Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 647 to 649.
130 DReps voted · 55 with a rationale · 1 changed their vote · 1 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 1 to no, together voting with 5.4M ₳ of voting power.
Voting concentration
6 of 130 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 14.9%, top 5 combined 47.8% of 3.9B ₳ voted.
The 9 largest voters together held as much voting power as the 67.0% threshold required in yes votes.
- No285.2K ₳No rationale
- No275.2K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on “Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal.” The proposal aims to create an independent structure dedicated to managing open-source sustainability funds for the Cardano ecosystem, including a new public charity, two advisory councils, and a 2,000,000 ADA maintenance fund for “critical” open-source infrastructure, all coordinated under a one-year program. It frames itself as an execution-focused, governance-accountable alternative to traditional foundations and DAOs, with the administrator role initially held by the proposer and DReps able to replace the administrator or sunset the program via Info Action.
While the motivation is understandable — Cardano does rely heavily on underfunded open-source infrastructure and maintainers — this proposal addresses that problem by introducing yet another central entity whose primary function is to allocate funds, rather than by funding specific, well-scoped OSS projects or tooling directly. Creating a new branded program, legal entity, and advisory structure that sits between the Treasury and open-source projects increases the number of secondary allocators in the ecosystem and adds another layer of coordination and politics, when the broader governance trend should be toward reducing such intermediary structures.
The structure also concentrates significant discretion in a single administrator role for the term of the program. Although the proposal emphasizes that councils are advisory, that the charter will be published, and that DReps can replace the administrator or shut the program down by Info Action, the practical effect for the year is still that one new entity and its initial administrator are being funded to decide, at their discretion, which projects receive multi-tier retainers and under what conditions. That is a material governance decision in itself, and it is not clear that creating a new allocator is the best way to achieve open-source sustainability.
Finally, the proposal remains broad in scope relative to the specificity of the requested allocation. It speaks in general terms about dependency audits, bus-factor metrics, contributor pathways, and commercial open source transitions, but leaves the concrete list of funded projects, specific deliverables for each, and clear exit conditions largely to the future program’s discretion after funds are granted. In this budget cycle, with multiple existing institutions already involved in ecosystem and open-source support, I do not believe it is prudent to establish another independent entity to manage unspecified “sustainability funds,” even for a limited initial term. For these reasons, I am voting NO.
- Abstain268.9K ₳No rationale
- Abstain260.8K ₳Rationale
Abstaining. The need for OSS maintenance is real and the proposer's track record is solid, so a NO isn't warranted. But a 4.1M ADA withdrawal released upfront to a sole administrator, with no milestone-gated disbursement, is a structural risk that doesn't merit a YES either. A resubmission with tranched, milestone-based releases would be supportable.
- No189.8K ₳No rationale
- No185K ₳No rationale
- No161.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes157.8K ₳No rationale
- No157.8K ₳No rationale
- No149.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain142.9K ₳No rationale
- No124.6K ₳No rationale
- No95.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes85.7K ₳Rationale
EN — iFly (SWADA) votes YES. This program funds sustained maintenance of the open-source libraries, SDKs, indexers and tooling Cardano builders depend on — an under-funded layer that is otherwise a systemic single point of failure. It is a scaled-down 12-month pilot (4,094,000 ADA) with sunset clauses and an on-chain-replaceable administrator.
Disclosure of interest: in keeping with the transparency I promised in my DRep profile, my own project (Intellishares / Clastenium) is built directly on community tooling of exactly this kind — for example Ogmios, Kupo and Lucid. I judge the network-wide benefit to be real independently of that interest, but disclose it so my vote can be weighed accordingly.
Reservation: funds are released to a single-key stake address rather than escrow, with sole allocation authority for roughly the first six months. I would prefer escrowed, milestone-released custody, and I support the on-chain replaceability and sunset mechanisms if oversight lags. On balance the builder-foundation benefit and modest size outweigh this concern. I vote YES.
SV — iFly (SWADA) röstar JA. Programmet finansierar långsiktigt underhåll av de bibliotek, SDK:er, indexerare och verktyg med öppen källkod som Cardanos byggare är beroende av — ett underfinansierat lager som annars är en systemisk sårbarhet. Det är ett nedskalat tolvmånaderspilotprojekt (4 094 000 ADA) med avvecklingsklausuler och en administratör som kan bytas ut on-chain.
Redovisning av intresse: i enlighet med den transparens jag utlovat i min DRep-profil är mitt eget projekt (Intellishares / Clastenium) byggt direkt på öppen källkod av just detta slag — till exempel Ogmios, Kupo och Lucid. Jag bedömer att nyttan för hela nätverket är verklig oberoende av det intresset, men redovisar det så att min röst kan vägas därefter.
Invändning: medlen betalas ut till en stakeadress med en enda nyckel i stället för escrow, med ensam beslutanderätt de första cirka sex månaderna. Jag hade föredragit en spärrad, delmålsstyrd förvaring, och jag stödjer mekanismerna för utbyte och avveckling on-chain om tillsynen brister. Sammantaget väger nyttan för byggarnas grundinfrastruktur och den blygsamma storleken tyngre än denna oro. Jag röstar JA. - Yes85.6K ₳Rationale
EN — iFly (SWADA) votes YES. This program funds sustained maintenance of the open-source libraries, SDKs, indexers and tooling Cardano builders depend on — an under-funded layer that is otherwise a systemic single point of failure. It is a scaled-down 12-month pilot (4,094,000 ADA) with sunset clauses and an on-chain-replaceable administrator.
Disclosure of interest: in keeping with the transparency I promised in my DRep profile, my own project (Intellishares / Clastenium) is built directly on community tooling of exactly this kind — for example Ogmios, Kupo and Lucid. I judge the network-wide benefit to be real independently of that interest, but disclose it so my vote can be weighed accordingly.
Reservation: funds are released to a single-key stake address rather than escrow, with sole allocation authority for roughly the first six months. I would prefer escrowed, milestone-released custody, and I support the on-chain replaceability and sunset mechanisms if oversight lags. On balance the builder-foundation benefit and modest size outweigh this concern. I vote YES.
SV — iFly (SWADA) röstar JA. Programmet finansierar långsiktigt underhåll av de bibliotek, SDK:er, indexerare och verktyg med öppen källkod som Cardanos byggare är beroende av — ett underfinansierat lager som annars är en systemisk sårbarhet. Det är ett nedskalat tolvmånaderspilotprojekt (4 094 000 ADA) med avvecklingsklausuler och en administratör som kan bytas ut on-chain.
Redovisning av intresse: i enlighet med den transparens jag utlovat i min DRep-profil är mitt eget projekt (Intellishares / Clastenium) byggt direkt på öppen källkod av just detta slag — till exempel Ogmios, Kupo och Lucid. Jag bedömer att nyttan för hela nätverket är verklig oberoende av det intresset, men redovisar det så att min röst kan vägas därefter.
Invändning: medlen betalas ut till en stakeadress med en enda nyckel i stället för escrow, med ensam beslutanderätt de första cirka sex månaderna. Jag hade föredragit en spärrad, delmålsstyrd förvaring, och jag stödjer mekanismerna för utbyte och avveckling on-chain om tillsynen brister. Sammantaget väger nyttan för byggarnas grundinfrastruktur och den blygsamma storleken tyngre än denna oro. Jag röstar JA. - No65.9K ₳No rationale
- No63.1K ₳No rationale
- No62.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain56.4K ₳Rationale
I vote ABSTAIN for this proposal
- No48K ₳No rationale
- Abstain35.1K ₳No rationale
- No31.8K ₳No rationale
- No19.4K ₳No rationale
- No15.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain15.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes6.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes3.6K ₳No rationale
- No293.8 ₳No rationale
- Abstain167.1 ₳No rationale
- Yes0 ₳No rationale