Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal
124 DReps voted · 50 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain575M ₳Rationale
"Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision."
- No384.3M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
- AbstainRevoted331.6M ₳History
Earlier votes
Abstain20d agoSuperseded
- Abstain299.7M ₳Rationale
"EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal, with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved."
- No258.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain175.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain171.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain90.6M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to ABSTAIN on the proposal: Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal
My rationale:
I voted NO on the previous version of this proposal, which requested ₳12M over 36 months. I appreciate that the proposer has incorporated a meaningful amount of the feedback received from DReps.
The revised proposal limits the commitment to one year and reduces the total request to ₳4.094M. It more clearly designates the administrator and independent auditor, introduces quarterly financial reviews, strengthens public reporting, commits to returning some undeployed funds, and provides a more transparent, data-driven process for identifying critical open-source dependencies. The proposed dependency audit, public health dashboard, selection rubric, and maintenance retainers could provide real value to Cardano.
However, I am not yet ready to support the complete proposal.
Although the headline budget has fallen from ₳12M to ₳4.094M, the annual spending rate has not materially decreased. The revision largely separates the first year of the previous three-year program rather than substantially reducing its annual cost or scope. It still combines maintenance funding with mentorship, attestations, bounties, hackathons, activation programs, legal entity formation, councils, and operational infrastructure.
Governance also remains highly concentrated. The two councils are advisory and have no approval or veto authority, while Christian Taylor and Open Source Cowboy Consulting retain final allocation authority. The proposal states that DReps can replace the administrator or terminate the program through an Info Action. However, an Info Action does not technically transfer wallet control, terminate legal agreements, or enforce the return of funds. This safeguard therefore depends on off-chain agreements and the administrator’s commitment to respect the result.
Several budget questions also remain. The ₳333k reserve in the Maintainer Development Program is highly discretionary and is not explicitly included among the reserves that must be returned if unused. Some participant calculations in WP3 do not clearly reconcile with the stated totals. The ₳100k operational contingency referenced in the repayment conditions is also not clearly separated in the WP1 budget. In addition, WP3, WP4, and WP5 would benefit from milestone and acceptance criteria comparable to those provided for WP1 and WP2.
I would also appreciate a clearer report on how much prior funding POSM received, what it delivered, what did not work, and which responsibilities this new structure is expected to replace.
If this version is not approved, I suggest returning with a narrower pilot focused primarily on the dependency audit, public health dashboard, and a limited first cohort of maintenance retainers. The mentorship, bounty, and ecosystem activation programs could then be proposed after the core model has demonstrated measurable results. Stronger multisig or staged-disbursement controls, an enforceable administrator-replacement process, clearer reserve rules, reconciled budget calculations, and a detailed overlap analysis would further improve the proposal.
I am abstaining to recognize the proposer’s constructive response to previous feedback and the substantial improvements made. This should not be interpreted as support for the current structure or complete budget, but as an acknowledgment that the proposal is moving in a better direction and may become approvable with further refinement.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
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https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - No88.4M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes NO on the treasury withdrawal "Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal" (4,094,000 ada).
SIPO voted No on the original 12,000,000 ada version of this program in June 2026, and set out three conditions on which its view would change. This revision meets none of the three, and explicitly declines one of them. SIPO's position is therefore unchanged in substance.
SIPO records what has genuinely improved. The request is down about 66%, from 12,000,000 to 4,094,000 ada, and the term is twelve months rather than thirty-six. The two advisory councils must now formally record their feedback before any disbursement under Work Packages 2 through 5. Quarterly reports carry an attached financial review by the Mill Law Firm, and the KPI set is sharper - CHAOSS-aligned health metrics, dependency-centrality coverage targets, and explicit bus-factor goals for the top-centrality projects. The underlying problem is also real, and SIPO said so when it voted on the original: a large share of the open-source software Cardano depends on is maintained by very few contributors, without succession planning or continuity funding, and the systemic risk of an unmaintained critical dependency is well documented. None of what follows is a judgement on the importance of that problem or on the competence of the proposer.
On the first condition - that the program be coordinated with, or routed through, the Intersect budget process and the Paid Open Source Model so the ecosystem funds one canonical open-source mechanism rather than two - the revision engages the concern but does not resolve it. The proposal states it is intended to replace and evolve the prior Paid Open Source Model work. But it is again submitted as a direct treasury withdrawal outside the Intersect budget process, and it states that core operations must remain deliberately independent. A replacement asserted by the proposer is not the same as a coordination that leaves the ecosystem with a single canonical mechanism.
On the second condition - administration through on-chain-enforced, audited escrow - the revision does not move at all. The withdrawal recipient remains a single-key stake address, not a script. On enactment, 4,094,000 ada would flow to a key-controlled wallet. The on-chain elements the proposal describes are attestations of contributor progress and the publication of reports; they concern deliverables, not custody. Every safeguard in the program - milestone acceptance, council feedback, the reserve, the sunset criteria, the return of unused funds - therefore remains a promise dependent on the key holder rather than a control enforced on-chain. SIPO applied this same standard in Epoch 645 when it voted No on the Global Order Book withdrawal, at a smaller amount, and it applies here.
On the third condition - that the independent legal entity and the advisory councils be constituted before funds are released - the revision explicitly declines. The proposal states that the administrator role is filled by the proposer at withdrawal, and that the councils and the public charity are additive governance improvements, not preconditions for fund administration. Council feedback is recorded, in the proposal's own words, without conditioning administrator authority. The 501(c)(3) public charity is targeted for month six, and the proposal notes it cannot be completed without initial capital. Funds precede the entity by design, which is the arrangement SIPO asked to see reversed.
SIPO also notes how the replaceability safeguard functions. DReps may replace the administrator or sunset the program through an on-chain Info Action, and the proposer commits to sponsoring such an action at the request of fifteen or more DReps. SIPO reads this as a good-faith commitment rather than a control: an Info Action carries no enforcement over a key-controlled wallet, and the sponsorship is voluntary. It is a statement of intent, and it should be described as one.
SIPO would support a structure that routes custody through an audited, on-chain-enforced escrow so that the milestone, council, and refund controls are cryptographically enforced; that constitutes the legal entity and the councils before funds are released rather than after; and that is coordinated with the Intersect budget process so the ecosystem funds one canonical open-source sustainability mechanism rather than two. Those were SIPO's terms in June and they remain its terms now. SIPO would welcome that revision. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep は、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal」（4,094,000 ADA）に反対（NO）を投じます。
SIPO は 2026 年 6 月、本プログラムの原案（12,000,000 ADA）に反対を投じ、その際に見解が変わる条件を 3 つ明示しました。本改訂版はその 3 つのいずれも満たしておらず、うち 1 つは明示的に退けています。したがって SIPO の立場は実質的に変わりません。
SIPO は、実際に改善された点を記録します。要求額は 12,000,000 ADA から 4,094,000 ADA へ約 66% 減額され、期間は 36 ヶ月ではなく 12 ヶ月になりました。2 つの諮問評議会は、ワークパッケージ 2 から 5 の支出に先立ってフィードバックを正式に記録することが求められるようになりました。四半期報告には Mill 法律事務所による財務レビューが添付され、KPI もより具体的です（CHAOSS 準拠の健全性指標、依存中心性のカバレッジ目標、中心性上位プロジェクトに対する明示的な bus factor 目標）。課題そのものが実在することも、SIPO は原案への投票時に述べたとおりです。Cardano が依存するオープンソースソフトウェアの多くは、ごく少数の貢献者によって、継承計画や継続的な資金もないまま維持されており、重要な依存先が保守されなくなる系統的リスクは広く文書化されています。以下に述べることは、その課題の重要性や提案者の能力に対する評価ではありません。
第一の条件、すなわち Intersect の予算プロセスおよび Paid Open Source Model と調整・統合し、エコシステムが 2 つではなく単一の canonical なオープンソース機構に資金を出す形にすること。改訂版はこの論点に向き合っていますが、解決はしていません。提案は、従来の Paid Open Source Model の作業を「置き換え、発展させる」ことを意図すると述べています。しかし本件は再び、Intersect の予算プロセスの外で direct treasury withdrawal として提出されており、かつ「core operations は意図的に独立を保たなければならない」と明言しています。提案者が自ら「置き換える」と主張することは、エコシステムに単一の canonical な機構を残す「調整」とは同じではありません。
第二の条件、すなわちオンチェーンで強制される監査済みの escrow を通じた管理。改訂版はまったく動いていません。引き出し先は依然として script ではなく単一署名鍵の stake アドレスです。可決時には 4,094,000 ADA が鍵管理ウォレットに着金します。提案が述べるオンチェーン要素は、貢献者の進捗に対する attestation と報告の公開であり、これらは成果物に関するものであって、資金の保管に関するものではありません。したがって本プログラムの安全装置 — マイルストーン検収、評議会のフィードバック、準備金、sunset 基準、未使用資金の返還 — はいずれも、オンチェーンで強制される制御ではなく、鍵保有者に依存する約束のままです。SIPO はエポック 645 において、より少額の Global Order Book 引き出しに反対した際にも同じ基準を適用しており、本件にも同じく適用します。
第三の条件、すなわち独立した法人と諮問評議会が資金解放の前に構成されること。改訂版はこれを明示的に退けています。提案は、管理者（administrator）の役割は引き出しの時点で提案者が担うと述べ、評議会と public charity は「追加的なガバナンス上の改善であり、資金管理の前提条件ではない」と記しています。評議会のフィードバックは、提案自身の言葉で「管理者の権限を条件づけることなく」記録されます。501(c)(3) の public charity は 6 ヶ月目を目標とし、提案はそれが初期資金なしには完了し得ないと注記しています。資金が法人に先行する構造は設計上のものであり、これはまさに SIPO が逆にするよう求めた点です。
SIPO は、交代可能性という安全装置がどう機能するかについても記します。DRep はオンチェーンの Info Action を通じて管理者を交代させ、あるいはプログラムを終了させることができ、提案者は 15 名以上の DRep の要請があればその Info Action を sponsor すると約束しています。SIPO はこれを制御ではなく誠意の表明と読みます。Info Action は鍵管理ウォレットに対して執行力を持たず、sponsor も自発的なものだからです。これは意思の表明であり、そのように記述されるべきものです。
SIPO は、次の条件を満たす構造であれば支持します。マイルストーン・評議会・返還の各制御が暗号学的に強制されるよう、監査済みでオンチェーン強制の escrow を通じて資金を保管すること。法人と評議会を、資金解放の後ではなく前に構成すること。そして Intersect の予算プロセスと調整し、エコシステムが 2 つではなく単一の canonical なオープンソース持続可能性機構に資金を出す形にすること。これらは 6 月における SIPO の条件であり、いまも変わりません。SIPO はその条件での改訂を歓迎します。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No85M ₳Rationale
I do not believe in this type of abdication of the power of the purse by the dReps. Easy "no" vote.
- No77.8M ₳No rationale
- No75.9M ₳Rationale
I agree that open source sustainability is important for Cardano. However, this proposal does not sufficiently demonstrate why a new legal entity, multiple advisory councils, and an operational team are necessary to manage approximately 4.09 million ADA.
Projects requiring support can apply directly to the Treasury, and funding could also be administered through existing structures, including Intersect. Where existing channels may already be capable of addressing the problem, creating another intermediary organization with substantial operating costs introduces unnecessary complexity, duplication, and concentration of authority.
The problem is valid, but I am not convinced that the proposed structure is the most efficient or necessary solution. For that reason, I am voting No.
オープンソースの持続可能性がCardanoにとって重要であることには同意します。しかし、その支援のために新たな法人、複数の評議会、運営チームを設立し、約409万ADAを一つの管理構造に委ねる必要性は十分に示されていません。
支援を必要とするプロジェクトはTreasuryへ直接申請することができ、Intersectを含む既存の組織や仕組みを通じて支援する選択肢もあります。既存の経路で対応できる可能性がある中、新たな中間組織と大きな固定運営費を追加することは、不要な複雑性、重複、権限集中を生むリスクがあります。
課題そのものは重要ですが、提案されている構造が最も効率的で必要不可欠な解決策であるとは判断できないため、反対します。
- No74.6M ₳No rationale
- No73.6M ₳Rationale
While sustaining Cardano's open-source infrastructure is critical, handing over 4 million ADA to a single individual administrator at launch creates an unacceptable centralization risk.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
While sustaining Cardano's open-source infrastructure is critical, handing over 4 million ADA to a single individual administrator at launch creates an unacceptable centralization risk. This budget is far too expensive for an unproven pilot program in current market conditions, especially before the planned legal entity is even fully operational. I urge the proposer to return with a significantly reduced budget and a decentralized, multi-sig control structure from day one.
- No53.8M ₳Rationale
I'm voting No on the Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal.
This proposal tries to solve the open-source maintenance gap through a single-person discretionary structure without even a multisig, and by creating yet another intermediary allocation body, so I can't support it.
The structure is far too centralized on one person. The councils are advisory only, and replacing the operator via Info Action is non-binding, which means it ultimately depends on the cooperation of the very person being replaced. There isn't even a simple multisig with trusted members of the community.
This is yet another intermediary allocation body. Instead of funding well-defined individual OSS projects directly, it inserts a new organization whose main function is allocation between the treasury and the projects. Maintenance funding is already flowing well through direct withdrawals, and adding a secondary allocator only adds another layer.
This isn't a vote against open-source sustainability. I just can't entrust the treasury to a structure like this, so I'm voting No.
- Abstain51M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- No50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on this proposal. This year's Net Change Limit (NCL) has been set well above the level I consider sustainable. Under my published voting framework, an appropriate NCL is roughly 15% of the previous year's staking rewards (on the order of 82M ADA), whereas the NCL currently in force is several times that amount. Because the treasury is already authorized to disburse far beyond my personal NCL threshold, I am voting No on all treasury withdrawal proposals until aggregate withdrawals are brought back within a sustainable limit — regardless of the individual merits of any single proposal. This vote reflects a position on total treasury spend, not a judgment on the value of your specific project. Reference: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/\n\n[Japanese version follows]\n\n本提案に反対票を投じます。今年のNet Change Limit（NCL）は、私が持続可能と考える水準を大幅に上回って設定されています。公開済みの投票フレームワークでは、適正なNCLは前年のステーキング報酬の約15%（82M ADA）ですが、現行のNCLはその数倍に達しています。トレジャリーは既に私のpersonal NCL（個人として許容する上限）を大きく超える出金が認められている状態にあるため、出金総額が持続可能な範囲に戻るまで、個別提案の良し悪しに関わらず、すべてのトレジャリー出金提案に反対票を投じます。本投票はトレジャリー支出全体に対する立場の表明であり、貴提案の価値そのものを否定するものではありません。参照: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem-jp/
- No49.5M ₳No rationale
- No47.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain39.9M ₳No rationale
- No37.4M ₳No rationale
- No37.3M ₳No rationale
- No34.5M ₳Rationale
これは国庫から資金を引き出して、特定の個人に分配権を握らせる仕組み。Intersectとと重複しないか疑問がある。
- No33.5M ₳Rationale
Vote: No. This action requests 4,094,000 ADA for a one-year open-source sustainability program, including maintenance retainers, contributor development, bounties, operations, and the creation of a new legal entity.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Cardano depends on open-source maintainers, and many important libraries and tools lack sustainable funding. The problem identified by this proposal is real. The Cardano First framework nevertheless reads No under Governance Transparency and Economic Sustainability.
The proposal does not sufficiently demonstrate why Cardano needs another legal entity, two advisory councils, and a new administrative layer to distribute maintenance funding. Projects can seek treasury funding directly, while existing ecosystem structures can administer shared programs without creating another permanent institution.
The advisory councils provide recommendations but have no veto authority. Final allocation responsibility remains with one administrator. The proposed mechanism for DReps to replace that administrator depends on commitments surrounding an Info Action rather than a direct on-chain enforcement mechanism.
A significant portion of the request also funds operations, governance infrastructure, contributor programs, and reserves instead of flowing directly to maintainers. Creating a new institution should require stronger evidence that existing channels cannot perform the work.
Cardano should fund critical maintainers, but it should do so through simpler structures with less duplication and clearer distribution of authority.
I vote No. - No31.4M ₳Rationale
NO — This proposal requests 4M ADA to establish and operate a new independent organization, which is not core, non‑optional infrastructure required for Cardano’s reliability or user access. While open‑source sustainability is important, creating a new administrative entity with staffing, operational costs, advisory councils, and multi‑program funding introduces long‑term Treasury dependency and significant ongoing financial obligations. The impact on adoption and protocol safety is indirect and uncertain, and the proposal overlaps with existing ecosystem structures such as Intersect’s open‑source programs. Under my criteria, Treasury funds must prioritize essential infrastructure and avoid large, recurring operational commitments. For these reasons, I vote NO.
- No28M ₳No rationale
- No27.9M ₳Rationale
I think this proposal aims to fill a real gap in Cardano open-source tool maintenance, but it comes at a time when there are many other competing priorities for funding. I think it might be better to build something like this from the ground-up on a much smaller scale.
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
Have every confidence in the group handling this proposal and am very glad to see a revised version submitted.
- No23.6M ₳Rationale
Imagine using public funds to build your own brand while failing to achieve the goals you were hired to do, then asking for funds to keep doing it. No, man. No.
- Abstain21.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes20M ₳Rationale
I say yes to this revised version, I see value in this. We need to support our open source ecosystem sensibly.
- No17.4M ₳Rationale
Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal
Vote: No
This proposal addresses a legitimate need: the long-term sustainability of Cardano’s open-source infrastructure. However, I cannot support it in its current form.
The structure places final control over 4.094 million ADA with a single administrator, while the proposed councils remain advisory and have no binding authority. At the same time, the program attempts to establish a legal entity, operate multiple funding programs, maintain two councils, fund critical projects, run mentorship initiatives, and provide audits within twelve months. The compensation allocated to the people expected to manage and deliver this work appears insufficient, and several budget calculations require clarification.
The objective is worthwhile, but the governance safeguards, budget accuracy, and execution plan are not strong enough for a treasury withdrawal of this scale. A revised proposal should include milestone-based withdrawals, shared control of funds, corrected financial calculations, and a more realistic scope.
For these reasons, I vote No.
- Abstain16.9M ₳Rationale
We agree that open-source sustainability is important for Cardano, and we support the idea of funding critical libraries, SDKs, tooling, indexers, and maintainer pipelines.
However, we are not fully comfortable voting YES in the current form. Our main concern is the proposed governance structure. We would prefer a DAO-style model where DReps and relevant technical experts are in the driving seat of the fund, rather than a new structure with final allocation authority concentrated around one administrator.
We also do not agree with the claim that DAOs and traditional foundations are inherently too vulnerable to political influence. Any structure can become political if accountability, transparency, conflict-of-interest rules, and selection criteria are weak.
The proposal would also benefit from clearer ADA/USD rate protection.
- Yes14.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA votes ABSTAIN on Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal.
This is a constructive abstention.
RCADA previously abstained on the earlier dOSPO and OMF proposal while noting that a smaller pilot would be easier to support. This revised version is meaningfully smaller and more focused, which RCADA recognises positively, but the key governance concerns around administrator concentration, advisory-only councils, and the not-yet-operational independent entity remain unresolved.
RCADA supports the underlying goal of improving open-source sustainability in the Cardano ecosystem. Cardano depends on many open-source tools, libraries, SDKs, indexers, governance tools, infrastructure components, and maintainers. A more systematic approach to identifying critical dependencies, reducing bus-factor risk, supporting maintainers, building contributor pipelines, and funding targeted maintenance work could provide meaningful public-good value.
RCADA also recognises that this revised proposal is an improvement over the earlier larger version. The request is now limited to 4,094,000 ADA over 12 months, with clearer work packages covering operations and governance infrastructure, a maintenance fund, maintainer development, CodeForUs bounties, and ecosystem activation.
RCADA sees value in several proposed components, especially the dependency audit, SBOMs, centrality scoring, bus-factor analysis, coverage-gap reporting, maintenance retainers, targeted bounties, and CHAOSS-aligned public reporting. These could help the ecosystem better understand which open-source components are most critical, most exposed, and most in need of sustained support.
RCADA also recognises Christian Taylor’s relevant open-source experience and prior contributions to Cardano. His previous role at Intersect, work on open-source governance structures, contribution frameworks, and the Paid Open Source Model, as well as his focus on maintainer sustainability and dependency-risk assessment, make him a credible proposer for this topic. Track record matters, and RCADA does not dismiss that expertise.
However, relevant expertise does not remove the need for strong institutional controls. RCADA is not comfortable voting YES because the governance structure remains too trust-heavy. At withdrawal, Christian Taylor / Open Source Cowboy Consulting is the sole Article II.7.5 administrator unless replaced by DReps through an on-chain Info Action. The advisory councils are advisory only, have no veto authority, and are formed after approval. The independent dOSPO legal entity is also a future deliverable, not an already-operational control layer at the time of funding.
Treasury governance should avoid creating new allocation layers where too much initial authority depends on one person or one private consultancy before independent governance structures are fully established. This is especially important where the funded program would influence which maintainers, tools, libraries, or open-source projects receive ongoing support.
RCADA also remains cautious about creating a new meta-funding structure instead of funding specific maintainers, tools, libraries, or open-source projects directly. A dedicated open-source sustainability layer may become valuable, but it needs especially strong controls because it would sit between Treasury funding and many downstream recipients. Selection formulas, conflict-of-interest rules, disbursement controls, renewal criteria, suspension criteria, and sunset conditions should be very clear and enforceable.
The proposal includes helpful safeguards, including quarterly reporting, Mill Law Firm as financial auditor, published advisory feedback before disbursements, DRep ability to replace the administrator or sunset the program, repayment of some undeployed reserves, dependency-based selection, and public health metrics. RCADA views these as meaningful improvements, but not enough to fully resolve the concern that the Treasury is being asked to fund a new allocation institution before its independent governance structure is operational.
RCADA would be more comfortable supporting a future version with the dOSPO entity established before withdrawal, stronger multi-party approval for large allocations, advisory bodies with more than advisory power over material disbursements, clearer conflict-of-interest and selection rules, and more enforceable reserve-return and sunset conditions. A smaller modular proposal focused first on dependency mapping, public dashboards, and a limited maintenance pilot may also be easier to support.
On balance, RCADA abstains because the proposal addresses a real ecosystem problem and is meaningfully improved, but the current governance structure does not yet provide enough confidence for a YES vote. RCADA encourages continued work on open-source sustainability and would welcome a tighter future proposal with stronger independent controls, clearer disbursement governance, and a more established institutional structure at the point of funding.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here: "https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/."
- No12.1M ₳Rationale
Critical libraries, developer tools, and shared infrastructure require long-term support, and the proposal rightly highlights the risks associated with maintainer burnout and dependency concentration. However, despite the importance of the problem being addressed, we are unable to support the proposal in its current form because several fundamental questions regarding governance, accountability, and value for money remain insufficiently answered.
Our primary concern is the absence of a clearly defined and objective framework for determining which projects qualify as "ecosystem-critical" and how funding decisions will ultimately be made. What specific methodology will be used to rank and select projects for funding, who has final authority over those decisions, and what safeguards exist to prevent conflicts of interest or preferential treatment? Without transparent and enforceable selection mechanisms, it is difficult to assess whether treasury resources will be allocated fairly and effectively.
We are also unconvinced that the proposal establishes measurable success criteria beyond the creation of governance structures and the distribution of grants. What concrete, auditable metrics will demonstrate that the program has improved ecosystem resilience, reduced maintenance risk, or strengthened the health of critical repositories after the twelve-month pilot period? Treasury funding should be tied to clear outcomes rather than administrative activities alone.
Another major concern relates to the overall efficiency of the proposed model. Why is the establishment of an entirely new organizational and administrative layer more effective than directly funding maintainers or leveraging existing treasury and Catalyst mechanisms? The proposal does not provide sufficient evidence that the additional governance overhead will generate value proportional to its cost.
Questions also remain regarding the allocation of the requested budget. Exactly how much of the ₳4.09 million allocation will reach maintainers and open-source contributors directly, and what proportion will be consumed by administration, governance operations, advisory bodies, audits, and other overhead costs? Without a detailed breakdown linking expenditure to expected outcomes, it is difficult to conclude that the proposal offers adequate value for money.
Finally, the proposal does not sufficiently address its long-term sustainability. What is the strategy for maintaining the dOSPO and OMF after the initial funding period, and how will the ecosystem avoid creating a permanent dependency on recurring treasury withdrawals? Before committing treasury resources to a new institution, voters need greater clarity on how it will achieve financial and operational sustainability beyond its first year.
- No10.9M ₳No rationale
- No10.4M ₳No rationale
- No8.6M ₳Rationale
本提案が目指すオープンソースソフトウェアの持続可能な保守・育成という目的や、そのための運営・ガバナンス体制を整備しようとする取り組みには価値があると考えます。また、前回提案から内容が改善され、Administrator、監査、資金返還などの仕組みがより明確になった点も評価しています。一方で、約₳4.094MというTreasury支出については、期待される成果に見合う費用対効果が十分に示されているとは判断できませんでした。そのため、私はこの提案に反対します。\n\n英語\n\nI vote No on this proposal. I recognize the value of its goal of establishing a sustainable framework for maintaining and developing open-source software within the Cardano ecosystem, and I appreciate the improvements made since the previous proposal, including clearer provisions for administration, auditing, and Treasury fund returns. However, I do not believe the proposed Treasury withdrawal of approximately ₳4.094M is sufficiently justified by the expected outcomes and overall value to the ecosystem. Therefore, I vote No on this proposal.
- No7.4M ₳Rationale
Voting NO
Use a blockchain explorer like https://cexplorer.io/ to read this rationale with Markdown enabled, it will allow you to see the tables properly and click on the links, etc.
I scored this proposal using my public rulebook and scoring system, available here: Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book version 17 - the Unified Commercial, Infrastructure, Marketing and Public-Goods Edition (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ed-IkSj4tDqys3D1jDMspgIZ7O9xSmxQsMPpB_b3DXA/edit?usp=sharing). The document is still evolving, but it reflects how I assess commercial and hybrid Treasury proposals.
The point of this process is to give some actionable feedback to proposers - in case they wish to resubmit.
I use AI assistance in this process because I want a scoring method that reflects my own thinking, but that I can apply as neutrally and consistently as possible across the large number of proposals. AI does not make the decision for me. It helps me structure the review, test the proposal against the same criteria, and spot issues I may otherwise miss. When a proposal is close to the necessary number of points, then I look at it even more closely. The point of the scoring framework is also to guide proposers towards elements I find important.
Rationale
Vote: No. Cardano needs stronger open-source maintenance. Christian Taylor has relevant experience and delivered related ecosystem work. The revised action is now published on-chain. Its final proposal is readable through public explorers. This fixes my earlier constitutional preflight concern. The action also encodes an on-chain withdrawal recipient. However, secondary accounts and custody controls remain unclear. One administrator still controls final allocations. The two councils cannot block unsuitable payments. An Info Action cannot directly move keys or funds. Several work packages lack complete milestone payment gates. Recovery, dispute, and replacement terms remain weak. ADA conversion rules also remain discretionary. The full request exceeds four million ADA. Rule Book v17 therefore treats it as very large. Such requests need at least ninety points. I score this proposal 64/100. Its mission is valuable, but its controls remain inadequate.
Governance action verification
Item Finding Proposal title Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal Governance action ID gov_action19apfhh339syqd0gkrxw6zr6pghdfspckr6vagjrpwnr0hx53lxpsq637y3tTransaction reference 2f429bde312c0806bd16199da10f4145da9807161e99d4486174c6fb9a91f983#0Action type Treasury Withdrawal Submitted 8 July 2026 Requested amount ₳4,094,000 Delivery period Twelve months Final action publication Confirmed Final proposal accessibility Confirmed Independent byte-level anchor hash check Not reproduced during this review Constitutional preflight treatment Pass with verification note Governance action links:
The Constitution still requires an immutable anchor and matching document hash. It also requires auditable administrator accounts and predefined abstain delegation.
Classification and decision
Test Finding Primary classification Open-source infrastructure and recurring maintenance Primary scorecard Commercial, Hybrid and Infrastructure Specialist overlay Recurring maintenance of genuine public goods Mixed-proposal treatment WP3 and WP5 also require public-good controls Requested amount ₳4,094,000 Request-size band Very large Reason for band Nominal request exceeds ₳4,000,000 Required score 90/100 Active Net Change Limit ₳350 million Share of NCL About 1.17% Decision reliability Sufficient for Yes or No Final vote No Rule Book v17 applies the highest triggered size test. The nominal request therefore controls the classification. The active NCL does not make the request automatically affordable. It only sets the maximum aggregate withdrawal exposure. (committees.docs.intersectmbo.org)
Full scoring table
# Category Maximum Score Assessment 1 Public value, additionality, timing, and harm 12 10 The maintenance need is credible and important. The initial dependency portfolio remains unknown. 2 Team quality, traction, and domain fit 7 6 Taylor has strong OSPO experience. Public POSM records show related delivery. They do not prove independent fund administration at this scale. 3 Improvement, innovation, and productive effect 6 5 Dependency centrality, SBOMs, health metrics, and attestations improve existing funding methods. 4 Price, budget realism, and ADA discipline 7 3 The budget lacks detailed rates, quotations, audit pricing, and conversion protections. 5 Integrity, conflicts, and prior outcomes 8 6 The revised proposal discloses earlier POSM funding. Conflict and related-party procedures need stronger enforcement. 6 Public assets, openness, and continuity 11 8 SBOMs, dashboards, records, and selection data create public value. Licences and transfer rights remain incomplete. 7 Treasury return, instrument fit, and risk sharing 12 6 Cardano receives maintenance services and public information. The Treasury carries nearly all financial risk. 8 Milestones, verification, and enforceability 12 6 WP1 and WP2 contain useful milestones. WP3 through WP5 lack complete payment and failure gates. 9 Risk management and resilience 9 5 Audits and public reporting help. Custody, key-person, legal, and conversion risks remain material. 10 Sustainability, exit, and succession 8 5 The legal entity and sunset plans help. Replacement and operational handover remain weak. 11 Portfolio exposure, neutrality, and decentralization 6 3 Selection uses public evidence. Final financial authority remains concentrated under one administrator. 12 Coordination and external demand quality 2 1 Several experts and organizations are named. Binding commitments and beneficiary demand remain absent. Total 100 64 Below the 90-point threshold Category minimums
Required category Required Awarded Result Public value 8/12 10/12 Pass Integrity and prior delivery 5/8 6/8 Pass Public asset and continuity 9/11 8/11 Fail Treasury return and instrument 5/12 6/12 Pass Milestones and enforceability 10/12 6/12 Fail Risk management 7/9 5/9 Fail Sustainability and succession 6/8 5/8 Fail Portfolio and neutrality 5/6 3/6 Fail Overall very-large threshold 90/100 64/100 Fail Hard-gate review
Hard gate Result Main finding Public purpose Pass The program targets credible Cardano infrastructure needs. Final governance action Pass The final Treasury Withdrawal is published on-chain. Immutable anchor Pass with note The full proposal is accessible. I did not independently recalculate its document hash. Named accountability Pass Christian Taylor and Open Source Cowboy Consulting are named administrators. Prior funding disclosure Pass Earlier POSM funding through Intersect is disclosed. Budget clarity Fail Rates, quotations, audit costs, and reserve rules remain incomplete. Instrument fit Concern A competitive procurement structure could reduce concentration. Milestone-linked payments Fail WP3, WP4, and WP5 lack complete milestone schedules. Independent verification Concern Audits are promised, but verifier scope and pricing remain unclear. Enforceability and recovery Fail No complete contract, jurisdiction, dispute process, or clawback system appears. On-chain recipient Pass A Treasury Withdrawal action encodes its withdrawal recipient. Secondary custody accounts Unverified Later holding, conversion, and operational accounts are not listed. Account segregation Concern Separate auditable account controls are not fully described. SPO and governance delegation Unverified The immutable proposal does not quote account delegation evidence. ADA volatility Fail Conversion timing and shortfall handling remain discretionary. Risk and continuity Fail Key-person and replacement execution risks remain significant. Neutrality and capture resistance Fail Advisory councils have no veto or payment-blocking power. Decision reliability Pass The remaining defects support No rather than Abstain. The Constitution requires separate auditable accounts when administrators hold Treasury funds. Those accounts cannot delegate stake to an SPO. They must use the predefined abstain governance option. The action’s existence does not prove every later account meets these rules. (Cardano)
Main financial and structural concerns
Concern Why it matters Full exposure under one administrator One person holds final authority over ₳4.094 million. Advisory councils lack veto power Published advice does not prevent an unsuitable payment. Info Action replacement mechanism An Info Action records sentiment but cannot move keys. Missing WP3 milestones ₳1 million lacks complete delivery and payment gates. Large WP3 reserve ₳333,000 has broad and weak release conditions. Audit budget unclear The Constitution requires funding for independent audits. Auditor role unclear Mill Law Center publicly describes itself as a law firm. Legal entity uncertainty Open-source 501(c)(3) approvals can face material legal hurdles. Conflicting formation timing The narrative mentions three months, while M1.2 allows six. ADA conversion discretion The administrator may choose conversion timing without limits. Contingency inconsistency A ₳100,000 contingency is promised but not clearly budgeted. Secondary accounts omitted Operational, conversion, and grant accounts remain unidentified. Mill Law Center has relevant nonprofit legal expertise. However, its public materials describe legal services, not independent accounting audits. The proposal should separate legal formation from financial assurance. (Mill Law Center)
Improvement packages
The point ranges below overlap. They are not automatic additions.
Package A — Custody and enforceability
Likely improvement: 8–11 points
- Quote the on-chain recipient account inside the proposal.
- Publish the anchor URL and matching document hash.
- List every operational and conversion account.
- Use separate accounts for each major work package.
- Prove that relevant accounts have no SPO delegation.
- Prove that governance delegation uses
alwaysAbstain. - Use a three-of-five independent multisignature wallet.
- Give independent signers emergency pause authority.
- Publish the binding administrator agreement.
- Name the applicable jurisdiction and dispute process.
- Add repayment, clawback, cure, and handover clauses.
- Transfer domains, records, repositories, and credentials after replacement.
- Keep Mill Law Center responsible for legal formation.
- Appoint a separate accounting firm for financial audits.
Package B — Verified tranches
Likely improvement: 7–10 points
Use separate Treasury Withdrawals or binding multisignature gates.
Stage Maximum release Example acceptance condition 1 ₳450,000 Accounts, contracts, signers, councils, and auditors established 2 ₳750,000 Dependency audit independently reproduced and accepted 3 ₳1,200,000 Retainer contracts signed after published selection 4 ₳900,000 Dashboard operates and contributor programs meet targets 5 ₳794,000 Quarterly audits pass and earlier outcomes remain compliant ₳4,094,000 The initial exposure would equal about 11%. That better matches very-large request discipline.
Each milestone should include:
Requirement Example Deliverable Published SBOMs for the top twenty dependencies Acceptance test Independent reproduction using published source data Evidence Repository, data export, signed report, and transaction record Verifier Named technical reviewer without payment authority Deadline Week twelve Payment Fixed tranche amount Cure period Fourteen days Failure rule Freeze later tranches and return uncommitted funds Package C — Budget and ADA controls
Likely improvement: 4–6 points
- Publish each role, rate, time allocation, and employment cost.
- Publish legal, accounting, hosting, and insurance quotations.
- Create a separate independent-audit budget line.
- Explain the ₳333,000 WP3 reserve.
- Define objective reserve release conditions.
- Reconcile the ₳100,000 contingency with the budget.
- State the ADA conversion reference price.
- Name the exchange-price source and observation period.
- Convert only approved quarterly fiat requirements.
- Return excess ADA from favourable price movements.
- Reduce scope after a defined ADA price decline.
- Publish monthly ADA and fiat reconciliations.
Package D — Demand, neutrality, and public rights
Likely improvement: 5–8 points
- Publish a preliminary dependency map before voting.
- Obtain signed demand letters from funded maintainers.
- Publish every candidate’s complete selection score.
- Publish administrator and council conflict disclosures.
- Require council approval for awards above ₳100,000.
- Give rejected applicants a documented appeal route.
- Use open tenders for major suppliers.
- Exclude administrator affiliates from program grants.
- Publish code, data, and methods under named licences.
- Publish all agreements after lawful redactions.
- Re-compete maintenance awards after twelve months.
- Require more than one maintainer for critical projects.
Package E — Reduce initial scope
Likely improvement: 3–7 points, or a lower threshold
A smaller pilot would test the administrator and selection process.
Alternative Scope ₳3.9 million Full program with a lower large-request threshold ₳950,000 Dependency audit, five retainers, and one cohort ₳500,000 Audit, dashboard, three retainers, and legal setup ₳250,000 Discovery, dependency mapping, and three small pilots The strongest commercial route is a ₳950,000 pilot. It would limit first-year downside. It would also produce evidence for later expansion.
Realistic pathways to approval
Path Required packages Threshold Estimated revised score Full ₳4.094 million A, B, C, D, and separate accounting audit 90 90–93 Reduced ₳3.9 million A, B, C, and D 85 86–90 ₳950,000 pilot A, B, and focused C controls 80 81–85 ₳500,000 pilot Basic A, B, and public selection data 80 80–83 ₳250,000 discovery Basic custody and verified deliverables 75 76–80 The full request could pass only with strong implementation. Written promises alone would not earn these points. Controls must appear in the immutable proposal. They must also bind the administrator before withdrawal.
Public evidence reviewed
- No7.2M ₳No rationale
- No5.9M ₳Rationale
dOSPO/OMF: Still abstain.
ALPHAGROWTH: YES. I support this proposal because growing Cardano's DeFi ecosystem, liquidity, and competitiveness is a strategic priority. While I would have preferred stronger attribution and performance metrics upfront, I believe the proposal contains sufficient milestone-based funding, reporting, and governance oversight to justify support. On balance, the opportunity cost of delaying a coordinated growth initiative outweighs the remaining execution risk.
Bifrost: NO. While I support Bitcoin interoperability as a concept, I am not convinced this proposal sufficiently demonstrates the value it will create for Cardano relative to its cost. This is the first phase of a multi-phase initiative that explicitly anticipates a future Treasury proposal for launch and operations, yet the proposal primarily relies on the expectation that Bitcoin liquidity and activity will naturally translate into meaningful value for Cardano. I would have preferred stronger evidence that this infrastructure is likely to drive measurable adoption, on-chain economic activity, and sustainable benefit to the ecosystem before committing Treasury funding to a longer-term roadmap.
Version 12 von Bergen: ABSTAIN, however know that this is starting to get a bit morbid.
Cardano Enterprise Ticketing: ABSTAIN. I support enterprise adoption as a strategic priority for Cardano, and I believe this proposal represents a legitimate opportunity. However, I remain divided on whether this is the right path for funding initiatives of this nature. I would have preferred to see enterprise opportunities evaluated through a dedicated catalyst or accelerator-style program rather than as standalone Treasury withdrawals. Given that uncertainty—and the broader community's differing views on the appropriate funding model—I am abstaining.
- No5.7M ₳No rationale
- No5.4M ₳No rationale
- NoChanged5.4M ₳Rationale
Reviewed and voting no. I suggest the team reach out to intersect and move from there.
Earlier votes
Abstain28d agoSuperseded
Needs further review. Will revisit.
- No4.6M ₳No rationale
- No4.4M ₳Rationale
This is an interesting initiative with a promising concept.
However, I do not believe it is necessary for our ecosystem at the present time.I also disagree with the proposed structure, particularly due to the lack of proper oversight, which I find concerning. Additionally, while the proposer has included an immediate shutdown mechanism, I consider the approach neither practical nor realistic.