupação. O NCL vigente de 350 milhões de ada foi estabelecido para cobrir um período de 100 epochs, entre as Epochs 613 e 713. No entanto, muito antes do encerramento desse horizonte, já se propõe sua ampliação para 500 milhões de ada, um aumento de aproximadamente 42,9%. A justificativa apresentada é que o espaço disponível sob o limite atual está ficando restrito, mas essa restrição deveria justamente produzir maior priorização, disciplina e seleção entre as Treasury Withdrawals.

    A ampliação também ocorre sem que tenha sido apresentada uma estratégia coerente sobre como os recursos adicionais seriam distribuídos. Não há indicação de quanto deveria ser destinado a infraestrutura, adoção, pesquisa, desenvolvimento, liquidez, educação, governança ou outras prioridades. Tampouco há uma avaliação sobre a concentração já observada em determinadas categorias e organizações. Assim, aumenta-se o espaço fiscal sem corrigir o processo fragmentado pelo qual as retiradas são avaliadas individualmente, frequentemente sem uma visão consolidada das necessidades do ecossistema.

    A ação não apresenta uma postura fiscal clara sobre a relação desejada entre entradas e saídas do Tesouro, preservação do saldo, runway ou ritmo sustentável de drawdown. Ao elevar o NCL de forma significativa antes do encerramento do período original, sem um budget estratégico ou uma justificativa fiscal mais ampla, o uso do Tesouro distancia-se progressivamente da reposição de ada.

    Riscos e preocupações

    Quando um limite é ampliado assim que começa a restringir novas retiradas, sua função como guardrail fiscal é enfraquecida. O problema não está apenas no valor de 500 milhões de ada, mas no precedente de tratar o NCL como um parâmetro ajustável sempre que o espaço restante se torna insuficiente para acomodar novas demandas. Isso reduz a previsibilidade do planejamento e enfraquece a confiança de que os limites acordados serão efetivamente respeitados durante o período para o qual foram definidos.

    Também pesa negativamente o fato de o próprio proposer estar associado à submissão de uma Treasury Withdrawal de 120 milhões de ada para a AlphaGrowth. Essa retirada não caberia no espaço disponível sob o NCL vigente. A apresentação de um NCL maior por um ator diretamente interessado em uma retirada de grande porte cria um incentivo estrutural problemático. Não é necessário atribuir má-fé ou provar uma intenção imprópria para reconhecer que essa prática compromete a percepção de independência do guardrail e estabelece um precedente institucional inadequado.

    Grandes retiradas não deveriam gerar pressão para que o limite fiscal seja ampliado até que possam ser acomodadas. O processo deveria funcionar no sentido inverso: as propostas deveriam competir dentro de um horizonte fiscal previamente definido, obrigando os DReps a estabelecer prioridades e rejeitar iniciativas menos essenciais ou menos competitivas.

    Caso contrário, forma-se um ciclo no qual novas propostas aumentam a pressão sobre o teto, o teto é ampliado para acomodá-las e o espaço adicional é novamente consumido sem que as deficiências de planejamento sejam corrigidas. Isso aumenta o risco de que o uso do Tesouro siga uma trajetória determinada principalmente pela pressão imediata das propostas disponíveis.

    3. Voto e Fundamentação

    Voto: NÃO

    A questão central não é como os 500 milhões de ada serão contabilizados, mas por que o ecossistema deveria ampliar um limite vigente sem antes estabelecer uma estratégia coerente de alocação e sem demonstrar capacidade de respeitar o horizonte fiscal previamente acordado.

    Por essas razões, a posição permanece NÃO. Enquanto o NCL continuar sendo proposto isoladamente, sem um budget estratégico com prioridades e alocações minimamente delineadas, não haverá base suficiente para apoiá-lo.

    Nesta ação específica, a expansão antecipada do teto torna a objeção ainda mais forte do que nas propostas anteriores. O limite vigente foi estabelecido para 100 epochs, mas já está sendo ampliado em aproximadamente 42,9% porque o espaço restante está ficando restrito. Essa restrição deveria, em vez disso, exigir priorização e competição entre as retiradas.

    A relação direta entre o proposer e uma retirada de 120 milhões de ada que depende de maior espaço fiscal reforça ainda mais a objeção. Um guardrail fiscal deveria restringir as propostas, e não ser ajustado para acomodá-las. O apoio exigiria que o NCL fosse acompanhado de um budget estratégico com prioridades e alocações minimamente delineadas.

    4. Conclusão

    O NCL está sendo ampliado antes do encerramento do horizonte acordado, sem um framework estratégico de alocação ou uma postura fiscal mais ampla sobre a sustentabilidade do Tesouro. Combinado à relação do proposer com uma retirada de 120 milhões de ada que exige espaço fiscal adicional, isso enfraquece o guardrail e fundamenta o voto NÃO.

  • Yes0 ₳No rationale