Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day 2026: Cardano Title Sponsorship
152 DReps voted · 61 with a rationale · 7 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No717.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes625.9K ₳Rationale
Ask: ₳2,750,000 / Structure: Three budget buckets — Dev Gov Day 2026 ($280K), Rare Evo Title Mainstage + Livestream ($200K), Overhead/Audit/Tax/2027 Deposit ($180K) July 28–31, 2026, ARIA Las Vegas
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Rare Evo occupies a category I generally watch carefully, community events are easy to approve based on vibes and hard to evaluate based on measurable ecosystem return. The default is skepticism. The exception to that default is when an event has a demonstrated multi-year track record, a specific Cardano governance coordination function rather than just general visibility, and a team with operational infrastructure that would cost significantly more to replicate from scratch. Rare Evo clears all three bars convincingly with the events proposal this cycle.
The stronger argument here is actually Dev Gov Day, not Rare Evo itself. Convening DReps, SPOs, builders, and governance contributors for a full day of dedicated Cardano governance programming for free and publicly accessible, ahead of a major multi-chain conference is precisely the kind of on-the-ground infrastructure a functioning governance process needs. The inaugural 2025 event delivered 500+ attendees without treasury funding. Rare Network has demonstrated they can run this, and treasury backing for the 2026 edition expands what they can deliver.
I'm voting Conditional YES on the merits, with three open concerns I would like to see addressed in the post-event reporting and in any future cycle's ask. First, the KPI floor targets need to exist, next year's proposal should commit to specific minimums derived from 2025 actuals, not just describe metrics as categories. If Rare Evo 2026 attracted fewer Cardano projects than the 40+ in 2025, what's the accountability mechanism? There currently isn't one. Second, the sponsorship substitution clause is asking to be clarified before the vote closes, what Cardano gets shouldn't be a function of what commercial sponsors purchase first. Third, the 2027 venue deposit embedded in this ask is a funding structure the community should examine critically when the 2027 proposal arrives; it shouldn't be used as a mechanism to lock in and leverage continuity ahead of future evaluation.
The 20% VIP ticket revenue return to the treasury is recognized and appreciated, it's a genuine revenue share mechanism, unusual for events proposals, and signals alignment between Rare Network's commercial success and Cardano’s interest. - No605.7K ₳Rationale
🚫 MY VOTE IS NO
On the Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day 2026 proposal, I vote NO.
The proposal requests ₳2,750,000 from the Cardano Treasury for sponsorship, stages, livestreams, tickets, flights, hotels, media coverage, legal costs, taxes, and a deposit for the following year.
That is a large amount.
At this point, I do not see enough value in this for the ecosystem.
Yes, conferences matter.
Yes, Cardano visibility matters.
Yes, live events, developers, DReps, SPOs, and ecosystem projects are part of growth.But right now, the priority should be different.
Cardano Governance is not built only on stages, logos, and livestreams.
It is built on people who read proposals, analyze documents, vote, explain decisions to the community, and take responsibility for their choices.That layer is the DRep layer.
The question is simple:
why can the Treasury allocate millions of ADA to events, while DReps who actually participate in governance still do not have a proper compensation system?
If governance is the heart of Cardano, then DReps are not decoration.
They are the working layer of governance.Without DReps, voting becomes a formality.
Without proposal analysis, Treasury funds can go anywhere.
Without clear explanations to the community, governance becomes a closed system for a small group of people.My position is clear:
first, Cardano needs a fair compensation system for DReps.
Only after that should the Treasury spend millions of ADA on large events.Rare Evo will happen even without this funding.
But strong governance cannot be built without motivated DReps.My vote: NO.
I believe the Cardano Treasury should first strengthen the governance mechanism itself, not fund expensive external events.
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- No589.7K ₳Rationale
While Rare Evo has historically been sucessful, my votes during this budget round are predominately in favour of technology, infrastructure and protocol advancement, which I believe are essential for us to go to #1
- Yes587.6K ₳No rationale
- No533.9K ₳Rationale
No. We need core infrastructure and New revenue streams. Cardano is well known enought, The Rare Evo team is a strong team but just doesn't make sense atm.
- No466.2K ₳No rationale
- No431.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain385.2K ₳Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - No383K ₳No rationale
- No381.1K ₳No rationale
- No360.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain314.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes313.4K ₳No rationale
- No300.6K ₳No rationale
- No298.9K ₳Rationale
Sorry, no more sponsored events. Not a good use of a marketing budget. I'd rather spend that money on something as simple as google ads.
- No294.4K ₳No rationale
- NoRevoted279.8K ₳History
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
No1mo agoSuperseded
- No271.8K ₳No rationale
- No270.1K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on “Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day 2026 Cardano Title Sponsorship.”
Rare Network has a strong track record of delivering high‑quality events, and this proposal presents a comparatively transparent budget with clear line items for venue, production, travel, booths, and administration. However, under current Treasury constraints, I must prioritise proposals where the link between spending and external ecosystem impact is clearer and more directly measurable.
The outcomes presented here focus primarily on internal metrics such as attendance, booths, speakers, social impressions, and media pieces, and feedback from other DReps and community members suggests that Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day have so far been attended largely by familiar faces within the existing Cardano ecosystem rather than driving demonstrable new-user or enterprise onboarding. At the same time, Rare Network is already involved in Amplify Cardano and this proposal allocates funds for a Dev Gov Day 2027 venue deposit, which raises concerns about overlapping funding and pre‑committing future Treasury resources before the 2026 outcomes have been delivered and evaluated.
For a future proposal, I would look for clearer evidence of external adoption or onboarding attributable to these events, explicit reconciliation with other Rare/Amplify/Catalyst budgets to avoid double funding, and a removal or restructuring of pre‑funding for subsequent years so that continuation is decided based on demonstrated results rather than assumed. Until then, I do not consider this sponsorship a sufficiently prudent use of Treasury funds in the current budget cycle.
- No261K ₳Rationale
Governance Action Report [EN]
1. Introduction
The governance action is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action requesting ₳2,750,000 from the Cardano Treasury, using a reference price of US$0.24 per ADA, equivalent to US$660,000. The funds would position Cardano as title sponsor of the Rare Evo 2026 main stage and global livestream, while also supporting the second annual Rare Dev Gov Day 2026, a dedicated Cardano-focused technical, governance, and community coordination event scheduled for July 28, 2026, at ARIA Las Vegas.
The proposal covers two sponsorship packages: Rare Evo 2026 Cardano Title Sponsorship and Cardano Dev Gov Day 2026 Sponsorship. It includes branding, livestream integration, governance programming, technical workshops, free General Admission access for the Cardano community, complimentary booth space for selected ecosystem projects, travel and lodging support for contributors and volunteers, media sponsorship, community giveaways, legal and audit costs, taxes withheld, and a deposit for Dev Gov Day 2027.
Rare Evo 2026 will occur regardless of treasury funding. The requested withdrawal would therefore not fund the existence of the event itself, but would expand Cardano’s presence, accessibility, programming, sponsorship position, and industry outreach within an already operational event.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
Rare Network has relevant history in the Cardano ecosystem, with activity since 2020 and five years of Rare Evo execution. The proposal reports positive historical metrics for 2025, including 2,500 participants, 80 booths, 85 speakers, more than 100 ecosystem partners, more than 20,000 livestream views, 4 million social impressions, more than 40 Cardano projects represented, more than 100 media coverage items or interviews, more than 50 enterprise participants, and more than 500 participants at Dev Gov Day 2025.
This weighs positively on execution. Unlike proposals that depend only on a future promise, Rare Network demonstrates previous capacity to organize complex events, attract participants, and deliver real operational infrastructure. Execution risk therefore appears relatively low.
The strongest component of the proposal is Cardano Dev Gov Day. An event dedicated to governance, technical coordination, DReps, SPOs, builders, projects, and community may have public value, especially when it is free, open, and directed toward governance and development discussions.
Cardano governance depends on social coordination, not only on on-chain mechanisms. In-person spaces may facilitate relationships, alignment, context sharing, noise reduction, and trust-building among actors who normally interact in fragmented ways.
In this sense, Dev Gov Day is more defensible than a simple brand sponsorship. It offers a more substantial argument around coordination, education, governance, and community participation.
The proposal includes free General Admission access for the Cardano community, free booth space for selected projects, programming slots, livestream, media, and support for participants and contributors. These elements may reduce participation barriers for some ecosystem members and offer visibility to projects that may not have their own budget to attend.
This may benefit startups, builders, dApps, community projects, DReps, and other ecosystem actors that need exposure, networking, and contact with stakeholders.
The proposal includes a commitment to return 20% of all VIP ticket sales to the Treasury. This mechanism is positive in principle, because it creates some alignment between commercial success of the event and return to the ecosystem.
Although this mechanism is insufficient as a financial guarantee, it is better than event proposals without any return mechanism. As precedent, it may be useful for future sponsorship or event proposals.
A possible favorable argument is that, during market contraction, Cardano risks losing external presence, narrative, and coordination. In theory, maintaining presence at relevant events may help preserve visibility, reinforce confidence, and keep projects connected during a difficult cycle.
Rare Evo also has a multi-chain character, which may allow Cardano exposure to audiences outside the ecosystem, including developers, enterprises, investors, media, and communities from other networks.
Negative aspects
There is recognition that Cardano governance has real problems, structural gaps, and relevant failures. However, one more governance event or workshop does not appear to be a proportional response to those problems.
Cardano has already held many workshops, events, in-person discussions, and online processes related to governance, including discussions around CIP-1694, the Constitution, and Voltaire. Despite those efforts, relevant problems of coordination, accountability, execution, institutional clarity, and effectiveness remain.
The point is not to deny abstract value to in-person gatherings. The problem is treating one more workshop as a relevant solution for structural failures that have already survived years of workshops, events, and deliberative processes. The marginal utility of another in-person event appears limited if there are no more concrete mechanisms for reform, execution, accountability, or institutional change.
The proposal concentrates in-person benefits in Las Vegas, United States. Even with livestream and free General Admission, the most relevant benefits of an in-person event remain networking, informal conversations, panel presence, stakeholder access, booths, meetings, visibility, and relationship-building.
These benefits favor people with visas, time, resources, geographic proximity, ability to travel, and existing connections. The proposal offers travel and lodging support for a small group of participants, but that does not eliminate concentration. It only transfers Treasury resources to subsidize physical attendance for some people.
For a global Treasury, this is an important problem. The Cardano ecosystem is international, but the direct return from this type of event tends to be localized, with greater benefit for participants in North America and groups already integrated into the event circuit.
The proposal includes relevant amounts for travel and lodging, food and beverage, happy hour and kickoff party, hotel rooms, VIP tickets, and other hospitality forms. This is particularly problematic in the current context.
In a bear market, with projects facing funding difficulties, initiatives closing or reducing activity, and contributors struggling to obtain support for more essential work, using Treasury resources to subsidize travel, lodging, food, and social events does not appear to be a priority.
The objection is not moralistic. Events may have normal operational costs. The problem is fiscal priority: when resources are scarce and there are multiple critical needs, spending on international travel, open bar, lodging, and hospitality perks appears less defensible than more direct investments in infrastructure, maintenance, tools, institutional governance, measurable adoption, or distributed support for contributors.
A decisive point is that Rare Evo 2026 will occur even without this Treasury withdrawal. Therefore, the proposal should not be evaluated as whether to fund the existence of the event. The correct question is whether the Treasury should pay ₳2.75M to expand Cardano’s presence through title sponsorship, branding, livestream, expanded Dev Gov Day, benefits, and hospitality.
This reduces the weight of the necessity argument. The Treasury would be buying an additional delta on top of an existing event. That delta may have value, but it needs to be demonstrated with much greater clarity, especially when it involves high expenditure and benefits that are difficult to measure.
The community and DReps already rejected Cardano Summit, the main annual event explicitly focused on Cardano. This creates a relevant political precedent. If Cardano’s own flagship event was rejected because of concerns around cost, ROI, priority, or structure, approving a relevant sponsorship for another event requires a particularly strong justification.
Rare Evo has its own merits: history, Cardano roots, multi-chain character, and Dev Gov Day. Even so, these elements do not eliminate the need to demonstrate why this package would be more justifiable than other rejected or questioned events.
The objection is not against marketing itself. Cardano may need marketing, communication, external presence, and greater visibility. The problem is the chosen format.
A large, in-person, expensive, and concentrated event may be an imprecise form of marketing. There are potentially more distributed, measurable, and cost-effective alternatives: targeted campaigns, technical content, regional programs, builder support, onboarding actions, partnerships with external audiences, segmented media, continuous education, smaller grants, or mechanisms that expand access globally.
At this moment, spending a relevant amount on sponsorship, physical presence, and hospitality appears less attractive than more targeted, measurable, and distributed allocations.
The negative position does not need to question Rare Network’s reputation, competence, or track record. On the contrary, the team appears to have execution capacity and a real delivery history.
The problem lies in the structure, timing, priority, measurement, and composition of the funded package. A proposal may be executable and still not be a good Treasury allocation.
The position is not against investing Treasury resources in governance. There are many real gaps in Cardano governance. The point is that another in-person event or workshop does not appear to be the best way to solve those problems.
Governance needs reforms, accountability, better processes, incentives, tools, institutional clarity, continuous support, evaluation standards, and distributed capacity. Events may help marginally, but they do not replace structural changes.
The position is also not against marketing or external visibility. Cardano needs to communicate its value proposition better. The problem is that marketing through a large, expensive, concentrated, in-person event appears less appropriate in this cycle than more precise, measurable, and distributed initiatives.
Risks and concerns
The absence of KPI targets is a serious problem and, by itself, could justify a NO vote.
The proposal lists several metrics that will be reported after the event, such as Rare Evo attendance, Dev Gov Day attendance, number of participating Cardano projects, workshops, governance sessions, livestream viewership, media coverage, social impressions, number of participants with travel support, tickets distributed, booth participation, developer participation, enterprise and institutional participation, networking participation, cross-chain collaboration opportunities, announcements or launches, and qualitative feedback.
However, these metrics appear as categories to be measured or reported. They are not accompanied by verifiable minimum targets.
For an event proposal, this is an especially negative failure. Events are one of the easiest categories to project and measure. It would be reasonable to expect minimum targets for participants, livestream views, represented Cardano projects, developers present, enterprise leads, media, participating DReps and SPOs, qualified meetings, follow-ups, newly onboarded builders, Treasury return, and regional diversity.
Without targets, there is no objective ruler to distinguish formal execution from impact proportional to the expenditure. The proposal may deliver photos, videos, livestream, programming, booths, and a post-event report, and still not demonstrate that the Treasury bought sufficient impact.
It is important to separate deliverables from performance targets.
Items such as 50 VIP tickets, food and beverage for 500 people, travel and lodging support for 20 participants, free General Admission tickets, free booths, livestream, media sponsorship, or return of 20% of VIP sales are deliverables, benefits, or economic mechanisms. They are not, by themselves, performance targets.
A KPI target would indicate the minimum expected result: for example, minimum number of participants, minimum number of Cardano projects, minimum number of qualified developers, minimum number of institutional leads, minimum number of views, minimum published media, minimum financial return to the Treasury, or minimum number of verifiable follow-ups.
The proposal presents many purchased outputs, but does not establish success thresholds.
The commitment to return 20% of VIP ticket sales to the Treasury is positive, but insufficient as a financial accountability mechanism.
The proposal does not present VIP sales projections, historical VIP sales, expected volume, estimated Treasury return, or minimum guarantee. Therefore, “20% of VIP ticket sales” is 20% of an unknown number.
Without a minimum floor or projection, this mechanism may have symbolic value, but it does not allow real financial recovery or spending proportionality to be evaluated.
The budget is relatively detailed by category, but a significant part of the resources is allocated to politically sensitive items: travel and lodging, food and beverage, happy hour and kickoff party, hotel rooms, VIP tickets, media sponsorship, legal, audit and admin fees, taxes withheld, and a deposit for 2027.
Even if these costs are normal in professional events, the question is whether they should be paid by the Cardano Treasury at this moment. The budget composition makes it difficult to classify the proposal as an essential governance action or pure public good.
The inclusion of a deposit for Dev Gov Day 2027 is a problem of precedent and fiscal discipline. The proposal funds a 2026 action, but reserves resources to secure a future venue, which would be followed by another Treasury proposal.
This anticipates commitment before the 2026 results are evaluated. It also creates recurrence risk or implicit pressure for continuity. Future editions should be evaluated based on delivered results, impact report, cost-benefit, and new budget context, not through pre-commitments embedded in the current budget.
The proposal combines components with different natures into a single action: Dev Gov Day, with a stronger governance and public-good argument; Rare Evo title sponsorship, closer to marketing and branding; hospitality and in-person benefits; travel and lodging support; media; legal, administrative, and tax costs; and a deposit for 2027.
This bundling creates a governance problem. A dRep could support Dev Gov Day in isolation while rejecting title sponsorship, hospitality, travel support, or a future deposit. The action does not allow that separation.
The most defensible component is tied to less defensible elements.
The proposal indicates that, if another sponsor purchases certain packages before approval, Cardano will receive another sponsorship of “equal impact/dollar value,” such as Enterprise & Policy Social, Registration, Closeout Party, or College Row.
This reduces the precision of the funded object. The Treasury would be voting on a package that may change according to available commercial inventory. Even if the dollar value is maintained, the strategic impact of each sponsorship may vary.
For a Treasury Withdrawal, the funded object should be more stable and verifiable.
The proposal states the amount requested from the Treasury, but does not sufficiently clarify the total Rare Evo budget, other expected revenue, sponsors, ticket sales, paid booths, commercial margin, percentage of the event covered by Cardano, or degree of cross-subsidy.
Because Rare Evo is a commercial and multi-chain event that will occur regardless, it is relevant to understand whether Cardano is buying fair market value or disproportionately subsidizing an already existing commercial infrastructure.
This point is especially important because the proposal requests public resources for a sponsorship package inside an event with multiple potential revenue sources.
Favorable external reviews tend to emphasize Rare Network’s execution history, the value of in-person interactions, the importance of Dev Gov Day, the need for Cardano’s external presence, the limited availability of large events for the ecosystem, the value of a Cardano-native and independent initiative, and alignment with governance, community, and visibility.
Cautious or opposing reviews tend to emphasize high cost in a constrained context, a proposal focused on insiders, difficulty proving ROI, absence of KPI targets, the fact that the event will occur without funding, travel, lodging, food and hospitality costs, the 2027 deposit, recurrence risk, lack of clarity on financial return, geographic concentration, and preference for infrastructure, direct adoption, liquidity, tooling, or distributed funding.
These reviews are useful as deliberative input, but do not replace the proposal itself.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO.
The proposal has real merits: Rare Network has history, Rare Evo is relevant for part of the ecosystem, Dev Gov Day has clearer public value, execution risk appears low, and there are positive elements such as free access, booths, livestream, media coverage, and partial return of VIP ticket sales to the Treasury.
However, these positive points do not overcome the central gaps of the proposal.
The package is expensive, concentrated, includes low-priority hospitality and travel support items, mixes Dev Gov Day with title sponsorship and perks, includes a deposit for 2027, lacks minimum KPI targets, and funds the amplification of an event that will occur independently of the Treasury.
The absence of KPI targets is a critical problem. For an event proposal, there should be clear targets for participation, reach, media, projects, developers, enterprises, Treasury return, diversity, and follow-up. Without this, there is no objective criterion to evaluate success proportional to expenditure.
The most consistent position is to recognize the value of Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day, but reject the current structure of the proposal as an inadequate use of the Treasury at this moment. The NO vote is based on fiscal prioritization, absence of KPI targets, low marginal utility of another governance workshop, geographic concentration, hospitality and travel support items, bundling, and weak alignment between spending and measurable impact.
A future proposal would be more defensible if it were smaller, separated Dev Gov Day from title sponsorship, removed hospitality-heavy items and future deposits, presented clear KPI targets, included a Treasury return projection, detailed the total event budget, and demonstrated measurable external impact.
4. Conclusion
Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day have recognizable value, and Rare Network has execution history. The current package, however, combines high cost, geographic concentration, hospitality and travel support, bundling, lack of KPI targets, uncertain financial return, and a 2027 pre-commitment. On that basis, the current Treasury withdrawal is not justified.
Relatório de Ação de Governança [PT]
1. Introdução
A ação de governança é uma Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action que solicita ₳2.750.000 do Tesouro da Cardano, usando uma referência de US$0,24 por ADA, equivalente a US$660.000. Os recursos posicionariam a Cardano como title sponsor do palco principal e do livestream global da Rare Evo 2026, além de apoiar o segundo Rare Dev Gov Day 2026, um evento técnico, de governança e coordenação comunitária focado em Cardano, previsto para 28 de julho de 2026, no ARIA Las Vegas.
A proposta cobre dois pacotes de sponsorship: Rare Evo 2026 Cardano Title Sponsorship e Cardano Dev Gov Day 2026 Sponsorship. Ela i
- No260.2K ₳No rationale
- No245.5K ₳Rationale
Sticking with my stance that these market conditions are not ones to be spending so much Ada on marketing/events.
- No238.8K ₳Rationale
- Treasury runway is shrinking rapidly and must be protected.
1.51 - 1.62B ADA remains ($260M USD at ~0.16 USD/ADA). The 350M ADA 2026-27 NCL already risks ~21% drawdown. Aggressive prior spending + ADA weakness demands selectivity to avoid depletion before real adoption. - Infrastructure is important, but it is not the primary bottleneck. Cardano's core tech is solid. The ecosystem stalls on adoption, liquidity, developer experience, and compelling use cases (DeFi, RWAs, revenue-generating apps). Broad infrastructure funding without adoption KPIs won't drive organic ADA demand.
- Hoskinson's concerns deserve respect, but governance requires balance. Core maintenance matters for competitiveness. DRep duty is long-term sustainability: not unlimited spending. Past allocations often failed to yield proportional TVL/users/ADA utility. Prioritize evidence-based proposals.
- Better capital allocation strategy: Favor high-leverage use-case initiatives, especially RWAs and revenue generating applications that commit to direct revenue or ADA return mechanisms back to the treasury, with clear milestones, private co-funding, and proven traction. Target specific tech unlocks only when tightly tied to measurable adoption impact. This builds real value without creating dependency.
- Treasury runway is shrinking rapidly and must be protected.
- No234.2K ₳No rationale
- No233.2K ₳No rationale
- No232.7K ₳No rationale
- No228.3K ₳No rationale
- No215.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes200.5K ₳No rationale
- No191.1K ₳No rationale
- No182.2K ₳No rationale
- No178.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes142.5K ₳No rationale
- Abstain131.9K ₳Rationale
I lean ABSTAIN primarily because of the “event happens anyway” framing combined with the size of the request for incremental title sponsorship. However, the marginal value at this price point feels difficult to justify against higher-priority technical and infrastructure needs.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This proposal is facing substantial pushback in current voting, and the objections are substantive rather than reflexive.
The core framing problem (repeated across multiple DRep rationales):
The proposal explicitly states that Rare Evo 2026 will occur regardless of treasury funding. This means the ask is primarily for incremental title branding and expanded presence on an already Cardano-centric event, not for keeping a critical platform alive. - No110.9K ₳No rationale
- Abstain108.3K ₳Rationale
Due to current limitations in our governance process, I will cast abstain votes on most upcoming proposals. The existing framework does not provide the adequate structure, clarity, or time required to make well-informed funding decisions. Moving forward, I will only vote "Yes" on initiatives that are absolutely critical to the network's immediate survival and success. I sincerely apologize to the teams who have dedicated time and effort to their proposals; you deserve a more robust evaluation system. Right now, my priority must shift from assessing standard funding requests to actively improving our governance infrastructure, ensuring we no longer have to make rushed decisions with insufficient information.
- No69.4K ₳No rationale
- No64.4K ₳No rationale
- No55.9K ₳No rationale
- No50.5K ₳No rationale
- No45.2K ₳Rationale
It's insanely huge amount for 1 event. Such proposals should go via Project Catalyst, so please return Project Catalyst. For this amount of money we can organize hundreds of events worldwide.
- No26.7K ₳Rationale
Obviously no.
- Yes15.5K ₳No rationale
- No15.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain10.8K ₳No rationale
- No8.1K ₳No rationale
- No6.7K ₳No rationale
- No1.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes682 ₳No rationale