Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget
220 DReps voted · 89 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote · 5 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 3 to yes, 1 to abstain, together voting with 115.7M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes11.9M ₳Rationale
We, the Wada DRep view the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget proposal as a timely strategy to deepen fiat-backed stablecoin markets on Cardano, remove slippage friction for builders and users, and create reusable public goods in governance contracts and legal scaffolding. The framing as an information action is appropriate for socialising the idea and gathering targeted feedback ahead of any request for funds.
We recognise clear strengths in the design. On-chain custody of LP tokens preserves auditability. A dRep-based oversight layer with freeze and shutdown powers embeds community control. The proposal sets concrete KPIs around slippage and yield, and phases work so a small legal and contract setup precedes any major deployment. These are reassuring features for a conservative treasury.
Our review still flags important open items that must be settled before treasury funds move. The legal structure remains a menu rather than a decision. While committee incentivisation is mentioned, time commitments, conflict disclosures, and incident response service levels are not yet defined. Price-impact controls for ADA liquidation need binding policies. The revenue model requires sensitivity analysis and clear downside responses.
Accordingly, we recommend that the forthcoming treasury withdrawal action address, as signed and verifiable artifacts, a full legal term sheet with jurisdiction, roles, liabilities, regulatory obligations, and costs. We expect audited contracts with admin and oversight keys, timelocks, emergency procedures, and proof that all LP tokens remain in the governance contract. We expect a named deployment plan per venue with allocations, venue-specific guardrails, exit criteria, and enforcement of the “max two per category” rule. We expect an execution policy for OTC and DCA, fee ladders, slippage and peg monitors, and auto-pause thresholds. We expect a reporting template and independent audit calendar published on-chain. We expect economic models with bear, base, and bull cases, treasury skim versus compounding, value-at-risk and drawdown limits, and venue caps. We expect governance details covering tDAO authorities, incident response timelines, compensation, rotations, and conflicts. We expect a one-year sunset with claw-backs and a concrete reversion plan to return remaining assets to the treasury if KPIs or risk limits are breached.
With those safeguards in place, the proposal can be assured of our yes vote on the upcoming TWA. In the meantime, because this is an information-gathering step, we vote Yes on this info-action to endorse the strategy and invite the team to integrate community feedback into a rigorous and auditable withdrawal package.
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.3M ₳Rationale
I want this to pass because Cardano needs liquidity but at the same time my reservations about the team managing the funds and how there are multiple conflicts of interest.
With these conflicts of interest, it is entirely possible that some of these members make money off who is selected from the DEXs, the ada delegation and possibly votes. There are multiple areas where there is no thought out plan and no answers given on the timeline, even after repetitive questions.
I want to vote yes and will but I will highly consider voting no, if they don't consider changes that are necessary.
- Yes10.2M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted9.8M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes11mo agoSuperseded
Yes11mo agoSuperseded
- Yes9.5M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES to support this proposal to help support Cardano's stablecoin and defi ecosystems. I have long been a proponent of DeFi in general and it's become clear over time there's just a little bit more needed for the ecosystem to ensure it can continue to grow with momentum.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting YES to support this proposal to help support Cardano's stablecoin and defi ecosystems. I have long been a proponent of DeFi in general and it's become clear over time there's just a little bit more needed for the ecosystem to ensure it can continue to grow with momentum.
Through months of feedback and socialization of this process I feel at this time the proposal is sufficient enough to address community concerns. It has a governed process (tDAO) that allows the community to more or less walk away from the process and return funds to the treasury if they desire. It also enables the community to choose managing members once this has been bootstrapped.
I do wish to see a broader coverage of stablecoin types eventually available, however for just the 50M ADA this is a good start leveraging USDM and USDA.
- Abstain8.9M ₳Rationale
RCADA has chosen to abstain at this time while reserving the option to review and update this vote prior to the voting deadline. This approach allows RCADA to allocate focus where immediate evaluation is most impactful, particularly on proposals that are close to threshold or raise significant procedural or constitutional concerns. If this proposal reaches the approval threshold prior to our review, the abstention will stand as a neutral signal of deferral, not opposition. Should further analysis be warranted, RCADA will update this vote accordingly.
- Yes7.7M ₳No rationale
- No7.6M ₳Rationale
I'll vote NO - see "ADDENDUM" at the end of this rationale for explanation why I will not vote YES for more spending in first year of minimum viable governance.
What follows from "THOUGHTS" below to the "ADDENDUM" are my thoughts on the process/proposal right now. If I made some mistakes, it wasn't on purpose. Could be my lack of knowledge, my lack of understanding, an oversight and/or just exhaustion from L2 Catalyst moderation stage. Anyway, feel free to ignore. Just thinking out loud and appreciate all efforts to create a better present & future for Cardano. I'm sorry, but I don't have time to shorten this rationale.THOUGHTS:
We have a system of minimum viable governance on Cardano today. I approach treasury funding with caution - as minimum viable governance is young and untested - especially in terms of ultimate outcomes.
In my opinion, this proposal is too big a bite for the first year of MVG. I do appreciate Elder Millennial's attempt to resolve a major issue on Cardano that was not resolved during the period of the Cardano Triumvirate (Emurgo, IOHK, and Cardano Foundation).
The objective makes sense. Cardano could benefit from deeper stablecoin liquidity. Yet, I have personal doubts that this can be implemented properly today with the current oversight abilities that we have, despite the good intentions.
For me the proposal expands the treasury’s role to a sort of a market-maker - not that it cannot be changed, but it is important to note it is being modified and this is a precedent. This early in on-chain minimum viable governance, the perceived risks to the treasury are greater than the perceived ecosystem benefits to me. A market-maker role is possibly also going to bias future net change limit (NCL) votes for 2026 as it normalizes protocol-owned liquidity and expectations for repeat funding - and having Emurgo, CF and IOHK reps in the committee could contribute to using this as a precedent for higher NCLs. This creates a sort of path dependence and expectations for repeat funding. Only one of the three above is not a major DRep.
I would have liked to see more reference to risk policies in regards to deploying the funds. Are there hard caps per issuer/protocol, a freeze playbook, rules for managing impermanent loss. I don't know, I'm not a DeFi expert - however, there could be some sudden market swings, depegs, etc... will there be a general rule / play book?
Legal structures to fully support the fund, the committee, and the tDAO will be proposed to the community, which addresses legal risk management but also further complexity at this early stage of governance. I understand they are necessary. Yet, complexity builds upon complexity.
Can we really predict that this will lead to good outcomes? The "three-body problem" - predicting the motion of three celestial objects under their mutual gravitational influence - apparently leads to chaotic and unpredictable orbits (sorry, reading the Deep Simplicity book right now, so this just crossed my mind) Are we setting up an unpredictable and untested set of bodies to manage stablecoin liquidity that will be seeded with a large sum of money from the treasury from the outset? With no pilot, small test of real viability?
The tDAO kill-switch/return-to-treasury is a good construct, still needs to be proven in practice.
Now, about the bodies. The committee executes, the tDAO (DReps) oversees. Speaking of the tDAO, representatives of some of the largest DReps are both in the committee, while their home orgs are performing oversight functions on the committee through the tDAO.
DRep oversight is not mature enough today. I doubt the ability of DReps this early in the governance game with the tools they have at their disposal - to monitor the true outcomes of complex liquidity operations in real-time - and to follow and react fast enough if problems emerge with the committee or its performance.
Concentration, capture, and political pressure are risks. The ethical considerations for the Committee are not strong enough. Some of the language - I will capitalize it: "In cases where a committee member is an employee of an organization that develops or runs a protocol, they SHOULD abstain from the vote. Other cases such as contract or consulting work MAY ALSO CONSIDER ABSTAINING on a case by case basis depending on the nature of the relationship." Mandatory recusals, public disclosures on every decision are needed from all committee members - overall I would like to see a more robust and airtight section on Ethical Considerations for the Committee and conflicts of interest. Add more guardrails, consider disinterested majority votes and public recusal logs.
Having heavyweight representatives from Cardano Foundation and Emurgo on the committee side while they’re also among the largest DReps (Emurgo additionally owns Yoroi wallet) is a concern for me. It concentrates influence in the committee and can sway tDAO oversight outcomes - they are large voting blocs of ADA.
EMURGO serves as the technology provider for USDA, although has not provided funding to Anzens Technology. A technology provider is a related party, still not neutral. Emurgo can still have economic and strategic incentives to sway events to its benefit. Those incentives create a related-party situation. This is less severe than direct ownership, but it is not neutral. Recusals and disinterested voting are underappreciated.
While Emurgo is a technology provider for one of the stablecoins, USDM is built by W3i Software, Inc. and issued by Moneta Digital, with support and investment from the Hoskinson Family Office, a venture co-founded by IOG founder Charles Hoskinson. However, IOHK is not a DRep and does not directly participate in governance as a DRep. IOHK and Charles not acting as DReps removes the direct DRep voting conflict. The office's investment in USDM’s issuer creates some economic alignment with a beneficiary of the program, which could be an indirect conflict - depending on the relationships between IOHK, the office, etc... The proposal should make sure that this is a conflict to be disclosed and properly managed as well.
Overall, to conclude, a smaller, time-boxed pilot with super strong conflict of interest management, KPIs and more rule books / play books may be more acceptable to me.ADDENDUM: No more YES votes from me in the first budget year of minimum viable governance (MVG). The current system of minimum viable governance - with heavy concentration of DRep power in the hands of a few DReps makes me even more wary of approving more treasury withdrawals. The majority of DRep power approved ₳272 million in treasury withdrawals in the first budget year of MVG. This effectively ties my hands for the rest of the budget year - apart from emergencies. I set a personal DRep limit to approve up to ₳200-250 million of spending in 1st year of MVG. I respected that. I voted YES to approve treasury withdrawals totalling around ₳172 million so far. As things stand, the upcoming @cardano_govtool proposal (if good and if submitted) could be my last YES vote to a Treasury Withdrawal this budget year, I see that as a necessity/emergency under MVG. Other emergencies may crop up - which might require an emergency YES vote if a true emergency.
- Yes7.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.5M ₳Rationale
I strongly support this initiative, as it aligns with the direction our ecosystem needs. With less than 35 million ADA to be converted into stables, this represents a bold and essential first step. We must lead in investing in our DeFi platforms and stablecoins, rather than lagging behind. I also endorse the 9 person committee structure, the process for selecting the DeFi protocol, the monthly revenue returns to the treasury, the involvement of DReps, and the composition of the interim committee!
Overall, a thoughtfully designed proposal.That said, a few aspects warrant clarification from the team.
I am dissatisfied with the rationale for prioritizing fiat backed stablecoins. The explanation that "it made more sense" lacks sufficient depth, particularly amid concerns raised by other DReps about potential conflicts of interest. I would like a clearer justification for not opting to mint assets like $DJED and $SHEN, for instance. Additionally, I have questions about the legal structures required for a decentralized protocol's token within a decentralized DeFi platform. I anticipate the committee will provide more detailed information in their next governance action.With that in mind, I will vote YES on this initial informational action, in eager anticipation of the subsequent steps.
- Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.9M ₳Rationale
I’m voting yes because Cardano badly needs deeper stablecoin liquidity. Without it, DeFi here will always lag behind other chains. This plan puts treasury funds to work in a way that grows the ecosystem while still keeping control in community hands.
The setup isn’t perfect, but it’s pragmatic: a 9-person multisig under oversight of the tDAO means no single group can run off with the money. Reports are public, funds sit in a contract, and revenue flows back to the treasury. That’s solid accountability.
Yes, fiat-backed stables are centralized, but they’re the only way to quickly get serious liquidity. Think of it as scaffolding — we use it now to build depth and volume, and later it helps attract more decentralized options and market makers.
Bottom line: it’s a smart, contained risk that gives Cardano a shot at real growth in DeFi.
- Yes4.8M ₳No rationale
- No4.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.2M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança (gov_action1u4j...t3alsy), pois ela tem o potencial de contribuir para a resolução de questões relevantes no cenário DeFi, na sustentabilidade da rede e na gestão do tesouro. Enfrentar o problema da baixa liquidez de stablecoins melhorará o "price impact" nas DEXs, aumentando o número de negociadores e as taxas geradas nos protocolos DeFi, o que beneficia os provedores de liquidez e estimula o crescimento do TVL. Isso também impulsiona a atividade on-chain, gerando mais transações, maior receita com taxas, aumento da rentabilidade do stake de ADA e novas oportunidades de marketing baseadas em métricas. Além disso, a proposta contribui para fortalecer os protocolos de stablecoins e gerar retornos para o tesouro. No entanto, é importante destacar preocupações quanto ao volume de recursos solicitado (50 milhões de ADA) e à forma como o DAO realizará a gestão de risco e a tomada de decisão com transparência e responsabilidade. Trata-se de uma iniciativa ousada, que, se bem executada, poderá gerar benefícios significativos em diversos aspectos. Esperamos que, na ação de governança referente ao saque do tesouro, sejam apresentados detalhamentos mais robustos sobre os processos decisórios, os critérios técnicos de operação e as salvaguardas de mitigação de riscos — priorizando a máxima eficiência de capital possível. Recomendamos, ainda, que o plano contemple a provisão de liquidez também em protocolos de livro de ofertas, como a Genius Yield, e não apenas em DEXs do tipo AMM. É fundamental manter diversificação, reavaliação constante das estratégias, metas bem definidas e mensuráveis, e comunicação transparente dos resultados.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action (gov_action1u4j...t3alsy), because it has the potential to address key challenges in the DeFi landscape, network sustainability, and treasury management. Tackling the issue of low stablecoin liquidity will improve the "price impact" on DEXs, increasing the number of traders and the fees generated across DeFi protocols, which benefits liquidity providers and stimulates TVL growth. This, in turn, boosts on-chain activity, generating more transactions, higher transaction fees, improved ADA staking returns, and marketing opportunities based on measurable metrics. The proposal also strengthens stablecoin protocols and creates opportunities for treasury growth. However, we note significant concerns regarding the large funding amount requested (50 million ADA) and the need for clear, transparent, and responsible risk management and decision-making processes within the DAO. This is a bold initiative that, if executed effectively, could yield substantial benefits across multiple fronts. We expect the forthcoming treasury withdrawal governance action to include greater detail on decision-making structures, technical criteria for operations, and robust risk safeguards aimed at achieving maximum capital efficiency. Additionally, we recommend that the plan include liquidity provision not only in AMM DEXs but also in order book protocols, such as Genius Yield. It is essential to ensure diversification, continuous reassessment of strategies, clearly defined and measurable goals, and transparent reporting of results. - Yes4M ₳Rationale
Liquidity Committee Proposal — Voting Rationale
Cardano’s limited liquidity has long been a friction point in the ecosystem’s growth. It’s reasonable to assume that this shortfall has constrained adoption relative to what might have been possible had deep liquidity pools and large stablecoins been established earlier. The exact impact is uncertain — but likely substantial.
Now that Cardano has viable, home-grown stablecoins and sufficient treasury resources to seed liquidity pools as a shared ecosystem asset, this proposal is timely and strategically sound.
⸻
Risk Perspective
As a fraud examiner, my concerns are not about the intent of this proposal but about the risk transfer — specifically, moving public funds currently safeguarded in the treasury to a smaller, semi-autonomous committee.
The proposal’s built-in guardrails appear thoughtful and reasonably designed to mitigate misuse or concentration risk. On that basis, I support proceeding.
However, approval carries an ongoing obligation for DReps: to exercise active oversight of the Committee’s operations and to ensure that its members are individuals of high integrity, technical competence, and relevant financial experience appropriate to be managing 50 million ADA.
⸻
Potential Design Flaw - Picks winners
The proposal’s governance document outlines a rule that limits support to “no more than two recipients of liquidity per DeFi category” (e.g., 2 stablecoins, 2 DEXes, 2 lending protocols, etc.).
While the intent — to avoid excessive fragmentation — is understandable, this mechanism effectively designates category leaders and risks entrenching incumbents. A more open or rotational allocation framework might better maintain competitive neutrality while still ensuring efficient liquidity concentration.
⸻
Suggested Improvement
Risk could be further reduced through staged disbursement
Designing the Withdrawal Info Action to allow the Committee to draw funds in multiple tranches — rather than in a single withdrawal — without another vote, would enable early testing of contracts and operational processes under real-world conditions before scaling up.Given that deployment will occur over time, tranching would not materially delay the program but would substantially reduce exposure to smart-contract or procedural failure, and minimize idle treasury funds awaiting allocation.
⸻
Conclusion
This proposal addresses a critical structural weakness in Cardano’s ecosystem and deserves support.
With proper governance, cautious rollout, and transparent oversight, it can help unlock the liquidity base that Cardano’s growth has long required — while maintaining the prudence expected of a decentralized public treasury.⸻
- Yes4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.9M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, my priority is to grow and protect the treasury. So this is a YES.
This proposal brings a clear 4% revenue stream back to the treasury and enables the whole Cardano DeFi/stablecoin ecosystem.
Strength and honor.
- Yes3.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.5M ₳Rationale
DeFi liquidity is needed in Cardano and therefore we support this initiative.
- Yes3.5M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged3M ₳Rationale
After an extensive review, I can confidently say I will be voting yes for this proposal.
DeFi Liquidity is a serious issue our ecosystem faces, and this proposal presents a solid solution with relatively low risk. Here are some key points to consider:
I would have expected the Cardano Foundation or EMURGO to fund something like this with genesis ADA, but once again the community and treasury are forced to fund it instead.
I would like to see some kind of contribution match by both the CF and EMURGO to bring up the stablecoin liquidity budget total to be higher, or to cover half the costs so the remainder can be returned to the treasury.
If the CF and EMURGO don't contribute financially to this proposal, I'd like to see their voting seats removed and replaced with other contributing members from the community.
When choosing vendors / exchanges, I would expect if any of the voting members have conflicts of interest, that they would abstain from voting.
Although this proposal would put the total spend above my personal NCL of 250 million ADA, the community has decided for a NCL of 350 million ADA and has already green lit a spend above my personal NCL. As a DRep I have to be responsive to community wishes, and this is one proposal I see as a true large scale infrastructure investment for our ecosystem, and not a proposal with high cost high risk and low ROI. It is needed, and should be accomplished sooner rather than later, so I believe this spend is valid for us to make to fill up the remainder of NCL for this year.
Thank you to everyone who has put so much work into this proposal, I appreciate your efforts to solve critical problems in our ecosystem.
Earlier votes
Abstain11mo agoSuperseded
As I have not yet had time to review this proposal, I have submitted a vote of Abstain for now.
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted2.7M ₳Rationale
I am voting yes on this proposal. Not only has the team behind this done a wonderful job socializing it on the timeline and answering all inquiries, but there is proven value to be had here, as stablecoin liquidity is imperative to the growth of the Cardano ecosystem.
Earlier votes
Yes10mo agoSuperseded
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
条件付き賛成。 本提案はスリッページ低減に正面から取り組み、安定通貨の板厚化によってCardano DeFiの使いやすさを改善する点を評価し、賛成します。公益性と波及効果も大きいと考えます。
ただし、次の改善を求めます：
- 財務への還元計算式を明確にすること
- 委員会メンバーの利益相反ルールを明文化すること
- 法定担保ステーブルの分散を確保すること
- 非常時縮退とKPI測定仕様を契約に組み込むこと
Conditional Yes. I support this proposal for its clear impact on reducing slippage and improving Cardano DeFi usability, while recognizing its public-good value and ecosystem benefits.
That said, I request the following improvements:
- Clarify the yield-to-treasury math
- Codify conflict-of-interest rules for committee members
- Diversify fiat-backed stablecoin exposures
- Hardwire emergency unwind and KPI measurement specs
- Yes2.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
It is a straightforward alleviation for an important pain point in the ecosystem. I expect a large marginal benefit going forward. It is also a new and experimental way of using the treasury and helps guiding future endeavors. The administrative structure and the plan in general seem credible.
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
It is time to deepen liquidity. I could push back on bits and piece but ultimately this is the closest team to addressing this issue and I want them to have their chance. I was against at higher amounts bc I want them to prove themselves. At 50m, this is a reasonable toe-dip in the broader problem of stablecoin liquidity. I prefer to plan in a crawl - walk - run capacity and this is a crawl. I want to see us work with the top DEXes and top lending and borrowing platforms. Specifically I like Minswap, Liqwid to be involved in this effort.
- Yes2.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳Rationale
Vote: YES — with strong reservations regarding the exclusion of DJED
After reviewing the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget proposal, I will be voting YES, as it represents a major strategic step forward for Cardano DeFi and the responsible evolution of our Treasury. However, I want to state clearly my dismay that algorithmic stablecoins—particularly DJED, Cardano’s native stablecoin—have been excluded from consideration.
Summary
This proposal requests a ₳50,000,000 allocation from the Treasury to deepen stablecoin liquidity across Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem.
The funds will form a balanced pool of ADA and fiat-backed stablecoins, deployed into DEXs and lending protocols to:Increase trading depth and efficiency
Provide a more reliable medium of exchange and unit of account for DeFi activity
Generate yield and diversify Treasury exposure
Strengthen Cardano’s competitiveness in on-chain liquidity and real-world adoption
A 9-member interim committee will manage deployment, subject to oversight by the Treasury DAO (tDAO), with on-chain checks such as:
Annual re-election or recall
Transparent reporting
Guardrails to remain within the Net Change Limit (NCL)
Why I Support It
Liquidity is the lifeblood of any DeFi ecosystem. Cardano’s weakness today is not technology—it’s depth and usability.
This proposal directly addresses that issue while introducing a repeatable, risk-managed framework for future Treasury deployments.I believe this design is both constitutional and pragmatic, aligning with:
Fiscal responsibility: It diversifies Treasury exposure, aims to generate returns, and keeps risk within defined parameters.
Decentralized governance: The tDAO oversight and recall powers align with the Constitution’s principles of accountability and transparency.
Ecosystem growth: It materially improves liquidity, user experience, and protocol attractiveness—supporting builders, DEXs, and lending markets.
If implemented well, it can serve as Cardano’s first on-chain sovereign liquidity engine, showing the ecosystem’s ability to self-organize, self-fund, and grow sustainably.
Where I’m Disappointed
Despite supporting this initiative, I am deeply disappointed that DJED has been excluded.
DJED is Cardano’s native algorithmic stablecoin, built on academic principles, overcollateralized in ADA, and powered by COTI’s transparent smart contract model. Excluding DJED from participation sends a negative signal to innovation and decentralization, especially when it embodies the scientific and open-source ethos that Cardano stands for.Yes, fiat-backed stablecoins offer near-term peg stability, but they rely on centralized custodians, off-chain collateral, and regulatory whims.
Cardano’s long-term vision is to build a self-sovereign financial system, not one dependent on fiat intermediaries. Algorithmic stablecoins are essential to that vision.
Treasury funds should not explicitly favor off-chain custodial assets over native, on-chain collateralized models that reflect the Constitution’s values of autonomy and decentralization.It would have been more balanced to allocate a percentage (e.g., 10–20%) of the stablecoin liquidity fund toward DJED, subject to transparent risk assessments.
This would strengthen liquidity diversity, demonstrate technological confidence, and ensure Cardano’s DeFi infrastructure remains resilient even if fiat-backed tokens face restrictions or blacklisting.Risks & Oversight
While the framework is well designed, success will depend on:
Professional liquidity management and transparent reporting.
Clear KPIs and yield/risk disclosures.
Continuous accountability of the committee to DReps and the wider community.
Prudent adherence to the Net Change Limit and Constitution’s fiscal prudence guardrails.
As a DRep, I will continue to monitor implementation closely to ensure:
Risk controls are enforced.
No single custodian or protocol gains undue advantage.
Reporting remains transparent and accessible to all ADA holders.
Conclusion
This proposal is a bold and necessary move for Cardano to strengthen its DeFi foundations and generate sustainable Treasury revenue. It is constitutional, fiscally sound, and growth-oriented.
However, I urge future revisions or follow-up proposals to integrate DJED and other algorithmic stablecoins, ensuring that Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem remains true to its decentralized DNA and not dependent solely on fiat bridges.Therefore, my vote is YES — with the expectation that the next phase will restore balance by recognizing the importance of algorithmic stablecoins like DJED to Cardano’s long-term sovereignty and resilience.
- AbstainChanged2M ₳Rationale
I'm changing my vote from NO to ABSTAIN.
This is done as a vote of confidence in the goodwill of the committee members, trusting that they recognise the importance of their role and will act in the best interest of the protocol rather than their personal interests.
Additionally, this decision was also influenced by the announcement by CF of their plan to invest an 8-figure amount in the same market.
With this in mind, the context changes considerably,
In the event this proposal does not pass, but CF still invests a considerable amount in the small market, the problem that I was trying to avoid by voting NO would still persist.
In this context, the two entities should be able to balance each other in the event of poor decisions. With this in mind, a YES vote is on the table, but I would need to receive some feedback from the people I'm representing before such a change.
Earlier votes
No11mo agoSuperseded
The proposal lacks any safeguards against the inevitable bias of the committee members, namely, a prohibition for committee members to hold tokens associated with protocols that will inevitably benefit from their decision-making.
I would also strongly discourage a UI on top of the smart contract, as it constitutes an important security issue (see ByBit hack via the Safe wallet UI), I would suggest a local cli tool to be used on an air-gapped machine.
If any of the committee members do not know how to use a cli tool, they are not qualified to manage such liquidity.
I will consider support once these issues are addressed.
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳Rationale
Support for the stablecoin liquidity budget has shifted now that there’s clear alignment between capital deployment and treasury growth. The plan no longer centers on simply holding stablecoins but on actively using them to generate yield that flows back into the treasury—enhancing both liquidity and long-term sustainability for Cardano.
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale